misc
This commit is contained in:
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ The mixnet is made up of nodes running in several different roles:
|
||||
* **Gateways** act as message storage for clients which may go offline and come back online again, and (once zk-nyms are enabled) check for anonymous proof of access credentials. They represent the first and last hop Mixnet packets travel through when travelling between clients.
|
||||
* **Services** are applications that communicate with nym clients, listening and sending traffic to the mixnet. This is an umbrella term for a variety of different pieces of code, such as the Network Requester.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Clients** are used to connect to and send messages through the Mixnet to other clients, utilising Gateways for ingress and egress. These are however on the 'user' side and not a Mixnet component per se.
|
||||
> **Clients** are used to connect to and send messages through the Mixnet to other clients, utilising Gateways for ingress and exit. These are however on the 'user' side and not a Mixnet component per se.
|
||||
|
||||
## Smoosh Status
|
||||
The various Mixnet components were originally completely separate binaries. They are in the process of being 'smooshed' together into a single `nym-node` binary which runs in different modes for ease of use, as well as to allow for a more developed and responsive Mixnet design, where the role of a node in a given time period is decided and changed automatically based on network conditions (more on this in the future).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Network Rewards
|
||||
|
||||
Node operator and delegator rewards are determined according to the principles laid out in the section 6 of [Nym Whitepaper](https://nymtech.net/nym-whitepaper.pdf).
|
||||
|
||||
Below is a TLDR of the variables and formulas involved in calculating these rewards per epoch. The initial reward pool contains 250 million NYM, leaving a circulating supply of 750 million NYM.
|
||||
|
||||
TODO FIX
|
||||
|
||||
|Symbol|Definition|
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
|<img src="https://render.githubusercontent.com/render/math?math=R"></img>|global share of rewards available, starts at 2% of the reward pool.
|
||||
|<img src="https://render.githubusercontent.com/render/math?math=R_{i}"></img>|node reward for mixnode `i`.
|
||||
|<img src="https://render.githubusercontent.com/render/math?math=\sigma_{i}"></img>|ratio of total node stake (node bond + all delegations) to the token circulating supply.
|
||||
|<img src="https://render.githubusercontent.com/render/math?math=\lambda_{i}"></img>|ratio of stake operator has pledged to their node to the token circulating supply.
|
||||
|<img src="https://render.githubusercontent.com/render/math?math=\omega_{i}"></img>|fraction of total effort undertaken by node `i`.
|
||||
|<img src="https://render.githubusercontent.com/render/math?math=k"></img>|number of nodes stakeholders are incentivised to create, set by the validators, a matter of governance. Currently determined by the reward set size.
|
||||
|<img src="https://render.githubusercontent.com/render/math?math=\alpha"></img>|Sybil attack resistance parameter - the higher this parameter is set the stronger the reduction in competitivness gets for a Sybil attacker.
|
||||
|<img src="https://render.githubusercontent.com/render/math?math=PM_{i}"></img>|declared profit margin of operator `i`.
|
||||
|<img src="https://render.githubusercontent.com/render/math?math=PF_{i}"></img>|uptime of node `i`, scaled to 0 - 1, for the rewarding epoch
|
||||
|<img src="https://render.githubusercontent.com/render/math?math=PP_{i}"></img>|cost of operating node `i` for the duration of the rewarding eopoch.
|
||||
|
||||
Node reward for node `i` is determined as:
|
||||
|
||||
<img src="https://render.githubusercontent.com/render/math?math=R_{i}=PF_{i} \cdot R \cdot (\sigma^'_{i} \cdot \omega_{i} \cdot k %2b \alpha \cdot \lambda^'_{i} \cdot \sigma^'_{i} \cdot k)/(1 %2b \alpha)"></img>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
where:
|
||||
|
||||
<img src="https://render.githubusercontent.com/render/math?math=\sigma^'_{i} = min\{\sigma_{i}, 1/k\}"></img>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
and
|
||||
|
||||
<img src="https://render.githubusercontent.com/render/math?math=\lambda^'_{i} = min\{\lambda_{i}, 1/k\}"></img>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Operator of node `i` is credited with the following amount:
|
||||
|
||||
<img src="https://render.githubusercontent.com/render/math?math=min\{PP_{i},R_{i}\} %2b max\{0, (PM_{i} %2b (1 - PM_{i}) \cdot \lambda_{i}/\delta_{i}) \cdot (R_{i} - PP_{i})\}"></img>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Delegate with stake `s` recieves:
|
||||
|
||||
<img src="https://render.githubusercontent.com/render/math?math=max\{0, (1-PM_{i}) \cdot (s^'/\sigma_{i}) \cdot (R_{i} - PP_{i})\}"></img>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
where `s'` is stake `s` scaled over total token circulating supply.
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user