Files
nym/gateway/src/node/client_handling/websocket/connection_handler/fresh.rs
T
Jędrzej Stuczyński b2d77aedd3 added additional logs
2024-08-22 11:07:49 +01:00

826 lines
33 KiB
Rust

// Copyright 2021-2023 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
use crate::error::RequestHandlingError;
use futures::{
channel::{mpsc, oneshot},
SinkExt, StreamExt,
};
use nym_credentials_interface::AvailableBandwidth;
use nym_crypto::asymmetric::identity;
use nym_gateway_requests::authentication::encrypted_address::{
EncryptedAddressBytes, EncryptedAddressConversionError,
};
use nym_gateway_requests::registration::handshake::shared_key::SharedKeyConversionError;
use nym_gateway_requests::{
iv::{IVConversionError, IV},
registration::handshake::{error::HandshakeError, gateway_handshake, SharedKeys},
types::{ClientControlRequest, ServerResponse},
BinaryResponse, CURRENT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, INITIAL_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
};
use nym_mixnet_client::forwarder::MixForwardingSender;
use nym_sphinx::DestinationAddressBytes;
use rand::{CryptoRng, Rng};
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use std::time::Duration;
use thiserror::Error;
use tokio::io::{AsyncRead, AsyncWrite};
use tokio_tungstenite::tungstenite::{protocol::Message, Error as WsError};
use tracing::field::debug;
use tracing::*;
use crate::node::client_handling::websocket::common_state::CommonHandlerState;
use crate::node::client_handling::{
active_clients::ActiveClientsStore,
websocket::{
connection_handler::{
AuthenticatedHandler, ClientDetails, InitialAuthResult, SocketStream,
},
message_receiver::{IsActive, IsActiveRequestSender},
},
};
use nym_gateway_storage::{error::StorageError, Storage};
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub(crate) enum InitialAuthenticationError {
#[error("Internal gateway storage error")]
StorageError(#[from] StorageError),
#[error(
"our datastore is corrupted. the stored key for client {client_id} is malformed: {source}"
)]
MalformedStoredSharedKey {
client_id: String,
#[source]
source: SharedKeyConversionError,
},
#[error("Failed to perform registration handshake: {0}")]
HandshakeError(#[from] HandshakeError),
#[error("Provided client address is malformed: {0}")]
// sphinx error is not used here directly as its messaging might be confusing to people
MalformedClientAddress(String),
#[error("Provided encrypted client address is malformed: {0}")]
MalformedEncryptedAddress(#[from] EncryptedAddressConversionError),
#[error("There is already an open connection to this client")]
DuplicateConnection,
#[error("Provided authentication IV is malformed: {0}")]
MalformedIV(#[from] IVConversionError),
#[error("Only 'Register' or 'Authenticate' requests are allowed")]
InvalidRequest,
#[error("Experienced connection error: {0}")]
ConnectionError(#[from] WsError),
#[error("Attempted to negotiate connection with client using incompatible protocol version. Ours is {current} and the client reports {client:?}")]
IncompatibleProtocol { client: Option<u8>, current: u8 },
#[error("failed to send authentication error response: {source}")]
ErrorResponseSendFailure {
#[source]
source: WsError,
},
#[error("failed to send authentication response: {source}")]
ResponseSendFailure {
#[source]
source: WsError,
},
#[error("possibly received a sphinx packet without prior authentication. Request is going to be ignored")]
BinaryRequestWithoutAuthentication,
#[error("received a connection close message")]
CloseMessage,
#[error("the connection has unexpectedly closed")]
ClosedConnection,
#[error("failed to obtain message from websocket stream: {source}")]
FailedToReadMessage {
#[source]
source: WsError,
},
#[error("could not establish client details")]
EmptyClientDetails,
#[error("failed to upgrade the client handler: {source}")]
HandlerUpgradeFailure { source: RequestHandlingError },
}
impl InitialAuthenticationError {
/// Converts this Error into an appropriate websocket Message.
fn to_error_message(&self) -> Message {
ServerResponse::new_error(self.to_string()).into()
}
}
pub(crate) struct FreshHandler<R, S, St> {
rng: R,
pub(crate) shared_state: CommonHandlerState<St>,
pub(crate) active_clients_store: ActiveClientsStore,
pub(crate) outbound_mix_sender: MixForwardingSender,
pub(crate) socket_connection: SocketStream<S>,
pub(crate) peer_address: SocketAddr,
// currently unused (but populated)
pub(crate) negotiated_protocol: Option<u8>,
}
impl<R, S, St> FreshHandler<R, S, St>
where
R: Rng + CryptoRng,
St: Storage + Clone + 'static,
{
// for time being we assume handle is always constructed from raw socket.
