check

build(deps): bump next from 15.5.9 to 16.1.5 in /documentation/docs

.github/workflows/ci-build.yml

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ on:
       - 'nym-api/**'
       - 'nym-authenticator-client/**'
       - 'nym-credential-proxy/**'
+      - 'nym-gateway-probe/**'
       - 'nym-ip-packet-client/**'
       - 'nym-network-monitor/**'
       - 'nym-node/**'
@@ -89,7 +90,7 @@ jobs:
         uses: actions-rs/cargo@v1
         with:
           command: clippy
-          args: --workspace --all-targets --exclude nym-gateway-probe -- -D warnings
+          args: --workspace --all-targets --exclude nym-gateway-probe --exclude nym-node-status-api -- -D warnings
 
       - name: Clippy (non-macos)
         if: contains(matrix.os, 'linux') || contains(matrix.os, 'windows')
@@ -104,6 +105,14 @@ jobs:
         with:
           command: build
 
+        # only build on linux because of wg FFI bindings of its dependency (network probe)
+      - name: Build nym-node-status-api (linux only)
+        if: runner.os == 'Linux'
+        uses: actions-rs/cargo@v1
+        with:
+          command: build
+          args: -p nym-node-status-api
+
       - name: Build all examples
         if: contains(matrix.os, 'linux')
         uses: actions-rs/cargo@v1

.github/workflows/ci-check-ns-api-version.yml

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: ci-check-ns-api-version
 on:
   pull_request:
     paths:
-      - "nym-node-status-api/**"
+      - "nym-node-status-api/nym-node-status-api/**"
 
 env:
   WORKING_DIRECTORY: "nym-node-status-api/nym-node-status-api"
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ jobs:
         uses: actions/checkout@v6
 
       - name: Get version from cargo.toml
-        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.50.1
+        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.52.2
         id: get_version
         with:
           cmd: yq -oy '.package.version' ${{ env.WORKING_DIRECTORY }}/Cargo.toml

.github/workflows/ci-check-nym-stats-api-version.yml

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ jobs:
         uses: actions/checkout@v6
 
       - name: Get version from cargo.toml
-        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.50.1
+        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.52.2
         id: get_version
         with:
           cmd: yq -oy '.package.version' ${{ env.WORKING_DIRECTORY }}/Cargo.toml

.github/workflows/ci-crates-publish-dry-run.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+name: Publish to crates.io (dry run)
+
+on:
+  workflow_dispatch:
+    inputs:
+      version:
+        description: "Version to publish (e.g. 1.21.0)"
+        required: true
+        type: string
+
+env:
+  CI_BOT_AUTHOR: "Nym bot"
+  CI_BOT_EMAIL: "nym-bot@users.noreply.github.com"
+
+jobs:
+  publish-dry-run:
+    runs-on: arc-linux-latest
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout repo
+        uses: actions/checkout@v6
+
+      - name: Configure git identity
+        run: |
+          git config --global user.name "${{ env.CI_BOT_AUTHOR }}"
+          git config --global user.email "${{ env.CI_BOT_EMAIL }}"
+
+      - name: Install rust toolchain
+        uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
+        with:
+          profile: minimal
+          toolchain: stable
+          override: true
+
+      - name: Install cargo-workspaces
+        run: cargo install cargo-workspaces
+
+      - name: Setup Node.js
+        uses: actions/setup-node@v4
+        with:
+          node-version: "20"
+
+      - name: Validate version format
+        run: |
+          if ! npx semver "${{ inputs.version }}"; then
+            echo "Error: '${{ inputs.version }}' is not valid semver"
+            exit 1
+          fi
+
+      - name: Get current version
+        id: current_version
+        run: |
+          VERSION=$(grep -oP '^\s*version\s*=\s*"\K[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+' Cargo.toml | head -1)
+          echo "version=$VERSION" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+
+      - name: Update workspace dependencies
+        run: |
+          sed -i '/path = /s/version = "${{ steps.current_version.outputs.version }}"/version = "${{ inputs.version }}"/g' Cargo.toml
+
+      - name: Bump versions (local only)
+        run: |
+          cargo workspaces version custom ${{ inputs.version }} \
+            --allow-branch ${{ github.ref_name }} \
+            --no-git-commit \
+
+      # Dry run may show cascading dependency errors because packages aren't
+      # actually uploaded - these are expected and ignored. We check for real
+      # errors like packaging failures, missing metadata, or invalid Cargo.toml.
+      - name: Publish (dry run)
+        run: |
+          output=$(cargo workspaces publish --dry-run --allow-dirty 2>&1) || true
+          echo "$output"
+
+          # Check for real errors (not cascading dependency errors)
+          # Cascading errors mention "crates.io index", real errors mention "Cargo.toml"
+          echo "$output" | grep -i "Cargo.toml" && exit 1 || true
+
+      # Show the list of packages published
+      - name: Show package versions
+        run: cargo workspaces list --long

.github/workflows/ci-crates-publish-resume.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+# This is in case, for whatever reason, a publication run fails, and we need to restart halfway down the list, of unbumped/unpublished crates.
+name: Resume crates.io publish
+
+on:
+  workflow_dispatch:
+    inputs:
+      resume_after:
+        description: "Last successfully published crate (will start from the next one)"
+        required: true
+        type: string
+      publish_interval:
+        description: "Seconds to wait between publishes"
+        required: false
+        default: "600"
+        type: string
+
+jobs:
+  publish:
+    runs-on: arc-linux-latest
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout repo
+        uses: actions/checkout@v6
+
+      - name: Install rust toolchain
+        uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
+        with:
+          profile: minimal
+          toolchain: stable
+          override: true
+
+      - name: Install cargo-workspaces
+        run: cargo install cargo-workspaces
+
+      # Get crates in publish order, skip up to and including resume_after
+      - name: Publish remaining crates
+        env:
+          CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          CRATES=$(cargo workspaces plan 2>/dev/null | sed -n '/^${{ inputs.resume_after }}$/,$p' | tail -n +2)
+
+          if [ -z "$CRATES" ]; then
+            echo "Error: No crates found after '${{ inputs.resume_after }}'"
+            echo "Check the crate name matches exactly from 'cargo workspaces plan'"
+            exit 1
+          fi
+
+          echo "Will publish the following crates:"
+          echo "$CRATES"
+          echo ""
+
+          echo "$CRATES" | while read crate; do
+            echo "Publishing $crate..."
+            cargo publish -p "$crate" --allow-dirty
+            echo "Waiting ${{ inputs.publish_interval }}s before next publish..."
+            sleep ${{ inputs.publish_interval }}
+          done
+
+      - name: Show package versions
+        run: cargo workspaces list --long

.github/workflows/ci-crates-publish.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+name: Publish crates to crates.io
+
+on:
+  workflow_dispatch:
+    inputs:
+      publish_interval:
+        description: "Seconds to wait between publishes (600 for first publish, 60 after)"
+        required: false
+        default: "600"
+        type: string
+      backup_author:
+        description: "Second team member added as owner of the crate"
+        required: false
+        default: "jstuczyn"
+        type: string
+
+jobs:
+  publish:
+    runs-on: arc-linux-latest
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout repo
+        uses: actions/checkout@v6
+
+      - name: Install rust toolchain
+        uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
+        with:
+          profile: minimal
+          toolchain: stable
+          override: true
+
+      - name: Install cargo-workspaces
+        run: cargo install cargo-workspaces
+
+      # `--publish-as-is` skips version bumping since that's done in a separate CI job.
+      - name: Publish
+        env:
+          CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          cargo workspaces publish \
+            --publish-as-is \
+            --publish-interval ${{ inputs.publish_interval }}
+
+      - name: Show package versions
+        run: cargo workspaces list --long
+
+      - name: Add team as crate owners
+        env:
+          CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          TEAM="github:nymtech:core"
+          echo "Checking and adding $TEAM as owner to workspace crates..."
+
+          cargo workspaces list | while read crate; do
+            echo "Checking $crate..."
+
+            if cargo owner --list "$crate" 2>/dev/null | grep -q "$TEAM"; then
+              echo "  $TEAM already owns $crate, skipping"
+            else
+              echo "  Adding $TEAM as owner of $crate..."
+              cargo owner --add "$TEAM" "$crate"
+              sleep 2
+            fi
+          done
+
+          echo "Done!"
+
+      - name: Add secondary member as crate owner
+        env:
+          CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          TEAM_MEMBER="${{ inputs.backup_author }}"
+          echo "Checking and adding $TEAM_MEMBER as owner to workspace crates..."
+
+          cargo workspaces list | while read crate; do
+            echo "Checking $crate..."
+
+            if cargo owner --list "$crate" 2>/dev/null | grep -q "$TEAM_MEMBER"; then
+              echo "  $TEAM_MEMBER already owns $crate, skipping"
+            else
+              echo "  Adding $TEAM_MEMBER as owner of $crate..."
+              cargo owner --add "$TEAM_MEMBER" "$crate"
+              sleep 2
+            fi
+          done
+
+          echo "Done!"

.github/workflows/ci-crates-version-bump.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+name: Bump crate versions
+
+on:
+  workflow_dispatch:
+    inputs:
+      version:
+        description: "Version to set (e.g. 1.21.0)"
+        required: true
+        type: string
+
+env:
+  CI_BOT_AUTHOR: "Nym bot"
+  CI_BOT_EMAIL: "nym-bot@users.noreply.github.com"
+
+jobs:
+  version-bump:
+    runs-on: arc-linux-latest
+    permissions:
+      contents: write
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout repo
+        uses: actions/checkout@v6
+
+      - name: Configure git identity
+        run: |
+          git config --global user.name "${{ env.CI_BOT_AUTHOR }}"
+          git config --global user.email "${{ env.CI_BOT_EMAIL }}"
+
+      - name: Install rust toolchain
+        uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
+        with:
+          profile: minimal
+          toolchain: stable
+          override: true
+
+      - name: Install cargo-workspaces
+        run: cargo install cargo-workspaces
+
+      - name: Setup Node.js
+        uses: actions/setup-node@v4
+        with:
+          node-version: "20"
+
+      - name: Validate version format
+        run: |
+          if ! npx semver "${{ inputs.version }}"; then
+            echo "Error: '${{ inputs.version }}' is not valid semver"
+            exit 1
+          fi
+
+      - name: Get current version
+        id: current_version
+        run: |
+          VERSION=$(grep -oP '^\s*version\s*=\s*"\K[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+' Cargo.toml | head -1)
+          echo "version=$VERSION" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+
+      - name: Update workspace dependencies
+        run: |
+          sed -i '/path = /s/version = "${{ steps.current_version.outputs.version }}"/version = "${{ inputs.version }}"/g' Cargo.toml
+
+      - name: Bump versions
+        run: |
+          cargo workspaces version custom ${{ inputs.version }} \
+            --no-git-commit \
+            --yes
+
+      - name: Commit and push version bump
+        run: |
+          git add -A
+          git commit -m "crates release: bump version to ${{ inputs.version }}"
+          git push
+
+      - name: Show package versions
+        run: cargo workspaces list --long

.github/workflows/ci-docs-linkcheck.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+name: ci-docs-linkcheck
+
+on:
+  workflow_dispatch:
+  push:
+    paths:
+      - "documentation/docs/**"
+      - ".github/workflows/ci-docs-linkcheck.yml"
+      - "lychee.toml"
+
+jobs:
+  linkcheck:
+    runs-on: arc-linux-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
+
+      - name: Check links
+        uses: lycheeverse/lychee-action@v2
+        with:
+          args: ${{ github.workspace }}/documentation/docs/ --config ${{ github.workspace }}/lychee.toml --root-dir ${{ github.workspace }}/documentation/docs/pages/
+          fail: true

.github/workflows/publish-crates-io-dry-run.yml

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-name: Publish to crates.io (dry run)
-
-on:
-  workflow_dispatch:
-    inputs:
-      version:
-        description: "Version to publish (e.g. 1.21.0)"
-        required: true
-        type: string
-
-jobs:
-  publish-dry-run:
-    runs-on: arc-ubuntu-22.04-dind
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout repo
-        uses: actions/checkout@v6
-
-      - name: Install rust toolchain
-        uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
-        with:
-          profile: minimal
-          toolchain: stable
-          override: true
-
-      - name: Install cargo-workspaces
-        run: cargo install cargo-workspaces
-
-      - name: Bump versions (local only)
-        run: |
-          cargo workspaces version ${{ inputs.version }} \
-            --no-git-commit \
-            --no-git-tag \
-            --no-git-push \
-            --yes
-
-      # Note: Dry run may show cascading dependency errors because packages
-      # aren't actually uploaded. Check if the missing dependency has an
-      # "aborting upload due to dry run" message earlier in the output - if so,
-      # it would succeed in a real publish since cargo-workspaces publishes in
-      # dependency order. cargo-workspaces doesn't fail on err, so there isn't
-      # a good way to check this at the moment.
-      - name: Publish (dry run)
-        run: cargo workspaces publish --from-git --dry-run --allow-dirty

.github/workflows/publish-crates-io.yml

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-name: Publish to crates.io
-
-on:
-  workflow_dispatch:
-    inputs:
-      version:
-        description: "Version to publish (e.g. 1.21.0)"
-        required: true
-        type: string
-
-jobs:
-  publish:
-    runs-on: arc-ubuntu-22.04-dind
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout repo
-        uses: actions/checkout@v6
-
-      - name: Install rust toolchain
-        uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
-        with:
-          profile: minimal
-          toolchain: stable
-          override: true
-
-      - name: Install cargo-workspaces
-        run: cargo install cargo-workspaces
-
-      # - name: Configure git
-      #   run: |
-      #     git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
-      #     git config user.email "github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
-
-      - name: Bump versions
-        run: |
-          cargo workspaces version ${{ inputs.version }} \
-            --no-git-push \
-            --no-git-tag \
-            --yes
-
-      - name: Publish
-        env:
-          CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
-        run: cargo workspaces publish --from-git --no-git-commit
-
-      # - name: Push version commit
-      #   run: |
-      #     git push origin HEAD

.github/workflows/push-credential-proxy.yaml

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ jobs:
           git config --global user.name "Lawrence Stalder"
 
       - name: Get version from cargo.toml
-        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.50.1
+        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.52.2
         id: get_version
         with:
           cmd: yq -oy '.package.version' ${{ env.WORKING_DIRECTORY }}/nym-credential-proxy/Cargo.toml

.github/workflows/push-data-observatory.yaml

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ jobs:
           git config --global user.name "Lawrence Stalder"
 
       - name: Get version from cargo.toml
-        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.50.1
+        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.52.2
         id: get_version
         with:
           cmd: yq -oy '.package.version' ${{ env.WORKING_DIRECTORY }}/Cargo.toml

.github/workflows/push-network-monitor.yaml

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ jobs:
           git config --global user.name "Lawrence Stalder"
 
       - name: Get version from cargo.toml
-        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.50.1
+        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.52.2
         id: get_version
         with:
           cmd: yq -oy '.package.version' ${{ env.WORKING_DIRECTORY }}/nym-network-monitor/Cargo.toml

.github/workflows/push-nym-api.yaml

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ jobs:
           git config --global user.name "Lawrence Stalder"
 
       - name: Get version from cargo.toml
-        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.50.1
+        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.52.2
         id: get_version
         with:
           cmd: yq -oy '.package.version' ${{ env.WORKING_DIRECTORY }}/nym-api/Cargo.toml

.github/workflows/push-nym-node.yaml

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ jobs:
           git config --global user.name "Lawrence Stalder"
 
       - name: Get version from cargo.toml
-        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.50.1
+        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.52.2
         id: get_version
         with:
           cmd: yq -oy '.package.version' ${{ env.WORKING_DIRECTORY }}/Cargo.toml

.github/workflows/push-nym-statistics-api.yaml

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ jobs:
           git config --global user.name "Lawrence Stalder"
 
       - name: Get version from cargo.toml
-        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.50.1
+        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.52.2
         id: get_version
         with:
           cmd: yq -oy '.package.version' ${{ env.WORKING_DIRECTORY }}/Cargo.toml

.github/workflows/push-nyx-chain-watcher.yaml

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ env:
 
 jobs:
   build-container:
-    runs-on: arc-ubuntu-22.04-dind
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
       - name: Login to Harbor
         uses: docker/login-action@v3
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ jobs:
           git config --global user.name "Lawrence Stalder"
 
       - name: Get version from cargo.toml
-        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.50.1
+        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.52.2
         id: get_version
         with:
           cmd: yq -oy '.package.version' ${{ env.WORKING_DIRECTORY }}/Cargo.toml

.github/workflows/push-validator-rewarder.yaml

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ jobs:
           git config --global user.name "Lawrence Stalder"
 
       - name: Get version from cargo.toml
-        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.50.1
+        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.52.2
         id: get_version
         with:
           cmd: yq -oy '.package.version' ${{ env.WORKING_DIRECTORY }}/Cargo.toml

.github/workflows/resume-publish-crates-io.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+name: Resume publish to crates.io
+
+on:
+  workflow_dispatch:
+    inputs:
+      resume_after:
+        description: "Last successfully published crate (will start from the next one)"
+        required: true
+        type: string
+
+jobs:
+  publish:
+    runs-on: arc-linux-latest
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout repo
+        uses: actions/checkout@v6
+
+      - name: Install rust toolchain
+        uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
+        with:
+          profile: minimal
+          toolchain: stable
+          override: true
+
+      - name: Install cargo-workspaces
+        run: cargo install cargo-workspaces
+
+      - name: Publish remaining crates
+        env:
+          CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          # Get crates in publish order, skip up to and including resume_after
+          cargo workspaces plan 2>/dev/null | sed -n '/^${{ inputs.resume_after }}$/,$p' | tail -n +2 | while read crate; do
+            echo "Publishing $crate..."
+            cargo publish -p "$crate" --allow-dirty
+            echo "Waiting 600s before next publish..."
+            sleep 600
+          done
+
+      - name: Show package versions
+        run: cargo workspaces list --long

.gitignore

@@ -67,7 +67,6 @@ nym-api/redocly/formatted-openapi.json
 *.profraw
 .beads
 CLAUDE.md
-docs
 .claude
 .superego
 

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,162 @@ Post 1.0.0 release, the changelog format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+## [2026.4-quark] (2026-02-24)
+
+- Enhance CI workflow with feature inputs ([#6462])
+- Chore/revert 6433 ([#6445])
+- Lp/stateless handshake ([#6437])
+- build(deps-dev): bump webpack from 5.98.0 to 5.105.0 in /wasm/client/internal-dev ([#6435])
+- build(deps-dev): bump webpack from 5.102.1 to 5.104.1 ([#6432])
+- build(deps-dev): bump webpack from 5.98.0 to 5.105.0 in /wasm/mix-fetch/internal-dev ([#6431])
+- build(deps-dev): bump webpack from 5.94.0 to 5.104.1 in /nym-credential-proxy/vpn-api-lib-wasm/internal-dev ([#6430])
+- build(deps-dev): bump webpack from 5.77.0 to 5.104.1 in /wasm/zknym-lib/internal-dev ([#6429])
+- build(deps-dev): bump webpack from 5.76.0 to 5.105.0 in /clients/native/examples/js-examples/websocket ([#6428])
+- HTTP & DNS Improvements ([#6423])
+- Endpoint for  exit GW IPs ([#6418])
+- build(deps): bump bytes from 1.6.0 to 1.11.1 in /contracts ([#6416])
+- build(deps): bump @isaacs/brace-expansion from 5.0.0 to 5.0.1 ([#6415])
+- build(deps): bump bytes from 1.11.0 to 1.11.1 ([#6414])
+- build(deps): bump mikefarah/yq from 4.50.1 to 4.52.2 ([#6407])
+- build(deps-dev): bump eslint from 8.57.1 to 9.26.0 ([#6405])
+- Update reqwest to v0.13.1 ([#6401])
+- build(deps): bump next from 15.5.9 to 16.1.5 in /documentation/docs ([#6387])
+- build(deps): bump next from 15.4.10 to 16.1.5 in /nym-node-status-api/nym-node-status-ui ([#6385])
+- build(deps): bump lodash from 4.17.21 to 4.17.23 ([#6369])
+- build(deps): bump lodash-es from 4.17.21 to 4.17.23 ([#6360])
+- build(deps-dev): bump lodash from 4.17.21 to 4.17.23 in /sdk/typescript/codegen/contract-clients ([#6359])
+- build(deps): bump lodash from 4.17.21 to 4.17.23 in /sdk/typescript/packages/nodejs-client ([#6354])
+- build(deps): bump lodash from 4.17.21 to 4.17.23 in /documentation/docs ([#6353])
+- build(deps): bump lodash from 4.17.21 to 4.17.23 in /clients/native/examples/js-examples/websocket ([#6351])
+- build(deps): bump lodash-es from 4.17.21 to 4.17.23 in /documentation/docs ([#6350])
+- build(deps): bump diff from 5.2.0 to 5.2.2 in /documentation/docs ([#6345])
+- Max/crates publishing tweaks ([#6343])
+- build(deps): bump h3 from 1.15.4 to 1.15.5 ([#6339])
+- build(deps): bump h3 from 1.15.4 to 1.15.5 in /documentation/docs ([#6332])
+- build(deps): bump undici from 6.21.3 to 6.23.0 in /documentation/docs ([#6325])
+- build(deps): bump rsa from 0.9.8 to 0.9.10 ([#6311])
+- build(deps): bump qs and express in /wasm/mix-fetch/internal-dev ([#6308])
+- build(deps): bump qs and express in /clients/native/examples/js-examples/websocket ([#6307])
+- feat: introduce on-disk cache persistance for major nym-api caches ([#6302])
+- Fix migrations in the Data Observatory ([#6271])
+
+[#6462]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6462
+[#6445]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6445
+[#6437]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6437
+[#6435]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6435
+[#6432]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6432
+[#6431]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6431
+[#6430]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6430
+[#6429]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6429
+[#6428]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6428
+[#6423]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6423
+[#6418]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6418
+[#6416]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6416
+[#6415]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6415
+[#6414]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6414
+[#6407]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6407
+[#6405]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6405
+[#6401]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6401
+[#6387]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6387
+[#6385]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6385
+[#6369]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6369
+[#6360]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6360
+[#6359]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6359
+[#6354]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6354
+[#6353]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6353
+[#6351]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6351
+[#6350]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6350
+[#6345]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6345
+[#6343]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6343
+[#6339]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6339
+[#6332]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6332
+[#6325]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6325
+[#6311]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6311
+[#6308]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6308
+[#6307]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6307
+[#6302]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6302
+[#6271]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6271
+
+## [2026.3-parmigiano] (2026-02-10)
+
+- chore: disable LP on parmigiano branch ([#6422])
+- revert mixnet-based client fautly changes from LP ([#6420])
+- [LP fix] Registration client with fallback ([#6419])
+- Lp/ip pool fixes ([#6412])
+- [LP-fix] expose wg psk for the vpn-client ([#6411])
+- LP-fix : configurable LP timeouts ([#6409])
+- LP-fix : add LP x25519 key to the description ([#6408])
+- use rng that is Send ([#6404])
+- use local kem key instead of local x25519 ([#6402])
+- [LP Gateway Probe] CLI and behavior improvements  ([#6400])
+- lp: attempt to negotiate (and use) protocol version ([#6399])
+- bugfix: use correct reserved bytes when parsing LpHeader ([#6398])
+- Lp/bugfix/share ip allocation ([#6395])
+- feat: use hex-encoding for lp key digests ([#6394])
+- Add socks5 test to gateway-probe ([#6393])
+- [LP Gateway probe] Improve file structure ([#6391])
+- Reduce the size of `HttpClientError` ([#6390])
+- Lp/two step dvpn reg ([#6386])
+- Add extra configured nym api url to env ([#6382])
+- Lp/dvpn psk injection ([#6378])
+- LP: include signing key digests to LP responses ([#6373])
+- Lp/use noise x25519 ([#6372])
+- Topology fallback ([#6363])
+- NS API socks5 support ([#6361])
+- LP: modified LPRemotePeer to dynamically choose required KEM key hash ([#6358])
+- Fix KKT Integration into LP ([#6357])
+- LP: mixnet reg fixes ([#6356])
+- LP: announced KEM key hashes ([#6349])
+- revert faulty drop changes ([#6346])
+- small qol changes ([#6340])
+- Apply configured api urls via env ([#6337])
+- lp chore: make sure to take reserved bytes straight from the header ([#6336])
+- LP: x25519/ed22519 cleanup round ([#6335])
+- Lp/encrypted kkt ([#6331])
+- ensure packets with incompatible versions are rejected ([#6326])
+- standarise lp serialisation: ([#6324])
+- Upgrade to def_guard_wireguard v0.8.0 ([#6315])
+- Max/crates io prep v2 ([#6270])
+
+[#6422]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6422
+[#6420]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6420
+[#6419]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6419
+[#6412]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6412
+[#6411]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6411
+[#6409]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6409
+[#6408]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6408
+[#6404]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6404
+[#6402]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6402
+[#6400]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6400
+[#6399]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6399
+[#6398]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6398
+[#6395]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6395
+[#6394]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6394
+[#6393]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6393
+[#6391]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6391
+[#6390]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6390
+[#6386]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6386
+[#6382]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6382
+[#6378]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6378
+[#6373]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6373
+[#6372]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6372
+[#6363]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6363
+[#6361]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6361
+[#6358]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6358
+[#6357]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6357
+[#6356]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6356
+[#6349]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6349
+[#6346]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6346
+[#6340]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6340
+[#6337]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6337
+[#6336]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6336
+[#6335]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6335
+[#6331]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6331
+[#6326]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6326
+[#6324]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6324
+[#6315]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6315
+[#6270]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6270
+
 ## [2026.2-oscypek] (2026-01-27)
 
 - bugfix: downgrade gateway protocol to clients proposed version ([#6377])

Cargo.toml

@@ -173,9 +173,8 @@ members = [
     "wasm/mix-fetch",
     "wasm/node-tester",
     "wasm/zknym-lib",
-    #    "nym-gateway-probe",
+    "nym-gateway-probe",
     "integration-tests", "common/nym-lp-transport", "common/nym-kkt-ciphersuite",
-    "common/nym-lp-sandbox"
 ]
 
 default-members = [
@@ -186,7 +185,6 @@ default-members = [
     "nym-credential-proxy/nym-credential-proxy",
     "nym-node",
     "nym-node-status-api/nym-node-status-agent",
-    "nym-node-status-api/nym-node-status-api",
     "nym-statistics-api",
     "nym-validator-rewarder",
     "nyx-chain-watcher",
@@ -207,7 +205,7 @@ edition = "2024"
 license = "Apache-2.0"
 rust-version = "1.85"
 readme = "README.md"
-version = "1.20.1"
+version = "1.20.4"
 
