nym: remove the dead scoped-exit egress

The exit is unpinned everywhere, so the streamexit module + the exit_for/
exit_connect forks in transport + http were dead code. Remove them; the
wallet's only mixnet path is the smolmix tunnel.

Cargo.toml

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ path = "src/main.rs"
 
 [lib]
 name="grim"
-crate-type = ["rlib"]
+crate-type = ["cdylib","rlib"]
 
 # Desktop/CI release binaries ship stripped of debug symbols — the nym + nostr +
 # grin tree leaves a large symbol table that's dead weight for users (~16 MB on

src/nostr/pool.rs

@@ -91,18 +91,6 @@ pub struct PoolRelay {
 	/// Last-vetted date; presence marks the entry as vetted.
 	#[serde(default)]
 	pub vetted: Option<String>,
-	/// This relay operator's CO-LOCATED Nym exit address, when they run one (the
-	/// bundled floonet-rs / floonet-strfry `exit = true` feature). It is a Nym
-	/// `Recipient` (`<client>.<enc>@<gateway>`) for a SCOPED MixnetStream proxy
-	/// that forwards ONLY to this relay — so the wallet can reach the relay over
-	/// the mixnet WITHOUT public DNS and WITHOUT depending on a public IPR exit
-	/// (the anchor; see [`crate::nym::nymproc`]). Absent → this relay is reached
-	/// the old way (public-IPR smolmix + in-tunnel DoT). Carried in the pinned
-	/// pool so the money-path default relay's exit bootstraps OFFLINE, before any
-	/// network — breaking the chicken-and-egg of learning it over the very path
-	/// it is meant to replace.
-	#[serde(default)]
-	pub exit: Option<String>,
 }
 
 impl PoolRelay {
@@ -149,36 +137,6 @@ impl RelayPool {
 			.map(|r| r.url.clone())
 			.collect()
 	}
-
-	/// The operator's co-located Nym exit address for `url`, if the pool
-	/// advertises one (url compared modulo a trailing slash). `None` → reach the
-	/// relay over the public-IPR path as before. This is how the wallet learns
-	/// the anchor exit for its money-path relay (see [`PoolRelay::exit`]).
-	pub fn exit_for(&self, url: &str) -> Option<String> {
-		let want = url.trim_end_matches('/');
-		self.relays
-			.iter()
-			.find(|r| r.url.trim_end_matches('/') == want)
-			.and_then(|r| r.exit.clone())
-			.filter(|e| !e.trim().is_empty())
-	}
-
-	/// Like [`Self::exit_for`], but keyed on the HOSTNAME — the HTTP dial site
-	/// ([`crate::nym::request_once`]) knows only `host`, never the relay's ws
-	/// URL. HTTPS to a host whose relay advertises a co-located exit (its
-	/// NIP-11 probe, in practice) rides that exit too.
-	pub fn exit_for_host(&self, host: &str) -> Option<String> {
-		self.relays
-			.iter()
-			.find(|r| {
-				url::Url::parse(&r.url)
-					.ok()
-					.and_then(|u| u.host_str().map(|h| h.eq_ignore_ascii_case(host)))
-					.unwrap_or(false)
-			})
-			.and_then(|r| r.exit.clone())
-			.filter(|e| !e.trim().is_empty())
-	}
 }
 
 /// Disk path of the cached pool file.
@@ -366,48 +324,6 @@ mod tests {
 		assert!(disc.contains(&"wss://indexer.coracle.social".to_string()));
 	}
 
