vocabulary change over all ecash docs
This commit is contained in:
mfahampshire
@@ -32,8 +32,8 @@
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- [Ledger Live Support](nyx/ledger-live.md)
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# zkNyms (prev. Coconut)
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- [What are zkNyms?](ecash/what-are-zknyms.md)
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- [zkNym Generation & Useage: Overview](ecash/zknym-overview.md)
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- [What are zk-nyms?](ecash/what-are-zknyms.md)
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- [zk-nym Generation & Useage: Overview](ecash/zknym-overview.md)
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- [Feature: Unlinkability](ecash/unlinkability.md)
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- [Feature: Double Spend Protection](ecash/double-spend-prot.md)
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- [Feature: Rerandomisation & Incremental Spend](ecash/rerandomise.md)
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@@ -1,8 +1,13 @@
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# Bandwidth Credentials
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```admonish caution
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This page is now archived.
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For up-to-date example interaction with zk-nyms navigate to the [zk-nym unlinkability](./unlinkability.md) page.
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```
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You can now try using Nym Bandwidth Credentials in our [Sandbox testnet environment](https://sandbox-explorer.nymtech.net).
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Create a `sandbox.env` file with the following details:
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Create a `sandbox.env` file with the following details:
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```
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CONFIGURED=true
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@@ -32,17 +37,17 @@ NYXD="https://rpc.sandbox.nymtech.net"
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NYM_API="https://sandbox-validator1-api.nymtech.net/api"
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```
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Create an account on Sandbox using the nym-cli:
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Create an account on Sandbox using the nym-cli:
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```./nym-cli --config-env-file <path-to>sandbox.env account create```
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You will need `nymt` funds sent to this account. Get in touch via Nym [Telegram](https://t.me/nymchan) or [Discord](https://nymtech.net/go/discord) and we can send them to you.
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You will need `nymt` funds sent to this account. Get in touch via Nym [Telegram](https://t.me/nymchan) or [Discord](https://nymtech.net/go/discord) and we can send them to you.
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Next, you init the nym-client with the enabled credentials mode set to true:
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Next, you init the nym-client with the enabled credentials mode set to true:
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```./nym-client --config-env-file <path-to>sandbox.env init --id <ID> --enabled-credentials-mode true```
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Using the new credentials binary, purchase some credentials for the client. The recovery directory is a directory where the credentials will be temporarily stored in case the request fails.
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Using the new credentials binary, purchase some credentials for the client. The recovery directory is a directory where the credentials will be temporarily stored in case the request fails.
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```./credential --config-env-file <path-to>sandbox.env run --client-home-directory <path-to-the-client-config> --nyxd-url https://rpc.sandbox.nymtech.net --mnemonic "<mnemonic of the account created above>" --amount 50 --recovery-dir <a-path> ```
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@@ -56,11 +61,11 @@ Run the network requester which can be downloaded [here](https://github.com/nymt
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> You need to run this version for now, as the `nym-client` functionality was recently integrated into the `network-requester` binary but for the moment cannot support coconut credentials natively.
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Now time to init the socks5 client:
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Now time to init the socks5 client:
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`./nym-socks5-client --config-env-file <path-to>sandbox.env init --id <ID> --provider <insert provider address which was returned when init-ing the nym-client> --enabled-credentials-mode true`
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Purchase credentials for this now too:
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Purchase credentials for this now too:
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`./credential --config-env-file <path-to>sandbox.env run --client-home-directory <path-to-socks5-config> --nyxd-url https://rpc.sandbox.nymtech.net --mnemonic "<any valid sandbox mnemonic>" --amount 100 --recovery-dir <a-path>`
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@@ -68,13 +73,13 @@ Run the socks5 client:
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`./nym-socks5-client --config-env-file <path-to>sandbox.env run --id <ID> --enabled-credentials-mode true`
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NOTE
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NOTE
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You can check to see if credentials have been correctly purchased by installing sqlite, and proceeding to do the following:
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```
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sqlite3 ~/.nym/socks5-clients/<ID>/data/credentials_database.db
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sqlite3 ~/.nym/socks5-clients/<ID>/data/credentials_database.db
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select * from coconut_credentials;
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```
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Keep in mind 1GB = 1NYM
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Keep in mind 1GB = 1NYM
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@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
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EDITS NEEDED IF CREDS=ZK-NYMS RATHER THAN TICKETS=ZK-NYMS
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# Double Spend Protection
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Double spend protection in the context of zk-nym is a balancing act between speed, reliability, and UX. There are two possible modes for protecting against attempted double spending of zk-nyms:
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@@ -11,32 +10,30 @@ Double spend protection in the context of zk-nym is a balancing act between spee
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The advantages of the offline approach are manifold:
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- Immediate access to the Nym network upon zk-nym submission, eliminating any delays in service provisioning until payments are deposited and verified as would occur in the online approach.