// if we decide we want to change it, that's not too difficult
// also at this point I'm not entirely sure how to deal with this warning without
// some considerable refactoring
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
pub(crate) fn new(
rng: R,
conn: S,
outbound_mix_sender: MixForwardingSender,
active_clients_store: ActiveClientsStore,
shared_state: CommonHandlerState<St>,
peer_address: SocketAddr,
) -> Self {
FreshHandler {
rng,
active_clients_store,
outbound_mix_sender,
socket_connection: SocketStream::RawTcp(conn),
peer_address,
negotiated_protocol: None,
shared_state,
}
}
/// Attempts to perform websocket handshake with the remote and upgrades the raw TCP socket
/// to the framed WebSocket.
pub(crate) async fn perform_websocket_handshake(&mut self) -> Result<(), WsError>
where
S: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Unpin,
{
self.socket_connection =
match std::mem::replace(&mut self.socket_connection, SocketStream::Invalid) {
SocketStream::RawTcp(conn) => {
// TODO: perhaps in the future, rather than panic here (and uncleanly shut tcp stream)
// return a result with an error?
let ws_stream = tokio_tungstenite::accept_async(conn).await?;
SocketStream::UpgradedWebSocket(ws_stream)
}
other => other,
};
Ok(())
}
/// Using received `init_msg` tries to continue the registration handshake with the connected
/// client to establish shared keys.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `init_msg`: a client handshake init message which should contain its identity public key as well as an ephemeral key.
async fn perform_registration_handshake(
&mut self,
init_msg: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<SharedKeys, HandshakeError>
where
S: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send,
{
debug_assert!(self.socket_connection.is_websocket());
match &mut self.socket_connection {
SocketStream::UpgradedWebSocket(ws_stream) => {
gateway_handshake(
&mut self.rng,
ws_stream,
self.shared_state.local_identity.as_ref(),
init_msg,
)
.await
}
_ => unreachable!(),
}
}
/// Attempts to read websocket message from the associated socket.
pub(crate) async fn read_websocket_message(&mut self) -> Option<Result<Message, WsError>>
where
S: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Unpin,
{
match self.socket_connection {
SocketStream::UpgradedWebSocket(ref mut ws_stream) => ws_stream.next().await,
_ => panic!("impossible state - websocket handshake was somehow reverted"),
}
}
/// Attempts to write a single websocket message on the available socket.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `msg`: WebSocket message to write back to the client.
pub(crate) async fn send_websocket_message(&mut self, msg: Message) -> Result<(), WsError>
where
S: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Unpin,
{
match self.socket_connection {
// TODO: more closely investigate difference between `Sink::send` and `Sink::send_all`
// it got something to do with batching and flushing - it might be important if it
// turns out somehow we've got a bottleneck here
SocketStream::UpgradedWebSocket(ref mut ws_stream) => ws_stream.send(msg).await,
_ => panic!("impossible state - websocket handshake was somehow reverted"),
}
}
/// Sends unwrapped sphinx packets (payloads) back to the client. Note that each message is encrypted and tagged with
/// the previously derived shared keys.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `shared_keys`: keys derived between the client and gateway.
/// * `packets`: unwrapped packets that are to be pushed back to the client.
pub(crate) async fn push_packets_to_client(
&mut self,
shared_keys: &SharedKeys,
packets: Vec<Vec<u8>>,
) -> Result<(), WsError>
where
S: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Unpin,
{
// note: into_ws_message encrypts the requests and adds a MAC on it. Perhaps it should
// be more explicit in the naming?
let messages: Vec<Result<Message, WsError>> = packets
.into_iter()
.map(|received_message| {
Ok(BinaryResponse::new_pushed_mix_message(received_message)
.into_ws_message(shared_keys))
})
.collect();
let mut send_stream = futures::stream::iter(messages);
match self.socket_connection {
SocketStream::UpgradedWebSocket(ref mut ws_stream) => {
ws_stream.send_all(&mut send_stream).await
}
_ => panic!("impossible state - websocket handshake was somehow reverted"),
}
}
/// Attempts to extract clients identity key from the received registration handshake init message.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `init_data`: received init message that should contain, among other things, client's public key.