 [workspace.dependencies]
 addr = "0.15.6"
@@ -234,7 +232,7 @@ blake3 = "1.7.0"
 bloomfilter = "3.0.1"
 bs58 = "0.5.1"
 bytecodec = "0.4.15"
-bytes = "1.10.1"
+bytes = "1.11.1"
 cargo_metadata = "0.19.2"
 celes = "2.6.0"
 cfg-if = "1.0.0"
@@ -305,6 +303,7 @@ ledger-transport = "0.10.0"
 ledger-transport-hid = "0.10.0"
 log = "0.4"
 mime = "0.3.17"
+mock_instant = "0.6.0"
 moka = { version = "0.12", features = ["future"] }
 nix = "0.30.1"
 notify = "5.1.0"
@@ -321,13 +320,13 @@ publicsuffix = "2.3.0"
 proc_pidinfo = "0.1.3"
 quote = "1"
 rand = "0.8.5"
-rand09 = { package = "rand", version = "0.9.2" }
+rand09 = { package = "rand", version = "=0.9.2" }
 rand_chacha = "0.3"
 rand_core = "0.6.3"
 rand_distr = "0.4"
 rayon = "1.5.1"
 regex = "1.10.6"
-reqwest = { version = "0.12.15", default-features = false }
+reqwest = { version = "0.13.1", default-features = false }
 rs_merkle = "1.5.0"
 schemars = "0.8.22"
 semver = "1.0.26"
@@ -383,7 +382,7 @@ url = "2.5"
 utoipa = "5.2"
 utoipa-swagger-ui = "8.1"
 utoipauto = "0.2"
-uuid = "*"
+uuid = "1.19.0"
 vergen = { version = "=8.3.1", default-features = false }
 vergen-gitcl = { version = "1.0.8", default-features = false }
 walkdir = "2"
@@ -392,119 +391,107 @@ zeroize = "1.7.0"
 
 prometheus = { version = "0.14.0" }
 
-
-# libcrux
-libcrux-kem = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux" }
-libcrux-ecdh = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux" }
-libcrux-chacha20poly1305 = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux" }
-libcrux-psq = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux" }
-libcrux-ml-kem = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux" }
-libcrux-sha3 = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux" }
-libcrux-traits = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux" }
-
-
-
 # Workspace dep definitions required by crates.io publication - we need a workspace version since `cargo workspaces` doesn't work with path imports from crate manifests
-nym-api-requests = { version = "1.20.1", path = "nym-api/nym-api-requests" }
-nym-authenticator-requests = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/authenticator-requests" }
-nym-async-file-watcher = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/async-file-watcher" }
-nym-authenticator-client = { version = "1.20.1", path = "nym-authenticator-client" }
-nym-bandwidth-controller = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/bandwidth-controller" }
-nym-bin-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/bin-common" }
-nym-cache = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nym-cache" }
-nym-client-core = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/client-core", default-features = false }
-nym-client-core-config-types = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/client-core/config-types" }
-nym-client-core-gateways-storage = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/client-core/gateways-storage" }
-nym-client-core-surb-storage = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/client-core/surb-storage" }
-nym-client-websocket-requests = { version = "1.20.1", path = "clients/native/websocket-requests" }
-nym-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nym-common" }
-nym-compact-ecash = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nym_offline_compact_ecash" }
-nym-config = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/config" }
-nym-contracts-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/contracts-common" }
-nym-coconut-dkg-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/coconut-dkg" }
-nym-credential-storage = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/credential-storage" }
-nym-credential-utils = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/credential-utils" }
-nym-credential-proxy-lib = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/credential-proxy" }
-nym-credentials = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/credentials", default-features = false }
-nym-credentials-interface = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/credentials-interface" }
-nym-credential-proxy-requests = { version = "1.20.1", path = "nym-credential-proxy/nym-credential-proxy-requests", default-features = false }
-nym-credential-verification = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/credential-verification" }
-nym-crypto = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/crypto", default-features = false }
-nym-dkg = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/dkg" }
-nym-ecash-contract-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/ecash-contract" }
-nym-ecash-signer-check = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/ecash-signer-check" }
-nym-ecash-signer-check-types = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/ecash-signer-check-types" }
-nym-ecash-time = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/ecash-time" }
-nym-exit-policy = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/exit-policy" }
-nym-ffi-shared = { version = "1.20.1", path = "sdk/ffi/shared" }
-nym-gateway-client = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/client-libs/gateway-client", default-features = false }
-nym-gateway-requests = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/gateway-requests" }
-nym-gateway-storage = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/gateway-storage" }
-nym-gateway-stats-storage = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/gateway-stats-storage" }
-nym-group-contract-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/group-contract" }
-nym-http-api-client = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/http-api-client" }
-nym-http-api-client-macro = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/http-api-client-macro" }
-nym-http-api-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/http-api-common", default-features = false }
-nym-id = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nym-id" }
+nym-api-requests = { version = "1.20.4", path = "nym-api/nym-api-requests" }
+nym-authenticator-requests = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/authenticator-requests" }
+nym-async-file-watcher = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/async-file-watcher" }
+nym-authenticator-client = { version = "1.20.4", path = "nym-authenticator-client" }
+nym-bandwidth-controller = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/bandwidth-controller" }
+nym-bin-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/bin-common" }
+nym-cache = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nym-cache" }
+nym-client-core = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/client-core", default-features = false }
+nym-client-core-config-types = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/client-core/config-types" }
+nym-client-core-gateways-storage = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/client-core/gateways-storage" }
+nym-client-core-surb-storage = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/client-core/surb-storage" }
+nym-client-websocket-requests = { version = "1.20.4", path = "clients/native/websocket-requests" }
+nym-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nym-common" }
+nym-compact-ecash = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nym_offline_compact_ecash" }
+nym-config = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/config" }
+nym-contracts-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/contracts-common" }
+nym-coconut-dkg-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/coconut-dkg" }
+nym-credential-storage = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/credential-storage" }
+nym-credential-utils = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/credential-utils" }
+nym-credential-proxy-lib = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/credential-proxy" }
+nym-credentials = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/credentials", default-features = false }
+nym-credentials-interface = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/credentials-interface" }
+nym-credential-proxy-requests = { version = "1.20.4", path = "nym-credential-proxy/nym-credential-proxy-requests", default-features = false }
+nym-credential-verification = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/credential-verification" }
+nym-crypto = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/crypto", default-features = false }
+nym-dkg = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/dkg" }
+nym-ecash-contract-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/ecash-contract" }
+nym-ecash-signer-check = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/ecash-signer-check" }
+nym-ecash-signer-check-types = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/ecash-signer-check-types" }
+nym-ecash-time = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/ecash-time" }
+nym-exit-policy = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/exit-policy" }
+nym-ffi-shared = { version = "1.20.4", path = "sdk/ffi/shared" }
+nym-gateway-client = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/client-libs/gateway-client", default-features = false }
+nym-gateway-requests = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/gateway-requests" }
+nym-gateway-storage = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/gateway-storage" }
+nym-gateway-stats-storage = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/gateway-stats-storage" }
+nym-group-contract-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/group-contract" }
+nym-http-api-client = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/http-api-client" }
+nym-http-api-client-macro = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/http-api-client-macro" }
+nym-http-api-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/http-api-common", default-features = false }
+nym-id = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nym-id" }
+nym-ip-packet-client = { version = "1.20.4", path = "nym-ip-packet-client" }
+nym-ip-packet-requests = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/ip-packet-requests" }
 nym-kkt-ciphersuite = { path = "common/nym-kkt-ciphersuite" }
-nym-ip-packet-client = { version = "1.20.1", path = "nym-ip-packet-client" }
-nym-ip-packet-requests = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/ip-packet-requests" }
-nym-metrics = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nym-metrics" }
-nym-mixnet-client = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/client-libs/mixnet-client" }
-nym-mixnet-contract-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/mixnet-contract" }
-nym-multisig-contract-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/multisig-contract" }
-nym-network-defaults = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/network-defaults" }
-nym-node-tester-utils = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/node-tester-utils" }
-nym-noise = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymnoise" }
-nym-noise-keys = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymnoise/keys" }
-nym-nonexhaustive-delayqueue = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nonexhaustive-delayqueue" }
-nym-node-requests = { version = "1.20.1", path = "nym-node/nym-node-requests", default-features = false }
-nym-node-metrics = { version = "1.20.1", path = "nym-node/nym-node-metrics" }
-nym-ordered-buffer = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/socks5/ordered-buffer" }
-nym-outfox = { version = "1.20.1", path = "nym-outfox" }
-nym-registration-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/registration" }
-nym-pemstore = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/pemstore" }
-nym-performance-contract-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/nym-performance-contract" }
-nym-sdk = { version = "1.20.1", path = "sdk/rust/nym-sdk" }
-nym-serde-helpers = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/serde-helpers" }
-nym-service-providers-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "service-providers/common" }
-nym-service-provider-requests-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/service-provider-requests-common" }
-nym-socks5-client-core = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/socks5-client-core" }
-nym-socks5-proxy-helpers = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/socks5/proxy-helpers" }
-nym-socks5-requests = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/socks5/requests" }
-nym-sphinx = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymsphinx" }
-nym-sphinx-acknowledgements = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymsphinx/acknowledgements" }
-nym-sphinx-addressing = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymsphinx/addressing" }
-nym-sphinx-anonymous-replies = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymsphinx/anonymous-replies" }
-nym-sphinx-chunking = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymsphinx/chunking" }
-nym-sphinx-cover = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymsphinx/cover" }
-nym-sphinx-forwarding = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymsphinx/forwarding" }
-nym-sphinx-framing = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymsphinx/framing" }
-nym-sphinx-params = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymsphinx/params" }
-nym-sphinx-routing = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymsphinx/routing" }
-nym-sphinx-types = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymsphinx/types" }
-nym-statistics-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/statistics" }
-nym-store-cipher = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/store-cipher" }
-nym-task = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/task" }
-nym-tun = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/tun" }
-nym-test-utils = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/test-utils" }
-nym-ticketbooks-merkle = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/ticketbooks-merkle" }
-nym-topology = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/topology" }
-nym-types = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/types" }
-nym-upgrade-mode-check = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/upgrade-mode-check" }
-nym-validator-client = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/client-libs/validator-client", default-features = false }
-nym-vesting-contract-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/vesting-contract" }
-nym-verloc = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/verloc" }
-nym-wireguard = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/wireguard" }
-nym-wireguard-types = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/wireguard-types" }
-nym-wireguard-private-metadata-shared = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/wireguard-private-metadata/shared" }
-nym-wireguard-private-metadata-client = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/wireguard-private-metadata/client" }
-nym-wireguard-private-metadata-server = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/wireguard-private-metadata/server" }
+nym-metrics = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nym-metrics" }
+nym-mixnet-client = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/client-libs/mixnet-client" }
+nym-mixnet-contract-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/mixnet-contract" }
+nym-multisig-contract-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/multisig-contract" }
+nym-network-defaults = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/network-defaults" }
+nym-node-tester-utils = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/node-tester-utils" }
+nym-noise = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymnoise" }
+nym-noise-keys = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymnoise/keys" }
+nym-nonexhaustive-delayqueue = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nonexhaustive-delayqueue" }
+nym-node-requests = { version = "1.20.4", path = "nym-node/nym-node-requests", default-features = false }
+nym-node-metrics = { version = "1.20.4", path = "nym-node/nym-node-metrics" }
+nym-ordered-buffer = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/socks5/ordered-buffer" }
+nym-outfox = { version = "1.20.4", path = "nym-outfox" }
+nym-registration-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/registration" }
+nym-pemstore = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/pemstore" }
+nym-performance-contract-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/nym-performance-contract" }
+nym-sdk = { version = "1.20.4", path = "sdk/rust/nym-sdk" }
+nym-serde-helpers = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/serde-helpers" }
+nym-service-providers-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "service-providers/common" }
+nym-service-provider-requests-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/service-provider-requests-common" }
+nym-socks5-client-core = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/socks5-client-core" }
+nym-socks5-proxy-helpers = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/socks5/proxy-helpers" }
+nym-socks5-requests = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/socks5/requests" }
+nym-sphinx = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymsphinx" }
+nym-sphinx-acknowledgements = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymsphinx/acknowledgements" }
+nym-sphinx-addressing = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymsphinx/addressing" }
+nym-sphinx-anonymous-replies = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymsphinx/anonymous-replies" }
+nym-sphinx-chunking = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymsphinx/chunking" }
+nym-sphinx-cover = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymsphinx/cover" }
+nym-sphinx-forwarding = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymsphinx/forwarding" }
+nym-sphinx-framing = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymsphinx/framing" }
+nym-sphinx-params = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymsphinx/params" }
+nym-sphinx-routing = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymsphinx/routing" }
+nym-sphinx-types = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymsphinx/types" }
+nym-statistics-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/statistics" }
+nym-store-cipher = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/store-cipher" }
+nym-task = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/task" }
+nym-tun = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/tun" }
+nym-test-utils = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/test-utils" }
+nym-ticketbooks-merkle = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/ticketbooks-merkle" }
+nym-topology = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/topology" }
+nym-types = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/types" }
+nym-upgrade-mode-check = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/upgrade-mode-check" }
+nym-validator-client = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/client-libs/validator-client", default-features = false }
+nym-vesting-contract-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/vesting-contract" }
+nym-verloc = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/verloc" }
+nym-wireguard = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/wireguard" }
+nym-wireguard-types = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/wireguard-types" }
+nym-wireguard-private-metadata-shared = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/wireguard-private-metadata/shared" }
+nym-wireguard-private-metadata-client = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/wireguard-private-metadata/client" }
+nym-wireguard-private-metadata-server = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/wireguard-private-metadata/server" }
 nym-sqlx-pool-guard = { version = "1.2.0", path = "nym-sqlx-pool-guard" }
-nym-wasm-client-core = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/wasm/client-core" }
-nym-wasm-storage = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/wasm/storage" }
-nym-wasm-utils = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/wasm/utils", default-features = false }
-nyxd-scraper-shared = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nyxd-scraper-shared" }
+nym-wasm-client-core = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/wasm/client-core" }
+nym-wasm-storage = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/wasm/storage" }
+nym-wasm-utils = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/wasm/utils", default-features = false }
+nyxd-scraper-shared = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nyxd-scraper-shared" }
 
 # coconut/DKG related
 # unfortunately until https://github.com/zkcrypto/nym-bls12_381-fork/issues/10 is resolved, we have to rely on the fork
@@ -554,7 +541,6 @@ wasm-bindgen-test = "0.3.49"
 wasmtimer = "0.4.1"
 web-sys = "0.3.76"
 
-
 # for local development:
 #[patch.crates-io]
 #sphinx-packet = { path = "../sphinx" }

clients/native/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "nym-client"
-version = "1.1.69"
+version = "1.1.71"
 authors = ["Dave Hrycyszyn <futurechimp@users.noreply.github.com>", "Jędrzej Stuczyński <andrew@nymtech.net>"]
 description = "Implementation of the Nym Client"
 edition = "2021"

clients/native/examples/js-examples/websocket/package.json

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "devDependencies": {
     "clean-webpack-plugin": "^4.0.0",
-    "webpack": "^5.76.0",
+    "webpack": "^5.105.0",
     "webpack-cli": "^4.9.2",
     "webpack-dev-server": "^4.7.4"
   },

clients/socks5/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "nym-socks5-client"
-version = "1.1.69"
+version = "1.1.71"
 authors = ["Dave Hrycyszyn <futurechimp@users.noreply.github.com>"]
 description = "A SOCKS5 localhost proxy that converts incoming messages to Sphinx and sends them to a Nym address"
 edition = "2021"

common/authenticator-requests/src/lib.rs

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ mod util;
 mod version;
 
 pub use error::Error;
+pub use util::{authenticator_ipv4_to_ipv6, authenticator_ipv6_to_ipv4};
 pub use v6 as latest;
 pub use version::AuthenticatorVersion;
 

common/authenticator-requests/src/response.rs

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ use crate::traits::{
     TopUpBandwidthResponse, UpgradeModeStatus,
 };
 use crate::{v2, v3, v4, v5, v6};
+use nym_sphinx::addressing::Recipient;
 
 #[derive(Debug)]
 pub enum AuthenticatorResponse {
@@ -17,6 +18,17 @@ pub enum AuthenticatorResponse {
     UpgradeMode(Box<dyn UpgradeModeStatus + Send + Sync + 'static>),
 }
 
+pub struct SerialisedResponse {
+    pub bytes: Vec<u8>,
+    pub reply_to: Option<Recipient>,
+}
+
+impl SerialisedResponse {
+    pub fn new(bytes: Vec<u8>, reply_to: Option<Recipient>) -> Self {
+        Self { bytes, reply_to }
+    }
+}
+
 impl UpgradeModeStatus for AuthenticatorResponse {
     fn upgrade_mode_status(&self) -> CurrentUpgradeModeStatus {
         match self {

common/authenticator-requests/src/util.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,38 @@
 // Copyright 2024 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 
+use nym_network_defaults::{WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V4, WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6};
+use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};
+
+pub fn authenticator_ipv6_to_ipv4(addr: Ipv6Addr) -> Ipv4Addr {
+    let before_last_byte = addr.octets()[14];
+    let last_byte = addr.octets()[15];
+
+    Ipv4Addr::new(
+        WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V4.octets()[0],
+        WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V4.octets()[1],
+        before_last_byte,
+        last_byte,
+    )
+}
+
+pub fn authenticator_ipv4_to_ipv6(addr: Ipv4Addr) -> Ipv6Addr {
+    let before_last_byte = addr.octets()[2];
+    let last_byte = addr.octets()[3];
+
+    let last_bytes = ((before_last_byte as u16) << 8) | last_byte as u16;
+    Ipv6Addr::new(
+        WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[0],
+        WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[1],
+        WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[2],
+        WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[3],
+        WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[4],
+        WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[5],
+        WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[6],
+        last_bytes,
+    )
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 pub(crate) mod tests {
     pub(crate) const CREDENTIAL_BYTES: [u8; 1245] = [

common/authenticator-requests/src/v4/registration.rs

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 
 use crate::error::Error;
+use crate::util::{authenticator_ipv4_to_ipv6, authenticator_ipv6_to_ipv4};
 use base64::{Engine, engine::general_purpose};
 use nym_credentials_interface::CredentialSpendingData;
-use nym_network_defaults::constants::{WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V4, WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6};
 use nym_wireguard_types::PeerPublicKey;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use std::collections::HashMap;
@@ -56,27 +56,11 @@ impl fmt::Display for IpPair {
 
 impl From<IpAddr> for IpPair {
     fn from(value: IpAddr) -> Self {
-        let (before_last_byte, last_byte) = match value {
-            std::net::IpAddr::V4(ipv4_addr) => (ipv4_addr.octets()[2], ipv4_addr.octets()[3]),
-            std::net::IpAddr::V6(ipv6_addr) => (ipv6_addr.octets()[14], ipv6_addr.octets()[15]),
+        let (ipv4, ipv6) = match value {
+            IpAddr::V4(ipv4) => (ipv4, authenticator_ipv4_to_ipv6(ipv4)),
+            IpAddr::V6(ipv6_addr) => (authenticator_ipv6_to_ipv4(ipv6_addr), ipv6_addr),
         };
-        let last_bytes = ((before_last_byte as u16) << 8) | last_byte as u16;
-        let ipv4 = Ipv4Addr::new(
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V4.octets()[0],
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V4.octets()[1],
-            before_last_byte,
-            last_byte,
-        );
-        let ipv6 = Ipv6Addr::new(
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[0],
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[1],
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[2],
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[3],
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[4],
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[5],
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[6],
-            last_bytes,
-        );
+
         IpPair::new(ipv4, ipv6)
     }
 }

common/authenticator-requests/src/v5/registration.rs

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 
 use crate::error::Error;
+use crate::util::{authenticator_ipv4_to_ipv6, authenticator_ipv6_to_ipv4};
 use base64::{Engine, engine::general_purpose};
 use nym_credentials_interface::CredentialSpendingData;
-use nym_network_defaults::constants::{WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V4, WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6};
 use nym_wireguard_types::PeerPublicKey;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use std::collections::HashMap;
@@ -54,27 +54,11 @@ impl fmt::Display for IpPair {
 
 impl From<IpAddr> for IpPair {
     fn from(value: IpAddr) -> Self {
-        let (before_last_byte, last_byte) = match value {
-            std::net::IpAddr::V4(ipv4_addr) => (ipv4_addr.octets()[2], ipv4_addr.octets()[3]),
-            std::net::IpAddr::V6(ipv6_addr) => (ipv6_addr.octets()[14], ipv6_addr.octets()[15]),
+        let (ipv4, ipv6) = match value {
+            IpAddr::V4(ipv4) => (ipv4, authenticator_ipv4_to_ipv6(ipv4)),
+            IpAddr::V6(ipv6_addr) => (authenticator_ipv6_to_ipv4(ipv6_addr), ipv6_addr),
         };
-        let last_bytes = ((before_last_byte as u16) << 8) | last_byte as u16;
-        let ipv4 = Ipv4Addr::new(
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V4.octets()[0],
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V4.octets()[1],
-            before_last_byte,
-            last_byte,
-        );
-        let ipv6 = Ipv6Addr::new(
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[0],
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[1],
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[2],
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[3],
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[4],
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[5],
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[6],
-            last_bytes,
-        );
+
         IpPair::new(ipv4, ipv6)
     }
 }

common/authenticator-requests/src/v6/registration.rs

@@ -3,13 +3,12 @@
 
 use crate::error::Error;
 use crate::models::BandwidthClaim;
+use crate::util::{authenticator_ipv4_to_ipv6, authenticator_ipv6_to_ipv4};
 use base64::{Engine, engine::general_purpose};
-use nym_network_defaults::constants::{WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V4, WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6};
 use nym_wireguard_types::PeerPublicKey;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use std::collections::HashMap;
 use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};
-use std::time::SystemTime;
 use std::{fmt, ops::Deref, str::FromStr};
 
 #[cfg(feature = "verify")]
@@ -20,13 +19,11 @@ use nym_crypto::asymmetric::x25519::{PrivateKey, PublicKey};
 use sha2::Sha256;
 
 pub type PendingRegistrations = HashMap<PeerPublicKey, RegistrationData>;
-pub type PrivateIPs = HashMap<IpPair, Taken>;
 
 #[cfg(feature = "verify")]
 pub type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
 
 pub type Nonce = u64;
-pub type Taken = Option<SystemTime>;
 
 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct IpPair {
@@ -54,27 +51,11 @@ impl fmt::Display for IpPair {
 
 impl From<IpAddr> for IpPair {
     fn from(value: IpAddr) -> Self {
-        let (before_last_byte, last_byte) = match value {
-            IpAddr::V4(ipv4_addr) => (ipv4_addr.octets()[2], ipv4_addr.octets()[3]),
-            IpAddr::V6(ipv6_addr) => (ipv6_addr.octets()[14], ipv6_addr.octets()[15]),
+        let (ipv4, ipv6) = match value {
+            IpAddr::V4(ipv4) => (ipv4, authenticator_ipv4_to_ipv6(ipv4)),
+            IpAddr::V6(ipv6_addr) => (authenticator_ipv6_to_ipv4(ipv6_addr), ipv6_addr),
         };
-        let last_bytes = ((before_last_byte as u16) << 8) | last_byte as u16;
-        let ipv4 = Ipv4Addr::new(
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V4.octets()[0],
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V4.octets()[1],
-            before_last_byte,
-            last_byte,
-        );
-        let ipv6 = Ipv6Addr::new(
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[0],
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[1],
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[2],
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[3],
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[4],
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[5],
-            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[6],
-            last_bytes,
-        );
+
         IpPair::new(ipv4, ipv6)
     }
 }

common/bandwidth-controller/src/mock.rs

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ pub struct MockBandwidthController {
 impl BandwidthTicketProvider for MockBandwidthController {
     async fn get_ecash_ticket(
         &self,
-        _ticket_type: TicketType,
+        ticket_type: TicketType,
         _gateway_id: PublicKey,
         tickets_to_spend: u32,
     ) -> Result<PreparedCredential, BandwidthControllerError> {
@@ -100,6 +100,10 @@ impl BandwidthTicketProvider for MockBandwidthController {
         let mut credential = CredentialSpendingData::try_from_bytes(&CREDENTIAL_BYTES)
             .expect("Failed to deserialize test credential - this is a bug in the test harness");
 
+        // change the ticket type to the requested ticket
+        // note that verification outside mocks is going to fail
+        credential.payment.t_type = ticket_type.to_repr() as u8;
+
         // Update spend_date to today to pass validation
         credential.spend_date = OffsetDateTime::now_utc().date();
 

common/bandwidth-controller/src/traits.rs

@@ -57,3 +57,22 @@ where
         Ok(Some(token))
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg_attr(target_arch = "wasm32", async_trait(?Send))]
+#[cfg_attr(not(target_arch = "wasm32"), async_trait)]
+impl<T: BandwidthTicketProvider + ?Sized + Send> BandwidthTicketProvider for Box<T> {
+    async fn get_ecash_ticket(
+        &self,
+        ticket_type: TicketType,
+        gateway_id: ed25519::PublicKey,
+        tickets_to_spend: u32,
+    ) -> Result<PreparedCredential, BandwidthControllerError> {
+        (**self)
+            .get_ecash_ticket(ticket_type, gateway_id, tickets_to_spend)
+            .await
+    }
+
+    async fn get_upgrade_mode_token(&self) -> Result<Option<String>, BandwidthControllerError> {
+        (**self).get_upgrade_mode_token().await
+    }
+}

common/bin-common/src/logging/mod.rs

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ pub use opentelemetry;
 pub use opentelemetry_jaeger;
 #[cfg(feature = "tracing")]
 pub use tracing_opentelemetry;
-#[cfg(feature = "tracing")]
+#[cfg(feature = "basic_tracing")]
 pub use tracing_subscriber;
 #[cfg(feature = "tracing")]
 pub use tracing_tree;

common/client-core/src/client/base_client/storage/mod.rs

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ use crate::{
     error::ClientCoreError,
 };
 #[cfg(all(not(target_arch = "wasm32"), feature = "fs-credentials-storage"))]
-use nym_credential_storage::persistent_storage::PersistentStorage as PersistentCredentialStorage;
+pub use nym_credential_storage::persistent_storage::PersistentStorage as PersistentCredentialStorage;
 
 pub use nym_client_core_gateways_storage as gateways_storage;
 pub use nym_client_core_gateways_storage::{GatewaysDetailsStore, InMemGatewaysDetails};

common/client-libs/validator-client/Cargo.toml

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ features = ["json"]
 
 [target."cfg(not(target_arch = \"wasm32\"))".dependencies.reqwest]
 workspace = true
-features = ["json", "rustls-tls"]
+features = ["json", "rustls"]
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 anyhow = { workspace = true }

common/client-libs/validator-client/src/client.rs

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ use nym_api_requests::ecash::{
 };
 use nym_api_requests::models::{
     ApiHealthResponse, GatewayCoreStatusResponse, HistoricalPerformanceResponse,
-    MixnodeCoreStatusResponse, NymNodeDescriptionV1, NymNodeDescriptionV2,
+    MixnodeCoreStatusResponse, NymNodeDescriptionV1,
 };
 use nym_api_requests::nym_nodes::{
     NodesByAddressesResponse, SemiSkimmedNodesWithMetadata, SkimmedNode, SkimmedNodesWithMetadata,
@@ -273,18 +273,18 @@ impl<C, S> Client<C, S> {
         Ok(history)
     }
 
-    #[deprecated(note = "use get_all_cached_described_nodes_v2 instead")]
+    // #[deprecated(note = "use get_all_cached_described_nodes_v2 instead")]
     pub async fn get_all_cached_described_nodes(
         &self,
     ) -> Result<Vec<NymNodeDescriptionV1>, ValidatorClientError> {
         Ok(self.nym_api.get_all_described_nodes().await?)
     }
 
-    pub async fn get_all_cached_described_nodes_v2(
-        &self,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<NymNodeDescriptionV2>, ValidatorClientError> {
-        Ok(self.nym_api.get_all_described_nodes_v2().await?)
-    }
+    // pub async fn get_all_cached_described_nodes_v2(
+    //     &self,
+    // ) -> Result<Vec<NymNodeDescriptionV2>, ValidatorClientError> {
+    //     Ok(self.nym_api.get_all_described_nodes_v2().await?)
+    // }
 
     pub async fn get_all_cached_bonded_nym_nodes(
         &self,
@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ impl NymApiClient {
         Ok(self.nym_api.health().await?)
     }
 
-    #[deprecated(note = "use .get_all_described_nodes_v2 instead")]
+    // #[deprecated(note = "use .get_all_described_nodes_v2 instead")]
     pub async fn get_all_described_nodes(
         &self,
     ) -> Result<Vec<NymNodeDescriptionV1>, ValidatorClientError> {
@@ -495,29 +495,29 @@ impl NymApiClient {
         Ok(descriptions)
     }
 
-    pub async fn get_all_described_nodes_v2(
-        &self,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<NymNodeDescriptionV2>, ValidatorClientError> {
-        // TODO: deal with paging in macro or some helper function or something, because it's the same pattern everywhere
-        let mut page = 0;
-        let mut descriptions = Vec::new();
-
-        loop {
-            let mut res = self
-                .nym_api
-                .get_nodes_described_v2(Some(page), None)
-                .await?;
-
-            descriptions.append(&mut res.data);
-            if descriptions.len() < res.pagination.total {
-                page += 1
-            } else {
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-
-        Ok(descriptions)
-    }
+    // pub async fn get_all_described_nodes_v2(
+    //     &self,
+    // ) -> Result<Vec<NymNodeDescriptionV2>, ValidatorClientError> {
+    //     // TODO: deal with paging in macro or some helper function or something, because it's the same pattern everywhere
+    //     let mut page = 0;
+    //     let mut descriptions = Vec::new();
+    //
+    //     loop {
+    //         let mut res = self
+    //             .nym_api
+    //             .get_nodes_described_v2(Some(page), None)
+    //             .await?;
+    //
+    //         descriptions.append(&mut res.data);
+    //         if descriptions.len() < res.pagination.total {
+    //             page += 1
+    //         } else {
+    //             break;
+    //         }
+    //     }
+    //
+    //     Ok(descriptions)
+    // }
 
     pub async fn get_all_bonded_nym_nodes(
         &self,

common/client-libs/validator-client/src/nym_api/mod.rs

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ use nym_api_requests::ecash::VerificationKeyResponse;
 use nym_api_requests::models::{
     AnnotationResponse, ApiHealthResponse, BinaryBuildInformationOwned, ChainBlocksStatusResponse,
     ChainStatusResponse, KeyRotationInfoResponse, NodePerformanceResponse, NodeRefreshBody,
-    NymNodeDescriptionV1, NymNodeDescriptionV2, PerformanceHistoryResponse, RewardedSetResponse,
+    NymNodeDescriptionV1, PerformanceHistoryResponse, RewardedSetResponse,
     SignerInformationResponse,
 };
 use nym_api_requests::nym_nodes::{
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ pub trait NymApiClientExt: ApiClient {
     }
 