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- Alleviates performance strain on ingress Gateways and Quorum members, serving as a more efficient method compared to the online counterpart. By moving computationally intense work to the Quorum, this means that Gateway nodes are able to be run on less powerful machines, meaning more operators can more easily run them (and cover their costs) and thus increase the overall number and spread of Gateways around the globe.
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- Moreover, the offline approach can circumvent the potential issue of overwhelming the blockchain with the serial numbers of spent coins (like in the case of the Zcash DoS attack). TODO reword
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- Moreover, the offline approach can circumvent the potential issue of overwhelming the blockchain with the serial numbers of spent coins.
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However, the offline approach introduces certain limitations.
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- Ingress Gateways accept zk-nyms without preemptively checking for instances of double spending thus making them susceptible to unknowingly accepting double-spent credentials.
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- Any potential repercussions against double spenders can only be implemented once the user requests a new credential for their zk-nym Generator (aka they have to 'top up' and buy more bandwidth allowance), assuming they haven't altered their identifier, such as the Bech32 address.
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- Any potential repercussions against double spenders can only be implemented once the user requests a new credential for their zk-nym Generator (aka they have to 'top up' and buy more bandwidth allowance), assuming they haven't altered their identifier (the Bech32 address).
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An exploitable scenario arises from these limitations:
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- A malicious user purchases bandwidth and aggregates a valid credential in the standard way, worth $10 of crypto/fiat. Subsequently, the malicious user proceeds to sell the credential to 100 users for $1 each, allowing each user to generate zk-nyms of 100MB from this **valid** credential. Under the offline approach, entry nodes forego double-spending checks, enabling all 100 users to access the network without obtaining a subscription. The 100 MB limit does not prevent that, as the bandwidth consumption is tracked locally between client and ingress node. This loophole highlights the need for stringent measures to counter such potential abuses within the system.
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We can, however, mitigate this problem.
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- A malicious user purchases bandwidth and aggregates a valid zk-nym credential in the standard way, worth $10 of crypto/fiat. Subsequently, the malicious user proceeds to sell the credential to 100 users for $1 each, allowing each user to generate zk-nym credits of 100MB from this **valid** credential. Under the offline approach, entry nodes forego double-spending checks; so long as the clients all used different ingress Gateways, all 100 users could access the network without obtaining a subscription. As bandwidth consumption is tracked locally between client and ingress node, and each zk-nym credit is rerandomised, there is no way that ingress Gateways would know that the zk-credential used by the client has been shared with other parties. This loophole highlights the need for stringent measures to counter such potential abuses within the system, without creating either speed bottlenecks (in the case of the Online model) or impacting the anonymity of the system. We can, however, mitigate this problem without doing either of these things.
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## Solution to Offline Double Spending
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To efficiently prevent the fraudulent use of tickets within the Nym network, a two-tiered solution is in place that combines (1) the immediate detection of double-spending attempts at the entry node level and (2) subsequent identification and blacklisting at the nym-API level.
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To efficiently prevent the fraudulent use of tickets within the Nym network, a two-tiered solution is in place that combines (1) the immediate detection of double-spending attempts at the level of individuals ingress Gateways and (2) subsequent identification and blacklisting of offending clients at the Quorum level.
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TODO check against https://www.figma.com/board/geUGlj4Dffddx3E08vMZxz/Ecash-Flow?node-id=0-1&node-type=CANVAS&t=yuSZkEQRna8RqzwD-0 to check you havent gone off piste
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<!-- TODO check against https://www.figma.com/board/geUGlj4Dffddx3E08vMZxz/Ecash-Flow?node-id=0-1&node-type=CANVAS&t=yuSZkEQRna8RqzwD-0 to check you havent gone off piste -->
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### Entry Node Implementation: Real-Time Ticket Unspending Validation
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Each zk-nym contains as an attribute a unique serial number, which is revealed in plaintext to the respective ingress Gateway. Each Gateway has a copy of a [Bloom Filter](https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/bloom-filters-introduction-and-python-implementation/) - on receiving a zk-nym, it will check against its copy in a local database to check whether this serial number has already been seen. If so, it rejects the zk-nym as being double-spent and the client's connection request is rejected. If not, it will add the serial number to its local DB cache.
