Files
nym/common/authenticator-requests/src/v2/registration.rs
T
Jędrzej Stuczyński 6b2bb3029b feat: merge intermediate upgrade mode changes (#6174)
* squashing feat: merge intermediate upgrade mode changes #6174 to more easily resolve merge conflicts during rebasing

added additional v2 query for metadata endpoint for requesting upgrade mode recheck

added additional message to v6 authenticator to request explicit upgrade mode recheck

clippy

test fixes due to updated keys

updated assertion for upgrading v1 top up request to v2

compare attester public key against the expected value within the credential proxy

use pre-generated attestation public keys within nym-nodes

remove version deprecation

bugfix: default bandwidth response for authenticator

expose upgrade mode information in authenticator responses

adding tests for new v2 server

passing upgrade mode information in metadata endpoint

v2 wireguard private metadata

bugfix: make sure to immediately poll for attestation after spawning task

fix gateway probe and remove code duplication for finalizing registration

squashing before rebasing

post rebasing fixes

AuthenticatorVersion helpers

additional nits

allow unwraps in mocks

fixed linux build

clippy

integrating upgrade mode into authenticator

fixed build after adding wrappers to response types

conditionally updating peer handle bandwidth

cleanup

negotiate initial protocol during registration

change auth to use highest protocol

handler for JWT message

dont meter client bandwidth in upgrade mode

handling recheck requests

sending information about upgrade_mode on client messages

gateway watching for upgrade mode attestation

wip: gateways to disable bandwidth metering on upgrade mode

* fixed ServerResponse deserialisation

* fixed incorrect swagger path for upgrade mode check endpoint

* moved upgrade mode endpoint out of bandwidth routes

* chore: remove unused error variant

* removed re-export of UpgradeModeAttestation from credentials-interface

* chore: define single source of truth for minimum bandwidth threshold value

* moved type definitions out of traits.rs

* updated v6 versioning to point to niolo release instead

* fixed incorrect error mapping
2025-11-14 13:13:15 +00:00

223 lines
6.5 KiB
Rust

// Copyright 2023-2024 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
use crate::error::Error;
use base64::{Engine, engine::general_purpose};
use nym_credentials_interface::CredentialSpendingData;
use nym_wireguard_types::PeerPublicKey;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::net::IpAddr;
use std::time::SystemTime;
use std::{fmt, ops::Deref, str::FromStr};
#[cfg(feature = "verify")]
use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
#[cfg(feature = "verify")]
use nym_crypto::asymmetric::x25519::{PrivateKey, PublicKey};
#[cfg(feature = "verify")]
use sha2::Sha256;
pub type PendingRegistrations = HashMap<PeerPublicKey, RegistrationData>;
pub type PrivateIPs = HashMap<IpAddr, Taken>;
#[cfg(feature = "verify")]
pub type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
pub type Nonce = u64;
pub type Taken = Option<SystemTime>;
pub const BANDWIDTH_CAP_PER_DAY: u64 = 1024 * 1024 * 1024; // 1 GB
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct InitMessage {
/// Base64 encoded x25519 public key
pub pub_key: PeerPublicKey,
}
impl InitMessage {
pub fn new(pub_key: PeerPublicKey) -> Self {
InitMessage { pub_key }
}
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct FinalMessage {
/// Gateway client data
pub gateway_client: GatewayClient,
/// Ecash credential
pub credential: Option<CredentialSpendingData>,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct RegistrationData {
pub nonce: u64,
pub gateway_data: GatewayClient,
pub wg_port: u16,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct RegisteredData {
pub pub_key: PeerPublicKey,
pub private_ip: IpAddr,
pub wg_port: u16,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct RemainingBandwidthData {
pub available_bandwidth: i64,
}
/// Client that wants to register sends its PublicKey bytes mac digest encrypted with a DH shared secret.
/// Gateway/Nym node can then verify pub_key payload using the same process
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct GatewayClient {
/// Base64 encoded x25519 public key
pub pub_key: PeerPublicKey,
/// Assigned private IP
pub private_ip: IpAddr,
/// Sha256 hmac on the data (alongside the prior nonce)
pub mac: ClientMac,
}
impl GatewayClient {
#[cfg(feature = "verify")]
pub fn new(
local_secret: &PrivateKey,
remote_public: x25519_dalek::PublicKey,
private_ip: IpAddr,
nonce: u64,
) -> Self {
let local_public = PublicKey::from(local_secret);
let remote_public = PublicKey::from(remote_public);
let dh = local_secret.diffie_hellman(&remote_public);
// TODO: change that to use our nym_crypto::hmac module instead
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(&dh[..])
.expect("x25519 shared secret is always 32 bytes long");
mac.update(local_public.as_bytes());
mac.update(private_ip.to_string().as_bytes());
mac.update(&nonce.to_le_bytes());
GatewayClient {
pub_key: PeerPublicKey::new(local_public.into()),
private_ip,
mac: ClientMac(mac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec()),
}
}
// Reusable secret should be gateways Wireguard PK
// Client should perform this step when generating its payload, using its own WG PK
#[cfg(feature = "verify")]
pub fn verify(&self, gateway_key: &PrivateKey, nonce: u64) -> Result<(), Error> {
// use gateways key as a ref to an x25519_dalek key
let dh = gateway_key.inner().diffie_hellman(&self.pub_key);
// TODO: change that to use our nym_crypto::hmac module instead
#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(dh.as_bytes())
.expect("x25519 shared secret is always 32 bytes long");
mac.update(self.pub_key.as_bytes());
mac.update(self.private_ip.to_string().as_bytes());
mac.update(&nonce.to_le_bytes());
mac.verify_slice(&self.mac)
.map_err(|source| Error::FailedClientMacVerification {
client: self.pub_key.to_string(),
source,
})
}
pub fn pub_key(&self) -> PeerPublicKey {
self.pub_key
}
}
// TODO: change the inner type into generic array of size HmacSha256::OutputSize
// TODO2: rely on our internal crypto/hmac
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct ClientMac(Vec<u8>);
impl fmt::Display for ClientMac {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
write!(f, "{}", general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(&self.0))
}
}
impl ClientMac {
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn new(mac: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
ClientMac(mac)
}
}
impl Deref for ClientMac {
type Target = Vec<u8>;
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
&self.0
}
}
impl FromStr for ClientMac {
type Err = Error;
fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
let mac_bytes: Vec<u8> =
general_purpose::STANDARD
.decode(s)
.map_err(|source| Error::MalformedClientMac {
mac: s.to_string(),
source,
})?;
Ok(ClientMac(mac_bytes))
}
}
impl Serialize for ClientMac {
fn serialize<S: serde::Serializer>(&self, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error> {
let encoded_key = general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(self.0.clone());
serializer.serialize_str(&encoded_key)
}
}
impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for ClientMac {
fn deserialize<D: serde::Deserializer<'de>>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error> {
let encoded_key = String::deserialize(deserializer)?;
ClientMac::from_str(&encoded_key).map_err(serde::de::Error::custom)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use nym_crypto::asymmetric::x25519;
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "verify")]
fn client_request_roundtrip() {
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
let gateway_key_pair = x25519::KeyPair::new(&mut rng);
let client_key_pair = x25519::KeyPair::new(&mut rng);
let nonce = 1234567890;
let client = GatewayClient::new(
client_key_pair.private_key(),
x25519_dalek::PublicKey::from(gateway_key_pair.public_key().to_bytes()),
"10.0.0.42".parse().unwrap(),
nonce,
);
assert!(client.verify(gateway_key_pair.private_key(), nonce).is_ok())
}
}