     #[tracing::instrument(level = "debug", skip_all)]
-    #[deprecated(note = "use .get_nodes_described_v2 instead")]
+    // #[deprecated(note = "use .get_nodes_described_v2 instead")]
     async fn get_nodes_described(
         &self,
         page: Option<u32>,
@@ -144,32 +144,32 @@ pub trait NymApiClientExt: ApiClient {
         .await
     }
 
-    #[tracing::instrument(level = "debug", skip_all)]
-    async fn get_nodes_described_v2(
-        &self,
-        page: Option<u32>,
-        per_page: Option<u32>,
-    ) -> Result<PaginatedResponse<NymNodeDescriptionV2>, NymAPIError> {
-        let mut params = Vec::new();
-
-        if let Some(page) = page {
-            params.push(("page", page.to_string()))
-        }
-
-        if let Some(per_page) = per_page {
-            params.push(("per_page", per_page.to_string()))
-        }
-
-        self.get_json(
-            &[
-                routes::V2_API_VERSION,
-                routes::NYM_NODES_ROUTES,
-                routes::NYM_NODES_DESCRIBED,
-            ],
-            &params,
-        )
-        .await
-    }
+    // #[tracing::instrument(level = "debug", skip_all)]
+    // async fn get_nodes_described_v2(
+    //     &self,
+    //     page: Option<u32>,
+    //     per_page: Option<u32>,
+    // ) -> Result<PaginatedResponse<NymNodeDescriptionV2>, NymAPIError> {
+    //     let mut params = Vec::new();
+    //
+    //     if let Some(page) = page {
+    //         params.push(("page", page.to_string()))
+    //     }
+    //
+    //     if let Some(per_page) = per_page {
+    //         params.push(("per_page", per_page.to_string()))
+    //     }
+    //
+    //     self.get_json(
+    //         &[
+    //             routes::V2_API_VERSION,
+    //             routes::NYM_NODES_ROUTES,
+    //             routes::NYM_NODES_DESCRIBED,
+    //         ],
+    //         &params,
+    //     )
+    //     .await
+    // }
 
     async fn get_current_rewarded_set(&self) -> Result<RewardedSetResponse, NymAPIError> {
         self.get_rewarded_set().await
@@ -302,8 +302,8 @@ pub trait NymApiClientExt: ApiClient {
         Ok(SkimmedNodesWithMetadata::new(nodes, metadata))
     }
 
-    #[deprecated(note = "use .get_all_described_nodes_v2 instead")]
-    #[allow(deprecated)]
+    // #[deprecated(note = "use .get_all_described_nodes_v2 instead")]
+    // #[allow(deprecated)]
     async fn get_all_described_nodes(&self) -> Result<Vec<NymNodeDescriptionV1>, NymAPIError> {
         // TODO: deal with paging in macro or some helper function or something, because it's the same pattern everywhere
         let mut page = 0;
@@ -323,24 +323,24 @@ pub trait NymApiClientExt: ApiClient {
         Ok(descriptions)
     }
 
-    async fn get_all_described_nodes_v2(&self) -> Result<Vec<NymNodeDescriptionV2>, NymAPIError> {
-        // TODO: deal with paging in macro or some helper function or something, because it's the same pattern everywhere
-        let mut page = 0;
-        let mut descriptions = Vec::new();
-
-        loop {
-            let mut res = self.get_nodes_described_v2(Some(page), None).await?;
-
-            descriptions.append(&mut res.data);
-            if descriptions.len() < res.pagination.total {
-                page += 1
-            } else {
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-
-        Ok(descriptions)
-    }
+    // async fn (&self) -> Result<Vec<NymNodeDescriptionV2>, NymAPIError> {
+    //     // TODO: deal with paging in macro or some helper function or something, because it's the same pattern everywhere
+    //     let mut page = 0;
+    //     let mut descriptions = Vec::new();
+    //
+    //     loop {
+    //         let mut res = self.get_nodes_described_v2(Some(page), None).await?;
+    //
+    //         descriptions.append(&mut res.data);
+    //         if descriptions.len() < res.pagination.total {
+    //             page += 1
+    //         } else {
+    //             break;
+    //         }
+    //     }
+    //
+    //     Ok(descriptions)
+    // }
 
     #[tracing::instrument(level = "debug", skip_all)]
     async fn get_nym_nodes(

common/commands/src/validator/mixnet/query/query_all_gateways.rs

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ pub struct Args {
 }
 
 pub async fn query(args: Args, client: &QueryClientWithNyxd) {
-    match client.get_all_cached_described_nodes_v2().await {
+    match client.get_all_cached_described_nodes().await {
         Ok(res) => match args.identity_key {
             Some(identity_key) => {
                 let node = res.iter().find(|node| {

common/commands/src/validator/mixnet/query/query_all_mixnodes.rs

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ pub struct Args {
 }
 
 pub async fn query(args: Args, client: &QueryClientWithNyxd) {
-    match client.get_all_cached_described_nodes_v2().await {
+    match client.get_all_cached_described_nodes().await {
         Ok(res) => match args.identity_key {
             Some(identity_key) => {
                 let node = res.iter().find(|node| {

common/credential-proxy/Cargo.toml

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ bs58 = { workspace = true }
 futures = { workspace = true }
 humantime = { workspace = true }
 rand = { workspace = true }
-reqwest = { workspace = true, features = ["rustls-tls"] }
+reqwest = { workspace = true, features = ["rustls"] }
 serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
 serde_json = { workspace = true }
 strum = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }

common/credential-verification/src/lib.rs

@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ pub mod ecash;
 pub mod error;
 pub mod upgrade_mode;
 
+const MOCK_BANDWIDTH: i64 = 2024 * 1024 * 1024;
+
 // Histogram buckets for ecash verification duration (in seconds)
 const ECASH_VERIFICATION_DURATION_BUCKETS: &[f64] =
     &[0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 5.0];
@@ -111,6 +113,13 @@ impl CredentialVerifier {
     }
 
     pub async fn verify(&mut self) -> Result<i64> {
+        if self.ecash_verifier.is_mock() {
+            // if we're in the mock mode (local testing), skip cryptographic verification
+            // and just return a dummy bandwidth value since we don't have blockchain access
+            // Return a reasonable test bandwidth value (e.g., 1GB in bytes)
+            return Ok(MOCK_BANDWIDTH);
+        }
+
         let start = Instant::now();
         nym_metrics::inc!("ecash_verification_attempts");
 

common/credential-verification/src/upgrade_mode.rs

@@ -291,3 +291,40 @@ struct UpgradeModeStateInner {
     // (and dealing with the async consequences of that)
     status: UpgradeModeStatus,
 }
+
+pub mod testing {
+    use crate::UpgradeModeState;
+    use crate::upgrade_mode::{
+        CheckRequest, UpgradeModeCheckConfig, UpgradeModeCheckRequestSender, UpgradeModeDetails,
+    };
+    use futures::channel::mpsc::UnboundedReceiver;
+    use nym_crypto::asymmetric::ed25519;
+    use std::time::Duration;
+
+    pub fn mock_dummy_upgrade_mode_details() -> (UpgradeModeDetails, UnboundedReceiver<CheckRequest>)
+    {
+        let (um_recheck_tx, um_recheck_rx) = futures::channel::mpsc::unbounded();
+
+        const DUMMY_ATTESTER_ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY: [u8; 32] = [
+            108, 49, 193, 21, 126, 161, 249, 85, 242, 207, 74, 195, 238, 6, 64, 149, 201, 140, 248,
+            163, 122, 170, 79, 198, 87, 85, 36, 29, 243, 92, 64, 161,
+        ];
+
+        pub(crate) fn dummy_attester_public_key() -> ed25519::PublicKey {
+            let private_key =
+                ed25519::PrivateKey::from_bytes(&DUMMY_ATTESTER_ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY).unwrap();
+            private_key.public_key()
+        }
+
+        let upgrade_mode_state = UpgradeModeState::new(dummy_attester_public_key());
+        let upgrade_mode_details = UpgradeModeDetails::new(
+            UpgradeModeCheckConfig {
+                // essentially we never want to trigger this in our tests
+                min_staleness_recheck: Duration::from_nanos(1),
+            },
+            UpgradeModeCheckRequestSender::new(um_recheck_tx),
+            upgrade_mode_state.clone(),
+        );
+        (upgrade_mode_details, um_recheck_rx)
+    }
+}

common/crypto/Cargo.toml

@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ cipher = { workspace = true, optional = true }
 x25519-dalek = { workspace = true, features = ["static_secrets"], optional = true }
 ed25519-dalek = { workspace = true, features = ["rand_core"], optional = true }
 rand = { workspace = true, optional = true }
-rand09 = { workspace = true }
 serde_bytes = { workspace = true, optional = true }
 serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"], optional = true }
 sha2 = { workspace = true, optional = true }
@@ -34,7 +33,7 @@ thiserror = { workspace = true }
 zeroize = { workspace = true, optional = true, features = ["zeroize_derive"] }
 
 # internal
-nym-sphinx-types = { workspace = true }
+nym-sphinx-types = { workspace = true, optional = true }
 nym-pemstore = { workspace = true }
 
 [dev-dependencies]
@@ -52,7 +51,7 @@ serde = ["dep:serde", "serde_bytes", "ed25519-dalek/serde", "x25519-dalek/serde"
 asymmetric = ["x25519-dalek", "ed25519-dalek", "curve25519-dalek", "sha2", "zeroize"]
 hashing = ["blake3", "digest", "hkdf", "hmac", "generic-array", "sha2", "zeroize"]
 stream_cipher = ["aes", "ctr", "cipher", "generic-array"]
-sphinx = ["nym-sphinx-types/sphinx"]
+sphinx = ["nym-sphinx-types", "nym-sphinx-types/sphinx"]
 
 [lints]
 workspace = true

common/crypto/src/hkdf.rs

@@ -109,152 +109,3 @@ impl DerivationMaterial {
         }
     }
 }
-
-pub mod blake3 {
-
-    //! Key Derivation Functions using Blake3.
-
-    use blake3::Hasher;
-
-    use rand09::{RngCore, rng};
-    use zeroize::Zeroize;
-
-    pub fn derive_key_blake3_multi_input(
-        info: &str,
-        input_key_material: &[&[u8]],
-        salt: &[u8],
-    ) -> [u8; 32] {
-        let mut hasher = Hasher::new_derive_key(info);
-
-        for input_key in input_key_material {
-            hasher.update(input_key);
-        }
-
-        hasher.update(salt);
-
-        hasher.finalize().as_bytes().to_owned()
-    }
-
-    /// Derives a 32-byte key using Blake3's key derivation mode.
-    ///
-    /// Uses Blake3's built-in `derive_key` function with domain separation via context string.
-    ///
-    /// # Arguments
-    /// * `info` - Context string for domain separation (e.g., "nym-lp-psk-v1")
-    /// * `input_key_material` - Input key material (shared secret from ECDH, etc.)
-    /// * `salt` - Additional salt for freshness (nonce)
-    ///
-    /// # Returns
-    /// 32-byte derived key suitable for use as PSK
-    ///
-    /// # Example
-    /// ```ignore
-    /// let psk = derive_key_blake3("nym-lp-psk-v1", shared_secret.as_bytes(), &salt);
-    /// ```
-    pub fn derive_key_blake3(info: &str, input_key_material: &[u8], salt: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
-        derive_key_blake3_multi_input(info, &[input_key_material], salt)
-    }
-
-    pub fn derive_fresh_key_blake3_multi_input(
-        info: &str,
-        input_key_material: &[&[u8]],
-    ) -> [u8; 32] {
-        let mut salt = [0u8; 32];
-        rng().fill_bytes(&mut salt);
-
-        let derived_key = derive_key_blake3_multi_input(info, input_key_material, &salt);
-
-        // Zeroize salt
-        salt.zeroize();
-
-        derived_key
-    }
-
-    /// Derives a fresh 32-byte key using Blake3's key derivation mode.
-    /// The function calls a random number generator to generate a fresh salt.
-    /// Uses Blake3's built-in `derive_key` function with domain separation via context string.
-    ///
-    /// # Arguments
-    /// * `info` - Context string for domain separation (e.g., "nym-lp-psk-v1")
-    /// * `input_key_material` - Input key material (shared secret from ECDH, etc.)
-    ///
-    /// # Returns
-    /// 32-byte derived key suitable for use as PSK
-    ///
-    /// # Example
-    /// ```ignore
-    /// let psk = derive_fresh_key_blake3("nym-lp-psk-v1", shared_secret.as_bytes());
-    /// ```
-    pub fn derive_fresh_key_blake3(info: &str, input_key_material: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
-        derive_fresh_key_blake3_multi_input(info, &[input_key_material])
-    }
-
-    #[cfg(test)]
-    mod tests {
-        use super::*;
-
-        #[test]
-        fn test_deterministic_derivation() {
-            let context = "test-context";
-            let key_material = b"shared_secret_12345";
-            let salt = b"salt_67890";
-
-            let key1 = derive_key_blake3(context, key_material, salt);
-            let key2 = derive_key_blake3(context, key_material, salt);
-
-            assert_eq!(key1, key2, "Same inputs should produce same output");
-        }
-
-        #[test]
-        fn test_different_contexts_produce_different_keys() {
-            let key_material = b"shared_secret";
-            let salt = b"salt";
-
-            let key1 = derive_key_blake3("context1", key_material, salt);
-            let key2 = derive_key_blake3("context2", key_material, salt);
-
-            assert_ne!(
-                key1, key2,
-                "Different contexts should produce different keys"
-            );
-        }
-
-        #[test]
-        fn test_different_salts_produce_different_keys() {
-            let context = "test-context";
-            let key_material = b"shared_secret";
-
-            let key1 = derive_key_blake3(context, key_material, b"salt1");
-            let key2 = derive_key_blake3(context, key_material, b"salt2");
-
-            assert_ne!(key1, key2, "Different salts should produce different keys");
-        }
-
-        #[test]
-        fn test_different_key_material_produces_different_keys() {
-            let context = "test-context";
-            let salt = b"salt";
-
-            let key1 = derive_key_blake3(context, b"secret1", salt);
-            let key2 = derive_key_blake3(context, b"secret2", salt);
-
-            assert_ne!(
-                key1, key2,
-                "Different key material should produce different keys"
-            );
-        }
-
-        #[test]
-        fn test_output_length() {
-            let key = derive_key_blake3("test", b"key", b"salt");
-            assert_eq!(key.len(), 32, "Output should be exactly 32 bytes");
-        }
-
-        #[test]
-        fn test_empty_inputs() {
-            // Should not panic with empty inputs
-            let key = derive_key_blake3("test", b"", b"");
-            assert_eq!(key.len(), 32);
-        }
-    }
-}

common/crypto/src/kdf.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+// Copyright 2025 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+
+//! Key Derivation Functions using Blake3.
+
+/// Derives a 32-byte key using Blake3's key derivation mode.
+///
+/// Uses Blake3's built-in `derive_key` function with domain separation via context string.
+///
+/// # Arguments
+/// * `context` - Context string for domain separation (e.g., "nym-lp-psk-v1")
+/// * `key_material` - Input key material (shared secret from ECDH, etc.)
+/// * `salt` - Additional salt for freshness (timestamp + nonce)
+///
+/// # Returns
+/// 32-byte derived key suitable for use as PSK
+///
+/// # Example
+/// ```ignore
+/// let psk = derive_key_blake3("nym-lp-psk-v1", shared_secret.as_bytes(), &salt);
+/// ```
+pub fn derive_key_blake3(context: &str, key_material: &[u8], salt: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
+    // Concatenate key_material and salt as input
+    let input = [key_material, salt].concat();
+
+    // Use Blake3's derive_key with context for domain separation
+    // blake3::derive_key returns [u8; 32] directly
+    blake3::derive_key(context, &input)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_deterministic_derivation() {
+        let context = "test-context";
+        let key_material = b"shared_secret_12345";
+        let salt = b"salt_67890";
+
+        let key1 = derive_key_blake3(context, key_material, salt);
+        let key2 = derive_key_blake3(context, key_material, salt);
+
+        assert_eq!(key1, key2, "Same inputs should produce same output");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_different_contexts_produce_different_keys() {
+        let key_material = b"shared_secret";
+        let salt = b"salt";
+
+        let key1 = derive_key_blake3("context1", key_material, salt);
+        let key2 = derive_key_blake3("context2", key_material, salt);
+
+        assert_ne!(
+            key1, key2,
+            "Different contexts should produce different keys"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_different_salts_produce_different_keys() {
+        let context = "test-context";
+        let key_material = b"shared_secret";
+
+        let key1 = derive_key_blake3(context, key_material, b"salt1");
+        let key2 = derive_key_blake3(context, key_material, b"salt2");
+
+        assert_ne!(key1, key2, "Different salts should produce different keys");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_different_key_material_produces_different_keys() {
+        let context = "test-context";
+        let salt = b"salt";
+
+        let key1 = derive_key_blake3(context, b"secret1", salt);
+        let key2 = derive_key_blake3(context, b"secret2", salt);
+
+        assert_ne!(
+            key1, key2,
+            "Different key material should produce different keys"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_output_length() {
+        let key = derive_key_blake3("test", b"key", b"salt");
+        assert_eq!(key.len(), 32, "Output should be exactly 32 bytes");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_empty_inputs() {
+        // Should not panic with empty inputs
+        let key = derive_key_blake3("test", b"", b"");
+        assert_eq!(key.len(), 32);
+    }
+}

common/crypto/src/lib.rs

@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ pub mod crypto_hash;
 pub mod hkdf;
 #[cfg(feature = "hashing")]
 pub mod hmac;
+#[cfg(feature = "hashing")]
+pub mod kdf;
 #[cfg(all(feature = "asymmetric", feature = "hashing", feature = "stream_cipher"))]
 pub mod shared_key;
 pub mod symmetric;

common/ecash-signer-check/Cargo.toml

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ description = "Functions to interact with zknym signers, checking their status a
 futures = { workspace = true }
 thiserror = { workspace = true }
 semver = { workspace = true }
+serde = { workspace = true }
 tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["time"] }
 tracing = { workspace = true }
 url = { workspace = true }

common/ecash-signer-check/src/lib.rs

@@ -3,14 +3,9 @@
 
 use crate::client_check::check_client;
 use futures::stream::{FuturesUnordered, StreamExt};
+use nym_ecash_signer_check_types::status::{SignerResult, Status};
 use nym_network_defaults::NymNetworkDetails;
 use nym_validator_client::QueryHttpRpcNyxdClient;
-use nym_validator_client::nyxd::contract_traits::{DkgQueryClient, PagedDkgQueryClient};
-use std::collections::HashMap;
-use url::Url;
-
-pub use error::SignerCheckError;
-use nym_ecash_signer_check_types::status::{SignerResult, Status};
 use nym_validator_client::ecash::models::EcashSignerStatusResponse;
 use nym_validator_client::models::{
     ChainBlocksStatusResponse, ChainStatusResponse, SignerInformationResponse,
@@ -18,6 +13,12 @@ use nym_validator_client::models::{
 use nym_validator_client::nyxd::contract_traits::dkg_query_client::{
     ContractVKShare, DealerDetails, Epoch,
 };
+use nym_validator_client::nyxd::contract_traits::{DkgQueryClient, PagedDkgQueryClient};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use url::Url;
+
+pub use error::SignerCheckError;
 
 mod client_check;
 pub mod error;
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ pub type TypedSignerResult = SignerResult<
 pub type LocalChainStatus = Status<ChainStatusResponse, ChainBlocksStatusResponse>;
 pub type SigningStatus = Status<SignerInformationResponse, EcashSignerStatusResponse>;
 
+#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct SignersTestResult {
     pub threshold: Option<u64>,
     pub results: Vec<TypedSignerResult>,

common/http-api-client/Cargo.toml

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ debug-inventory = ["nym-http-api-client-macro/debug-inventory"]
 async-trait = { workspace = true }
 bincode = { workspace = true }
 cfg-if = { workspace = true}
-reqwest = { workspace = true, features = ["json", "gzip", "deflate", "brotli", "zstd", "rustls-tls"] }
+reqwest = { workspace = true, features = ["json", "gzip", "deflate", "brotli", "zstd", "rustls"] }
 http.workspace = true
 url = { workspace = true }
 once_cell = { workspace = true }

common/http-api-client/src/dns.rs

@@ -46,7 +46,10 @@ use std::{
     collections::HashMap,
     net::{IpAddr, SocketAddr},
     str::FromStr,
-    sync::{Arc, LazyLock},
+    sync::{
+        Arc, LazyLock,
+        atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering::Relaxed},
+    },
     time::Duration,
 };
 
@@ -70,14 +73,23 @@ pub(crate) const DEFAULT_QUERY_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5);
 
 impl ClientBuilder {
     /// Override the DNS resolver implementation used by the underlying http client.
+    /// This forces the use of an independent request executor (via [`Self::non_shared`]).
     pub fn dns_resolver<R: Resolve + 'static>(mut self, resolver: Arc<R>) -> Self {
-        self.reqwest_client_builder = self.reqwest_client_builder.dns_resolver(resolver);
+        self = self.non_shared();
+        // because of the call to non-shared this conditional should always run.
+        if let Some(rb) = self.reqwest_client_builder {
+            self.reqwest_client_builder = Some(rb.dns_resolver(resolver));
+        }
         self.use_secure_dns = false;
         self
     }
 
-    /// Override the DNS resolver implementation used by the underlying http client.
+    /// Override the DNS resolver implementation used by the underlying http client. If
+    /// [`Self::dns_resolver`] is called directly that will take priority over this, there is no
+    /// need to call both.
+    /// This forces the use of an independent request executor (via [`Self::non_shared`]).
     pub fn no_hickory_dns(mut self) -> Self {
+        self = self.non_shared();
         self.use_secure_dns = false;
         self
     }
@@ -129,7 +141,8 @@ pub struct HickoryDnsResolver {
     // Tokio Runtime in initialization, so we must delay the actual
     // construction of the resolver.
     state: Arc<OnceCell<TokioResolver>>,
-    fallback: Option<Arc<OnceCell<TokioResolver>>>,
+    use_system: Arc<AtomicBool>,
+    system_resolver: Arc<OnceCell<TokioResolver>>,
     static_base: Option<Arc<OnceCell<StaticResolver>>>,
     use_shared: bool,
     /// Overall timeout for dns lookup associated with any individual host resolution. For example,
@@ -141,7 +154,8 @@ impl Default for HickoryDnsResolver {
     fn default() -> Self {
         Self {
             state: Default::default(),
-            fallback: Default::default(),
+            use_system: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
+            system_resolver: Default::default(),
             static_base: Some(Default::default()),
             use_shared: true,
             overall_dns_timeout: DEFAULT_OVERALL_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT,
@@ -151,16 +165,28 @@ impl Default for HickoryDnsResolver {
 
 impl Resolve for HickoryDnsResolver {
     fn resolve(&self, name: Name) -> Resolving {
-        let resolver = self.state.clone();
-        let maybe_fallback = self.fallback.clone();
-        let maybe_static = self.static_base.clone();
+        let use_system = self.use_system.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
         let use_shared = self.use_shared;
+        let resolver = if use_system {
+            match self
+                .system_resolver
+                .get_or_try_init(|| HickoryDnsResolver::new_resolver_system(use_shared))
+            {
+                Ok(r) => r.clone(),
+                Err(e) => return Box::pin(return_err(e)),
+            }
+        } else {
+            self.state
+                .get_or_init(|| HickoryDnsResolver::new_resolver(use_shared))
+                .clone()
+        };
+
+        let maybe_static = self.static_base.clone();
         let overall_dns_timeout = self.overall_dns_timeout;
         Box::pin(async move {
             resolve(
                 name,
                 resolver,
-                maybe_fallback,
                 maybe_static,
                 use_shared,
                 overall_dns_timeout,
@@ -171,16 +197,17 @@ impl Resolve for HickoryDnsResolver {
     }
 }
 
+async fn return_err(e: ResolveError) -> Result<Addrs, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
+    Err(Box::new(e) as Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>)
+}
+
 async fn resolve(
     name: Name,
-    resolver: Arc<OnceCell<TokioResolver>>,
-    maybe_fallback: Option<Arc<OnceCell<TokioResolver>>>,
+    resolver: TokioResolver,
     maybe_static: Option<Arc<OnceCell<StaticResolver>>>,
     independent: bool,
     overall_dns_timeout: Duration,
 ) -> Result<Addrs, ResolveError> {
-    let resolver = resolver.get_or_init(|| HickoryDnsResolver::new_resolver(independent));
-
     // try checking the static table to see if any of the addresses in the table have been
     // looked up previously within the timeout to where we are not yet ready to try the
     // default resolver yet again.
@@ -214,22 +241,6 @@ async fn resolve(
         }
     };
 
-    // If the primary resolver encountered an error, attempt a lookup using the fallback
-    // resolver if one is configured.
-    if let Some(ref fallback) = maybe_fallback {
-        let resolver =
-            fallback.get_or_try_init(|| HickoryDnsResolver::new_resolver_system(independent))?;
-
-        let resolve_fut =
-            tokio::time::timeout(overall_dns_timeout, resolver.lookup_ip(name.as_str()));
-        if let Ok(Ok(lookup)) = resolve_fut.await {
-            let addrs: Addrs = Box::new(SocketAddrs {
-                iter: lookup.into_iter(),
-            });
-            return Ok(addrs);
-        }
-    }
-
     // If no record has been found and a static map of fallback addresses is configured
     // check the table for our entry
     if let Some(ref static_resolver) = maybe_static {
@@ -258,6 +269,11 @@ impl Iterator for SocketAddrs {
 }
 
 impl HickoryDnsResolver {
+    /// Returns an instance of the shared resolver.
+    pub fn shared() -> Self {
+        SHARED_RESOLVER.clone()
+    }
+
     /// Attempt to resolve a domain name to a set of ['IpAddr']s
     pub async fn resolve_str(
         &self,
@@ -265,10 +281,20 @@ impl HickoryDnsResolver {
     ) -> Result<impl Iterator<Item = IpAddr> + use<>, ResolveError> {
         let n =
             Name::from_str(name).map_err(|_| ResolveError::InvalidNameError(name.to_string()))?;
+        let use_system = self.use_system.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
+        let resolver = if use_system {
+            self.system_resolver
+                .get_or_try_init(|| HickoryDnsResolver::new_resolver_system(self.use_shared))?
+                .clone()
+        } else {
+            self.state
+                .get_or_init(|| HickoryDnsResolver::new_resolver(self.use_shared))
+                .clone()
+        };
+
         resolve(
             n,
-            self.state.clone(),
-            self.fallback.clone(),
+            resolver,
             self.static_base.clone(),
             self.use_shared,
             self.overall_dns_timeout,
@@ -298,13 +324,11 @@ impl HickoryDnsResolver {
     fn new_resolver_system(use_shared: bool) -> Result<TokioResolver, ResolveError> {
         // using a closure here is slightly gross, but this makes sure that if the
         // lazy-init returns an error it can be handled by the client
-        if !use_shared || SHARED_RESOLVER.fallback.is_none() {
+        if !use_shared {
             new_resolver_system()
         } else {
             Ok(SHARED_RESOLVER
-                .fallback
-                .as_ref()
-                .unwrap()
+                .system_resolver
                 .get_or_try_init(new_resolver_system)?
                 .clone())
         }
@@ -320,45 +344,80 @@ impl HickoryDnsResolver {
         }
     }
 
-    /// Enable fallback to the system default resolver if the primary (DoX) resolver fails
-    pub fn enable_system_fallback(&mut self) -> Result<(), ResolveError> {
-        self.fallback = Some(Default::default());
-        let _ = self
-            .fallback
-            .as_ref()
-            .unwrap()
-            .get_or_try_init(new_resolver_system)?;
+    /// Swap the primary internal resolver to the system resolver rather than the
+    /// configured custom resolver.
+    pub fn use_system_resolver(&self) {
+        self.use_system.store(true, Relaxed);
 
-        // IF THIS INSTANCE IS A FRONT FOR THE SHARED RESOLVER SHOULDN'T THIS FN ENABLE THE SYSTEM FALLBACK FOR THE SHARED RESOLVER TOO?
-        // if self.use_shared {
-        //     SHARED_RESOLVER.enable_system_fallback()?;
-        // }
-        Ok(())
+        if self.use_shared {
+            SHARED_RESOLVER.use_system_resolver();
+        }
     }
 