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Each spent zk-nym credit contains as an attribute a unique serial number, which is revealed in plaintext to the respective ingress Gateway. Each Gateway has a copy of a [Bloom Filter](https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/bloom-filters-introduction-and-python-implementation/) - on receiving a credit, it will check against its copy of a local database to check whether this serial number has already been seen. If so, it rejects the credit as being double-spent and the client's connection request is rejected. If not, it will add the serial number to its local DB.
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> Since each time a zk-nym is rerandomised its serial number is changed, the serial number being shared in no way identifies a client or user.
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> Since each time a zk-nym credential is rerandomised its serial number is changed, the serial number being shared in no way identifies a client or user.
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Each Gateway will periodically share their serial numbers with the Quorum and refresh their copy of the Bloom Filters from the Quorum, in order to refresh the global list shared by all ingress Gateways and the Quorum. See the step below for more on this.
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> Crucially, ingress Gateways refrain from extensive computations to identify the original ticket owner, and avoids broadcasting information about the double-spending attempt to other ingress Gateways. The entry node is also not involved in any global blacklisting process of the clients. The sole purpose of this check is to swiftly identify any attempts at double-spending and add the seen ticket's serial number to the local DB cache.
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### Nym-API Implementation: Blacklisting and Penalties for Double-Spenders
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All Gateways periodically forward the collected zk-nyms to the Quorum, enabling them to pinpoint and blacklist any clients who double spend. Upon receiving the tickets, the Quorum appends all the incoming serial numbers to the global list of spend zk-nym serial numbers and proceed with the identification process for any malicious users engaging in double-spending.
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All Gateways periodically forward the collected credits to the Quorum, enabling them to pinpoint and blacklist any clients who double spend. Upon receiving the credits, the Quorum appends all the incoming serial numbers to the global list of spend zk-nym serial numbers and proceed with the identification process for any malicious users engaging in double-spending.
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This identification phase involves looking for instances of double spending, identifying the id of the double-spending client, and blacklisting this client by its id. Subsequently, when this client requests a new credential, their plaintext public identifier is included in the request. The Quorum then checks if this identifier is blacklisted. If it is, a new credential is not issued. Furthermore, since the PSCs are only attainable after depositing NYM as payment, the Quorum has the authority to withhold the deposited NYMs as a punitive measure for any detected instances of double-spending.
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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# Rerandomisation & Incremental Spend
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Each zkNym generated by the Generator will not be valid for the entire amount of data that the credential aggregated from the PSCs is; if the aggregated credential is worth (e.g.) 10GB of Mixnet data, each zkNym created by the Generator will be worth far less.
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Each zk-nym credit will not be valid for the entire amount of data that the credential aggregated from the PSCs is; if the aggregated credential is worth (e.g.) 10GB of Mixnet data, each credit will be worth far less (e.g. 100MB). This amount will be globally uniform in order to avoid situations where differently sized credits allow for patterns to emerge.
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```admonish info
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The functionality included in the following code block examples were added to the [nym-cli tool](../tools/nym-cli.md) for illustrative purposes only: this is not necessarily how credentials will be accessed in the future.
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@@ -10,11 +10,12 @@ The functionality included in the following code block examples were added to th
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The numbers used in this high level overview are for illustration purposes only. The figures used in production will potentially vary. Note that individual zkNym sizes will be uniform across the Network.
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```
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## Why not spend the entire credential at once?
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This is to account for the need for a client to change their ingress Gateway, either because the Gateway itself has gone down / is not offering the required bandwidth, or because a user might simply want to split their traffic across multiple Gateways for extra privacy.
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In order to accomodate this then each generated zkNym will be worth a far smaller amount than the aggregated credential fed into the zkNym Generator. A single aggregated credential worth (e.g.) 10GB of data might be split into 100MB zkNym chunks. This means that clients are not tied to particular Gateways they have 'spent' their entire subscription amount with; if the ingress Gateway goes down, or the client simply wishes to use another ingress Gateway, the user has multiple other zkNyms they can use that account for their remaining purchased bandwidth.