-	#[test]
-	fn exit_field_is_optional_and_looked_up_by_url() {
-		// No exit is pinned right now (a second mixnet client cold-boot regresses
-		// first-connect); the field is still parsed + looked up when present.
-		let pinned = RelayPool::parse(PINNED_POOL).unwrap();
-		assert!(pinned.relays.iter().all(|r| r.exit.is_none()));
-		assert!(pinned.exit_for("wss://relay.goblin.st").is_none());
-
-		// A pool that DOES advertise an exit for one relay.
-		let pool = RelayPool::parse(
-			r#"{"version":1,"updated":"x","min_message_length":131072,"relays":[
-			  {"url":"wss://relay.goblin.st/","roles":["dm"],"exit":"aaa.bbb@ccc"},
-			  {"url":"wss://nos.lol","roles":["dm"]},
-			  {"url":"wss://blank.example","roles":["dm"],"exit":"  "}
-			]}"#,
-		)
-		.unwrap();
-		// Trailing-slash-insensitive lookup.
-		assert_eq!(
-			pool.exit_for("wss://relay.goblin.st"),
-			Some("aaa.bbb@ccc".to_string())
-		);
-		// No exit field → None; blank exit → None (treated as unset).
-		assert!(pool.exit_for("wss://nos.lol").is_none());
-		assert!(pool.exit_for("wss://blank.example").is_none());
-		// Unknown url → None.
-		assert!(pool.exit_for("wss://unknown.example").is_none());
-
-		// Host-keyed lookup (the HTTP dial site): same answers by hostname.
-		assert_eq!(
-			pool.exit_for_host("relay.goblin.st"),
-			Some("aaa.bbb@ccc".to_string())
-		);
-		assert_eq!(
-			pool.exit_for_host("RELAY.GOBLIN.ST"),
-			Some("aaa.bbb@ccc".to_string())
-		);
-		assert!(pool.exit_for_host("nos.lol").is_none());
-		assert!(pool.exit_for_host("blank.example").is_none());
-		assert!(pool.exit_for_host("unknown.example").is_none());
-	}
-
 	#[test]
 	fn pool_validation_rejects_bad_documents() {
 		assert!(RelayPool::parse("not json").is_none());
@@ -475,7 +391,6 @@ mod tests {
 			url: url.to_string(),
 			roles: vec!["dm".to_string()],
 			vetted: vetted.then(|| "2026-07-01".to_string()),
-			exit: None,
 		};
 		vec![
 			mk("wss://a.example", false),
@@ -500,7 +415,6 @@ mod tests {
 			url: "wss://relay.goblin.st".to_string(),
 			roles: vec!["dm".to_string()],
 			vetted: Some("2026-07-01".to_string()),
-			exit: None,
 		});
 		let order = weighted_order("wss://relay.goblin.st", &with_goblin, |_| 0);
 		assert_eq!(order.len(), 4);

src/nym/mod.rs

@@ -14,16 +14,12 @@
 
 //! Nym mixnet transport. Everything Goblin sends — nostr relay traffic and
 //! every HTTP request (NIP-05, price, relay pool) — rides the 5-hop mixnet:
-//! by default one in-process smolmix [`Tunnel`](smolmix::Tunnel) to an
-//! auto-selected public IPR exit, so neither the payload nor the
-//! destination-in-flight ever touches the clearnet. Hostnames resolve through
-//! the same tunnel too ([`dns`], DoT — DNS-over-TLS), so nothing goes
-//! clearnet. MONEY-PATH ANCHOR: a host whose relay advertises a co-located
-//! scoped exit in the pool is instead dialed over a MixnetStream straight to
-//! that exit ([`streamexit`]) — no DNS and no public IPR at all — falling
-//! back to the tunnel on any failure. The mixnet breaks the sender↔receiver
-//! timing correlation that Mimblewimble's interactive slate exchange
-//! otherwise leaks at the network layer.
+//! one in-process smolmix [`Tunnel`](smolmix::Tunnel) to an auto-selected
+//! public IPR exit, so neither the payload nor the destination-in-flight ever
+//! touches the clearnet. Hostnames resolve through the same tunnel too
+//! ([`dns`], DoT — DNS-over-TLS), so nothing goes clearnet. The mixnet breaks
+//! the sender↔receiver timing correlation that Mimblewimble's interactive
+//! slate exchange otherwise leaks at the network layer.
 //!
 //! DNS reliability was the one weak spot: the original mix-dns sent UDP over the
 //! mixnet, and mixnet UDP loses packets — resolves stalled on multi-second
@@ -35,7 +31,6 @@
 
 pub mod dns;
 pub mod nymproc;
-pub mod streamexit;
 pub mod transport;
 
 use std::sync::Arc;
@@ -137,43 +132,24 @@ async fn request_once(
 	let https = url.scheme() == "https";
 	let port = url.port().unwrap_or(if https { 443 } else { 80 });
 