-    /// Disable fallback resolution. If the primary resolver fails the error is
-    /// returned immediately
-    pub fn disable_system_fallback(&mut self) {
-        self.fallback = None;
+    /// Swap the primary internal resolver to the configured custom resolver rather than the
+    /// system resolver.
+    pub fn use_configured_resolver(&self) {
+        self.use_system.store(false, Relaxed);
 
-        // // IF THIS INSTANCE IS A FRONT FOR THE SHARED RESOLVER SHOULDN'T THIS FN ENABLE THE SYSTEM FALLBACK FOR THE SHARED RESOLVER TOO?
-        // if self.use_shared {
-        //     SHARED_RESOLVER.fallback = None;
-        // }
+        if self.use_shared {
+            SHARED_RESOLVER.use_configured_resolver();
+        }
     }
 
-    /// Get the current map of hostname to address in use by the fallback static lookup if one
+    /// Clear entries from the static table that would return entries during the pre-resolve stage.
+    /// This means that all lookups will attempt to use the network resolver again before the static
+    /// table is consulted.
+    ///  
+    /// Entries elevated to pre-resolve from fallback (added from default or using
+    /// [`set_fallback`]`) will have their cache timeout cleared. Entries added directly to
+    /// pre-resolve (using [`Self::set_static_preresolve`]) will be removed.
+    pub fn clear_preresolve(&self) {
+        debug!("clearing pre-resolve table");
+        if let Some(cell) = &self.static_base
+            && let Some(static_base) = cell.get()
+        {
+            static_base.clear_preresolve()
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Get the current map of hostnames to addresses used in the fallback static lookup stage if one
     /// exists.
     pub fn get_static_fallbacks(&self) -> Option<HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>>> {
-        Some(self.static_base.as_ref()?.get()?.get_addrs())
+        Some(self.static_base.as_ref()?.get()?.get_fallback_addrs())
     }
 
     /// Set (or overwrite) the map of addresses used in the fallback static hostname lookup
-    pub fn set_static_fallbacks(&mut self, addrs: HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>>) {
-        let cell = OnceCell::new();
-        cell.set(StaticResolver::new(addrs))
-            .expect("infallible assign");
-        self.static_base = Some(Arc::new(cell));
+    pub fn set_fallback_addrs(&mut self, addrs: HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>>) {
+        debug!("setting fallback entries for {:?}", addrs.keys());
+        if self.static_base.is_none() {
+            let cell = OnceCell::new();
+            self.static_base = Some(Arc::new(cell));
+        }
+        self.static_base
+            .as_ref()
+            .unwrap()
+            .get_or_init(|| Self::new_static_fallback(self.use_shared))
+            .set_fallback(addrs);
+    }
+
+    /// Get the current map of hostnames to addresses used in the preresolve static lookup stage
+    /// if one exists.
+    pub fn get_static_preresolve(&self) -> Option<HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>>> {
+        Some(self.static_base.as_ref()?.get()?.get_preresolve_addrs())
+    }
+
+    /// Set (or overwrite) the map of addresses used in the preresolve static hostname lookup
+    pub fn set_static_preresolve(&mut self, addrs: HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>>) {
+        debug!("setting pre-resolve entries for {:?}", addrs.keys());
+        if self.static_base.is_none() {
+            let cell = OnceCell::new();
+            self.static_base = Some(Arc::new(cell));
+        }
+        self.static_base
+            .as_ref()
+            .unwrap()
+            .get_or_init(|| Self::new_static_fallback(self.use_shared))
+            .set_preresolve(addrs);
     }
 
     /// Successfully resolved addresses are cached for a minimum of 30 minutes
@@ -495,7 +554,7 @@ fn new_resolver_system() -> Result<TokioResolver, ResolveError> {
 }
 
 fn new_default_static_fallback() -> StaticResolver {
-    StaticResolver::new(constants::default_static_addrs())
+    StaticResolver::new().with_fallback(constants::default_static_addrs())
 }
 
 /// Do a trial resolution using each nameserver individually to test which are working and which
@@ -532,10 +591,7 @@ mod test {
     use super::*;
     use itertools::Itertools;
     use std::collections::HashMap;
-    use std::{
-        net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr},
-        time::Instant,
-    };
+    use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};
 
     /// IP addresses guaranteed to fail attempts to resolve
     ///
@@ -552,7 +608,7 @@ mod test {
         let var_name = HickoryDnsResolver::default();
         let resolver = var_name;
         let client = reqwest::ClientBuilder::new()
-            .dns_resolver(resolver.into())
+            .dns_resolver(resolver)
             .build()
             .unwrap();
 
@@ -597,7 +653,7 @@ mod test {
         let example_ip6: IpAddr = "dead::beef".parse().unwrap();
         addr_map.insert(example_domain.to_string(), vec![example_ip4, example_ip6]);
 
-        resolver.set_static_fallbacks(addr_map);
+        resolver.set_fallback_addrs(addr_map);
 
         let mut addrs = resolver.resolve_str(example_domain).await?;
         assert!(addrs.contains(&example_ip4));
@@ -738,18 +794,19 @@ mod test {
         }
 
         #[tokio::test]
-        #[ignore]
-        // this test is dependent of external network setup -- i.e. blocking all traffic to the default
-        // resolvers. Otherwise the default resolvers will succeed without using the static fallback,
-        // making the test pointless
+        #[cfg(any())] // #[ignore] we run --ignore in CI/CD assuming it just means slow -_-
+        // This test impacts the state of the shared resolver and as such is disabled to avoid
+        // interference with other tests.
+        //
+        // this test is dependent of external network setup -- i.e. blocking all traffic to the
+        // default resolvers. Otherwise the default resolvers will succeed without using the static
+        // fallback, making the test pointless
         async fn dns_lookup_failure_on_shared() -> Result<(), ResolveError> {
-            let time_start = Instant::now();
-            let r = OnceCell::new();
-            r.set(build_broken_resolver().expect("failed to build resolver"))
-                .expect("broken resolver init error");
+            let resolver1 = HickoryDnsResolver::shared();
 
-            // create a new resolver that won't mess with the shared resolver used by other tests
-            let resolver = HickoryDnsResolver::default();
+            let time_start = std::time::Instant::now();
+            // create a new resolver that uses the shared resolver
+            let resolver = HickoryDnsResolver::shared();
 
             // successful lookup using fallback to static resolver
             let domain = "rpc.nymtech.net";
@@ -758,9 +815,27 @@ mod test {
                 .await
                 .expect("failed to resolve address in static lookup");
 
-            println!(
-                "{}ms resolved {domain}",
-                (Instant::now() - time_start).as_millis()
+            let lookup_dur = Instant::now() - time_start;
+            assert!(
+                lookup_dur > resolver.overall_dns_timeout,
+                "expected lookup timeout - took {}ms",
+                (lookup_dur).as_millis()
+            );
+
+            let time_start = std::time::Instant::now();
+            // successful lookup using pre-resolve entry promoted from fallback
+            let domain = "rpc.nymtech.net";
+            let _ = resolver1
+                .resolve_str(domain)
+                .await
+                .expect("domain expected to be in pre-resolve");
+
+            // this lookup should basically be instant as we are using pre-resolve
+            let lookup_dur = std::time::Instant::now() - time_start;
+            assert!(
+                lookup_dur < Duration::from_millis(10),
+                "expected instant - took {}ms",
+                (lookup_dur).as_millis()
             );
 
             // unsuccessful lookup - primary times out, and not in static table
@@ -771,5 +846,62 @@ mod test {
             // assert!(result.is_err_and(|e| matches!(e, ResolveError::ResolveError(e) if e.is_nx_domain())));
             Ok(())
         }
+
+        #[tokio::test]
+        #[cfg(any())] // #[ignore] we run --ignore in CI/CD assuming it just means slow -_-
+        // This test impacts the state of the shared resolver and as such is disabled to avoid
+        // interference with other tests.
+        async fn setting_dns_fallbacks_with_shared_resolver() -> Result<(), ResolveError> {
+            let resolver1 = HickoryDnsResolver::shared();
+
+            // create a new resolver that uses the shared resolver
+            let mut resolver = HickoryDnsResolver::shared();
+
+            let example_domains = [
+                String::from("static1.nymvpn.com"),
+                String::from("static2.nymvpn.com"),
+            ];
+            let mut addr_map1 = HashMap::new();
+            addr_map1.insert(
+                example_domains[0].clone(),
+                vec![Ipv4Addr::new(10, 10, 10, 10).into()],
+            );
+            addr_map1.insert(
+                example_domains[1].clone(),
+                vec![Ipv4Addr::new(1, 1, 1, 1).into()],
+            );
+
+            resolver.set_static_preresolve(addr_map1);
+
+            let time_start = std::time::Instant::now();
+            // successful lookup using pre-resolve entry promoted from fallback
+            let _ = resolver1
+                .resolve_str(&example_domains[0])
+                .await
+                .expect("domain expected to be in pre-resolve");
+
+            // this lookup should basically be instant as we are using pre-resolve
+            let lookup_dur = std::time::Instant::now() - time_start;
+            assert!(
+                lookup_dur < Duration::from_millis(10),
+                "expected instant - took {}ms",
+                (lookup_dur).as_millis()
+            );
+
+            // After clearing the pre-resolve in one instance of the shared resolver ...
+            resolver.clear_preresolve();
+
+            // ... other instances have their pre-resolve entries cleared.
+            let prereslve_lookup = resolver1
+                .static_base
+                .as_ref()
+                .unwrap()
+                .get()
+                .unwrap()
+                .pre_resolve(&example_domains[0]);
+            assert!(prereslve_lookup.is_none());
+
+            Ok(())
+        }
     }
 }

common/http-api-client/src/dns/constants.rs

@@ -51,6 +51,9 @@ pub const VERCEL_COM_IPS: &[IpAddr] = &[
     IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(198, 169, 1, 193)),
 ];
 
+pub const NYM_API_CDN: &str = "cdn1.media-platform.net";
+pub const NYM_API_CDN_IPS: &[IpAddr] = &[IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(172, 104, 178, 252))];
+
 pub const NYM_COM_DOMAIN: &str = "nym.com";
 pub const NYM_COM_IPS: &[IpAddr] = &[IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(76, 76, 21, 22))];
 
@@ -69,6 +72,12 @@ pub const NYM_RPC_IPS: &[IpAddr] = &[
     )),
 ];
 
+#[allow(unused)]
+pub fn empty_static_addrs() -> HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>> {
+    HashMap::new()
+}
+
+#[allow(unused)]
 pub fn default_static_addrs() -> HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>> {
     let mut m = HashMap::new();
     m.insert(NYM_API_DOMAIN.to_string(), NYM_API_IPS.to_vec());
@@ -88,6 +97,7 @@ pub fn default_static_addrs() -> HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>> {
     m.insert(YELP_FASTLY_DOMAIN.to_string(), YELP_FASTLY_IPS.to_vec());
     m.insert(VERCEL_APP_DOMAIN.to_string(), VERCEL_APP_IPS.to_vec());
     m.insert(VERCEL_COM_DOMAIN.to_string(), VERCEL_COM_IPS.to_vec());
+    m.insert(NYM_API_CDN.to_string(), NYM_API_CDN_IPS.to_vec());
     m.insert(NYM_COM_DOMAIN.to_string(), NYM_COM_IPS.to_vec());
     m.insert(NYM_STATS_API_DOMAIN.to_string(), NYM_STATS_API_IPS.to_vec());
     m.insert(NYM_RPC_DOMAIN.to_string(), NYM_RPC_IPS.to_vec());

common/http-api-client/src/dns/static_resolver.rs

@@ -14,42 +14,78 @@ const DEFAULT_PRE_RESOLVE_TIMEOUT: Duration = super::DEFAULT_POSITIVE_LOOKUP_CAC
 
 #[derive(Debug, Default, Clone)]
 pub struct StaticResolver {
-    static_addr_map: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, Entry>>>,
+    fallback_addr_map: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>>>>,
+    preresolve_addr_map: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, Entry>>>,
     pre_resolve_timeout: Option<Duration>,
 }
 
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
+enum PreResolveStatus {
+    #[default]
+    Valid,
+    ValidUntil(Instant),
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
 struct Entry {
-    valid_for_pre_resolve_until: Option<Instant>,
+    status: PreResolveStatus,
     addrs: Vec<IpAddr>,
 }
 
 impl Entry {
     fn new(addrs: Vec<IpAddr>) -> Self {
         Self {
-            valid_for_pre_resolve_until: None,
+            status: PreResolveStatus::Valid,
             addrs,
         }
     }
+
+    fn new_timeout(addrs: Vec<IpAddr>, timeout: Duration) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            status: PreResolveStatus::ValidUntil(Instant::now() + timeout),
+            addrs,
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn is_valid(&self) -> bool {
+        match self.status {
+            PreResolveStatus::Valid => true,
+            PreResolveStatus::ValidUntil(t) => t > Instant::now(),
+        }
+    }
 }
 
 impl StaticResolver {
-    pub fn new(static_entries: HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>>) -> StaticResolver {
-        debug!("building static resolver");
-        let static_entries = static_entries
-            .into_iter()
-            .map(|(name, ips)| (name, Entry::new(ips)))
-            .collect();
+    pub fn new() -> StaticResolver {
         Self {
-            static_addr_map: Arc::new(Mutex::new(static_entries)),
+            fallback_addr_map: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
+            preresolve_addr_map: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
             pre_resolve_timeout: Some(DEFAULT_PRE_RESOLVE_TIMEOUT),
         }
     }
 
-    /// Return the full set of domain names and associated addresses stored in this static lookup table
-    pub fn get_addrs(&self) -> HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>> {
+    /// Initialize the contents of the pre-resolve table for this instance of the static resolver
+    #[allow(unused)]
+    pub fn with_preresolve(mut self, entries: HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>>) -> Self {
+        let entries = entries
+            .into_iter()
+            .map(|(name, ips)| (name, Entry::new(ips)))
+            .collect();
+        self.preresolve_addr_map = Arc::new(Mutex::new(entries));
+        self
+    }
+
+    /// Initialize the contenes of the fallback table for this instance of the static resolver
+    pub fn with_fallback(mut self, entries: HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>>) -> Self {
+        self.fallback_addr_map = Arc::new(Mutex::new(entries));
+        self
+    }
+
+    /// Return the set of domain names and associated addresses stored in the pre-resolve static
+    /// lookup table
+    pub fn get_preresolve_addrs(&self) -> HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>> {
         let mut out = HashMap::new();
-        self.static_addr_map
+        self.preresolve_addr_map
             .lock()
             .unwrap()
             .iter()
@@ -59,6 +95,38 @@ impl StaticResolver {
         out
     }
 
+    /// Return the set of domain names and associated addresses stored in the fallback static lookup
+    /// table
+    pub fn get_fallback_addrs(&self) -> HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>> {
+        self.fallback_addr_map.lock().unwrap().clone()
+    }
+
+    /// Set (or overwrite) the map of static addresses to be returned only after attempting a lookup
+    /// over the network resolver.
+    pub fn set_fallback(&self, addrs: HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>>) {
+        self.fallback_addr_map.lock().unwrap().extend(addrs);
+    }
+
+    /// Clear entries from the static table that would return entries during the pre-resolve stage.
+    /// This means that all lookups will attempt to use the network resolver again before the static
+    /// table is consulted.
+    ///  
+    /// Entries elevated to pre-resolve from fallback (added from default or using
+    /// [`set_fallback`]`) will have their cache timeout cleared. Entries added directly to
+    /// pre-resolve (using [`Self::preresolve_to_addrs`]) will be removed.
+    pub fn clear_preresolve(&self) {
+        *self.preresolve_addr_map.lock().unwrap() = HashMap::new();
+    }
+
+    /// Set (or overwrite) the map of static addresses and mark these domains to be returned
+    /// WITHOUT attempting a lookup over the network resolver.
+    pub fn set_preresolve(&self, addrs: HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>>) {
+        let mut current_map = self.preresolve_addr_map.lock().unwrap();
+        for (domain, ips) in addrs.into_iter() {
+            _ = current_map.insert(domain, Entry::new(ips))
+        }
+    }
+
     /// Change the timeout for which domains can be pre-resolved after they are looked up in the
     /// static lookup table.
     #[allow(unused)]
@@ -71,44 +139,58 @@ impl StaticResolver {
     /// recently (within the configured timeout) looked it up previously in this static table using
     /// a regular resolve.
     pub fn pre_resolve(&self, name: &str) -> Option<Vec<IpAddr>> {
-        debug!("found {name:?} in pre-resolve static table resolver");
-
-        self.pre_resolve_timeout?;
-
-        self.static_addr_map
+        self.preresolve_addr_map
             .lock()
             .unwrap()
             .get(name)
-            .filter(|e| {
-                e.valid_for_pre_resolve_until
-                    .is_some_and(|t| t > Instant::now())
+            .filter(|entry| entry.is_valid())
+            .map(|entry| {
+                debug!("pre-resolve lookup hit for \"{name:?}\" in static table resolver");
+                entry.addrs.clone()
             })
-            .map(|e| e.addrs.clone())
     }
 
     #[allow(unused)]
     pub fn resolve_str(&self, name: &str) -> Option<Vec<IpAddr>> {
         Self::resolve_inner(
-            self.static_addr_map.lock().unwrap(),
+            self.fallback_addr_map.lock().unwrap(),
+            self.preresolve_addr_map.lock().unwrap(),
             name,
             self.pre_resolve_timeout,
         )
-        .map(|e| e.addrs)
     }
 
     fn resolve_inner(
-        mut table: MutexGuard<'_, HashMap<String, Entry>>,
+        fallback_table: MutexGuard<'_, HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>>>,
+        mut preresolve_table: MutexGuard<'_, HashMap<String, Entry>>,
         name: &str,
-        timeout: Option<Duration>,
-    ) -> Option<Entry> {
-        let resolved = table.get_mut(name)?;
+        pre_resolve_cache_timeout: Option<Duration>,
+    ) -> Option<Vec<IpAddr>> {
+        let resolved = fallback_table.get(name)?;
 
-        debug!("found {name:?} in static table resolver");
+        debug!("lookup hit for \"{name:?}\" in static table resolver");
 
-        if let Some(pre_resolve_timeout) = timeout {
-            // We had to look this entry up and a pre-resolve duration is defined, so it will
-            // trigger in pre-resolve lookups for the next _timeout_ window.
-            resolved.valid_for_pre_resolve_until = Some(Instant::now() + pre_resolve_timeout);
+        // We had to look this entry up and a pre-resolve duration is defined, so it will
+        // trigger in pre-resolve lookups for the next _timeout_ window if it wasn't already
+        // triggering.
+        if let Some(pre_resolve_timeout) = pre_resolve_cache_timeout {
+            match preresolve_table.get_mut(name) {
+                None => {
+                    _ = preresolve_table.insert(
+                        name.to_string(),
+                        Entry::new_timeout(resolved.clone(), pre_resolve_timeout),
+                    );
+                }
+                // Not sure how we would get cases where this is Some( ) -- it requires having a
+                // Valid entry in the preresolve table and still doing a lookup against fallback.
+                Some(entry) if matches!(entry.status, PreResolveStatus::ValidUntil(_)) => {
+                    _ = preresolve_table.insert(
+                        name.to_string(),
+                        Entry::new_timeout(resolved.clone(), pre_resolve_timeout),
+                    );
+                }
+                _ => {}
+            }
         }
         Some(resolved.clone())
     }
@@ -117,13 +199,23 @@ impl StaticResolver {
 impl Resolve for StaticResolver {
     fn resolve(&self, name: Name) -> Resolving {
         debug!("looking up {name:?} in static resolver");
-        let addr_map = self.static_addr_map.clone();
+        // these should clone arcs, not the actual tables
+        let fallback_addr_map = self.fallback_addr_map.clone();
+        let presesolve_addr_map = self.preresolve_addr_map.clone();
         let timeout = self.pre_resolve_timeout;
+        // Also the returned future doesn't try to take the lock on the tables until the
+        // future is awaited, so no blocking issues.
         Box::pin(async move {
-            let addr_map = addr_map.lock().unwrap();
-            let lookup = match Self::resolve_inner(addr_map, name.as_str(), timeout) {
+            let fallback_addr_map = fallback_addr_map.lock().unwrap();
+            let presesolve_addr_map = presesolve_addr_map.lock().unwrap();
+            let lookup = match Self::resolve_inner(
+                fallback_addr_map,
+                presesolve_addr_map,
+                name.as_str(),
+                timeout,
+            ) {
                 None => return Err(ResolveError::StaticLookupMiss.into()),
-                Some(entry) => entry.addrs,
+                Some(addrs) => addrs,
             };
             let addrs: Addrs = Box::new(
                 lookup
@@ -142,6 +234,7 @@ mod test {
 
     use super::*;
     use std::error::Error as StdError;
+    use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
     use std::str::FromStr;
 
     #[tokio::test]
@@ -149,7 +242,7 @@ mod test {
         let example_domain = String::from("static.nymvpn.com");
 
         // lookup for domain for which there is no entry
-        let resolver = StaticResolver::new(HashMap::new());
+        let resolver = StaticResolver::new();
 
         let url = reqwest::dns::Name::from_str(&example_domain).unwrap();
         let result = resolver.resolve(url).await;
@@ -166,7 +259,7 @@ mod test {
         addr_map.insert(example_domain.clone(), vec![example_ip4, example_ip6]);
 
         let url = reqwest::dns::Name::from_str(&example_domain).unwrap();
-        let resolver = StaticResolver::new(addr_map);
+        let resolver = StaticResolver::new().with_fallback(addr_map);
         let mut addrs = resolver.resolve(url).await?;
         assert!(addrs.contains(&SocketAddr::new(example_ip4, 0)));
         assert!(addrs.contains(&SocketAddr::new(example_ip6, 0)));
@@ -175,7 +268,7 @@ mod test {
     }
 
     #[test]
-    fn static_lookup_pre_resolve() {
+    fn elevate_fallback_to_pre_resolve() {
         let example_duration = Duration::from_secs(3);
         let example_domain = String::from("static.nymvpn.com");
         let mut addr_map = HashMap::new();
@@ -183,24 +276,23 @@ mod test {
         let example_ip6: IpAddr = "dead::beef".parse().unwrap();
         addr_map.insert(example_domain.clone(), vec![example_ip4, example_ip6]);
 
-        let resolver = StaticResolver::new(addr_map).with_pre_resolve_timeout(example_duration);
+        let resolver = StaticResolver::new()
+            .with_fallback(addr_map)
+            .with_pre_resolve_timeout(example_duration);
 
         // ensure that attempting to pre-resolve without first resolving returns none
         let result = resolver.pre_resolve(&example_domain);
         assert!(result.is_none());
 
         // resolving should now update the pre-resolve validity timeout for the entry
-        let entry = StaticResolver::resolve_inner(
-            resolver.static_addr_map.lock().unwrap(),
-            &example_domain,
-            Some(example_duration),
-        )
-        .expect("missing entry???!!!!");
-        assert!(
-            entry
-                .valid_for_pre_resolve_until
-                .is_some_and(|t| t < Instant::now() + example_duration)
-        );
+        let _addrs = resolver
+            .resolve_str(&example_domain)
+            .expect("entry should exist");
+        assert!(matches!(
+            resolver.preresolve_status(&example_domain),
+            Some(PreResolveStatus::ValidUntil(t))
+                if t < Instant::now() + example_duration
+        ));
 
         // check that pre-resolve now returns the expected record
         let addrs = resolver
@@ -214,4 +306,139 @@ mod test {
         let result = resolver.pre_resolve(&example_domain);
         assert!(result.is_none());
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn set_and_use_preresolve() {
+        let example_duration = Duration::from_secs(3);
+        let example_domains = [
+            String::from("static1.nymvpn.com"),
+            String::from("static2.nymvpn.com"),
+            String::from("preresolve.nymvpn.com"),
+        ];
+        let mut addr_map1 = HashMap::new();
+        addr_map1.insert(
+            example_domains[0].clone(),
+            vec![Ipv4Addr::new(10, 10, 10, 10).into()],
+        );
+        addr_map1.insert(
+            example_domains[1].clone(),
+            vec![Ipv4Addr::new(1, 1, 1, 1).into()],
+        );
+
+        let mut addr_map2 = HashMap::new();
+        addr_map2.insert(
+            example_domains[1].clone(),
+            vec![Ipv4Addr::new(1, 1, 1, 1).into()],
+        );
+        addr_map2.insert(
+            example_domains[2].clone(),
+            vec![Ipv4Addr::new(8, 8, 8, 8).into()],
+        );
+
+        let resolver = StaticResolver::new()
+            .with_fallback(addr_map1)
+            .with_pre_resolve_timeout(example_duration);
+
+        // Attempting to pre-resolve without setting the table returns none
+        let result = resolver.pre_resolve(&example_domains[0]);
+        assert!(result.is_none());
+
+        resolver.set_preresolve(addr_map2);
+
+        // After setting the pre-resolve, addresses in the the table are returned
+        let result = resolver.pre_resolve(&example_domains[1]);
+        assert!(result.is_some());
+
+        // If the domain wasn't in the pre-resolve table it returns none.
+        let result = resolver.pre_resolve(&example_domains[0]);
+        assert!(result.is_none());
+
+        resolver.clear_preresolve();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn preresolve_with_fallback() {
+        let example_duration = Duration::from_secs(3);
+        let example_domains = [
+            String::from("static1.nymvpn.com"),
+            String::from("static2.nymvpn.com"),
+            String::from("preresolve.nymvpn.com"),
+        ];
+        let mut addr_map1 = HashMap::new();
+        addr_map1.insert(
+            example_domains[0].clone(),
+            vec![Ipv4Addr::new(10, 10, 10, 10).into()],
+        );
+        addr_map1.insert(
+            example_domains[1].clone(),
+            vec![Ipv4Addr::new(1, 1, 1, 1).into()],
+        );
+
+        let mut addr_map2 = HashMap::new();
+        addr_map2.insert(
+            example_domains[1].clone(),
+            vec![Ipv4Addr::new(1, 1, 1, 1).into()],
+        );
+        addr_map2.insert(
+            example_domains[2].clone(),
+            vec![Ipv4Addr::new(8, 8, 8, 8).into()],
+        );
+
+        let resolver = StaticResolver::new()
+            .with_fallback(addr_map1)
+            .with_preresolve(addr_map2)
+            .with_pre_resolve_timeout(example_duration);
+
+        // when using both pre-resolve and fallback elevating entries from fallback to pre-resolve
+        // leaves the entries as `Valid`.
+        assert!(matches!(
+            resolver.preresolve_status(&example_domains[1]),
+            Some(PreResolveStatus::Valid)
+        ));
+        let _addrs = resolver
+            .resolve_str(&example_domains[1])
+            .expect("entry should exist");
+        assert!(matches!(
+            resolver.preresolve_status(&example_domains[1]),
+            Some(PreResolveStatus::Valid)
+        ));
+
+        // entries not already in pre-resolve get elevated with a timeout.
+        assert!(!resolver.preresolve_contains(&example_domains[0]));
+        let _addrs = resolver
+            .resolve_str(&example_domains[0])
+            .expect("entry should exist");
+        assert!(resolver.preresolve_contains(&example_domains[0]));
+        assert!(matches!(
+            resolver.preresolve_status(&example_domains[0]),
+            Some(PreResolveStatus::ValidUntil(_))
+        ));
+
+        // clearing the pre-resolve table doesn't impact the fallback table.
+        resolver.clear_preresolve();
+        assert!(!resolver.preresolve_contains(&example_domains[0]));
+        assert!(!resolver.preresolve_contains(&example_domains[1]));
+        assert!(!resolver.preresolve_contains(&example_domains[2]));
+        assert!(!resolver.fallback_contains(&example_domains[0]));
+        assert!(!resolver.fallback_contains(&example_domains[1]));
+    }
+
+    /// convenience functions for testing
+    impl StaticResolver {
+        fn preresolve_status(&self, name: &str) -> Option<PreResolveStatus> {
+            self.preresolve_addr_map
+                .lock()
+                .unwrap()
+                .get(name)
+                .map(|e| e.status.clone())
+        }
+
+        fn preresolve_contains(&self, name: &str) -> bool {
+            self.preresolve_addr_map.lock().unwrap().contains_key(name)
+        }
+
+        fn fallback_contains(&self, name: &str) -> bool {
+            self.preresolve_addr_map.lock().unwrap().contains_key(name)
+        }
+    }
 }

common/http-api-client/src/fronted.rs

@@ -3,15 +3,21 @@
 
 //! Utilities for and implementation of request tunneling
 
-use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
+use std::sync::{
+    Arc, LazyLock, RwLock,
+    atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering},
+};
 use tracing::warn;
 