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This means that clients are not tied to particular Gateways they have 'spent' their entire subscription amount with; if the ingress Gateway goes down, or the client simply wishes to use another ingress Gateway, the user has multiple other zk-nym credits they can use that account for their remaining purchased bandwidth.
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Going back to the `nym-cli` tool to illustrate this; we can generate multiple unlinkable zkNyms ('tickets' on this command output) from a single aggregated credential ('ticketbook' below):
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Going back to the `nym-cli` tool to illustrate this; we can generate multiple unlinkable credits ('tickets' on this command output) from a single aggregated credential ('ticketbook' below):
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```
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❯ ./nym-cli ecash generate-ticket --credential-storage storage.db --provider 6qidVK21zpHD298jdDa1RRpbRozP29ENVyqcSbm6hQrG --full
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@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
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# zkNym Unlinkability
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Each time a credential is requested by an ingress Gateway to prove that a client has purchased data to send through the Mixnet, the zkNym Generator will provide a new, unlinkable zkNym. This is a rereandomised value that is able to be verified as being legitimate (in that it was created by feeding a valid root credential into the Generator) but **not linked to any other zkNyms**, either previously generated or to be generated in the future.
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# Unlinkability
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Each time a credential is requested by an ingress Gateway to prove that a client has purchased data to send through the Mixnet, instead of sending that credential, the Requester's device will produce a zk-nym credit. This is a rereandomised value that is able to be verified as being legitimate (in that it was created by a valid root credential) but **not linked to any other credits**, either previously generated or to be generated in the future. This feature also allows for a credential to be split across multiple ingress Gateways / connections and [incrementally spent](./rerandomise.md) over time.
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```admonish info
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The functionality included in the following code block examples were added to the [nym-cli tool](../tools/nym-cli.md) for illustrative purposes only: this is not necessarily how credentials will be accessed in the future.
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**Furthermore, the `nym-cli` uses the words 'tickets' in place of 'zkNyms' and 'ticketbook' in place of 'aggregated credential': this was WIP internal wording that we are moving away from now.**
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**Furthermore, the `nym-cli` uses the words 'tickets' in place of 'credits' and 'ticketbook' in place of 'credential': this was WIP internal wording that we are moving away from now.**
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TODO ONCE THESE DOCS ARE GOOD TO GO, CHANGE NYM-CLI ARGS IN SAME PR
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```
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@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ PAYMENT FOR TICKET 3:
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```
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Now lets generate another zkNym to spend either topping up once the previous one's data allowance has been used, or with another Gateway. Notice that the `ticket-index` is the same: this is generated from the same aggregated credential as the one above!
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Now lets generate another credit to spend either topping up once the previous one's data allowance has been used, or with another Gateway. Notice that the `ticket-index` is the same: this is generated from the same aggregated credential as the one above!
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```
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❯ ./nym-cli ecash generate-ticket --credential-storage storage.db --provider 6qidVK21zpHD298jdDa1RRpbRozP29ENVyqcSbm6hQrG --ticket-index=3
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@@ -33,4 +33,4 @@ PAYMENT FOR TICKET 3:
|
||||
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
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
These are both generated by the _same_ underlying credential fed into the zkNym Generator and verified and used in a way that they cannot be tied to each other. An ingress Gateway might (for instance) get 100 connection requests from 100 Nym clients, each validated with a zkNym. It has no way of knowing whether these are all zkNyms from the same single subscription, or 100 different ones.
|
||||
These are both generated by the _same_ underlying credential and used in a way that they cannot be tied to each other. An ingress Gateway might (for instance) get 100 connection requests from 100 Nym clients, each validated with a zk-nym credi t. It has no way of knowing whether these are all from the same single subscription, or 100 different ones.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,54 +2,50 @@
|
||||
|
||||
```admonish info
|
||||
The first use-case of zk-nyms is for anonymously proving the right to use the Nym mixnet for privacy.
|
||||
|
||||
The Nym mixnet is - at the time of publication - free for everyone. However, soon™ it will be required for each connecting client to present a valid credential - a zk-nym - to their ingress Gateway to access the Mixnet.
|
||||
|
||||
Accessing zk-nym credentials will vary depending on use:
|
||||
- Individual developers building on the mixnet will be able to get zk-nym credentials via something like a faucet.
|
||||
- Individual developers building on the mixnet will be able to get zk-nym credentials via something like a faucet.
|
||||
- Larger application integrations will have their own 'under the hood' credential generation and distribution scheme to generate access credentials on behalf of their users automatically.
|
||||
- and NymVPN users will have a variety of payment methods avaliable to them.
|
||||
_More on this soon_.
|
||||
- NymVPN users will have a variety of payment methods avaliable to them. The vast majority, if not all of the steps outlined on this page, will happen under the hood from their perspective. _More on this soon_.