// Note: this is out of the scope of this PR, but in the future, this should be removed in favour
// of doing full parse of the init_data elsewhere
fn extract_remote_identity_from_register_init(
init_data: &[u8],
) -> Result<identity::PublicKey, InitialAuthenticationError> {
if init_data.len() < identity::PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH {
Err(InitialAuthenticationError::HandshakeError(
HandshakeError::MalformedRequest,
))
} else {
identity::PublicKey::from_bytes(&init_data[..identity::PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH]).map_err(
|_| InitialAuthenticationError::HandshakeError(HandshakeError::MalformedRequest),
)
}
}
/// Attempts to retrieve all messages currently stored in the persistent database to the client,
/// which was offline at the time of their receipt.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `client_address`: address of the client that is going to receive the messages.
/// * `shared_keys`: shared keys derived between the client and the gateway used to encrypt and tag the messages.
#[instrument(skip_all)]
async fn push_stored_messages_to_client(
&mut self,
client_address: DestinationAddressBytes,
shared_keys: &SharedKeys,
) -> Result<(), InitialAuthenticationError>
where
S: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Unpin,
{
debug!("attempting to push stored messages to client");
let mut start_next_after = None;
loop {
// retrieve some messages
let (messages, new_start_next_after) = self
.shared_state
.storage
.retrieve_messages(client_address, start_next_after)
.await?;
let (messages, ids) = messages
.into_iter()
.map(|msg| (msg.content, msg.id))
.unzip();
// push them to the client
if let Err(err) = self.push_packets_to_client(shared_keys, messages).await {
warn!("We failed to send stored messages to fresh client - {err}",);
return Err(InitialAuthenticationError::ConnectionError(err));
} else {
// if it was successful - remove them from the store
self.shared_state.storage.remove_messages(ids).await?;
}
// no more messages to grab
if new_start_next_after.is_none() {
break;
} else {
start_next_after = new_start_next_after
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Checks whether the stored shared keys match the received data, i.e. whether the upon decryption
/// the provided encrypted address matches the expected unencrypted address.
///
/// Returns the retrieved shared keys if the check was successful.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `client_address`: address of the client.
/// * `encrypted_address`: encrypted address of the client, presumably encrypted using the shared keys.
/// * `iv`: iv created for this particular encryption.
async fn verify_stored_shared_key(
&self,
client_address: DestinationAddressBytes,
encrypted_address: EncryptedAddressBytes,
iv: IV,
) -> Result<Option<SharedKeys>, InitialAuthenticationError> {
let shared_keys = self
.shared_state
.storage
.get_shared_keys(client_address)
.await?;
if let Some(shared_keys) = shared_keys {
// this should never fail as we only ever construct persisted shared keys ourselves when inserting
// data to the storage. The only way it could fail is if we somehow changed implementation without
// performing proper migration
let keys = SharedKeys::try_from_base58_string(
shared_keys.derived_aes128_ctr_blake3_hmac_keys_bs58,
)
.map_err(|source| {
InitialAuthenticationError::MalformedStoredSharedKey {
client_id: client_address.as_base58_string(),
source,
}
})?;
// TODO: SECURITY:
// this is actually what we have been doing in the past, however,
// after looking deeper into implementation it seems that only checks the encryption
// key part of the shared keys. the MAC key might still be wrong
// (though I don't see how could this happen unless client messed with himself
// and I don't think it could lead to any attacks, but somebody smarter should take a look)
if encrypted_address.verify(&client_address, &keys, &iv) {
Ok(Some(keys))
} else {
Ok(None)
}
} else {
Ok(None)
}
}
fn negotiate_client_protocol(
&self,
client_protocol: Option<u8>,
) -> Result<u8, InitialAuthenticationError> {
debug!("client protocol: {client_protocol:?}, ours: {CURRENT_PROTOCOL_VERSION}");
let Some(client_protocol_version) = client_protocol else {
warn!("the client we're connected to has not specified its protocol version. It's probably running version < 1.1.X, but that's still fine for now. It will become a hard error in 1.2.0");