-use crate::ClientBuilder;
+use crate::{Client, ClientBuilder};
+
+static SHARED_FRONTING_POLICY: LazyLock<Arc<RwLock<FrontPolicy>>> =
+    LazyLock::new(|| Arc::new(RwLock::new(FrontPolicy::Off)));
 
 // #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
 #[derive(Debug)]
 pub(crate) struct Front {
-    pub(crate) policy: FrontPolicy,
+    pub(crate) policy: Arc<RwLock<FrontPolicy>>,
     enabled: AtomicBool,
 }
 
@@ -19,7 +25,7 @@ impl Clone for Front {
     fn clone(&self) -> Self {
         Self {
             policy: self.policy.clone(),
-            enabled: AtomicBool::new(self.enabled.load(Ordering::Relaxed)),
+            enabled: AtomicBool::new(false),
         }
     }
 }
@@ -27,13 +33,30 @@ impl Clone for Front {
 impl Front {
     pub(crate) fn new(policy: FrontPolicy) -> Self {
         Self {
-            enabled: AtomicBool::new(policy == FrontPolicy::Always),
+            enabled: AtomicBool::new(false),
+            policy: Arc::new(RwLock::new(policy)),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) fn off() -> Self {
+        Self::new(FrontPolicy::Off)
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) fn shared() -> Self {
+        let policy = SHARED_FRONTING_POLICY.clone();
+        Self {
+            enabled: AtomicBool::new(false),
             policy,
         }
     }
 
+    pub(crate) fn set_policy(&self, policy: FrontPolicy) {
+        *self.policy.write().unwrap() = policy;
+        self.enabled.store(false, Ordering::Relaxed);
+    }
+
     pub(crate) fn is_enabled(&self) -> bool {
-        match self.policy {
+        match *self.policy.read().unwrap() {
             FrontPolicy::Off => false,
             FrontPolicy::OnRetry => self.enabled.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
             FrontPolicy::Always => true,
@@ -46,14 +69,13 @@ impl Front {
         if self.is_enabled() {
             return;
         }
-        if matches!(self.policy, FrontPolicy::OnRetry) {
+        if matches!(*self.policy.read().unwrap(), FrontPolicy::OnRetry) {
             self.enabled.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed);
         }
     }
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Default, PartialEq, Clone)]
-#[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
 /// Policy for when to use domain fronting for HTTP requests.
 pub enum FrontPolicy {
     /// Always use domain fronting for all requests.
@@ -66,29 +88,208 @@ pub enum FrontPolicy {
 }
 
 impl ClientBuilder {
-    /// Enable and configure request tunneling for API requests.
-    #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
-    pub fn with_fronting(mut self, policy: FrontPolicy) -> Self {
-        let front = Front::new(policy);
+    /// Enable and configure request tunneling for API requests. If no front policy is
+    /// provided the shared fronting policy will be used.
+    pub fn with_fronting(mut self, policy: Option<FrontPolicy>) -> Self {
+        let front = if let Some(p) = policy {
+            Front::new(p)
+        } else {
+            Front::shared()
+        };
 
         // Check if any of the supplied urls even support fronting
         if !self.urls.iter().any(|url| url.has_front()) {
             warn!(
-                "fronting is enabled, but none of the supplied urls have configured fronting domains"
+                "fronting is enabled, but none of the supplied urls have configured fronting domains: {:?}",
+                self.urls
             );
         }
 
-        self.front = Some(front);
+        self.front = front;
 
         self
     }
 }
 
+impl Client {
+    /// Set the policy for enabling fronting. If fronting was previously unset this will set it, and
+    /// make it possible to enable (i.e [`FrontPolicy::Off`] will not enable it).
+    ///
+    /// Calling this function sets a custom policy for this client, disconnecting it from the shared
+    /// fronting policy -- i.e. changes applied through [`Client::set_shared_front_policy`] will not
+    /// be impact this client.
+    pub fn set_front_policy(&mut self, policy: FrontPolicy) {
+        self.front.set_policy(policy)
+    }
+
+    /// Set the fronting policy for this client to follow the shared policy.
+    pub fn use_shared_front_policy(&mut self) {
+        self.front = Front::shared();
+    }
+
+    /// Set the fronting policy for all clients using the shared policy.
+    //
+    // NOTE: this does not reset the per-instance enabled flag like it will when using
+    // [`Front::set_front_policy`]. So if a client is using shared policy with the `OnRetry` policy
+    // and this function is used to swap that policy away from and then back to `OnRetry` the
+    // fronting will still be enabled. Noting this here just in case this triggers any corner cases
+    // down the road.
+    pub fn set_shared_front_policy(policy: FrontPolicy) {
+        *SHARED_FRONTING_POLICY.write().unwrap() = policy;
+    }
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
     use crate::{ApiClientCore, NO_PARAMS, Url};
 
+    impl Front {
+        pub(crate) fn policy(&self) -> FrontPolicy {
+            self.policy.read().unwrap().clone()
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Policy can be set for an independent client and the update is applied properly
+    #[test]
+    fn set_policy_independent_client() {
+        let url1 = Url::new(
+            "https://validator.global.ssl.fastly.net",
+            Some(vec!["https://yelp.global.ssl.fastly.net"]),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let mut client1 = ClientBuilder::new(url1.clone())
+            .unwrap()
+            .with_fronting(Some(FrontPolicy::Off))
+            .build()
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(client1.front.policy() == FrontPolicy::Off);
+
+        let client2 = ClientBuilder::new(url1.clone())
+            .unwrap()
+            .with_fronting(Some(FrontPolicy::OnRetry))
+            .build()
+            .unwrap();
+
+        // Ensure that setting the policy for a client it gets properly applied.
+        client1.set_front_policy(FrontPolicy::Always);
+        assert!(client1.front.policy() == FrontPolicy::Always);
+
+        // ensure that setting the policy in a client NOT using the shared policy does NOT update
+        // the policy used by another client.
+        assert!(client2.front.policy() == FrontPolicy::OnRetry);
+
+        // Ensure that the policy takes effect and is applied when setting host headers on outgoing
+        // requests
+        let req = client1
+            .create_request(reqwest::Method::GET, &["/"], NO_PARAMS, None::<&()>)
+            .unwrap()
+            .build()
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let expected_host = url1.host_str().unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            req.headers()
+                .get(reqwest::header::HOST)
+                .is_some_and(|h| h.to_str().unwrap() == expected_host),
+            "{:?} != {:?}",
+            expected_host,
+            req,
+        );
+
+        let expected_front = url1.front_str().unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            req.url()
+                .host()
+                .is_some_and(|url| url.to_string() == expected_front),
+            "{:?} != {:?}",
+            expected_front,
+            req,
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Policy can be set for the shared client and the update is applied properly
+    // NOTE THIS TEST IS DISABLED BECAUSE IT INTERACTS WITH THE SHARED POLICY AND AS SUCH CAN HAVE
+    // AN IMPACT ON OTHER TESTS
+    #[test]
+    #[cfg(any())] // #[ignore] we run --ignore in CI/CD assuming it just means slow -_-
+    fn set_policy_shared_client() {
+        let url1 = Url::new(
+            "https://validator.global.ssl.fastly.net",
+            Some(vec!["https://yelp.global.ssl.fastly.net"]),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        Client::set_shared_front_policy(FrontPolicy::Off);
+        assert!(*SHARED_FRONTING_POLICY.read().unwrap() == FrontPolicy::Off);
+
+        let client1 = ClientBuilder::new(url1.clone())
+            .unwrap()
+            .with_fronting(None)
+            .build()
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(client1.front.policy() == FrontPolicy::Off);
+
+        let mut client2 = ClientBuilder::new(url1.clone())
+            .unwrap()
+            .with_fronting(Some(FrontPolicy::Off))
+            .build()
+            .unwrap();
+
+        // Ensure that setting the shared policy gets properly applied
+        Client::set_shared_front_policy(FrontPolicy::Always);
+        assert!(client1.front.policy() == FrontPolicy::Always);
+
+        // Setting the shared policy should NOT update clients NOT using the shared policy.
+        assert!(client2.front.policy() == FrontPolicy::Off);
+
+        // Ensure that the policy takes effect and is applied when setting host headers on outgoing
+        // requests
+        let req = client1
+            .create_request(reqwest::Method::GET, &["/"], NO_PARAMS, None::<&()>)
+            .unwrap()
+            .build()
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let expected_host = url1.host_str().unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            req.headers()
+                .get(reqwest::header::HOST)
+                .is_some_and(|h| h.to_str().unwrap() == expected_host),
+            "{:?} != {:?}",
+            expected_host,
+            req,
+        );
+
+        let expected_front = url1.front_str().unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            req.url()
+                .host()
+                .is_some_and(|url| url.to_string() == expected_front),
+            "{:?} != {:?}",
+            expected_front,
+            req,
+        );
+
+        // ensure that setting to the shared policy works
+        client2.use_shared_front_policy();
+        assert!(client2.front.policy() == FrontPolicy::Always);
+
+        // ensure that if the policy is OnRetry then the `enabled` fields are still independent,
+        // despite the policy being shared.
+        Client::set_shared_front_policy(FrontPolicy::OnRetry);
+        assert!(client1.front.policy() == FrontPolicy::OnRetry);
+        assert!(client2.front.policy() == FrontPolicy::OnRetry);
+
+        assert!(!client1.front.is_enabled());
+        assert!(!client2.front.is_enabled());
+
+        client1.front.retry_enable();
+        assert!(client1.front.is_enabled());
+        assert!(!client2.front.is_enabled());
+    }
+
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn nym_api_works() {
         let url1 = Url::new(
@@ -104,7 +305,7 @@ mod tests {
 
         let client = ClientBuilder::new(url1)
             .expect("bad url")
-            .with_fronting(FrontPolicy::Always)
+            .with_fronting(Some(FrontPolicy::Always))
             .build()
             .expect("failed to build client");
 
@@ -140,7 +341,7 @@ mod tests {
 
         let client = ClientBuilder::new_with_urls(vec![url1, url2])
             .expect("bad url")
-            .with_fronting(FrontPolicy::Always)
+            .with_fronting(Some(FrontPolicy::Always))
             .build()
             .expect("failed to build client");
 

common/http-api-client/src/lib.rs

@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@
 //! ```
 #![warn(missing_docs)]
 
+use http::header::USER_AGENT;
 pub use inventory;
 pub use reqwest;
 pub use reqwest::ClientBuilder as ReqwestClientBuilder;
@@ -147,6 +148,7 @@ pub mod registry;
 use crate::path::RequestPath;
 use async_trait::async_trait;
 use bytes::Bytes;
+use cfg_if::cfg_if;
 use http::HeaderMap;
 use http::header::{ACCEPT, CONTENT_TYPE};
 use itertools::Itertools;
@@ -161,9 +163,7 @@ use std::time::Duration;
 use thiserror::Error;
 use tracing::{debug, instrument, warn};
 
-#[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
-use std::net::SocketAddr;
-use std::sync::Arc;
+use std::sync::{Arc, LazyLock};
 
 #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
 mod fronted;
@@ -195,6 +195,8 @@ use nym_http_api_client_macro::client_defaults;
 /// high and chatty protocols take a while to complete.
 pub const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
 
+const NYM_OUTER_SNI_HEADER: &str = "NYM-ORIGINAL-OUTER-SNI";
+
 #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
 client_defaults!(
     priority = -100;
@@ -206,6 +208,24 @@ client_defaults!(
     user_agent = format!("nym-http-api-client/{}", env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"))
 );
 
+static SHARED_CLIENT: LazyLock<reqwest::Client> = LazyLock::new(|| {
+    tracing::info!("Initializing shared HTTP client");
+    cfg_if! {
+        if #[cfg(target_arch = "wasm32")] {
+            reqwest::ClientBuilder::new().build()
+                .expect("failed to initialize shared http client")
+        } else {
+            let mut builder = default_builder();
+
+            builder = builder.dns_resolver(Arc::new(HickoryDnsResolver::default()));
+
+            builder
+                .build()
+                .expect("failed to initialize shared http client")
+        }
+    }
+});
+
 /// Collection of URL Path Segments
 pub type PathSegments<'a> = &'a [&'a str];
 /// Collection of HTTP Request Parameters
@@ -327,16 +347,22 @@ pub enum HttpClientError {
         source: reqwest::Error,
     },
 
+    #[error("failed to parse header value: {source}")]
+    InvalidHeaderValue {
+        #[source]
+        source: http::Error,
+    },
+
     #[error("failed to send request for {url}: {source}")]
     RequestSendFailure {
-        url: reqwest::Url,
+        url: Box<reqwest::Url>,
         #[source]
         source: ReqwestErrorWrapper,
     },
 
     #[error("failed to read response body from {url}: {source}")]
     ResponseReadFailure {
-        url: reqwest::Url,
+        url: Box<reqwest::Url>,
         headers: Box<HeaderMap>,
         status: StatusCode,
         #[source]
@@ -353,7 +379,7 @@ pub enum HttpClientError {
     },
 
     #[error("the requested resource could not be found at {url}")]
-    NotFound { url: reqwest::Url },
+    NotFound { url: Box<reqwest::Url> },
 
     #[error("attempted to use domain fronting and clone a request containing stream data")]
     AttemptedToCloneStreamRequest,
@@ -365,7 +391,7 @@ pub enum HttpClientError {
         "the request for {url} failed with status '{status}'. no additional error message provided. response headers: {headers:?}"
     )]
     RequestFailure {
-        url: reqwest::Url,
+        url: Box<reqwest::Url>,
         status: StatusCode,
         headers: Box<HeaderMap>,
     },
@@ -374,7 +400,7 @@ pub enum HttpClientError {
         "the returned response from {url} was empty. status: '{status}'. response headers: {headers:?}"
     )]
     EmptyResponse {
-        url: reqwest::Url,
+        url: Box<reqwest::Url>,
         status: StatusCode,
         headers: Box<HeaderMap>,
     },
@@ -383,7 +409,7 @@ pub enum HttpClientError {
         "failed to resolve request for {url}. status: '{status}'. response headers: {headers:?}. additional error message: {error}"
     )]
     EndpointFailure {
-        url: reqwest::Url,
+        url: Box<reqwest::Url>,
         status: StatusCode,
         headers: Box<HeaderMap>,
         error: String,
@@ -453,7 +479,7 @@ impl HttpClientError {
 
     pub fn request_send_error(url: reqwest::Url, source: reqwest::Error) -> Self {
         HttpClientError::RequestSendFailure {
-            url,
+            url: Box::new(url),
             source: ReqwestErrorWrapper(source),
         }
     }
@@ -554,6 +580,19 @@ pub trait ApiClientCore {
         let req = self.create_request(method, path, params, json_body)?;
         self.send(req).await
     }
+
+    /// If multiple base urls are available rotate to next (e.g. when the current one resulted in an error)
+    ///
+    /// Takes an optional URL argument. If this is none, the current host will be updated automatically.
+    /// If a url is provided first check that the CURRENT host matches the hostname in the URL before
+    /// triggering a rotation. This is meant to prevent parallel requests that fail from rotating the host
+    /// multiple times.
+    fn maybe_rotate_hosts(&self, offending_url: Option<Url>);
+
+    /// If the fronting policy for the client is set to `OnRetry` this function will enable the
+    /// fronting if not already enabled.
+    #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
+    fn maybe_enable_fronting(&self, context: impl std::fmt::Debug);
 }
 
 /// A `ClientBuilder` can be used to create a [`Client`] with custom configuration applied consistently
@@ -562,16 +601,18 @@ pub struct ClientBuilder {
     urls: Vec<Url>,
 
     timeout: Option<Duration>,
-    custom_user_agent: bool,
-    reqwest_client_builder: reqwest::ClientBuilder,
+    custom_user_agent: Option<HeaderValue>,
+    reqwest_client_builder: Option<reqwest::ClientBuilder>,
     #[allow(dead_code)] // not dead code, just unused in wasm
     use_secure_dns: bool,
 
     #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
-    front: Option<fronted::Front>,
+    front: fronted::Front,
 
     retry_limit: usize,
     serialization: SerializationFormat,
+
+    error: Option<HttpClientError>,
 }
 
 impl ClientBuilder {
@@ -642,10 +683,10 @@ impl ClientBuilder {
 
         let mut builder = Self::new_with_urls(urls)?;
 
-        // Enable domain fronting by default (on retry)
+        // Enable domain fronting using the shared fronting policy
         #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
         {
-            builder = builder.with_fronting(FrontPolicy::OnRetry);
+            builder = builder.with_fronting(None);
         }
 
         Ok(builder)
@@ -659,26 +700,31 @@ impl ClientBuilder {
 
         let urls = Self::check_urls(urls);
 
-        #[cfg(target_arch = "wasm32")]
-        let reqwest_client_builder = reqwest::ClientBuilder::new();
-
-        #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
-        let reqwest_client_builder = default_builder();
-
         Ok(ClientBuilder {
             urls,
             timeout: None,
-            custom_user_agent: false,
-            reqwest_client_builder,
+            custom_user_agent: None,
+            reqwest_client_builder: None,
             use_secure_dns: true,
             #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
-            front: None,
+            front: fronted::Front::off(),
 
             retry_limit: 0,
             serialization: SerializationFormat::Json,
+            error: None,
         })
     }
 
+    /// Configure use of an independent HTTP request executor. This prevents use of beneficial
+    /// features like connection pooling under the hood.
+    #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
+    pub fn non_shared(mut self) -> Self {
+        if self.reqwest_client_builder.is_none() {
+            self.reqwest_client_builder = Some(default_builder());
+        }
+        self
+    }
+
     /// Add an additional URL to the set usable by this constructed `Client`
     pub fn add_url(mut self, url: Url) -> Self {
         self.urls.push(url);
@@ -723,7 +769,7 @@ impl ClientBuilder {
 
     /// Provide a pre-configured [`reqwest::ClientBuilder`]
     pub fn with_reqwest_builder(mut self, reqwest_builder: reqwest::ClientBuilder) -> Self {
-        self.reqwest_client_builder = reqwest_builder;
+        self.reqwest_client_builder = Some(reqwest_builder);
         self
     }
 
@@ -733,18 +779,12 @@ impl ClientBuilder {
         V: TryInto<HeaderValue>,
         V::Error: Into<http::Error>,
     {
-        self.custom_user_agent = true;
-        self.reqwest_client_builder = self.reqwest_client_builder.user_agent(value);
-        self
-    }
-
-    /// Override DNS resolution for specific domains to particular IP addresses.
-    ///
-    /// Set the port to `0` to use the conventional port for the given scheme (e.g. 80 for http).
-    /// Ports in the URL itself will always be used instead of the port in the overridden addr.
-    #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
-    pub fn resolve_to_addrs(mut self, domain: &str, addrs: &[SocketAddr]) -> ClientBuilder {
-        self.reqwest_client_builder = self.reqwest_client_builder.resolve_to_addrs(domain, addrs);
+        match value.try_into() {
+            Ok(v) => self.custom_user_agent = Some(v),
+            Err(err) => {
+                self.error = Some(HttpClientError::InvalidHeaderValue { source: err.into() })
+            }
+        }
         self
     }
 
@@ -761,30 +801,33 @@ impl ClientBuilder {
 
     /// Returns a Client that uses this ClientBuilder configuration.
     pub fn build(self) -> Result<Client, HttpClientError> {
+        if let Some(err) = self.error {
+            return Err(err);
+        }
+
         #[cfg(target_arch = "wasm32")]
-        let reqwest_client = self.reqwest_client_builder.build()?;
+        let reqwest_client = Some(reqwest::ClientBuilder::new().build()?);
 
-        // TODO: we should probably be propagating the error rather than panicking,
-        // but that'd break bunch of things due to type changes
         #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
-        let reqwest_client = {
-            let mut builder = self.reqwest_client_builder;
+        let reqwest_client = self
+            .reqwest_client_builder
+            .map(|mut builder| {
+                // unless explicitly disabled use the DoT/DoH enabled resolver
+                if self.use_secure_dns {
+                    builder = builder.dns_resolver(Arc::new(HickoryDnsResolver::default()));
+                }
 
-            // unless explicitly disabled use the DoT/DoH enabled resolver
-            if self.use_secure_dns {
-                builder = builder.dns_resolver(Arc::new(HickoryDnsResolver::default()));
-            }
-
-            builder
-                .build()
-                .map_err(HttpClientError::reqwest_client_build_error)?
-        };
+                builder
+                    .build()
+                    .map_err(HttpClientError::reqwest_client_build_error)
+            })
+            .transpose()?;
 
         let client = Client {
             base_urls: self.urls,
             current_idx: Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0)),
             reqwest_client,
-            using_secure_dns: self.use_secure_dns,
+            custom_user_agent: self.custom_user_agent,
 
             #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
             front: self.front,
@@ -804,11 +847,11 @@ impl ClientBuilder {
 pub struct Client {
     base_urls: Vec<Url>,
     current_idx: Arc<AtomicUsize>,
-    reqwest_client: reqwest::Client,
-    using_secure_dns: bool,
+    reqwest_client: Option<reqwest::Client>,
+    custom_user_agent: Option<HeaderValue>,
 
     #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
-    front: Option<fronted::Front>,
+    front: fronted::Front,
 
     #[cfg(target_arch = "wasm32")]
     request_timeout: Duration,
@@ -862,8 +905,8 @@ impl Client {
         Client {
             base_urls: vec![new_url],
             current_idx: Arc::new(Default::default()),
-            reqwest_client: self.reqwest_client.clone(),
-            using_secure_dns: self.using_secure_dns,
+            reqwest_client: None,
+            custom_user_agent: None,
 
             #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
             front: self.front.clone(),
@@ -897,9 +940,7 @@ impl Client {
 
     #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
     fn matches_current_host(&self, url: &Url) -> bool {
-        if let Some(ref front) = self.front
-            && front.is_enabled()
-        {
+        if self.front.is_enabled() {
             url.host_str() == self.current_url().front_str()
         } else {
             url.host_str() == self.current_url().host_str()
@@ -926,9 +967,7 @@ impl Client {
         }
 
         #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
-        if let Some(ref front) = self.front
-            && front.is_enabled()
-        {
+        if self.front.is_enabled() {
             // if we are using fronting, try updating to the next front
             let url = self.current_url();
 
@@ -948,9 +987,7 @@ impl Client {
 
             // if fronting is enabled we want to update to a host that has fronts configured
             #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
-            if let Some(ref front) = self.front
-                && front.is_enabled()
-            {
+            if self.front.is_enabled() {
                 while next != orig {
                     if self.base_urls[next].has_front() {
                         // we have a front for the next host, so we can use it
@@ -981,14 +1018,12 @@ impl Client {
     /// this method. For example, if the client is configured to rotate hosts after each error, this
     /// method should be called after the host has been updated -- i.e. as part of the subsequent
     /// send.
-    fn apply_hosts_to_req(&self, r: &mut reqwest::Request) -> (&str, Option<&str>) {
+    pub(crate) fn apply_hosts_to_req(&self, r: &mut reqwest::Request) -> (&str, Option<&str>) {
         let url = self.current_url();
         r.url_mut().set_host(url.host_str()).unwrap();
 
         #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
-        if let Some(ref front) = self.front
-            && front.is_enabled()
-        {
+        if self.front.is_enabled() {
             if let Some(front_host) = url.front_str() {
                 if let Some(actual_host) = url.host_str() {
                     tracing::debug!(
@@ -1008,6 +1043,13 @@ impl Client {
                         .headers_mut()
                         .insert(reqwest::header::HOST, actual_host_header);
 
+                    // Set a custom header to capture the outer host (used in the SNI) of the request
+                    let front_host_header: HeaderValue =
+                        front_host.parse().unwrap_or(HeaderValue::from_static(""));
+                    _ = r
+                        .headers_mut()
+                        .insert(NYM_OUTER_SNI_HEADER, front_host_header);
+
                     return (url.as_str(), url.front_str());
                 } else {
                     tracing::debug!(
@@ -1048,12 +1090,21 @@ impl ApiClientCore for Client {
 
         self.apply_hosts_to_req(&mut req);
 
-        let mut rb = RequestBuilder::from_parts(self.reqwest_client.clone(), req);
+        let client = if let Some(client) = &self.reqwest_client {
+            client.clone()
+        } else {
+            SHARED_CLIENT.clone()
+        };
+        let mut rb = RequestBuilder::from_parts(client, req);
 
         rb = rb
             .header(ACCEPT, self.serialization.content_type())
             .header(CONTENT_TYPE, self.serialization.content_type());
 
+        if let Some(user_agent) = &self.custom_user_agent {
+            rb = rb.header(USER_AGENT, user_agent.clone());
+        }
+
         if let Some(body) = body {
             match self.serialization {
                 SerializationFormat::Json => {
@@ -1096,16 +1147,19 @@ impl ApiClientCore for Client {
 
             #[cfg(target_arch = "wasm32")]
             let response: Result<Response, HttpClientError> = {
-                Ok(wasmtimer::tokio::timeout(
-                    self.request_timeout,
-                    self.reqwest_client.execute(req),
+                let client = self.reqwest_client.as_ref().unwrap_or(&*SHARED_CLIENT);
+                Ok(
+                    wasmtimer::tokio::timeout(self.request_timeout, client.execute(req))
+                        .await
+                        .map_err(|_timeout| HttpClientError::RequestTimeout)??,
                 )
-                .await
-                .map_err(|_timeout| HttpClientError::RequestTimeout)??)
             };
 
             #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
-            let response = self.reqwest_client.execute(req).await;
+            let response = {
+                let client = self.reqwest_client.as_ref().unwrap_or(&*SHARED_CLIENT);
+                client.execute(req).await
+            };
 
             match response {
                 Ok(resp) => return Ok(resp),
@@ -1121,20 +1175,10 @@ impl ApiClientCore for Client {
 
                     if is_network_err {
                         // if we have multiple urls, update to the next
-                        self.update_host(Some(url.clone()));
+                        self.maybe_rotate_hosts(Some(url.clone()));
 
                         #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
-                        if let Some(ref front) = self.front {
-                            // If fronting is set to be enabled on error, enable domain fronting as we
-                            // have encountered an error.
-                            let was_enabled = front.is_enabled();
-                            front.retry_enable();
-                            if !was_enabled && front.is_enabled() {
-                                tracing::info!(
-                                    "Domain fronting activated after connection failure: {err}",
-                                );
-                            }
-                        }
+                        self.maybe_enable_fronting(("network", url.as_str(), &err));
                     }
 
                     if attempts < self.retry_limit {
@@ -1158,6 +1202,21 @@ impl ApiClientCore for Client {
             }
         }
     }
+
+    fn maybe_rotate_hosts(&self, offending: Option<Url>) {
+        self.update_host(offending);
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
+    fn maybe_enable_fronting(&self, context: impl std::fmt::Debug) {
+        // If fronting is set to be OnRetry, enable domain fronting as we
+        // have encountered an error.
+        let was_enabled = self.front.is_enabled();
+        self.front.retry_enable();
+        if !was_enabled && self.front.is_enabled() {
+            tracing::debug!("Domain fronting activated after failure: {context:?}",);
+        }
+    }
 }
 
 /// Common usage functionality for the http client.
@@ -1310,6 +1369,35 @@ pub trait ApiClient: ApiClientCore {
         self.get_response(path, params).await
     }
 
+    /// Attempt to parse a response object from an HTTP response
+    async fn parse_response<T>(
+        &self,
+        res: Response,
+        allow_empty: bool,
+    ) -> Result<T, HttpClientError>
+    where
+        T: DeserializeOwned,
+    {
+        let url = Url::from(res.url());
+        parse_response(res, allow_empty).await.inspect_err(|e| {
+            if matches!(
+                // if we encounter a read error while we attempt to parse it could be caused by censorship and we should
+                // rotate hosts / enable fronting.
+                e,
+                HttpClientError::ResponseReadFailure {
+                    url: _,
+                    headers: _,
+                    status: _,
+                    source: _,
+                }
+            ) {
+                self.maybe_rotate_hosts(Some(url.clone()));
+                #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
+                self.maybe_enable_fronting(("parse/read", url.as_str(), e));
+            }
+        })
+    }
+
     /// 'get' data from the segment-defined path, e.g. `["api", "v1", "mixnodes"]`, with tuple
     /// defined key-value parameters, e.g. `[("since", "12345")]`. Attempt to parse the response
     /// into the provided type `T` based on the content type header
@@ -1327,7 +1415,8 @@ pub trait ApiClient: ApiClientCore {
         let res = self
             .send_request(reqwest::Method::GET, path, params, None::<&()>)
             .await?;
-        parse_response(res, false).await
+
+        self.parse_response(res, false).await
     }
 
     /// 'post' json data to the segment-defined path, e.g. `["api", "v1", "mixnodes"]`, with tuple
@@ -1349,7 +1438,7 @@ pub trait ApiClient: ApiClientCore {
         let res = self
             .send_request(reqwest::Method::POST, path, params, Some(json_body))
             .await?;
-        parse_response(res, false).await
+        self.parse_response(res, false).await
     }
 
     /// 'delete' json data from the segment-defined path, e.g. `["api", "v1", "mixnodes"]`, with
@@ -1369,7 +1458,7 @@ pub trait ApiClient: ApiClientCore {
         let res = self
             .send_request(reqwest::Method::DELETE, path, params, None::<&()>)
             .await?;
-        parse_response(res, false).await
+        self.parse_response(res, false).await
     }
 
     /// 'patch' json data at the segment-defined path, e.g. `["api", "v1", "mixnodes"]`, with tuple
@@ -1391,7 +1480,7 @@ pub trait ApiClient: ApiClientCore {
         let res = self
             .send_request(reqwest::Method::PATCH, path, params, Some(json_body))
             .await?;
-        parse_response(res, false).await
+        self.parse_response(res, false).await
     }
 
     /// `get` json data from the provided absolute endpoint, e.g. `"/api/v1/mixnodes?since=12345"`.
@@ -1403,7 +1492,7 @@ pub trait ApiClient: ApiClientCore {
     {
         let req = self.create_request_endpoint(reqwest::Method::GET, endpoint, None::<&()>)?;
         let res = self.send(req).await?;
-        parse_response(res, false).await
+        self.parse_response(res, false).await
     }
 
     /// `post` json data to the provided absolute endpoint, e.g. `"/api/v1/mixnodes?since=12345"`.
@@ -1420,7 +1509,7 @@ pub trait ApiClient: ApiClientCore {
     {
         let req = self.create_request_endpoint(reqwest::Method::POST, endpoint, Some(json_body))?;
         let res = self.send(req).await?;
-        parse_response(res, false).await
+        self.parse_response(res, false).await
     }
 
     /// `delete` json data from the provided absolute endpoint, e.g.
@@ -1432,7 +1521,7 @@ pub trait ApiClient: ApiClientCore {
     {
         let req = self.create_request_endpoint(reqwest::Method::DELETE, endpoint, None::<&()>)?;
         let res = self.send(req).await?;
-        parse_response(res, false).await
+        self.parse_response(res, false).await
     }
 
     /// `patch` json data at the provided absolute endpoint, e.g. `"/api/v1/mixnodes?since=12345"`.
@@ -1450,7 +1539,7 @@ pub trait ApiClient: ApiClientCore {
         let req =
             self.create_request_endpoint(reqwest::Method::PATCH, endpoint, Some(json_body))?;
         let res = self.send(req).await?;
-        parse_response(res, false).await
+        self.parse_response(res, false).await
     }
 }
 
@@ -1517,7 +1606,7 @@ where
 
     if !allow_empty && let Some(0) = res.content_length() {
         return Err(HttpClientError::EmptyResponse {
-            url,
+            url: Box::new(url),
             status,
             headers: Box::new(headers),
         });
@@ -1530,25 +1619,25 @@ where
             .bytes()
             .await
             .map_err(|source| HttpClientError::ResponseReadFailure {
-                url,
+                url: Box::new(url),
                 headers: Box::new(headers.clone()),
                 status,
                 source: ReqwestErrorWrapper(source),
             })?;
         decode_raw_response(&headers, full)
     } else if res.status() == StatusCode::NOT_FOUND {
-        Err(HttpClientError::NotFound { url })
+        Err(HttpClientError::NotFound { url: Box::new(url) })
     } else {
         let Ok(plaintext) = res.text().await else {
             return Err(HttpClientError::RequestFailure {
-                url,
+                url: Box::new(url),
                 status,
                 headers: Box::new(headers),
             });
         };
 
         Err(HttpClientError::EndpointFailure {
-            url,
+            url: Box::new(url),
             status,
             headers: Box::new(headers),
             error: plaintext,

common/http-api-client/src/tests.rs

@@ -89,7 +89,8 @@ fn sanitizing_urls() {
 // - on error without retries is where we have multiple urls, is the url updated?
 