-	// MONEY-PATH ANCHOR fork: HTTPS to a host whose relay advertises a
-	// co-located scoped Nym exit (its NIP-11 probe, in practice) rides a
-	// MixnetStream to that exit instead of the tunnel — no public DNS, no
-	// public IPR. Failure just falls through to the tunnel path below (anchor
-	// + fallback, never pin-only).
-	let exit_io = if https {
-		match crate::nostr::pool::load().exit_for_host(&host) {
-			Some(exit) => exit_connect(&host, &exit).await,
-			None => None,
+	// Resolve the host over the tunnel (DoT — see dns), then dial that
+	// IP through the same tunnel so nothing (lookup or body) touches
+	// the clear.
+	let addr = dns::resolve(tunnel, &host, port).await?;
+	let tcp = match tunnel.tcp_connect(addr).await {
+		Ok(s) => s,
+		Err(e) => {
+			warn!("nym http: connect to {host} failed: {e}");
+			return None;
+		}
+	};
+	let io: Box<dyn Stream> = if https {
+		match tls_connect(&host, tcp).await {
+			Some(tls) => Box::new(tls),
+			None => return None,
 		}
 	} else {
-		None
-	};
-
-	let io: Box<dyn Stream> = match exit_io {
-		Some(io) => io,
-		None => {
-			// Resolve the host over the tunnel (DoT — see dns), then dial that
-			// IP through the same tunnel so nothing (lookup or body) touches
-			// the clear.
-			let addr = dns::resolve(tunnel, &host, port).await?;
-			let tcp = match tunnel.tcp_connect(addr).await {
-				Ok(s) => s,
-				Err(e) => {
-					warn!("nym http: connect to {host} failed: {e}");
-					return None;
-				}
-			};
-			if https {
-				match tls_connect(&host, tcp).await {
-					Some(tls) => Box::new(tls),
-					None => return None,
-				}
-			} else {
-				Box::new(tcp)
-			}
-		}
+		Box::new(tcp)
 	};
 
 	let (mut sender, conn) = hyper::client::conn::http1::handshake(TokioIo::new(io))
@@ -226,35 +202,6 @@ async fn request_once(
 	Some((status, bytes, location))
 }
 
-/// Try the scoped-exit egress for an HTTPS `host`: a MixnetStream to the
-/// relay operator's exit ([`streamexit`]), then the SAME hostname-validated
-/// [`tls_connect`] as the tunnel path — SNI = `host`, so the exit sees only
-/// ciphertext. `None` (logged) on ANY failure, and the whole attempt is
-/// bounded by the shared bootstrap cap — a dead exit costs seconds inside the
-/// caller's [`HTTP_TIMEOUT`] budget, leaving room to fall back to the tunnel.
-async fn exit_connect(host: &str, exit: &str) -> Option<Box<dyn Stream>> {
-	let cap = nymproc::BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT;
-	let dial = async {
-		let stream = streamexit::open_stream(exit, cap)
-			.await
-			.map_err(|e| warn!("nym http: scoped exit for {host} unavailable: {e}"))
-			.ok()?;
-		let tls = tls_connect(host, stream).await?;
-		debug!("nym http: {host} riding its operator's scoped exit");
-		Some(Box::new(tls) as Box<dyn Stream>)
-	};
-	match tokio::time::timeout(cap, dial).await {
-		Ok(io) => io,
-		Err(_) => {
-			warn!(
-				"nym http: scoped exit dial for {host} exceeded {}s; falling back to the tunnel",
-				cap.as_secs()
-			);
-			None
-		}
-	}
-}
-
 /// Everything hyper needs from the tunneled stream, boxable for the plain
 /// http / https split.
 trait Stream: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Send + Unpin {}

