Jędrzej Stuczyński
827c13b69e
dont build netstack in CI additional rust 2024 fixes fixes removed temp.rs first round of cleanup removed duplicated NS types moved gateway probe to the monorepo
70 lines
3.1 KiB
Rust
70 lines
3.1 KiB
Rust
// Copyright 2021 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
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use nym_crypto::Aes256GcmSiv;
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use nym_crypto::aes::Aes128;
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use nym_crypto::blake3;
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use nym_crypto::ctr;
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type Aes128Ctr = ctr::Ctr64BE<Aes128>;
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// Re-export for ease of use
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pub use key_rotation::SphinxKeyRotation;
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pub use packet_sizes::PacketSize;
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pub use packet_types::PacketType;
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pub use packet_version::PacketVersion;
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pub mod key_rotation;
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pub mod packet_sizes;
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pub mod packet_types;
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pub mod packet_version;
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// TODO: not entirely sure how to feel about those being defined here, ideally it'd be where [`Fragment`]
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// is defined, but that'd introduce circular dependencies as the acknowledgements crate also needs
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// access to that
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pub const FRAG_ID_LEN: usize = 5;
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pub type SerializedFragmentIdentifier = [u8; FRAG_ID_LEN];
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// TODO: ask @AP about the choice of below algorithms
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/// Hashing algorithm used during hkdf for ephemeral shared key generation per sphinx packet payload.
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pub type PacketHkdfAlgorithm = blake3::Hasher;
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/// Hashing algorithm used during hkdf while establishing long-term shared key between client and gateway.
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pub type GatewaySharedKeyHkdfAlgorithm = blake3::Hasher;
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/// Hashing algorithm used when computing digest of a reply SURB encryption key.
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pub type ReplySurbKeyDigestAlgorithm = blake3::Hasher;
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/// Hashing algorithm used when computing integrity (H)Mac for message exchanged between client and gateway.
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// TODO: if updated, the pem type defined in gateway\gateway-requests\src\registration\handshake\legacy_shared_key
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// needs updating!
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pub type GatewayIntegrityHmacAlgorithm = blake3::Hasher;
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/// Encryption algorithm used for encrypting acknowledgement messages.
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// TODO: if updated:
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// - PacketSize::ACK_PACKET_SIZE needs to be manually updated (if nonce/iv size differs);
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// this requirement will eventually go away once const generics are stabilised (and generic_array and co. start using them)
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// - the pem type defined in nym\common\nymsphinx\acknowledgements\src\key needs updating!
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pub type AckEncryptionAlgorithm = Aes128Ctr;
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/// Legacy encryption algorithm used for end-to-end encryption of messages exchanged between clients
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/// and their gateways.
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// TODO: if updated, the pem type defined in gateway\gateway-requests\src\registration\handshake\legacy_shared_key
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// needs updating!
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pub type LegacyGatewayEncryptionAlgorithm = Aes128Ctr;
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/// Encryption algorithm used for end-to-end encryption of messages exchanged between clients
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/// and their gateways.
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// NOTE: if updated, the pem type defined in gateway\gateway-requests\src\registration\handshake\shared_key
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pub type GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm = Aes256GcmSiv;
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/// Encryption algorithm used for end-to-end encryption of messages exchanged between clients that are
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/// encapsulated inside sphinx packets.
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pub type PacketEncryptionAlgorithm = Aes128Ctr;
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/// Encryption algorithm used for end-to-end encryption of reply messages constructed using ReplySURBs.
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// TODO: I don't see any reason for it to be different than what is used for regular packets. Perhaps
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// it could be potentially insecure to use anything else?
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pub type ReplySurbEncryptionAlgorithm = PacketEncryptionAlgorithm;
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