 #[tokio::test]
-#[ignore] // test relies on external services being available and behaving in a specific way.
+#[cfg(any())] // #[ignore] we run ignore assuming it just means slow in Ci/CD -_-
+// test relies on external services being available and behaving in a specific way.
 async fn api_client_retry() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
     let client = ClientBuilder::new_with_urls(vec![
         "http://broken.nym.test".parse()?, // This should fail because of DNS NXDomain (rotate)
@@ -199,7 +200,7 @@ fn fronted_host_updating() {
     let url = Url::new("http://nym-api.test", Some(vec!["http://cdn1.test"])).unwrap();
     let mut client = ClientBuilder::new(url)
         .unwrap()
-        .with_fronting(crate::fronted::FrontPolicy::Always)
+        .with_fronting(Some(crate::fronted::FrontPolicy::Always))
         .build()
         .unwrap();
 

common/http-api-client/src/url.rs

@@ -123,6 +123,16 @@ impl From<reqwest::Url> for Url {
     }
 }
 
+impl From<&reqwest::Url> for Url {
+    fn from(url: &url::Url) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            url: url.clone(),
+            fronts: None,
+            current_front: Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0)),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 impl AsRef<url::Url> for Url {
     fn as_ref(&self) -> &url::Url {
         &self.url

common/network-defaults/Cargo.toml

@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ edition.workspace = true
 authors.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true
 repository.workspace = true
+# Exclude build.rs from published crate - it's only used for dev-time sync
+# of env files and requires workspace context
+exclude = ["build.rs"]
 
 [dependencies]
 dotenvy = { workspace = true, optional = true }

common/network-defaults/src/mainnet.rs

@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ pub const NYM_APIS: &[ApiUrlConst] = &[
         url: "https://nym-frontdoor.global.ssl.fastly.net/api/",
         front_hosts: Some(&["yelp.global.ssl.fastly.net"]),
     },
+    ApiUrlConst {
+        url: "https://cdn1.media-platform.net/api/",
+        front_hosts: None,
+    },
 ];
 
 pub const NYM_VPN_API: &str = "https://nymvpn.com/api/";

common/nym-kcp/Cargo.toml

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ edition = { workspace = true }
 authors = { workspace = true }
 license = { workspace = true }
 repository = { workspace = true }
+publish = false
 
 [lib]
 name = "nym_kcp"

common/nym-kkt-ciphersuite/Cargo.toml

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ license.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true
 readme.workspace = true
 version.workspace = true
+publish = false
 
 [dependencies]
 thiserror = { workspace = true }
@@ -17,7 +18,7 @@ strum = { workspace = true }
 strum_macros = { workspace = true }
 
 blake3 = { workspace = true, optional = true }
-libcrux-sha3 = { workspace = true, optional = true }
+libcrux-sha3 = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux", optional = true }
 
 [features]
 digests = ["blake3", "libcrux-sha3"]

common/nym-kkt-ciphersuite/src/lib.rs

@@ -226,17 +226,6 @@ impl KEM {
     }
 }
 
-// pub const fn map_kem_to_libcrux_kem(kem: &KEM) -> Result<Algorithm, KKTError> {
-//     match kem {
-//         KEM::MlKem768 => Ok(Algorithm::MlKem768),
-//         KEM::XWing => Ok(Algorithm::XWingKemDraft06),
-//         KEM::X25519 => Ok(Algorithm::X25519),
-//         KEM::McEliece => Err(KKTError::KEMMapping {
-//             info: "attempted to map McEliece KEM to libcrux_kem",
-//         }),
-//     }
-// }
-
 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Debug)]
 pub struct Ciphersuite {
     hash_function: HashFunction,
@@ -284,16 +273,16 @@ impl Ciphersuite {
         self.verification_key_length
     }
 
-    pub fn hash_function(&self) -> &HashFunction {
-        &self.hash_function
+    pub fn hash_function(&self) -> HashFunction {
+        self.hash_function
     }
 
-    pub fn kem(&self) -> &KEM {
-        &self.kem
+    pub fn kem(&self) -> KEM {
+        self.kem
     }
 
-    pub fn signature_scheme(&self) -> &SignatureScheme {
-        &self.signature_scheme
+    pub fn signature_scheme(&self) -> SignatureScheme {
+        self.signature_scheme
     }
 
     pub fn hash_len(&self) -> usize {
@@ -362,17 +351,6 @@ impl Display for Ciphersuite {
     }
 }
 
-impl Default for Ciphersuite {
-    fn default() -> Self {
-        Self::new(
-            KEM::MlKem768,
-            HashFunction::Blake3,
-            SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
-            HashLength::Default,
-        )
-    }
-}
-
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;

common/nym-kkt/Cargo.toml

@@ -7,23 +7,25 @@ license.workspace = true
 publish = false
 
 [dependencies]
+blake3 = { workspace = true }
 thiserror = { workspace = true }
 num_enum = { workspace = true }
 strum = { workspace = true }
 
+
 # internal
-nym-crypto = { path = "../crypto", features = ["hashing"] }
+nym-crypto = { path = "../crypto", features = ["asymmetric", "serde"] }
 nym-kkt-ciphersuite = { workspace = true, features = ["digests"] }
 
-libcrux-kem = { workspace = true }
-libcrux-ecdh = { workspace = true, features = ["codec"] }
-libcrux-chacha20poly1305 = { workspace = true }
+libcrux-kem = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux" }
+libcrux-ecdh = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux", features = ["codec"] }
+libcrux-chacha20poly1305 = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux" }
 
+# rand 0.9 for libcrux integration (libcrux uses rand 0.9)
 rand09 = { workspace = true }
 zeroize = { workspace = true, features = ["zeroize_derive"] }
+classic-mceliece-rust = { git = "https://github.com/georgio/classic-mceliece-rust", features = ["mceliece460896f", "zeroize"] }
 
-libcrux-psq = { workspace = true, features = ["classic-mceliece"] }
-libcrux-ml-kem = { workspace = true }
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 rand_chacha = "0.9.0"

common/nym-kkt/benches/benches.rs

@@ -7,20 +7,29 @@
 
 use criterion::{Criterion, criterion_group, criterion_main};
 
+use nym_crypto::asymmetric::ed25519;
 use nym_kkt::{
     ciphersuite::{Ciphersuite, EncapsulationKey, HashFunction, KEM, SignatureScheme},
     context::KKTMode,
     frame::KKTFrame,
-    key_utils::{
-        generate_keypair_libcrux, generate_keypair_mceliece, generate_keypair_mlkem,
-        hash_encapsulation_key,
-    },
+    key_utils::{generate_keypair_libcrux, generate_keypair_mceliece, hash_encapsulation_key},
     session::{
-        initiator_ingest_response, initiator_process, responder_ingest_message, responder_process,
+        anonymous_initiator_process, initiator_ingest_response, initiator_process,
+        responder_ingest_message, responder_process,
     },
 };
 use rand09::prelude::*;
 
+pub fn gen_ed25519_keypair(c: &mut Criterion) {
+    c.bench_function("Generate Ed25519 Keypair", |b| {
+        b.iter(|| {
+            let mut s: [u8; 32] = [0u8; 32];
+            rand09::rng().fill_bytes(&mut s);
+            ed25519::KeyPair::from_secret(s, 0)
+        });
+    });
+}
+
 pub fn gen_mlkem768_keypair(c: &mut Criterion) {
     c.bench_function("Generate MlKem768 Keypair", |b| {
         b.iter(|| {
@@ -32,12 +41,15 @@ pub fn gen_mlkem768_keypair(c: &mut Criterion) {
 pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
     let mut rng = rand09::rng();
 
+    // generate ed25519 keys
     let mut secret_initiator: [u8; 32] = [0u8; 32];
     rng.fill_bytes(&mut secret_initiator);
+    let initiator_ed25519_keypair = ed25519::KeyPair::from_secret(secret_initiator, 0);
 
     let mut secret_responder: [u8; 32] = [0u8; 32];
     rng.fill_bytes(&mut secret_responder);
 
+    let responder_ed25519_keypair = ed25519::KeyPair::from_secret(secret_responder, 1);
     for kem in [KEM::MlKem768, KEM::XWing, KEM::X25519, KEM::McEliece] {
         for hash_function in [
             HashFunction::Blake3,
@@ -57,8 +69,8 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
 
             let (responder_kem_public_key, initiator_kem_public_key) = match kem {
                 KEM::MlKem768 => (
-                    EncapsulationKey::MlKem768(generate_keypair_mlkem(&mut rng).1),
-                    EncapsulationKey::MlKem768(generate_keypair_mlkem(&mut rng).1),
+                    EncapsulationKey::MlKem768(generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1),
+                    EncapsulationKey::MlKem768(generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1),
                 ),
                 KEM::XWing => (
                     EncapsulationKey::XWing(generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1),
@@ -95,14 +107,12 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                 c.bench_function(
                     &format!("{kem}, {hash_function} | Anonymous Initiator: Generate Request",),
                     |b| {
-                        b.iter(|| {
-                            initiator_process(&mut rng, KKTMode::OneWay, ciphersuite, None).unwrap()
-                        });
+                        b.iter(|| anonymous_initiator_process(&mut rng, ciphersuite).unwrap());
                     },
                 );
 
-                let (mut i_context, i_frame) =
-                    initiator_process(&mut rng, KKTMode::OneWay, ciphersuite, None).unwrap();
+                let (i_context, i_frame) =
+                    anonymous_initiator_process(&mut rng, ciphersuite).unwrap();
 
                 c.bench_function(
                     &format!(
@@ -127,12 +137,14 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                         "{kem}, {hash_function} | Anonymous Initiator: Responder Ingest Frame",
                     ),
                     |b| {
-                        b.iter(|| responder_ingest_message(&r_context, None, &i_frame_r).unwrap());
+                        b.iter(|| {
+                            responder_ingest_message(&r_context, None, None, &i_frame_r).unwrap()
+                        });
                     },
                 );
 
-                let (mut r_context, _) =
-                    responder_ingest_message(&r_context, None, &i_frame_r).unwrap();
+                let (r_context, _) =
+                    responder_ingest_message(&r_context, None, None, &i_frame_r).unwrap();
 
                 c.bench_function(
                     &format!(
@@ -141,8 +153,9 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                     |b| {
                         b.iter(|| {
                             responder_process(
-                                &mut r_context,
+                                &r_context,
                                 i_frame_r.session_id(),
+                                responder_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
                                 &responder_kem_public_key,
                             )
                             .unwrap()
@@ -150,8 +163,9 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                     },
                 );
                 let r_frame = responder_process(
-                    &mut r_context,
+                    &r_context,
                     i_frame_r.session_id(),
+                    responder_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
                     &responder_kem_public_key,
                 )
                 .unwrap();
@@ -170,9 +184,10 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                     |b| {
                         b.iter(|| {
                             initiator_ingest_response(
-                                &mut i_context,
+                                &i_context,
                                 &r_frame,
                                 &r_frame.context().unwrap(),
+                                responder_ed25519_keypair.public_key(),
                                 &r_dir_hash,
                             )
                             .unwrap()
@@ -181,9 +196,10 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                 );
 
                 let obtained_key = initiator_ingest_response(
-                    &mut i_context,
+                    &i_context,
                     &r_frame,
                     &r_frame.context().unwrap(),
+                    responder_ed25519_keypair.public_key(),
                     &r_dir_hash,
                 )
                 .unwrap();
@@ -192,14 +208,27 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
             }
             // Initiator, OneWay
             {
-                let (mut i_context, i_frame) =
-                    initiator_process(&mut rng, KKTMode::OneWay, ciphersuite, None).unwrap();
+                let (i_context, i_frame) = initiator_process(
+                    &mut rng,
+                    KKTMode::OneWay,
+                    ciphersuite,
+                    initiator_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
+                    None,
+                )
+                .unwrap();
 
                 c.bench_function(
                     &format!("{kem}, {hash_function} | Initiator OneWay: Generate Request",),
                     |b| {
                         b.iter(|| {
-                            initiator_process(&mut rng, KKTMode::OneWay, ciphersuite, None).unwrap()
+                            initiator_process(
+                                &mut rng,
+                                KKTMode::OneWay,
+                                ciphersuite,
+                                initiator_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
+                                None,
+                            )
+                            .unwrap()
                         });
                     },
                 );
@@ -221,12 +250,25 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                 c.bench_function(
                     &format!("{kem}, {hash_function} | Initiator OneWay: Responder Ingest Frame",),
                     |b| {
-                        b.iter(|| responder_ingest_message(&r_context, None, &i_frame_r).unwrap());
+                        b.iter(|| {
+                            responder_ingest_message(
+                                &r_context,
+                                Some(initiator_ed25519_keypair.public_key()),
+                                None,
+                                &i_frame_r,
+                            )
+                            .unwrap()
+                        });
                     },
                 );
 
-                let (mut r_context, r_obtained_key) =
-                    responder_ingest_message(&r_context, None, &i_frame_r).unwrap();
+                let (r_context, r_obtained_key) = responder_ingest_message(
+                    &r_context,
+                    Some(initiator_ed25519_keypair.public_key()),
+                    None,
+                    &i_frame_r,
+                )
+                .unwrap();
 
                 assert!(r_obtained_key.is_none());
 
@@ -237,8 +279,9 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                     |b| {
                         b.iter(|| {
                             responder_process(
-                                &mut r_context,
+                                &r_context,
                                 i_frame_r.session_id(),
+                                responder_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
                                 &responder_kem_public_key,
                             )
                             .unwrap()
@@ -247,8 +290,9 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                 );
 
                 let r_frame = responder_process(
-                    &mut r_context,
+                    &r_context,
                     i_frame_r.session_id(),
+                    responder_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
                     &responder_kem_public_key,
                 )
                 .unwrap();
@@ -267,9 +311,10 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                     |b| {
                         b.iter(|| {
                             initiator_ingest_response(
-                                &mut i_context,
+                                &i_context,
                                 &r_frame,
                                 &r_frame.context().unwrap(),
+                                responder_ed25519_keypair.public_key(),
                                 &r_dir_hash,
                             )
                             .unwrap()
@@ -278,9 +323,10 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                 );
 
                 let i_obtained_key = initiator_ingest_response(
-                    &mut i_context,
+                    &i_context,
                     &r_frame,
                     &r_frame.context().unwrap(),
+                    responder_ed25519_keypair.public_key(),
                     &r_dir_hash,
                 )
                 .unwrap();
@@ -298,6 +344,7 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                                 &mut rng,
                                 KKTMode::Mutual,
                                 ciphersuite,
+                                initiator_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
                                 Some(&initiator_kem_public_key),
                             )
                             .unwrap()
@@ -305,10 +352,11 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                     },
                 );
 
-                let (mut i_context, i_frame) = initiator_process(
+                let (i_context, i_frame) = initiator_process(
                     &mut rng,
                     KKTMode::Mutual,
                     ciphersuite,
+                    initiator_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
                     Some(&initiator_kem_public_key),
                 )
                 .unwrap();
@@ -335,14 +383,24 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                     &format!("{kem}, {hash_function} | Initiator Mutual: Responder Ingest Frame",),
                     |b| {
                         b.iter(|| {
-                            responder_ingest_message(&r_context, Some(&i_dir_hash), &i_frame_r)
-                                .unwrap()
+                            responder_ingest_message(
+                                &r_context,
+                                Some(initiator_ed25519_keypair.public_key()),
+                                Some(&i_dir_hash),
+                                &i_frame_r,
+                            )
+                            .unwrap()
                         });
                     },
                 );
 
-                let (mut r_context, r_obtained_key) =
-                    responder_ingest_message(&r_context, Some(&i_dir_hash), &i_frame_r).unwrap();
+                let (r_context, r_obtained_key) = responder_ingest_message(
+                    &r_context,
+                    Some(initiator_ed25519_keypair.public_key()),
+                    Some(&i_dir_hash),
+                    &i_frame_r,
+                )
+                .unwrap();
 
                 assert_eq!(r_obtained_key.unwrap().encode(), i_kem_key_bytes);
 
@@ -353,8 +411,9 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                     |b| {
                         b.iter(|| {
                             responder_process(
-                                &mut r_context,
+                                &r_context,
                                 i_frame_r.session_id(),
+                                responder_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
                                 &responder_kem_public_key,
                             )
                             .unwrap()
@@ -363,8 +422,9 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                 );
 
                 let r_frame = responder_process(
-                    &mut r_context,
+                    &r_context,
                     i_frame_r.session_id(),
+                    responder_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
                     &responder_kem_public_key,
                 )
                 .unwrap();
@@ -385,9 +445,10 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                     |b| {
                         b.iter(|| {
                             initiator_ingest_response(
-                                &mut i_context,
+                                &i_context,
                                 &r_frame,
                                 &r_frame.context().unwrap(),
+                                responder_ed25519_keypair.public_key(),
                                 &r_dir_hash,
                             )
                             .unwrap()
@@ -396,9 +457,10 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                 );
 
                 let obtained_key = initiator_ingest_response(
-                    &mut i_context,
+                    &i_context,
                     &r_frame,
                     &r_frame.context().unwrap(),
+                    responder_ed25519_keypair.public_key(),
                     &r_dir_hash,
                 )
                 .unwrap();
@@ -409,5 +471,10 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
     }
 }
 
-criterion_group!(benches, gen_mlkem768_keypair, kkt_benchmark);
+criterion_group!(
+    benches,
+    gen_ed25519_keypair,
+    gen_mlkem768_keypair,
+    kkt_benchmark
+);
 criterion_main!(benches);

common/nym-kkt/src/carrier.rs

@@ -1,189 +0,0 @@
-use libcrux_chacha20poly1305::TAG_LEN;
-use libcrux_psq::handshake::types::{DHKeyPair, DHPublicKey};
-use nym_crypto::hkdf::blake3::derive_key_blake3;
-use rand09::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
-use zeroize::{Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop};
-
-use crate::error::KKTError;
-
-// This is arbitrary
-pub const MAX_PAYLOAD_LEN: usize = 1_000_000;
-const CARRIER_KDF_INFO_TX: &str = "CARRIER_V1_KDF_RX";
-const CARRIER_KDF_INFO_RX: &str = "CARRIER_V1_KDF_TX";
-
-#[derive(Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
-pub struct Carrier {
-    tx_key: [u8; 32],
-    rx_key: [u8; 32],
-    tx_counter: u64,
-    rx_counter: u64,
-}
-
-pub enum CarrierRole {
-    Initiator,
-    Responder,
-}
-
-fn increment_nonce(nonce: &mut u64) -> Result<(), KKTError> {
-    match nonce.checked_add(1) {
-        Some(incremented_nonce) => {
-            *nonce = incremented_nonce;
-            Ok(())
-        }
-        None => Err(KKTError::AEADError {
-            info: "Nonce maxed out.",
-        }),
-    }
-}
-
-fn as_nonce_bytes(nonce: u64) -> [u8; 12] {
-    let mut bytes = [0u8; 12];
-    let nonce_bytes = nonce.to_le_bytes();
-    bytes[4..].clone_from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
-    bytes
-}
-
-impl Carrier {
-    fn init(tx_key: [u8; 32], rx_key: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            tx_key,
-            rx_key,
-            tx_counter: 1,
-            rx_counter: 1,
-        }
-    }
-    pub fn new<R>(
-        rng: &mut R,
-        remote_public_key: &DHPublicKey,
-        context: &[u8],
-    ) -> Result<(Self, DHPublicKey), KKTError>
-    where
-        R: RngCore + CryptoRng,
-    {
-        let ephemeral_keypair = DHKeyPair::new(rng);
-        let shared_secret = ephemeral_keypair
-            .sk()
-            .diffie_hellman(remote_public_key)
-            .map_err(|_| KKTError::X25519Error {
-                info: "Key Derivation Error",
-            })?;
-
-        Ok((
-            Self::from_secret_slice(shared_secret.as_ref(), context),
-            ephemeral_keypair.pk,
-        ))
-    }
-
-    pub(crate) fn from_secret_slice(secret: &[u8], context: &[u8]) -> Self {
-        let tx_key = derive_key_blake3(CARRIER_KDF_INFO_TX, secret, context);
-        let rx_key = derive_key_blake3(CARRIER_KDF_INFO_RX, secret, context);
-        Self::init(tx_key, rx_key)
-    }
-
-    pub fn from_secret(mut secret: [u8; 32], context: &[u8]) -> Self {
-        let tx_key = derive_key_blake3(CARRIER_KDF_INFO_TX, secret.as_ref(), context);
-        let rx_key = derive_key_blake3(CARRIER_KDF_INFO_RX, secret.as_ref(), context);
-        secret.zeroize();
-        Self::init(tx_key, rx_key)
-    }
-
-    pub(crate) fn flip_keys(self) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            tx_key: self.rx_key,
-            rx_key: self.tx_key,
-            tx_counter: self.rx_counter,
-            rx_counter: self.tx_counter,
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn encrypt(&mut self, plaintext: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, KKTError> {
-        if plaintext.len() > MAX_PAYLOAD_LEN {
-            return Err(KKTError::AEADError {
-                info: "Plaintext too large",
-            });
-        }
-        let mut output_buffer = vec![0; plaintext.len() + TAG_LEN];
-        libcrux_chacha20poly1305::encrypt(
-            &self.tx_key,
-            plaintext,
-            &mut output_buffer,
-            b"kkt-carrier-v1",
-            &as_nonce_bytes(self.tx_counter),
-        )?;
-
-        increment_nonce(&mut self.tx_counter)?;
-
-        Ok(output_buffer)
-    }
-    pub fn decrypt(&mut self, ciphertext: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, KKTError> {
-        if ciphertext.len() > MAX_PAYLOAD_LEN + TAG_LEN {
-            return Err(KKTError::AEADError {
-                info: "Ciphertext too large",
-            });
-        }
-        let mut output_buffer = vec![0; ciphertext.len() - TAG_LEN];
-        libcrux_chacha20poly1305::decrypt(
-            &self.rx_key,
-            &mut output_buffer,
-            ciphertext,
-            b"kkt-carrier-v1",
-            &as_nonce_bytes(self.rx_counter),
-        )?;
-
-        increment_nonce(&mut self.rx_counter)?;
-
-        Ok(output_buffer)
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use crate::{carrier::Carrier, key_utils::generate_keypair_x25519};
-    use rand09::RngCore;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_e2e() {
-        let mut rng = rand09::rng();
-
-        // generate responder x25519 keys
-        let r_x25519 = generate_keypair_x25519(&mut rng);
-
-        let mut context: [u8; 32] = [0u8; 32];
-        rng.fill_bytes(&mut context);
-
-        let ephemeral_keypair = generate_keypair_x25519(&mut rng);
-
-        let i_shared_secret = ephemeral_keypair.sk().diffie_hellman(&r_x25519.pk).unwrap();
-
-        let r_shared_secret = r_x25519.sk().diffie_hellman(&ephemeral_keypair.pk).unwrap();
-
-        let mut i_carrier = Carrier::from_secret_slice(i_shared_secret.as_ref(), &context);
-        let mut r_carrier =
-            Carrier::from_secret_slice(r_shared_secret.as_ref(), &context).flip_keys();
-
-        let test1 = b"test1: i>r #1";
-        let ct1 = i_carrier.encrypt(test1).unwrap();
-        let pt1 = r_carrier.decrypt(&ct1).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(pt1, test1);
-
-        let test2 = b"test2: r>i #1";
-        let ct2 = i_carrier.encrypt(test2).unwrap();
-        let pt2 = r_carrier.decrypt(&ct2).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(pt2, test2);
-        let test3 = b"test3: i>r #2";
-
-        let ct3 = i_carrier.encrypt(test3).unwrap();
-        let pt3 = r_carrier.decrypt(&ct3).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(pt3, test3);
-
-        let test4 = b"test4: i>r #3";
-        let ct4 = i_carrier.encrypt(test4).unwrap();
-        let pt4 = r_carrier.decrypt(&ct4).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(pt4, test4);
-
-        let test5 = b"test5: r>i #2";
-        let ct5 = i_carrier.encrypt(test5).unwrap();
-        let pt5 = r_carrier.decrypt(&ct5).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(pt5, test5);
-    }
-}