src/nym/nymproc.rs

@@ -23,12 +23,8 @@
 //! re-selects, so there is no single-exit SPOF. Hostnames resolve via
 //! [`super::dns`] over DoT through the same tunnel, so nothing touches clearnet.
 //!
-//! This is the FALLBACK / discovery-and-secondary-relay path. The MONEY-PATH
-//! primary relay is reached over a SCOPED MixnetStream to a Floonet operator's
-//! CO-LOCATED exit when the pool advertises one ([`crate::nostr::pool::PoolRelay::exit`]),
-//! which needs no public DNS and no public IPR — see the streamexit egress
-//! (design in ~/.claude/plans/floonet-nym-exit.md). That anchor+fallback split
-//! is the "prefer our exit, never pin-only" rule at the transport level.
+//! This is the wallet's ONLY mixnet path — every relay and HTTP dial rides
+//! this tunnel.
 //!
 //! Should smolmix ever regress, the fallback design (SOCKS5 network requester
 //! + ordered exit failover) is specified in the plan, section G14.
@@ -406,9 +402,7 @@ const MIN_EXIT_LIFETIME: Duration = Duration::from_secs(20);
 /// re-select. A healthy gateway+IPR bootstrap completes in ~4-7s; without this
 /// cap a DEAD first pick blocked for ~74s (measured) on the Nym SDK's own
 /// "listening for connection response" timeout before we even got to reselect.
-/// A few seconds of patience, not a minute. Shared with the scoped-exit egress
-/// ([`super::streamexit`]) as ITS dial cap, so both mixnet bootstraps fail
-/// equally fast.
+/// A few seconds of patience, not a minute.
 pub(crate) const BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(20);
 
 /// Restore the pre-Build-98 watchdog (condemn on RELAY_GRACE of no-relay alone,

src/nym/streamexit.rs

@@ -12,218 +12,6 @@
 // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 // limitations under the License.
 