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Generation of zk-nyms involves the following actors / pieces of infrastructure:
|
||||
- **Requester needing a zk-nym** for example a single user using the NymVPN app, or a company purchasing zk-nyms to distribute to their app users, in the instance of an app integrating a Mixnet client via one of the SDKs. The Requester is represented by a Bech32 address on the Nyx blockchain.
|
||||
- [NymAPI](https://nymtech.net/operators/nodes/nym-api.html) instances working together on Distributed Key Generation, referred to as the **NymAPI Quorum**. Members of the Quorum are a subset of the Nyx chain Validator set (other tasks they perform include a multisig used for triggering reward payouts to the Network Infrastructure Node Operators).
|
||||
- **OrderAPI**: an API creating crypto/fiat <> NYM swaps and then depositing the NYM tokens in a smart contract managed by the NymAPI Quroum for payment verification. Implementation details of the API will be released in the future.
|
||||
- [NymAPI](https://nymtech.net/operators/nodes/nym-api.html) instances working together on signature generation and spent credential validation, referred to as the **NymAPI Quorum**. Members of the Quorum are a subset of the Nyx chain Validator set (other tasks they perform include a multisig used for triggering reward payouts to the Network Infrastructure Node Operators and maintaining the global Bloom Filter for double-spend protection).
|
||||
- **OrderAPI**: an API creating crypto/fiat <> NYM swaps and then depositing the NYM tokens in a smart contract managed by the NymAPI Quroum for payment verification. Implementation details of the API will be released in the coming months.
|
||||
|
||||
Generation happens in 3 distinct stages:
|
||||
- 1 Key Generation & payment
|
||||
- 2 Deposit NYM tokens & issue credential
|
||||
- 3 Generate unlinkable zk-nyms for Nym Network access
|
||||
- Key Generation & payment
|
||||
- Issue credential
|
||||
- Generate unlinkable zk-nyms for Nym Network access
|
||||
|
||||
From the perspective of the Requester most of this happens under the hood, but results in the creation and usage of an **unlinkable, rerandomisable anonymous proof-of-payment credential** - a zk-nym - with which to access the Mixnet without fear of doxxing themselves via linking app usage and payment information. The user experience is further enhanced by the fact that a single credential can be split into multiple small zk-nyms, meaning that a Requester may buy a large chunk of bandwidth but 'spend' this in the form of multiple zk-nyms with different ingress Gateways. Whilst this happens under the hood, what it affords the Requester is an ease of experience in that they have to 'top up' their bandwidth less and are able to chop and change ingress points to the Nym Network as they see fit, akin to the UX of most modern day VPNs and dVPNs.
|
||||
|
||||
TODO ADD A BIG DIAGRAM FOR EACH STAGE
|
||||
|
||||
## 1 Key Generation & Payment
|
||||
## Key Generation & Payment
|
||||
- First, a Cosmos [Bech32 address](https://docs.cosmos.network/main/build/spec/addresses/bech32) is created for the Requester. This is used to identify themselves when interacting with the OrderAPI via signed authentication tokens. This is the only identity that the OrderAPI is able to see, and is not able to link this to the zk-nyms that will be generated. This identity never leaves the Requester’s device and there is no email or any personal details needed for signup. If a Requester is simply 'topping up' their subscription, the creation of the address is skipped as it already exists.
|
||||
- The Requester also generates an ed25519 keypair: this is used to identify and authenticate them in the case of using zk-nyms across several devices as an individual user. However, this is never used in the clear: these keys are used as private attribute values within generated credentials which are verified via zero-knowledge.
|
||||
- The Requester can then interact with various payment backends to pay for their zk-nyms with crypto, fiat options, or natively with NYM tokens.
|
||||
- Payment options will trigger the OrderAPI. This will:
|
||||
- Create a swap for <PAYMENT_AMOUNT> <> NYM tokens.