common/nym-kkt/src/ciphersuite.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+// Copyright 2025 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+
+use crate::error::KKTError;
+use libcrux_kem::Algorithm;
+
+pub use nym_kkt_ciphersuite::*;
+
+pub enum EncapsulationKey<'a> {
+    MlKem768(libcrux_kem::PublicKey),
+    XWing(libcrux_kem::PublicKey),
+    X25519(libcrux_kem::PublicKey),
+    McEliece(classic_mceliece_rust::PublicKey<'a>),
+}
+
+pub enum DecapsulationKey<'a> {
+    MlKem768(libcrux_kem::PrivateKey),
+    XWing(libcrux_kem::PrivateKey),
+    X25519(libcrux_kem::PrivateKey),
+    McEliece(classic_mceliece_rust::SecretKey<'a>),
+}
+impl<'a> EncapsulationKey<'a> {
+    pub(crate) fn decode(kem: KEM, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, KKTError> {
+        match kem {
+            KEM::McEliece => {
+                if bytes.len() != classic_mceliece_rust::CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES {
+                    Err(KKTError::KEMError {
+                        info: "Received McEliece Encapsulation Key with Invalid Length",
+                    })
+                } else {
+                    let mut public_key_bytes =
+                        Box::new([0u8; classic_mceliece_rust::CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES]);
+                    // Size must be correct due to KKTFrame::from_bytes(message_bytes)?
+                    public_key_bytes.clone_from_slice(bytes);
+                    Ok(EncapsulationKey::McEliece(
+                        classic_mceliece_rust::PublicKey::from(public_key_bytes),
+                    ))
+                }
+            }
+            KEM::X25519 => Ok(EncapsulationKey::X25519(libcrux_kem::PublicKey::decode(
+                map_kem_to_libcrux_kem(kem)?,
+                bytes,
+            )?)),
+            KEM::MlKem768 => Ok(EncapsulationKey::MlKem768(libcrux_kem::PublicKey::decode(
+                map_kem_to_libcrux_kem(kem)?,
+                bytes,
+            )?)),
+            KEM::XWing => Ok(EncapsulationKey::XWing(libcrux_kem::PublicKey::decode(
+                map_kem_to_libcrux_kem(kem)?,
+                bytes,
+            )?)),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+        match self {
+            EncapsulationKey::XWing(public_key)
+            | EncapsulationKey::MlKem768(public_key)
+            | EncapsulationKey::X25519(public_key) => public_key.encode(),
+            EncapsulationKey::McEliece(public_key) => Vec::from(public_key.as_array()),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+pub const fn map_kem_to_libcrux_kem(kem: KEM) -> Result<Algorithm, KKTError> {
+    match kem {
+        KEM::MlKem768 => Ok(Algorithm::MlKem768),
+        KEM::XWing => Ok(Algorithm::XWingKemDraft06),
+        KEM::X25519 => Ok(Algorithm::X25519),
+        KEM::McEliece => Err(KKTError::KEMMapping {
+            info: "attempted to map McEliece KEM to libcrux_kem",
+        }),
+    }
+}

common/nym-kkt/src/context.rs

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 // Copyright 2025 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 
-use crate::{KKT_VERSION, error::KKTError};
+use crate::ciphersuite::CIPHERSUITE_ENCODING_LEN;
+use crate::{KKT_VERSION, ciphersuite::Ciphersuite, error::KKTError, frame::KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN};
 use num_enum::{IntoPrimitive, TryFromPrimitive};
-use nym_kkt_ciphersuite::{CIPHERSUITE_ENCODING_LEN, Ciphersuite};
 use std::fmt::Display;
 
 pub const KKT_CONTEXT_LEN: usize = 3 + CIPHERSUITE_ENCODING_LEN;
@@ -15,11 +15,11 @@ pub enum KKTStatus {
     Ok = 0b0000_0000,
     InvalidRequestFormat = 0b0010_0000,
     InvalidResponseFormat = 0b0100_0000,
-    UnsupportedCiphersuite = 0b0110_0000,
-    UnsupportedKKTVersion = 0b1000_0000,
-    InvalidKey = 0b1010_0000,
-    Timeout = 0b1100_0000,
-    UnverifiedKEMKey = 0b1110_0000,
+    InvalidSignature = 0b0110_0000,
+    UnsupportedCiphersuite = 0b1000_0000,
+    UnsupportedKKTVersion = 0b1010_0000,
+    InvalidKey = 0b1100_0000,
+    Timeout = 0b1110_0000,
 }
 
 impl Display for KKTStatus {
@@ -28,10 +28,10 @@ impl Display for KKTStatus {
             KKTStatus::Ok => "Ok",
             KKTStatus::InvalidRequestFormat => "Invalid Request Format",
             KKTStatus::InvalidResponseFormat => "Invalid Response Format",
+            KKTStatus::InvalidSignature => "Invalid Signature",
             KKTStatus::UnsupportedCiphersuite => "Unsupported Ciphersuite",
             KKTStatus::UnsupportedKKTVersion => "Unsupported KKT Version",
             KKTStatus::InvalidKey => "Invalid Key",
-            KKTStatus::UnverifiedKEMKey => "Could not verify received encapsulation key",
             KKTStatus::Timeout => "Timeout",
         })
     }
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ impl Display for KKTStatus {
 pub enum KKTRole {
     Initiator = 0b0000_0000,
     Responder = 0b0000_0001,
+    AnonymousInitiator = 0b0000_0010,
 }
 
 // bitmask used: 0b0001_1100
@@ -63,15 +64,20 @@ pub struct KKTContext {
     ciphersuite: Ciphersuite,
 }
 impl KKTContext {
-    pub fn new(role: KKTRole, mode: KKTMode, ciphersuite: &Ciphersuite) -> Self {
-        Self {
+    pub fn new(role: KKTRole, mode: KKTMode, ciphersuite: Ciphersuite) -> Result<Self, KKTError> {
+        if role == KKTRole::AnonymousInitiator && mode != KKTMode::OneWay {
+            return Err(KKTError::IncompatibilityError {
+                info: "Anonymous Initiator can only use OneWay mode",
+            });
+        }
+        Ok(Self {
             version: KKT_VERSION,
             message_sequence: 0,
             status: KKTStatus::Ok,
             mode,
             role,
-            ciphersuite: *ciphersuite,
-        }
+            ciphersuite,
+        })
     }
 
     pub fn derive_responder_header(&self) -> Result<Self, KKTError> {
@@ -101,8 +107,8 @@ impl KKTContext {
     pub fn status(&self) -> KKTStatus {
         self.status
     }
-    pub fn ciphersuite(&self) -> &Ciphersuite {
-        &self.ciphersuite
+    pub fn ciphersuite(&self) -> Ciphersuite {
+        self.ciphersuite
     }
     pub fn role(&self) -> KKTRole {
         self.role
@@ -112,10 +118,9 @@ impl KKTContext {
     }
 
     pub fn body_len(&self) -> usize {
-        if (self.status != KKTStatus::Ok && self.status != KKTStatus::UnverifiedKEMKey)
-        ||
-        // no payload
-        (self.mode == KKTMode::OneWay && self.role == KKTRole::Initiator)
+        if self.status != KKTStatus::Ok
+            || (self.mode == KKTMode::OneWay
+                && (self.role == KKTRole::Initiator || self.role == KKTRole::AnonymousInitiator))
         {
             0
         } else {
@@ -123,12 +128,31 @@ impl KKTContext {
         }
     }
 
+    pub fn signature_len(&self) -> usize {
+        match self.role {
+            KKTRole::Initiator | KKTRole::Responder => self.ciphersuite.signature_len(),
+            KKTRole::AnonymousInitiator => 0,
+        }
+    }
+
     pub const fn header_len(&self) -> usize {
         KKT_CONTEXT_LEN
     }
 
+    pub const fn session_id_len(&self) -> usize {
+        // note: if anyone decides to update this function and changes the constant value,
+        // you will have to adjust encoding/decoding functions
+
+        // match self.role {
+        //     KKTRole::Initiator | KKTRole::Responder => SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
+        // It doesn't make sense to send a session_id if we send messages in the clear
+        //     KKTRole::AnonymousInitiator => 0,
+        // }
+        KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN
+    }
+
     pub fn full_message_len(&self) -> usize {
-        self.body_len() + self.header_len()
+        self.body_len() + self.signature_len() + self.header_len() + self.session_id_len()
     }
 
     pub fn encode(&self) -> Result<[u8; KKT_CONTEXT_LEN], KKTError> {
@@ -204,8 +228,9 @@ mod tests {
         let valid_context = KKTContext::new(
             KKTRole::Initiator,
             KKTMode::Mutual,
-            &Ciphersuite::decode([255, 1, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
-        );
+            Ciphersuite::decode([255, 1, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
         let encoded = valid_context.encode().unwrap();
         let decoded = KKTContext::try_decode(encoded).unwrap();
 

common/nym-kkt/src/encryption.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
+// Copyright 2025-2026 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+
+use crate::{KKT_INITIAL_FRAME_AAD, context::KKTContext, error::KKTError, frame::KKTFrame};
+use blake3::Hasher;
+use libcrux_chacha20poly1305::{NONCE_LEN, TAG_LEN};
+use nym_crypto::asymmetric::x25519;
+use rand09::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
+use zeroize::Zeroize;
+
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Zeroize)]
+pub struct KKTSessionSecret([u8; 32]);
+
+impl KKTSessionSecret {
+    pub fn new<R>(rng: &mut R, remote_public_key: &x25519::PublicKey) -> (Self, x25519::PublicKey)
+    where
+        R: RngCore + CryptoRng,
+    {
+        let mut private_key_bytes = [0u8; x25519::PRIVATE_KEY_SIZE];
+        rng.fill_bytes(&mut private_key_bytes);
+
+        let ephemeral_private_key = x25519::PrivateKey::from_secret(private_key_bytes);
+        let ephemeral_public_key = x25519::PublicKey::from(&ephemeral_private_key);
+
+        (
+            Self::derive(&ephemeral_private_key, remote_public_key),
+            ephemeral_public_key,
+        )
+    }
+    pub fn from_bytes(secret: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
+        Self(secret)
+    }
+
+    fn try_derive(private_key: &x25519::PrivateKey, public_key: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, KKTError> {
+        let mut pub_key: [u8; 32] = [0u8; 32];
+        pub_key.copy_from_slice(&public_key[0..x25519::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
+
+        // Todo: check validity of pk...
+        let pk = x25519::PublicKey::from(pub_key);
+        Ok(Self::derive(private_key, &pk))
+    }
+
+    pub fn derive(private_key: &x25519::PrivateKey, public_key: &x25519::PublicKey) -> Self {
+        let mut shared_secret = private_key.diffie_hellman(public_key);
+
+        let mut hasher = Hasher::new();
+
+        hasher.update(&shared_secret);
+        shared_secret.zeroize();
+
+        Self(hasher.finalize().as_bytes().to_owned())
+    }
+    pub fn as_bytes(&self) -> &[u8; 32] {
+        &self.0
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn encrypt_initial_kkt_frame<R>(
+    rng: &mut R,
+    remote_public_key: &x25519::PublicKey,
+    kkt_frame: &KKTFrame,
+) -> Result<(KKTSessionSecret, Vec<u8>), KKTError>
+where
+    R: CryptoRng + RngCore,
+{
+    let (session_secret_key, ephemeral_public_key) = KKTSessionSecret::new(rng, remote_public_key);
+
+    let mut encrypted_frame =
+        encrypt_kkt_frame(rng, &session_secret_key, kkt_frame, KKT_INITIAL_FRAME_AAD)?;
+
+    let mut output_buffer = Vec::with_capacity(encrypted_frame.len() + x25519::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE);
+    output_buffer.extend_from_slice(ephemeral_public_key.as_bytes());
+    output_buffer.append(&mut encrypted_frame);
+
+    // [     32     |  12   | ciphertext | 16];
+    // [eph_pub_key | nonce | ciphertext | tag];
+    Ok((session_secret_key, output_buffer))
+}
+
+pub fn decrypt_initial_kkt_frame(
+    responder_private_key: &x25519::PrivateKey,
+    encrypted_frame_bytes: &[u8],
+) -> Result<(KKTSessionSecret, KKTFrame, KKTContext), KKTError> {
+    if encrypted_frame_bytes.len() < x25519::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE + TAG_LEN + NONCE_LEN {
+        Err(KKTError::AEADError {
+            info: "Encrypted KKT Frame is too short.",
+        })
+    } else {
+        let shared_secret = KKTSessionSecret::try_derive(
+            responder_private_key,
+            &encrypted_frame_bytes[0..x25519::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE],
+        )?;
+
+        let (kkt_frame, kkt_context) = decrypt_kkt_frame(
+            &shared_secret,
+            &encrypted_frame_bytes[x25519::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE..],
+            KKT_INITIAL_FRAME_AAD,
+        )?;
+        Ok((shared_secret, kkt_frame, kkt_context))
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn encrypt_kkt_frame<R>(
+    rng: &mut R,
+    secret_key: &KKTSessionSecret,
+    kkt_frame: &KKTFrame,
+    aad: &[u8],
+) -> Result<Vec<u8>, KKTError>
+where
+    R: CryptoRng + RngCore,
+{
+    let kkt_frame_bytes = kkt_frame.to_bytes();
+
+    // generate nonce
+    let mut nonce: [u8; NONCE_LEN] = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
+    rng.fill_bytes(&mut nonce);
+
+    let mut ciphertext = encrypt(secret_key.as_bytes(), &kkt_frame_bytes, aad, &nonce)?;
+
+    // [  12  | ciphertext | 16];
+    // [nonce | ciphertext | tag];
+    let mut output_buffer: Vec<u8> =
+        Vec::with_capacity(NONCE_LEN + kkt_frame_bytes.len() + TAG_LEN);
+
+    output_buffer.extend_from_slice(&nonce);
+    output_buffer.append(&mut ciphertext);
+
+    Ok(output_buffer)
+}
+
+// kkt_frame_bytes should look like this
+// [  12  | ciphertext | 16];
+// [nonce | ciphertext | tag];
+pub fn decrypt_kkt_frame(
+    secret_key: &KKTSessionSecret,
+    kkt_frame_bytes: &[u8],
+    aad: &[u8],
+) -> Result<(KKTFrame, KKTContext), KKTError> {
+    let mut nonce: [u8; NONCE_LEN] = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
+    nonce.copy_from_slice(&kkt_frame_bytes[0..NONCE_LEN]);
+
+    let plaintext = decrypt(
+        secret_key.as_bytes(),
+        &kkt_frame_bytes[NONCE_LEN..],
+        aad,
+        &nonce,
+    )?;
+
+    KKTFrame::from_bytes(&plaintext)
+}
+
+fn encrypt(
+    secret_key: &[u8; 32],
+    plaintext: &[u8],
+    aad: &[u8],
+    nonce: &[u8; NONCE_LEN],
+) -> Result<Vec<u8>, KKTError> {
+    let mut output_buffer = vec![0; plaintext.len() + TAG_LEN];
+    libcrux_chacha20poly1305::encrypt(secret_key, plaintext, &mut output_buffer, aad, nonce)?;
+    Ok(output_buffer)
+}
+
+fn decrypt(
+    secret_key: &[u8; 32],
+    ciphertext: &[u8],
+    aad: &[u8],
+    nonce: &[u8; NONCE_LEN],
+) -> Result<Vec<u8>, KKTError> {
+    let mut output_buffer = vec![0; ciphertext.len() - TAG_LEN];
+    libcrux_chacha20poly1305::decrypt(secret_key, &mut output_buffer, ciphertext, aad, nonce)?;
+    Ok(output_buffer)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod test {
+    use crate::ciphersuite::Ciphersuite;
+    use crate::context::{KKTContext, KKTMode, KKTRole};
+    use crate::encryption::{decrypt_kkt_frame, encrypt_kkt_frame};
+    use crate::frame::{KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN, KKTFrame};
+    use crate::{
+        ciphersuite::DEFAULT_HASH_LEN,
+        encryption::{KKTSessionSecret, decrypt, encrypt},
+        key_utils::generate_keypair_x25519,
+    };
+    use rand09::{RngCore, SeedableRng, rng};
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_keygen() {
+        let mut rng = rng();
+        let responder_x25519_keypair = generate_keypair_x25519(&mut rng);
+
+        let (session_secret_key, ephemeral_public_key) =
+            KKTSessionSecret::new(&mut rng, responder_x25519_keypair.public_key());
+
+        let shared_secret = KKTSessionSecret::try_derive(
+            responder_x25519_keypair.private_key(),
+            ephemeral_public_key.as_bytes().as_slice(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(shared_secret.as_bytes(), session_secret_key.as_bytes())
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_encryption() {
+        let mut rng = rng();
+
+        let mut secret_key = [0u8; DEFAULT_HASH_LEN];
+        rng.fill_bytes(&mut secret_key);
+
+        let mut plaintext = vec![0; 100];
+        rng.fill_bytes(&mut plaintext);
+
+        let mut nonce = [0; 12];
+        rng.fill_bytes(&mut nonce);
+
+        let mut aad = vec![0; 124];
+        rng.fill_bytes(&mut aad);
+
+        let ciphertext = encrypt(&secret_key, &plaintext, &aad, &nonce).unwrap();
+
+        let o_plaintext = decrypt(&secret_key, &ciphertext, &aad, &nonce).unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(o_plaintext, plaintext)
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn kkt_frame_encryption() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        let mut rng = rand_chacha::ChaCha20Rng::seed_from_u64(42);
+        let session_key = KKTSessionSecret::from_bytes([42u8; 32]);
+        let aad = b"my-amazing-aad";
+
+        let valid_context = KKTContext::new(
+            KKTRole::Initiator,
+            KKTMode::Mutual,
+            Ciphersuite::decode([255, 1, 0, 0])?,
+        )?;
+        let dummy_frame = KKTFrame::new(
+            valid_context.encode()?,
+            &[2u8; 32],
+            [3u8; KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN],
+            &[4u8; 64],
+        );
+
+        let ciphertext = encrypt_kkt_frame(&mut rng, &session_key, &dummy_frame, aad.as_slice())?;
+
+        let (frame, context) = decrypt_kkt_frame(&session_key, &ciphertext, aad.as_slice())?;
+
+        assert_eq!(dummy_frame, frame);
+        assert_eq!(context, valid_context);
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}

common/nym-kkt/src/error.rs

@@ -8,12 +8,13 @@ use thiserror::Error;
 
 #[derive(Error, Debug)]
 pub enum KKTError {
+    #[error("Signature constructor error")]
+    SigConstructorError,
+    #[error("Signature verification error")]
+    SigVerifError,
     #[error(transparent)]
     CiphersuiteDecodingError(#[from] KKTCiphersuiteError),
 
-    #[error(transparent)]
-    MaskedByteError(#[from] MaskedByteError),
-
     #[error("KEM mapping failure: {}", info)]
     KEMMapping { info: &'static str },
 
@@ -47,28 +48,10 @@ pub enum KKTError {
     #[error("{}", info)]
     AEADError { info: &'static str },
 
-    #[error("{}", info)]
-    DecodingError { info: &'static str },
-
-    #[error("{}", info)]
-    UnsupportedAlgorithm { info: &'static str },
-
     #[error("Generic libcrux error")]
     LibcruxError,
 }
 
-#[derive(Error, Debug)]
-pub enum MaskedByteError {
-    #[error(
-        "Invalid Masked Byte Length: Expected({}), Actual({}).",
-        expected,
-        actual
-    )]
-    InvalidLength { expected: usize, actual: usize },
-    #[error("Failed to Unmask Byte.")]
-    Failure,
-}
-
 impl From<libcrux_kem::Error> for KKTError {
     fn from(err: libcrux_kem::Error) -> Self {
         match err {

common/nym-kkt/src/frame.rs

@@ -7,120 +7,42 @@
 // [2..=5] => Ciphersuite
 // [6] => Reserved
 
-use libcrux_psq::handshake::types::{DHKeyPair, DHPublicKey};
-use nym_kkt_ciphersuite::x25519::PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH;
-use rand09::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
-
 use crate::{
-    carrier::Carrier,
     context::{KKT_CONTEXT_LEN, KKTContext},
     error::KKTError,
-    masked_byte::{MASKED_BYTE_LEN, MaskedByte},
 };
 
-const KKT_CARRIER_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"CARRIER_V1_KKT_V1_KDF";
+pub const KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN: usize = 16;
+
+pub type KKTSessionId = [u8; KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN];
 
 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Clone)]
 pub struct KKTFrame {
     context: [u8; KKT_CONTEXT_LEN],
+    session_id: KKTSessionId,
     body: Vec<u8>,
+    signature: Vec<u8>,
 }
 
-// if oneway and message coming from initiator => body is empty.
-// if mutual and message coming from initiator => body has the initiator's kem public key.
-// if coming from responder => body has the responder's kem public key.
+// if oneway and message coming from initiator => body is empty, signature contains signature of context + session id (64 bytes).
+// if message coming from anonymous initiator => body is empty, there is no signature.
+// if mutual and message coming from initiator => body has the initiator's kem public key and the signature is over the context + body + session_id.
+// if coming from responder => body has the responder's kem public key and the signature is over the context + body + session_id.
 
 impl KKTFrame {
-    pub fn new(context: &KKTContext, body: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, KKTError> {
-        let context_bytes = context.encode()?;
-        Ok(Self {
-            context: context_bytes,
+    pub fn new(
+        context: [u8; KKT_CONTEXT_LEN],
+        body: &[u8],
+        session_id: [u8; KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN],
+        signature: &[u8],
+    ) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            context,
             body: Vec::from(body),
-        })
+            session_id,
+            signature: Vec::from(signature),
+        }
     }
-
-    pub fn encrypt_initiator_frame<R>(
-        &self,
-        rng: &mut R,
-        responder_public_key: &DHPublicKey,
-        version_byte: u8,
-    ) -> Result<(Carrier, Vec<u8>), KKTError>
-    where
-        R: CryptoRng + RngCore,
-    {
-        let ephemeral_keypair = DHKeyPair::new(rng);
-        let shared_secret = ephemeral_keypair
-            .sk()
-            .diffie_hellman(responder_public_key)
-            .map_err(|_| KKTError::X25519Error {
-                info: "Key Derivation Error",
-            })?;
-
-        let mut mask = Vec::from(ephemeral_keypair.pk.as_ref());
-        mask.extend_from_slice(responder_public_key.as_ref());
-
-        let masked_byte = MaskedByte::new(version_byte, &mask);
-
-        let mut context = Vec::from(masked_byte.as_slice());
-        context.extend_from_slice(KKT_CARRIER_CONTEXT);
-        context.extend_from_slice(ephemeral_keypair.pk.as_ref());
-        context.extend_from_slice(responder_public_key.as_ref());
-
-        let mut carrier = Carrier::from_secret_slice(shared_secret.as_ref(), &context);
-
-        let mut full_kkt_message = Vec::from(ephemeral_keypair.pk.as_ref());
-        full_kkt_message.extend_from_slice(masked_byte.as_slice());
-        let encrypted_kkt_frame = carrier.encrypt(&self.to_bytes())?;
-        full_kkt_message.extend_from_slice(&encrypted_kkt_frame);
-
-        Ok((carrier, full_kkt_message))
-    }
-
-    pub fn decrypt_initiator_frame(
-        responder_keypair: &DHKeyPair,
-        message: &[u8],
-        supported_versions: &[u8],
-    ) -> Result<(Carrier, KKTFrame, KKTContext), KKTError> {
-        let mut initiator_public_key_bytes: [u8; PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH] = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH];
-        initiator_public_key_bytes.clone_from_slice(&message[0..PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH]);
-
-        // check mask
-
-        let masked_byte =
-            MaskedByte::try_from(&message[PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH..PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH + MASKED_BYTE_LEN])?;
-
-        let mut mask = Vec::from(&initiator_public_key_bytes);
-        mask.extend_from_slice(responder_keypair.pk.as_ref());
-
-        // this could be used later when we have multiple versions
-        // if this call fails, it does before the server has to run a DH
-        let _outer_protocol_version =
-            masked_byte.unmask_check_version(&mask, supported_versions)?;
-
-        // now that the version is ok, we can try dh
-
-        let initiator_public_key = DHPublicKey::from_bytes(&initiator_public_key_bytes);
-
-        let shared_secret = responder_keypair
-            .sk()
-            .diffie_hellman(&initiator_public_key)
-            .map_err(|_| KKTError::X25519Error {
-                info: "Key Derivation Error",
-            })?;
-
-        let mut context = Vec::from(masked_byte.as_slice());
-        context.extend_from_slice(KKT_CARRIER_CONTEXT);
-        context.extend_from_slice(initiator_public_key.as_ref());
-        context.extend_from_slice(responder_keypair.pk.as_ref());
-
-        let mut carrier = Carrier::from_secret_slice(shared_secret.as_ref(), &context).flip_keys();
-
-        let decrypted_message = carrier.decrypt(&message[PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH + MASKED_BYTE_LEN..])?;
-        let (frame, context) = KKTFrame::from_bytes(&decrypted_message)?;
-
-        Ok((carrier, frame, context))
-    }
-
     pub fn context_ref(&self) -> &[u8] {
         &self.context
     }
@@ -129,22 +51,42 @@ impl KKTFrame {
         KKTContext::try_decode(self.context)
     }
 
+    pub fn signature_ref(&self) -> &[u8] {
+        &self.signature
+    }
+
     pub fn body_ref(&self) -> &[u8] {
         &self.body
     }
 
+    pub fn session_id_ref(&self) -> &[u8] {
+        &self.session_id
+    }
+    pub fn session_id(&self) -> [u8; KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN] {
+        self.session_id
+    }
+
+    pub fn signature_mut(&mut self) -> &mut [u8] {
+        &mut self.signature
+    }
     pub fn body_mut(&mut self) -> &mut [u8] {
         &mut self.body
     }
 
+    pub fn session_id_mut(&mut self) -> &mut [u8] {
+        &mut self.session_id
+    }
+
     pub fn frame_length(&self) -> usize {
-        self.context.len() + self.body.len()
+        self.context.len() + self.session_id.len() + self.body.len() + self.signature.len()
     }
 
     pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
         let mut bytes = Vec::with_capacity(self.frame_length());
         bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.context);
         bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.body);
+        bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.session_id);
+        bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.signature);
         bytes
     }
 
@@ -173,6 +115,7 @@ impl KKTFrame {
         }
 
         let mut body = Vec::new();
+        let mut signature = Vec::new();
 
         // decode body
         if context.body_len() > 0 {
@@ -180,7 +123,33 @@ impl KKTFrame {
             body.extend_from_slice(body_bytes);
         }
 