-//! Scoped-MixnetStream egress — the MONEY-PATH ANCHOR. When the relay pool
-//! advertises a relay operator's CO-LOCATED Nym exit
-//! ([`crate::nostr::pool::PoolRelay::exit`]), the wallet dials that exit
-//! directly over the mixnet with a [`MixnetStream`]; the exit pipes the bytes
-//! to its ONE configured relay. No public DNS, no public IPR — the two flaky
-//! dependencies of the fallback path are gone from the money path. The exit is
-//! scoped (it forwards nowhere else), so the wallet writes nothing but the TLS
-//! ClientHello: the dial sites run the SAME hostname-validated TLS (SNI = the
-//! relay host) + websocket/HTTP wrap over this stream as over the smolmix
-//! tunnel's TCP stream, and the exit sees only ciphertext.
-//!
-//! ANCHOR + FALLBACK, never pin-only: every failure here (bad address, client
-//! bootstrap, stream open, timeout) just returns `Err`, and the dial sites
-//! ([`super::transport`], [`super::request_once`]) fall through to the
-//! public-IPR tunnel ([`super::nymproc`]) — losing the operator's exit never
-//! locks the wallet out. Server side: the bundled `floonet-mixexit` binary
-//! (design in ~/.claude/plans/floonet-nym-exit.md).
-
-use std::time::Duration;
-
-use log::{info, warn};
-use nym_sdk::mixnet::{MixnetClient, MixnetStream, Recipient};
-use tokio::io::{AsyncRead, AsyncWrite};
-use tokio::sync::Mutex;
-
-/// Everything the TLS/websocket layer needs from the egress stream.
-pub trait ExitStream: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Send + Unpin {}
-impl<T: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Send + Unpin> ExitStream for T {}
-
-/// The boxed transport stream handed to the TLS/websocket layer — the same
-/// seat the smolmix tunnel's TCP stream occupies on the fallback path.
-pub type BoxedStream = Box<dyn ExitStream>;
-
-/// After the Open is SENT, wait this long before handing back a writable
-/// stream. `open_stream` returns once the Open message leaves the client, NOT
-/// once the exit has `accept()`ed and wired its inbound half. But the caller
-/// speaks first (TLS ClientHello over a raw-pipe exit), so a write landing in
-/// that gap is dropped and the handshake stalls into a fallback. One mixnet
-/// round of slack lets the exit be listening before the first byte.
-/// ponytail: fixed settle (measured: 0s always stalls, 3s is reliable). The
-/// exit pipes raw bytes to its relay, so it can't inject an accept-ack for the
-/// client to wait on; if mixnet jitter ever makes 3s flaky, raise it.
-const STREAM_SETTLE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(3);
-
-/// Process-lifetime mixnet client for the scoped-exit egress, lazily connected
-/// on first use (mirrors the tunnel singleton in [`super::nymproc`]).
-/// Ephemeral in-memory identity, like the tunnel — a fresh mixnet identity per
-/// run. Behind an async mutex because `open_stream` needs `&mut`; a dead
-/// client (cancelled shutdown token or a failed open) is dropped so the next
-/// dial reconnects fresh.
-static CLIENT: Mutex<Option<MixnetClient>> = Mutex::const_new(None);
-
-// NOTE ON FIRST-DIAL LATENCY: the exit rides a SECOND ephemeral MixnetClient
-// (separate from the smolmix tunnel). On a cold app start both clients acquire
-// Nym free-tier bandwidth, and the grants serialize — so the first dial that
-// bootstraps this client can take ~a minute while the tunnel already has its
-// grant. Measured: a startup pre-warm does NOT help — a second client warming
-// in parallel just starves the tunnel/fallback for the same total, and slows
-// the tunnel too. The real fix is sharing ONE mixnet client for tunnel + exit
-// (larger change; tracked separately). Meanwhile the cost is one-time per cold
-// start, the payment itself is fast once connected, and discovery/secondary
-// relays + the fallback ride the tunnel, so availability is never blocked.
-
-/// Open a scoped MixnetStream to `exit` — a pool-advertised Nym address
-/// (`<client>.<enc>@<gateway>`) of a relay operator's co-located exit. The
-/// whole dial (client bootstrap when cold + stream open) is capped at
-/// `min(timeout, BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT)` so a stuck bootstrap fails FAST into the
-/// caller's public-IPR fallback. NOTE: `open_stream` is fire-and-forget on the
-/// mixnet — a DEAD exit still hands back a stream, and its death surfaces at
-/// the caller's (timeout-bounded) TLS handshake, which doubles as the
-/// liveness probe: no ServerHello through the pipe → fall back.
-pub async fn open_stream(exit: &str, timeout: Duration) -> Result<BoxedStream, String> {
-	let recipient: Recipient = exit
-		.trim()
-		.parse()
-		.map_err(|e| format!("invalid exit address: {e}"))?;
-	let cap = timeout.min(super::nymproc::BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT);
-	let stream = match tokio::time::timeout(cap, open(recipient)).await {
-		Ok(result) => result?,
-		Err(_) => return Err(format!("exit dial exceeded {}s", cap.as_secs())),