// note: in +1.2.0 we will have to return a hard error here
return Ok(INITIAL_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
};
// a v2 gateway will understand v1 requests, but v1 client will not understand v2 responses
if client_protocol_version == 1 {
return Ok(1);
}
// we can't handle clients with higher protocol than ours
// (perhaps we could try to negotiate downgrade on our end? sounds like a nice future improvement)
if client_protocol_version <= CURRENT_PROTOCOL_VERSION {
info!("the client is using exactly the same (or older) protocol version as we are. We're good to continue!");
Ok(CURRENT_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
} else {
let err = InitialAuthenticationError::IncompatibleProtocol {
client: client_protocol,
current: CURRENT_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
};
error!("{err}");
Err(err)
}
}
/// Using the received challenge data, i.e. client's address as well the ciphertext of it plus
/// a fresh IV, attempts to authenticate the client by checking whether the ciphertext matches
/// the expected value if encrypted with the shared key.
///
/// Finally, upon completion, all previously stored messages are pushed back to the client.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `client_address`: address of the client wishing to authenticate.
/// * `encrypted_address`: ciphertext of the address of the client wishing to authenticate.
/// * `iv`: fresh IV received with the request.
async fn authenticate_client(
&mut self,
client_address: DestinationAddressBytes,
encrypted_address: EncryptedAddressBytes,
iv: IV,
) -> Result<Option<SharedKeys>, InitialAuthenticationError>
where
S: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Unpin,
{
debug!(
"Processing authenticate client request for: {}",
client_address.as_base58_string()
);
let shared_keys = self
.verify_stored_shared_key(client_address, encrypted_address, iv)
.await?;
if let Some(shared_keys) = shared_keys {
self.push_stored_messages_to_client(client_address, &shared_keys)
.await?;
Ok(Some(shared_keys))
} else {
Ok(None)
}
}
async fn handle_duplicate_client(
&mut self,
address: DestinationAddressBytes,
mut is_active_request_tx: IsActiveRequestSender,
) -> Result<(), InitialAuthenticationError> {
// Ask the other connection to ping if they are still active.
// Use a oneshot channel to return the result to us
let (ping_result_sender, ping_result_receiver) = oneshot::channel();
debug!("Asking other connection handler to ping the connected client to see if it is still active");
if let Err(err) = is_active_request_tx.send(ping_result_sender).await {
warn!("Failed to send ping request to other handler: {err}");
}
// Wait for the reply
match tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_millis(2000), ping_result_receiver).await {
Ok(Ok(res)) => {
match res {
IsActive::NotActive => {
// The other handler reported that the client is not active, so we can
// disconnect the other client and continue with this connection.
debug!("Other handler reports it is not active");
self.active_clients_store.disconnect(address);
}
IsActive::Active => {
// The other handled reported a positive reply, so we have to assume it's
// still active and disconnect this connection.
info!("Other handler reports it is active");
return Err(InitialAuthenticationError::DuplicateConnection);
}
IsActive::BusyPinging => {
// The other handler is already busy pinging the client, so we have to
// assume it's still active and disconnect this connection.
debug!("Other handler reports it is already busy pinging the client");
return Err(InitialAuthenticationError::DuplicateConnection);
}
}
}
Ok(Err(_)) => {
// Other channel failed to reply (the channel sender probably dropped)
info!("Other connection failed to reply, disconnecting it in favour of this new connection");
self.active_clients_store.disconnect(address);
}
Err(_) => {
// Timeout waiting for reply
warn!(
"Other connection timed out, disconnecting it in favour of this new connection"
);
self.active_clients_store.disconnect(address);
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Tries to handle the received authentication request by checking correctness of the received data.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `client_address`: address of the client wishing to authenticate.
/// * `encrypted_address`: ciphertext of the address of the client wishing to authenticate.
/// * `iv`: fresh IV received with the request.