|
||||
- Deposit these tokens with the NymAPI Quorum via a CosmWasm smart contract deployed on the Nyx blockchain.
|
||||
- The Requester generates an ed25519 keypair: this is used to identify and authenticate them in the case of using zk-nyms across several devices as an individual user. However, this is never used in the clear: these keys are used as private attribute values within generated credentials which are verified via zero-knowledge.
|
||||
- The Requester sends a request to each member of the Quorum requesting a zk-nym credential. This request is signed with their private key and includes the transaction hash of the NYM deposit into the deposit contract, performed either by themselves or the OrderAPI. _(( TODO double check which keypair and make clear. JAYA suggestion: lets do a diagram that shows clearly how on the one hand, the Bech32 address is used to identify user towards the OrderAPI for payments, and on the other hand shows how the ed25519 keypair is for identification and authentication for using zk-nym creds))_
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## 2 Deposit NYM & Issue zk-nym
|
||||
## Issue zk-nym
|
||||
At this point, NYM tokens have been deposited into the smart contract controlled by the Quorum's multisig and a zk-nym credential has been requested. Next, each member of the Quorum who responds to the Requester's request for a zk-nym checks the validity and returns a PSC signed with part of the master key (since this is a threshold cryptsystem, not all members of the Quroum must respond to create a zk-nym, only enough to pass the threshold). The process looks like this:
|
||||
|
||||
- Members of the Quroum performs several checks to verify the request is valid:
|
||||
- They verify the signature sent as part of the request is valid and that the request was made in the last 48 hours.
|
||||
- They verify that the amount requested matches the amount deposited in the transation, the hash of which was signed and sent as part of the request.
|
||||
- Members then create a partial blinded signature - a 'partial signed credential' ('PSC') - from their fragment of the master key generated and split amongst them at the beginning of the Quroum in the initial DKG ceremony.
|
||||
- They verify that the amount requested matches the amount deposited in the transation, the hash of which was signed by the Requester's ed25519 key and sent as part of the request.
|
||||
- Members then create a partial blinded signature - a 'partial signed credential' ('PSC') - from their fragment of the master key generated and split amongst them at the beginning of the Quroum in the initial DKG ceremony.
|
||||
- The member also creates a `key:value` entry in their local cache with the transaction hash as the key, and the PSC + encrypted signature as the value. This is used later for zk-nym validation and is cleaned after a predefined timeout.
|
||||
- These PSCs are given back to the Requester after setting up a secure channel via DH key exchange, with each replying Quorum member also sending their public key for verification that the returned PSC was signed by them.
|
||||
|
||||
Once the Requester has received > threshold number of PSCs they can assemble them into a credential signed by the master key. The Requester never learns this master key (it is a private attribute) but the credential can be verified by the Quroum as being valid by checking for a proof that the credential's private attribute - the value of the master key - is valid.
|
||||
|
||||
This credential is fed into the Requester's local 'zk-nym Generator'.
|
||||
|
||||
## 3 Spend zk-nym to Access Mixnet
|
||||
- The zk-nym Generator is entirely offline and holds the credential created from the aggregated threshold PSCs returned from individual members of the Quorum. Each time an application requests an access credential, the Generator will provide an unlinkable and unique zk-nym to the requesting ingress Gateway.
|
||||
- _((TODO add a point on what spend is in other terms))_
|
||||
- This zk-nym is later presented to the Quorum by the Gateway that collected it, which is used to calculate reward percentages given to Nym Network infrastructure operators by the Quorum, with payouts triggered by their multisig wallet.
|
||||
## Spend zk-nym to Access Mixnet
|
||||
- Once the credential has been aggregated from the PSCs returned from > threshold of Quorum members, smaller 'zk-nym credits' can be generated from it, accounting for smaller chunks of bandwidth which can be 'spent' with ingress Gateways. This occurs entirely offline, on the device of the zk-nym Requester. See pages on the scheme's [unlinkability](unlinkability.md) and [rerandomisation and incremental spending](./rerandomise.md) features for further information on this.
|
||||
- This zk-nym credit is later presented to the Quorum by the Gateway that collected it, which is used to calculate reward percentages given to Nym Network infrastructure operators by the Quorum, with payouts triggered by their multisig wallet. Both ingress Gateways and the Quorum use spent zk-nym credits when engaging in [double spending protection](./double-spend-prot.md).
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user