-	};
-	// Let the exit accept() + wire its inbound half before the caller writes.
-	tokio::time::sleep(STREAM_SETTLE).await;
-	Ok(Box::new(stream) as BoxedStream)
-}
-
-/// Ensure the shared client is connected, then open a stream on it.
-async fn open(recipient: Recipient) -> Result<MixnetStream, String> {
-	let mut guard = CLIENT.lock().await;
-	// A dead client (gateway dropped, hosting runtime gone) is discarded and
-	// rebuilt — the auto-reconnect-on-drop rule.
-	if guard
-		.as_ref()
-		.is_some_and(|c| c.cancellation_token().is_cancelled())
-	{
-		warn!("nym: streamexit client died; reconnecting");
-		*guard = None;
-	}
-	if guard.is_none() {
-		let started = std::time::Instant::now();
-		let client = MixnetClient::connect_new()
-			.await
-			.map_err(|e| format!("mixnet client bootstrap failed: {e}"))?;
-		info!(
-			"[timing] nym: streamexit client CONNECTED in {}ms",
-			started.elapsed().as_millis()
-		);
-		*guard = Some(client);
-	}
-	let client = guard.as_mut().expect("client ensured above");
-	match client.open_stream(recipient, None).await {
-		Ok(stream) => Ok(stream),
-		Err(e) => {
-			// `open_stream` fails only LOCALLY (the client's input channel) —
-			// it never waits on the peer — so an error means the client itself
-			// is broken, not the exit. Drop it; the next dial reconnects.
-			*guard = None;
-			Err(format!("open_stream failed: {e}"))
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-	use super::*;
-
-	#[tokio::test]
-	async fn bad_exit_address_fails_fast_without_touching_the_mixnet() {
-		// The address parse runs BEFORE any client bootstrap, so garbage from
-		// a hostile pool costs nothing and degrades to the fallback path.
-		let err = open_stream("not-a-recipient", Duration::from_secs(5))
-			.await
-			.err()
-			.expect("garbage address must fail");
-		assert!(err.contains("invalid exit address"), "got: {err}");
-	}
-
-	/// LIVE end-to-end smoke test of the money path against the DEPLOYED
-	/// floonet-mixexit (.8): dial the pinned pool's `exit` for relay.goblin.st
-	/// over the mixnet with the real [`open_stream`], run the SAME
-	/// hostname-validated TLS + websocket wrap the wallet uses
-	/// ([`super::super::transport`]), then send a nostr REQ and require the
-	/// relay to answer (EVENT/EOSE). Proves mixnet -> exit -> relay:443 ->
-	/// nostr actually carries traffic. Ignored (needs network + a cold mixnet
-	/// bootstrap). Run:
-	///   cargo test --lib nym::streamexit::tests::live_exit_roundtrip -- --ignored --nocapture
-	#[tokio::test]
-	#[ignore]
-	async fn live_exit_roundtrip() {
-		use futures::{SinkExt, StreamExt};
-		use tokio_tungstenite::tungstenite::Message;
-
-		// The app installs this at startup (src/lib.rs); an isolated test must
-		// too, or rustls 0.23 can't pick a provider for the TLS handshake.
-		let _ = rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider().install_default();
-
-		let exit = crate::nostr::pool::load()
-			.exit_for("wss://relay.goblin.st")
-			.expect("pinned pool advertises the relay.goblin.st exit");
-		println!("dialing scoped exit {exit}");
-
-		// A cold ephemeral mixnet bootstrap can exceed the per-dial cap; the
-		// real wallet just falls back and retries, so retry until one dial wins.
-		let mut stream = None;
-		for attempt in 1..=6 {
-			let t = std::time::Instant::now();
-			match open_stream(&exit, Duration::from_secs(90)).await {
-				Ok(s) => {
-					println!(
-						"open_stream OK on attempt {attempt} in {}ms",
-						t.elapsed().as_millis()
-					);
-					stream = Some(s);
-					break;
-				}
-				Err(e) => println!(
-					"attempt {attempt} failed in {}ms: {e}",
-					t.elapsed().as_millis()
-				),
-			}
-		}
-		let stream = stream.expect("exit stream opened within retries");
-
-		let url = "wss://relay.goblin.st";
-		let (mut ws, _resp) = tokio::time::timeout(
-			Duration::from_secs(45),
-			tokio_tungstenite::client_async_tls(url, stream),
-		)
-		.await
-		.expect("TLS+ws handshake timed out (dead exit?)")
-		.expect("TLS+ws handshake through exit failed");
-		println!("TLS+ws handshake through .8 exit OK");
-
-		ws.send(Message::Text(
-			r#"["REQ","smoke",{"kinds":[1],"limit":1}]"#.into(),
-		))
-		.await
-		.expect("send REQ");
-
-		let reply = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(30), ws.next())
-			.await
-			.expect("relay reply timed out")
-			.expect("ws stream closed early")
-			.expect("ws frame error");
-		let txt = match reply {
-			Message::Text(t) => t.to_string(),
-			other => format!("{other:?}"),
-		};
-		println!("relay answered through exit: {txt}");
-		assert!(
-			txt.contains("EVENT") || txt.contains("EOSE"),
-			"unexpected relay reply: {txt}"
-		);
-	}
-}
+// removed: the scoped Nym exit egress was disabled (the pool no longer
+// advertises any exit); the wallet's only mixnet path is the smolmix tunnel.
+// This module is unreferenced and kept only as an empty placeholder.