#[instrument(skip_all)]
async fn handle_authenticate(
&mut self,
client_protocol_version: Option<u8>,
address: String,
enc_address: String,
iv: String,
) -> Result<InitialAuthResult, InitialAuthenticationError>
where
S: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Unpin,
{
debug("handling client authentication");
let negotiated_protocol = self.negotiate_client_protocol(client_protocol_version)?;
// populate the negotiated protocol for future uses
self.negotiated_protocol = Some(negotiated_protocol);
let address = DestinationAddressBytes::try_from_base58_string(address)
.map_err(|err| InitialAuthenticationError::MalformedClientAddress(err.to_string()))?;
let encrypted_address = EncryptedAddressBytes::try_from_base58_string(enc_address)?;
let iv = IV::try_from_base58_string(iv)?;
// Check for duplicate clients
if let Some(client_tx) = self.active_clients_store.get_remote_client(address) {
warn!("Detected duplicate connection for client: {address}");
self.handle_duplicate_client(address, client_tx.is_active_request_sender)
.await?;
}
let Some(shared_keys) = self
.authenticate_client(address, encrypted_address, iv)
.await?
else {
// it feels weird to be returning an 'Ok' here, but I didn't want to change the existing behaviour
return Ok(InitialAuthResult::new_failed(Some(negotiated_protocol)));
};
let client_id = self.shared_state.storage.get_client_id(address).await?;
let available_bandwidth: AvailableBandwidth = self
.shared_state
.storage
.get_available_bandwidth(client_id)
.await?
.map(From::from)
.unwrap_or_default();
let bandwidth_remaining = if available_bandwidth.expired() {
self.expire_bandwidth(client_id).await?;
0
} else {
available_bandwidth.bytes
};
Ok(InitialAuthResult::new(
Some(ClientDetails::new(client_id, address, shared_keys)),
ServerResponse::Authenticate {
protocol_version: Some(negotiated_protocol),
status: true,
bandwidth_remaining,
},
))
}
pub(crate) async fn expire_bandwidth(&self, client_id: i64) -> Result<(), StorageError> {
self.shared_state.storage.reset_bandwidth(client_id).await
}
/// Attempts to finalize registration of the client by storing the derived shared keys in the
/// persistent store as well as creating entry for its bandwidth allocation.
///
/// Finally, upon completion, all previously stored messages are pushed back to the client.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `client`: details (i.e. address and shared keys) of the registered client
async fn register_client(
&mut self,
client_address: DestinationAddressBytes,
client_shared_keys: &SharedKeys,
) -> Result<i64, InitialAuthenticationError>
where
S: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Unpin,
{
debug!(
"Processing register client request for: {}",
client_address.as_base58_string()
);
let client_id = self
.shared_state
.storage
.insert_new_client(client_address, client_shared_keys)
.await?;
self.push_stored_messages_to_client(client_address, client_shared_keys)
.await?;
Ok(client_id)
}
/// Tries to handle the received register request by checking attempting to complete registration
/// handshake using the received data.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `init_data`: init payload of the registration handshake.
#[instrument(skip_all)]
async fn handle_register(
&mut self,
client_protocol_version: Option<u8>,
init_data: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<InitialAuthResult, InitialAuthenticationError>
where
S: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send,
{
debug!("handling client registration");
let negotiated_protocol = self.negotiate_client_protocol(client_protocol_version)?;
// populate the negotiated protocol for future uses
self.negotiated_protocol = Some(negotiated_protocol);
let remote_identity = Self::extract_remote_identity_from_register_init(&init_data)?;
let remote_address = remote_identity.derive_destination_address();
if self.active_clients_store.is_active(remote_address) {
return Err(InitialAuthenticationError::DuplicateConnection);
}
let shared_keys = self.perform_registration_handshake(init_data).await?;
debug!("managed to derived shared keys");
let client_id = self.register_client(remote_address, &shared_keys).await?;
event!(Level::DEBUG, client_id, protocol = negotiated_protocol);
let client_details = ClientDetails::new(client_id, remote_address, shared_keys);
Ok(InitialAuthResult::new(
Some(client_details),
ServerResponse::Register {
protocol_version: Some(negotiated_protocol),
status: true,
},
))
}
/// Handles data that resembles request to either start registration handshake or perform
/// authentication.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `raw_request`: raw text request received from the websocket.