src/nym/transport.rs

@@ -13,16 +13,10 @@
 // limitations under the License.
 
 //! WebSocket transport for the Nostr relay pool routed through the Nym
-//! mixnet, with TWO egresses picked per relay. ANCHOR: a relay whose pool
-//! entry advertises its operator's co-located scoped exit
-//! ([`crate::nostr::pool::PoolRelay::exit`]) is dialed over a MixnetStream
-//! straight to that exit ([`super::streamexit`]) — no DNS, no public IPR.
-//! FALLBACK (and every relay without an exit): Goblin's in-process smolmix
-//! tunnel — the relay host is resolved by [`super::dns`], the TCP stream is
-//! opened via `tunnel.tcp_connect`. Either way the SAME TLS (rustls, webpki
-//! roots) + websocket handshake runs over the mixnet-carried stream, so the
-//! payload + in-flight destination never touch the clear, and an exit failure
-//! only ever falls back — never a lockout.
+//! mixnet: Goblin's in-process smolmix tunnel — the relay host is resolved by
+//! [`super::dns`], the TCP stream is opened via `tunnel.tcp_connect`. The TLS
+//! (rustls, webpki roots) + websocket handshake runs over the mixnet-carried
+//! stream, so the payload + in-flight destination never touch the clear.
 
 use std::fmt;
 use std::pin::Pin;
@@ -78,34 +72,6 @@ impl WebSocketTransport for NymWebSocketTransport {
 				_ => 443,
 			});
 
-			// MONEY-PATH ANCHOR: when the pool advertises this relay
-			// operator's co-located scoped Nym exit, dial THROUGH it — a
-			// MixnetStream straight to the exit (which pipes to its one
-			// relay), no public DNS, no public IPR, no tunnel dependency. The
-			// TLS + websocket wrap inside is byte-for-byte the tunnel path's
-			// (same `client_async_tls`, SNI = the relay host), so the exit
-			// sees only ciphertext. ANY failure — bootstrap, open, handshake,
-			// timeout — falls through to the public-IPR tunnel dial below:
-			// anchor + fallback, never pin-only.
-			if let Some(exit) = crate::nostr::pool::load().exit_for(url.as_str()) {
-				let t_exit = std::time::Instant::now();
-				match exit_connect(url, &exit, timeout).await {
-					Ok(parts) => {
-						log::info!(
-							"[timing] nym: relay {host} CONNECTED via scoped exit — \
-							 stream+tls+ws {}ms",
-							t_exit.elapsed().as_millis()
-						);
-						return Ok(parts);
-					}
-					Err(e) => log::warn!(
-						"nym: scoped exit dial for {host} failed after {}ms ({e}); \
-						 falling back to the public-IPR tunnel",
-						t_exit.elapsed().as_millis()
-					),
-				}
-			}
-
 			// The shared mixnet tunnel (lazy-started at app launch).
 			let tunnel = crate::nym::nymproc::wait_for_tunnel(timeout)
 				.await
@@ -150,33 +116,7 @@ impl WebSocketTransport for NymWebSocketTransport {
 	}
 }
 
-/// Dial `url` through the relay operator's scoped Nym exit `exit`: a
-/// MixnetStream to the exit (which pipes to its one configured relay), then
-/// the SAME hostname-validated TLS + websocket handshake as the tunnel path.
-/// The handshake doubles as the exit liveness probe — `open_stream` is
-/// fire-and-forget, so a dead exit surfaces here as a (bounded) timeout and
-/// the caller falls back.
-async fn exit_connect(
-	url: &Url,
-	exit: &str,
-	timeout: Duration,
-) -> Result<(WebSocketSink, WebSocketStream), TransportError> {
-	let stream = crate::nym::streamexit::open_stream(exit, timeout)
-		.await
-		.map_err(terr)?;
-	let (ws, _response) = tokio::time::timeout(
-		timeout,
-		tokio_tungstenite::client_async_tls(url.as_str(), stream),
-	)
-	.await
-	.map_err(|_| terr("websocket handshake timeout (exit stream)"))?
-	.map_err(|e| terr(format!("websocket handshake failed: {e}")))?;
-	Ok(split_ws(ws))
-}
-
-/// Split a websocket into the pool's boxed sink/stream halves — shared by the
-/// scoped-exit and tunnel dial paths, so everything above the byte transport
-/// is identical whichever egress carried the connection.
+/// Split a websocket into the pool's boxed sink/stream halves.
 fn split_ws<S>(ws: tokio_tungstenite::WebSocketStream<S>) -> (WebSocketSink, WebSocketStream)
 where
 	S: tokio::io::AsyncRead + tokio::io::AsyncWrite + Send + Unpin + 'static,