async fn handle_initial_authentication_request(
&mut self,
raw_request: String,
) -> Result<InitialAuthResult, InitialAuthenticationError>
where
S: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send,
{
if let Ok(request) = ClientControlRequest::try_from(raw_request) {
match request {
ClientControlRequest::Authenticate {
protocol_version,
address,
enc_address,
iv,
} => {
self.handle_authenticate(protocol_version, address, enc_address, iv)
.await
}
ClientControlRequest::RegisterHandshakeInitRequest {
protocol_version,
data,
} => self.handle_register(protocol_version, data).await,
// won't accept anything else (like bandwidth) without prior authentication
_ => Err(InitialAuthenticationError::InvalidRequest),
}
} else {
Err(InitialAuthenticationError::InvalidRequest)
}
}
/// Listens for only a subset of possible client requests, i.e. for those that can either
/// result in client getting registered or authenticated. All other requests, such as forwarding
/// sphinx packets considered an error and terminate the connection.
// TODO: somehow cleanup this method
pub(crate) async fn perform_initial_authentication(
mut self,
) -> Result<AuthenticatedHandler<R, S, St>, InitialAuthenticationError>
where
S: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send,
{
trace!("Started waiting for authenticate/register request...");
while let Some(msg) = self.read_websocket_message().await {
let msg = match msg {
Ok(msg) => msg,
Err(source) => {
debug!("failed to obtain message from websocket stream! stopping connection handler: {source}");
return Err(InitialAuthenticationError::FailedToReadMessage { source });
}
};
if msg.is_close() {
return Err(InitialAuthenticationError::CloseMessage);
}
// ONLY handle 'Authenticate' or 'Register' requests, ignore everything else
match msg {
// we have explicitly checked for close message
Message::Close(_) => unreachable!(),
Message::Text(text_msg) => {
let (mix_sender, mix_receiver) = mpsc::unbounded();
return match self.handle_initial_authentication_request(text_msg).await {
Err(err) => {
debug!("authentication failure: {err}");
// try to send error to the client
if let Err(source) =
self.send_websocket_message(err.to_error_message()).await
{
debug!("Failed to send authentication error response: {source}");
return Err(InitialAuthenticationError::ErrorResponseSendFailure {
source,
});
}
// return the underlying error
Err(err)
}
Ok(auth_result) => {
// try to send auth response back to the client
if let Err(source) = self
.send_websocket_message(auth_result.server_response.into())
.await
{
debug!("Failed to send authentication response: {source}");
return Err(InitialAuthenticationError::ResponseSendFailure {
source,
});
}
if let Some(client_details) = auth_result.client_details {
// Channel for handlers to ask other handlers if they are still active.
let (is_active_request_sender, is_active_request_receiver) =
mpsc::unbounded();
self.active_clients_store.insert_remote(
client_details.address,
mix_sender,
is_active_request_sender,
);
AuthenticatedHandler::upgrade(
self,
client_details,
mix_receiver,
is_active_request_receiver,
)
.await
.map_err(|source| {
InitialAuthenticationError::HandlerUpgradeFailure { source }
})
} else {
// honestly, it's been so long I don't remember under what conditions its possible (if at all)
// to have empty client details
Err(InitialAuthenticationError::EmptyClientDetails)
}
}
};
}
Message::Binary(_) => {
// perhaps logging level should be reduced here, let's leave it for now and see what happens
// if client is working correctly, this should have never happened
debug!("possibly received a sphinx packet without prior authentication. Request is going to be ignored");
if let Err(source) = self
.send_websocket_message(
ServerResponse::new_error(
"binary request without prior authentication",
)
.into(),
)
.await
{
return Err(InitialAuthenticationError::ErrorResponseSendFailure {
source,
});
}
return Err(InitialAuthenticationError::BinaryRequestWithoutAuthentication);
}
_ => continue,
};
}
Err(InitialAuthenticationError::ClosedConnection)
}
pub(crate) async fn start_handling(self, shutdown: nym_task::TaskClient)
where
S: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send,
{
super::handle_connection(self, shutdown).await
}
}