-        let frame = KKTFrame::new(&context, &body)?;
-        Ok((frame, context))
+        let session_bytes = &bytes[KKT_CONTEXT_LEN + context.body_len()
+            ..KKT_CONTEXT_LEN + context.body_len() + KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN];
+        // SAFETY: we're using exactly KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN bytes and we checked for sufficient bytes
+        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
+        let session_id = session_bytes.try_into().unwrap();
+
+        // // old code left for reference if session id becomes variable in length:
+        // if context.session_id_len() > 0 {
+        //     session_id.extend_from_slice(
+        //         &bytes[KKT_CONTEXT_LEN + context.body_len()
+        //             ..KKT_CONTEXT_LEN + context.body_len() + context.session_id_len()],
+        //     );
+        // }
+
+        // decode signature
+        if context.signature_len() > 0 {
+            let signature_bytes = &bytes[KKT_CONTEXT_LEN + context.body_len() + KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN
+                ..KKT_CONTEXT_LEN
+                    + context.body_len()
+                    + KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN
+                    + context.signature_len()];
+            signature.extend_from_slice(signature_bytes);
+        }
+
+        Ok((
+            KKTFrame::new(context_bytes, &body, session_id, &signature),
+            context,
+        ))
     }
 }

common/nym-kkt/src/initiator.rs

@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
-use libcrux_psq::handshake::types::DHPublicKey;
-use nym_kkt_ciphersuite::Ciphersuite;
-use rand09::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
-use zeroize::{Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop};
-
-use crate::{
-    carrier::Carrier,
-    context::{KKTContext, KKTMode, KKTRole, KKTStatus},
-    error::KKTError,
-    frame::KKTFrame,
-    key_utils::validate_encapsulation_key,
-};
-
-pub struct KKTInitiator<'a> {
-    carrier: Carrier,
-    context: KKTContext,
-    expected_hash: &'a [u8],
-}
-impl<'a> Zeroize for KKTInitiator<'a> {
-    fn zeroize(&mut self) {
-        self.carrier.zeroize();
-    }
-}
-impl<'a> ZeroizeOnDrop for KKTInitiator<'a> {}
-
-impl<'a> KKTInitiator<'a> {
-    // to be used by clients
-    pub fn generate_one_way_request<R>(
-        rng: &mut R,
-        ciphersuite: &Ciphersuite,
-        responder_dh_public_key: &DHPublicKey,
-        expected_hash: &'a [u8],
-        outer_protocol_version: u8,
-    ) -> Result<(Self, Vec<u8>), KKTError>
-    where
-        R: CryptoRng + RngCore,
-    {
-        Self::generate_encrypted_request(
-            rng,
-            KKTMode::OneWay,
-            ciphersuite,
-            None,
-            responder_dh_public_key,
-            expected_hash,
-            outer_protocol_version,
-        )
-    }
-
-    // to be used by nodes
-    pub fn generate_mutual_request<'b, R>(
-        rng: &mut R,
-        ciphersuite: &Ciphersuite,
-        local_encapsulation_key: &'b [u8],
-        responder_dh_public_key: &DHPublicKey,
-        expected_hash: &'a [u8],
-        outer_protocol_version: u8,
-    ) -> Result<(Self, Vec<u8>), KKTError>
-    where
-        R: CryptoRng + RngCore,
-    {
-        Self::generate_encrypted_request(
-            rng,
-            KKTMode::Mutual,
-            ciphersuite,
-            Some(local_encapsulation_key),
-            responder_dh_public_key,
-            expected_hash,
-            outer_protocol_version,
-        )
-    }
-
-    fn generate_encrypted_request<'b, R>(
-        rng: &mut R,
-        mode: KKTMode,
-        ciphersuite: &Ciphersuite,
-        local_encapsulation_key: Option<&'b [u8]>,
-        responder_dh_public_key: &DHPublicKey,
-        expected_hash: &'a [u8],
-        outer_protocol_version: u8,
-    ) -> Result<(Self, Vec<u8>), KKTError>
-    where
-        R: CryptoRng + RngCore,
-    {
-        let (context, frame) = initiator_process(mode, ciphersuite, local_encapsulation_key)?;
-        let (carrier, message_bytes) =
-            frame.encrypt_initiator_frame(rng, responder_dh_public_key, outer_protocol_version)?;
-
-        Ok((
-            Self {
-                carrier,
-                context,
-                expected_hash,
-            },
-            message_bytes,
-        ))
-    }
-
-    // bool would be true if the initiator was using mutual mode
-    // and the responder was able to verify the initiator's kem key
-    pub fn process_response(&mut self, response_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, bool), KKTError> {
-        let decrypted_response_bytes = self.carrier.decrypt(response_bytes)?;
-        let (response_frame, remote_context) = KKTFrame::from_bytes(&decrypted_response_bytes)?;
-        initiator_ingest_response(
-            &mut self.context,
-            &response_frame,
-            &remote_context,
-            self.expected_hash,
-        )
-    }
-}
-
-pub fn initiator_process<'a>(
-    mode: KKTMode,
-    ciphersuite: &Ciphersuite,
-    own_encapsulation_key: Option<&'a [u8]>,
-) -> Result<(KKTContext, KKTFrame), KKTError> {
-    let context = KKTContext::new(KKTRole::Initiator, mode, ciphersuite);
-
-    let body: &[u8] = match mode {
-        KKTMode::OneWay => &[],
-        KKTMode::Mutual => match own_encapsulation_key {
-            Some(encaps_key) => encaps_key,
-
-            // Missing key
-            None => {
-                return Err(KKTError::FunctionInputError {
-                    info: "KEM Key Not Provided",
-                });
-            }
-        },
-    };
-
-    let frame = KKTFrame::new(&context, body)?;
-
-    Ok((context, frame))
-}
-
-pub fn initiator_ingest_response(
-    own_context: &mut KKTContext,
-    remote_frame: &KKTFrame,
-    remote_context: &KKTContext,
-    expected_hash: &[u8],
-) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, bool), KKTError> {
-    match remote_context.status() {
-        KKTStatus::Ok | KKTStatus::UnverifiedKEMKey => {
-            match validate_encapsulation_key(
-                own_context.ciphersuite().hash_function(),
-                own_context.ciphersuite().hash_len(),
-                remote_frame.body_ref(),
-                expected_hash,
-            ) {
-                true => Ok((
-                    remote_frame.body_ref().to_vec(),
-                    remote_context.status() != KKTStatus::UnverifiedKEMKey,
-                )),
-
-                // The key does not match the hash obtained from the directory
-                false => Err(KKTError::KEMError {
-                    info: "Hash of received encapsulation key does not match the value stored on the directory.",
-                }),
-            }
-        }
-        _ => Err(KKTError::ResponderFlaggedError {
-            status: remote_context.status(),
-        }),
-    }
-}

common/nym-kkt/src/key_utils.rs

@@ -1,38 +1,70 @@
+use crate::ciphersuite::HashFunction;
 use std::collections::HashMap;
 
-use libcrux_kem::{MlKem768PrivateKey, MlKem768PublicKey};
-use libcrux_psq::handshake::types::DHKeyPair;
-use nym_kkt_ciphersuite::{DEFAULT_HASH_LEN, HashFunction, KeyDigests};
+use classic_mceliece_rust::keypair_boxed;
+
+use nym_kkt_ciphersuite::{DEFAULT_HASH_LEN, KeyDigests};
 use rand09::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
 
-pub fn generate_keypair_x25519<R>(rng: &mut R) -> DHKeyPair
+pub fn generate_keypair_ed25519<R>(
+    rng: &mut R,
+    index: Option<u32>,
+) -> nym_crypto::asymmetric::ed25519::KeyPair
 where
     R: RngCore + CryptoRng,
 {
-    DHKeyPair::new(rng)
+    let mut secret_initiator: [u8; 32] = [0u8; 32];
+    rng.fill_bytes(&mut secret_initiator);
+    nym_crypto::asymmetric::ed25519::KeyPair::from_secret(secret_initiator, index.unwrap_or(0))
 }
 
-pub fn generate_keypair_mlkem<R>(rng: &mut R) -> (MlKem768PrivateKey, MlKem768PublicKey)
+pub fn generate_keypair_x25519<R>(rng: &mut R) -> nym_crypto::asymmetric::x25519::KeyPair
 where
     R: RngCore + CryptoRng,
 {
-    libcrux_ml_kem::mlkem768::rand::generate_key_pair(rng).into_parts()
+    let mut secret_initiator: [u8; 32] = [0u8; 32];
+    rng.fill_bytes(&mut secret_initiator);
+
+    let private_key = nym_crypto::asymmetric::x25519::PrivateKey::from_secret(secret_initiator);
+    private_key.into()
 }
 
 // (decapsulation_key, encapsulation_key)
-pub fn generate_keypair_mceliece<R>(
+pub fn generate_keypair_libcrux<R>(
     rng: &mut R,
-) -> (
-    libcrux_psq::classic_mceliece::SecretKey,
-    libcrux_psq::classic_mceliece::PublicKey,
-)
+    kem: crate::ciphersuite::KEM,
+) -> Result<(libcrux_kem::PrivateKey, libcrux_kem::PublicKey), crate::error::KKTError>
 where
-    // this is annoying because mceliece lib uses rand 0.8.5...
     R: RngCore + CryptoRng,
 {
-    let kp = libcrux_psq::classic_mceliece::KeyPair::generate_key_pair(rng);
-
-    (kp.sk, kp.pk)
+    match kem {
+        crate::ciphersuite::KEM::MlKem768 => {
+            Ok(libcrux_kem::key_gen(libcrux_kem::Algorithm::MlKem768, rng)?)
+        }
+        crate::ciphersuite::KEM::XWing => Ok(libcrux_kem::key_gen(
+            libcrux_kem::Algorithm::XWingKemDraft06,
+            rng,
+        )?),
+        crate::ciphersuite::KEM::X25519 => {
+            Ok(libcrux_kem::key_gen(libcrux_kem::Algorithm::X25519, rng)?)
+        }
+        _ => Err(crate::error::KKTError::KEMError {
+            info: "Key Generation Error: Unsupported Libcrux Algorithm",
+        }),
+    }
+}
+// (decapsulation_key, encapsulation_key)
+pub fn generate_keypair_mceliece<'a, R>(
+    rng: &mut R,
+) -> (
+    classic_mceliece_rust::SecretKey<'a>,
+    classic_mceliece_rust::PublicKey<'a>,
+)
+where
+    R: RngCore + CryptoRng,
+{
+    let (encapsulation_key, decapsulation_key) = keypair_boxed(rng);
+    (decapsulation_key, encapsulation_key)
 }
 
 pub fn hash_key_bytes(

common/nym-kkt/src/kkt.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,449 @@
+// Copyright 2025 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+
+//! Convenience wrappers around KKT protocol functions for easier integration.
+//!
+//! This module provides simplified APIs for the common use case of exchanging
+//! KEM public keys between a client (initiator) and gateway (responder).
+//!
+//! The underlying KKT protocol is implemented in the `session` module.
+
+use nym_crypto::asymmetric::{ed25519, x25519};
+use rand09::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
+
+use crate::{
+    ciphersuite::{Ciphersuite, EncapsulationKey},
+    context::{KKTContext, KKTMode},
+    encryption::{decrypt_initial_kkt_frame, decrypt_kkt_frame, encrypt_kkt_frame},
+    error::KKTError,
+};
+
+// Re-export core session functions for advanced use cases
+pub use crate::session::{
+    anonymous_initiator_process, initiator_ingest_response, initiator_process,
+    responder_ingest_message, responder_process,
+};
+
+use crate::encryption::{KKTSessionSecret, encrypt_initial_kkt_frame};
+use crate::frame::KKTFrame;
+
+/// Perform an *Encrypted* request for a KEM public key from a responder (OneWay mode).
+///
+/// This is the client-side operation that initiates a KKT exchange.
+/// The request will be signed with the provided signing key.
+///
+/// # Arguments
+/// * `rng` - random number generator
+/// * `ciphersuite` - Negotiated ciphersuite (KEM, hash, signature algorithms)
+/// * `signing_key` - Client's Ed25519 signing key for authentication
+/// * `responder_dh_public_key` - Responder's long-term x25519 Diffie-Hellman public key
+///
+/// # Returns
+/// * `KKTSessionSecret` - Session Secret Key to use when decrypting responses
+/// * `KKTContext` - Context to use when validating the response
+/// * `Vec<u8>` - Contains the client's ephemeral public key and encrypted and signed bytes to send to responder
+///
+/// # Example
+/// ```ignore
+/// let (session_secret, context, request_frame) = request_kem_key(
+///     &mut rng,
+///     ciphersuite,
+///     client_signing_key,
+///     responder_dh_public_key,
+/// )?;
+/// // Send request_frame to gateway
+/// ```
+pub fn request_kem_key<R: CryptoRng + RngCore>(
+    rng: &mut R,
+    ciphersuite: Ciphersuite,
+    signing_key: &ed25519::PrivateKey,
+    responder_dh_public_key: &x25519::PublicKey,
+) -> Result<(KKTSessionSecret, KKTContext, Vec<u8>), KKTError> {
+    // OneWay mode: client only wants responder's KEM key
+    // None: client doesn't send their own KEM key
+    let (initiator_context, initiator_frame) =
+        initiator_process(rng, KKTMode::OneWay, ciphersuite, signing_key, None)?;
+
+    // Generate the session's shared secret and encrypt the Initiator's request
+    let (session_secret, encrypted_request_bytes) =
+        encrypt_initial_kkt_frame(rng, responder_dh_public_key, &initiator_frame)?;
+
+    Ok((session_secret, initiator_context, encrypted_request_bytes))
+}
+
+/// Decrypt, validate an *Encrypted* KKT response and extract the responder's KEM public key.
+///
+/// This is the client-side operation that processes the gateway's response.
+/// It verifies the signature and validates the key hash against the expected value
+/// (typically retrieved from a directory service).
+///
+/// # Arguments
+/// * `context` - Context from the initial request
+/// * `session_secret` - Session Secret Key (generated with request)
+/// * `responder_vk` - Responder's Ed25519 verification key (from directory)
+/// * `expected_key_hash` - Expected hash of responder's KEM key (from directory)
+/// * `response_bytes` - Serialized response frame from responder
+///
+/// # Returns
+/// * `EncapsulationKey` - Authenticated KEM public key of the responder
+///
+/// # Example
+/// ```ignore
+/// let gateway_kem_key = validate_kem_response(
+///     &context,
+///     &session_secret,
+///     &gateway_verification_key,
+///     &expected_hash_from_directory,
+///     &response_bytes,
+/// )?;
+/// // Use gateway_kem_key for PSQ
+/// ```
+pub fn validate_kem_response<'a>(
+    context: &mut KKTContext,
+    session_secret: &KKTSessionSecret,
+    responder_vk: &ed25519::PublicKey,
+    expected_key_hash: &[u8],
+    encrypted_response_bytes: &[u8],
+) -> Result<EncapsulationKey<'a>, KKTError> {
+    let (responder_frame, responder_context) =
+        decrypt_kkt_response_frame(session_secret, encrypted_response_bytes)?;
+
+    initiator_ingest_response(
+        context,
+        &responder_frame,
+        &responder_context,
+        responder_vk,
+        expected_key_hash,
+    )
+}
+
+/// Decrypts and validates an *Encrypted* KKT response
+///
+/// This is the client-side operation that processes the gateway's response.
+pub fn decrypt_kkt_response_frame(
+    session_secret: &KKTSessionSecret,
+    frame_ciphertext: &[u8],
+) -> Result<(KKTFrame, KKTContext), KKTError> {
+    decrypt_kkt_frame(session_secret, frame_ciphertext, KKT_RESPONSE_AAD)
+}
+
+/// Handle an *Encrypted* KKT request and generate a signed response with the responder's KEM key.
+///
+/// This is the gateway-side operation that processes a client's KKT request.
+/// It validates the request signature (if authenticated) and responds with
+/// the gateway's KEM public key, signed for authenticity.
+///
+/// # Arguments
+/// * `encrypted_request_bytes` - encrypted KEM request
+/// * `initiator_vk` - Initiator's Ed25519 verification key (None for anonymous)
+/// * `responder_signing_key` - Gateway's Ed25519 signing key
+/// * `responder_dh_public_key` - Gateway's long-term x25519 Diffie-Hellman private key
+/// * `responder_kem_key` - Gateway's KEM public key to send
+///
+/// # Returns
+/// * `KKTFrame` - Signed response frame containing the KEM public key
+///
+/// # Example
+/// ```ignore
+/// let response_frame = handle_kem_request(
+///     &request_frame,
+///     Some(client_verification_key),  // or None for anonymous
+///     gateway_signing_key,
+///     &gateway_kem_public_key,
+/// )?;
+/// // Send response_frame back to client
+/// ```
+pub fn handle_kem_request<'a, R>(
+    rng: &mut R,
+    encrypted_request_bytes: &[u8],
+    initiator_vk: Option<&ed25519::PublicKey>,
+    responder_signing_key: &ed25519::PrivateKey,
+    responder_dh_private_key: &x25519::PrivateKey,
+    responder_kem_key: &EncapsulationKey<'a>,
+) -> Result<Vec<u8>, KKTError>
+where
+    R: RngCore + CryptoRng,
+{
+    // Compute the session's shared secret, decrypt and parse context from the request frame
+
+    let (session_secret, request_frame, initiator_context) =
+        decrypt_initial_kkt_frame(responder_dh_private_key, encrypted_request_bytes)?;
+
+    // Validate the request (verifies signature if initiator_vk provided)
+    let (mut response_context, _) = responder_ingest_message(
+        &initiator_context,
+        initiator_vk,
+        None, // Not checking initiator's KEM key in OneWay mode
+        &request_frame,
+    )?;
+
+    // Generate signed response with our KEM public key
+    let responder_frame = responder_process(
+        &mut response_context,
+        request_frame.session_id(),
+        responder_signing_key,
+        responder_kem_key,
+    )?;
+
+    // Encrypt the responder's response with the session's shared secret
+    encrypt_kkt_frame(rng, &session_secret, &responder_frame, KKT_RESPONSE_AAD)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::{
+        ciphersuite::{HashFunction, KEM, SignatureScheme},
+        key_utils::{generate_keypair_libcrux, hash_encapsulation_key},
+    };
+
+    fn random_x25519_key() -> x25519::PrivateKey {
+        let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
+        let mut rng = rand09::rng();
+        rng.fill_bytes(&mut bytes);
+        x25519::PrivateKey::from_secret(bytes)
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_kkt_wrappers_oneway_authenticated() {
+        let mut rng = rand09::rng();
+
+        // Generate Ed25519 keypairs for both parties
+        let mut initiator_secret = [0u8; 32];
+        rng.fill_bytes(&mut initiator_secret);
+        let ed25519_init = ed25519::KeyPair::from_secret(initiator_secret, 0);
+
+        let mut responder_secret = [0u8; 32];
+        rng.fill_bytes(&mut responder_secret);
+        let ed25519_resp = ed25519::KeyPair::from_secret(responder_secret, 1);
+
+        let x25519_resp_priv = random_x25519_key();
+        let x25519_resp_pub = x25519::PublicKey::from(&x25519_resp_priv);
+
+        // Generate responder's KEM keypair (X25519 for testing)
+        let (_, responder_kem_pk) = generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, KEM::X25519).unwrap();
+        let responder_kem_key = EncapsulationKey::X25519(responder_kem_pk);
+
+        // Create ciphersuite
+        let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::resolve_ciphersuite(
+            KEM::X25519,
+            HashFunction::Blake3,
+            SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
+            None,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        // Hash the KEM key (simulating directory storage)
+        let key_hash = hash_encapsulation_key(
+            &ciphersuite.hash_function(),
+            ciphersuite.hash_len(),
+            &responder_kem_key.encode(),
+        );
+
+        // Client: Request KEM key
+        let (session_key, context, request_frame_ciphertext) = request_kem_key(
+            &mut rng,
+            ciphersuite,
+            ed25519_init.private_key(),
+            &x25519_resp_pub,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        // Gateway: Handle request
+        let response_frame_ciphertext = handle_kem_request(
+            &mut rng,
+            &request_frame_ciphertext,
+            Some(ed25519_init.public_key()), // Authenticated
+            ed25519_resp.private_key(),
+            &x25519_resp_priv,
+            &responder_kem_key,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        // Client: Validate response
+        let obtained_key = validate_kem_response(
+            &context,
+            &session_key,
+            ed25519_resp.public_key(),
+            &key_hash,
+            &response_frame_ciphertext,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        // Verify we got the correct KEM key
+        assert_eq!(obtained_key.encode(), responder_kem_key.encode());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_kkt_wrappers_anonymous() {
+        let mut rng = rand09::rng();
+
+        // Only responder has keys
+        let mut responder_secret = [0u8; 32];
+        rng.fill_bytes(&mut responder_secret);
+        let responder_keypair = ed25519::KeyPair::from_secret(responder_secret, 1);
+
+        let (_, responder_kem_pk) = generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, KEM::X25519).unwrap();
+        let responder_kem_key = EncapsulationKey::X25519(responder_kem_pk);
+
+        let x25519_resp_priv = random_x25519_key();
+        let x25519_resp_pub = x25519::PublicKey::from(&x25519_resp_priv);
+
+        let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::resolve_ciphersuite(
+            KEM::X25519,
+            HashFunction::Blake3,
+            SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
+            None,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let key_hash = hash_encapsulation_key(
+            &ciphersuite.hash_function(),
+            ciphersuite.hash_len(),
+            &responder_kem_key.encode(),
+        );
+
+        // Anonymous initiator
+        let (context, request_frame) = anonymous_initiator_process(&mut rng, ciphersuite).unwrap();
+
+        // Generate the session's shared secret and encrypt the Initiator's request
+        let (session_secret, encrypted_request_bytes) =
+            encrypt_initial_kkt_frame(&mut rng, &x25519_resp_pub, &request_frame).unwrap();
+
+        // Gateway: Handle anonymous request
+        let response_frame = handle_kem_request(
+            &mut rng,
+            &encrypted_request_bytes,
+            None, // Anonymous - no verification key
+            responder_keypair.private_key(),
+            &x25519_resp_priv,
+            &responder_kem_key,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        // Initiator: Validate response
+        let obtained_key = validate_kem_response(
+            &context,
+            &session_secret,
+            responder_keypair.public_key(),
+            &key_hash,
+            &response_frame,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(obtained_key.encode(), responder_kem_key.encode());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_invalid_signature_rejected() {
+        let mut rng = rand09::rng();
+
+        let mut initiator_secret = [0u8; 32];
+        rng.fill_bytes(&mut initiator_secret);
+        let initiator_keypair = ed25519::KeyPair::from_secret(initiator_secret, 0);
+
+        let mut responder_secret = [0u8; 32];
+        rng.fill_bytes(&mut responder_secret);
+        let responder_keypair = ed25519::KeyPair::from_secret(responder_secret, 1);
+
+        let x25519_resp_priv = random_x25519_key();
+        let x25519_resp_pub = x25519::PublicKey::from(&x25519_resp_priv);
+
+        // Different keypair for wrong signature
+        let mut wrong_secret = [0u8; 32];
+        rng.fill_bytes(&mut wrong_secret);
+        let wrong_keypair = ed25519::KeyPair::from_secret(wrong_secret, 2);
+
+        let (_, responder_kem_pk) = generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, KEM::X25519).unwrap();
+        let responder_kem_key = EncapsulationKey::X25519(responder_kem_pk);
+
+        let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::resolve_ciphersuite(
+            KEM::X25519,
+            HashFunction::Blake3,
+            SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
+            None,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let (_session_key, _context, request_frame_ciphertext) = request_kem_key(
+            &mut rng,
+            ciphersuite,
+            initiator_keypair.private_key(),
+            &x25519_resp_pub,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        // Gateway handles request but we provide WRONG verification key
+        let result = handle_kem_request(
+            &mut rng,
+            &request_frame_ciphertext,
+            Some(wrong_keypair.public_key()), // Wrong key!
+            responder_keypair.private_key(),
+            &x25519_resp_priv,
+            &responder_kem_key,
+        );
+
+        // Should fail signature verification
+        assert!(result.is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_hash_mismatch_rejected() {
+        let mut rng = rand09::rng();
+
+        let mut initiator_secret = [0u8; 32];
+        rng.fill_bytes(&mut initiator_secret);
+        let initiator_keypair = ed25519::KeyPair::from_secret(initiator_secret, 0);
+
+        let mut responder_secret = [0u8; 32];
+        rng.fill_bytes(&mut responder_secret);
+        let responder_keypair = ed25519::KeyPair::from_secret(responder_secret, 1);
+
+        let x25519_resp_priv = random_x25519_key();
+        let x25519_resp_pub = x25519::PublicKey::from(&x25519_resp_priv);
+
+        let (_, responder_kem_pk) = generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, KEM::X25519).unwrap();
+        let responder_kem_key = EncapsulationKey::X25519(responder_kem_pk);
+
+        let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::resolve_ciphersuite(
+            KEM::X25519,
+            HashFunction::Blake3,
+            SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
+            None,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        // Use WRONG hash
+        let wrong_hash = [0u8; 32];
+
+        let (session_key, context, request_frame) = request_kem_key(
+            &mut rng,
+            ciphersuite,
+            initiator_keypair.private_key(),
+            &x25519_resp_pub,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let response_frame = handle_kem_request(
+            &mut rng,
+            &request_frame,
+            Some(initiator_keypair.public_key()),
+            responder_keypair.private_key(),
+            &x25519_resp_priv,
+            &responder_kem_key,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        // Client validates with WRONG hash
+        let result = validate_kem_response(
+            &context,
+            &session_key,
+            responder_keypair.public_key(),
+            &wrong_hash, // Wrong!
+            &response_frame,
+        );
+
+        // Should fail hash validation
+        assert!(result.is_err());
+    }
+}

common/nym-kkt/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,210 +1,498 @@
 // Copyright 2025 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 
-pub mod carrier;
+pub mod ciphersuite;
 pub mod context;
+pub mod encryption;
 pub mod error;
 pub mod frame;
-pub mod initiator;
 pub mod key_utils;
-pub mod masked_byte;
-pub mod rekey;
-pub mod responder;
+// pub mod kkt;
+pub mod session;
 
 // This must be less than 4 bits
 pub const KKT_VERSION: u8 = 1;
 const _: () = assert!(KKT_VERSION < 1 << 4);
+pub const KKT_RESPONSE_AAD: &[u8] = b"KKT_Response";
+pub(crate) const KKT_INITIAL_FRAME_AAD: &[u8] = b"KKT_INITIAL_FRAME";
 
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod test {
-    use nym_kkt_ciphersuite::{Ciphersuite, HashFunction, HashLength, KEM, SignatureScheme};
-
     use crate::{
-        initiator::KKTInitiator,
-        key_utils::{
-            generate_keypair_mceliece, generate_keypair_mlkem, generate_keypair_x25519,
-            hash_encapsulation_key,
+        KKT_RESPONSE_AAD,
+        ciphersuite::{Ciphersuite, EncapsulationKey, HashFunction, KEM},
+        encryption::{
+            decrypt_initial_kkt_frame, decrypt_kkt_frame, encrypt_initial_kkt_frame,
+            encrypt_kkt_frame,
+        },
+        frame::KKTFrame,
+        key_utils::{
+            generate_keypair_ed25519, generate_keypair_libcrux, generate_keypair_mceliece,
+            generate_keypair_x25519, hash_encapsulation_key,
+        },
+        session::{
+            anonymous_initiator_process, initiator_ingest_response, initiator_process,
+            responder_ingest_message, responder_process,
         },
-        responder::KKTResponder,
     };
 
     #[test]
-    fn test_kkt_psq_e2e_encrypted_carrier() {
+    fn test_kkt_psq_e2e_clear() {
         let mut rng = rand09::rng();
 
+        // generate ed25519 keys
+        let initiator_ed25519_keypair = generate_keypair_ed25519(&mut rng, Some(0));
+        let responder_ed25519_keypair = generate_keypair_ed25519(&mut rng, Some(1));
+
+        for kem in [KEM::MlKem768, KEM::XWing, KEM::X25519, KEM::McEliece] {
+            for hash_function in [
+                HashFunction::Blake3,
+                HashFunction::SHA256,
+                HashFunction::Shake128,
+                HashFunction::Shake256,
+            ] {
+                let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::resolve_ciphersuite(
+                    kem,
+                    hash_function,
+                    crate::ciphersuite::SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
+                    None,
+                )
+                .unwrap();
+
+                // generate kem public keys
+
+                let (responder_kem_public_key, initiator_kem_public_key) = match kem {
+                    KEM::MlKem768 => (
+                        EncapsulationKey::MlKem768(
+                            generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1,
+                        ),
+                        EncapsulationKey::MlKem768(
+                            generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1,
+                        ),
+                    ),
+                    KEM::XWing => (
+                        EncapsulationKey::XWing(generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1),
+                        EncapsulationKey::XWing(generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1),
+                    ),
+                    KEM::X25519 => (
+                        EncapsulationKey::X25519(
+                            generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1,
+                        ),
+                        EncapsulationKey::X25519(
+                            generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1,
+                        ),
+                    ),
+                    KEM::McEliece => (
+                        EncapsulationKey::McEliece(generate_keypair_mceliece(&mut rng).1),
+                        EncapsulationKey::McEliece(generate_keypair_mceliece(&mut rng).1),
+                    ),
+                };
+
+                let i_kem_key_bytes = initiator_kem_public_key.encode();
+
+                let r_kem_key_bytes = responder_kem_public_key.encode();
+
+                let i_dir_hash = hash_encapsulation_key(
+                    &ciphersuite.hash_function(),
+                    ciphersuite.hash_len(),
+                    &i_kem_key_bytes,
+                );
+
+                let r_dir_hash = hash_encapsulation_key(
+                    &ciphersuite.hash_function(),
+                    ciphersuite.hash_len(),
+                    &r_kem_key_bytes,
+                );
+
+                // Anonymous Initiator, OneWay
+                {
+                    let (i_context, i_frame) =
+                        anonymous_initiator_process(&mut rng, ciphersuite).unwrap();
+
+                    let i_frame_bytes = i_frame.to_bytes();
+
+                    let (i_frame_r, r_context) = KKTFrame::from_bytes(&i_frame_bytes).unwrap();
+
+                    let (r_context, _) =
+                        responder_ingest_message(&r_context, None, None, &i_frame_r).unwrap();
+
+                    let r_frame = responder_process(
+                        &r_context,
+                        i_frame_r.session_id(),
+                        responder_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
+                        &responder_kem_public_key,
+                    )
+                    .unwrap();
+
+                    let r_bytes = r_frame.to_bytes();
+
+                    let (i_frame_r, i_context_r) = KKTFrame::from_bytes(&r_bytes).unwrap();
+
+                    let i_obtained_key = initiator_ingest_response(
+                        &i_context,
+                        &i_frame_r,
+                        &i_context_r,
+                        responder_ed25519_keypair.public_key(),
+                        &r_dir_hash,
+                    )
+                    .unwrap();
+
+                    assert_eq!(i_obtained_key.encode(), r_kem_key_bytes)
+                }
+                // Initiator, OneWay
+                {
+                    let (i_context, i_frame) = initiator_process(
+                        &mut rng,
+                        crate::context::KKTMode::OneWay,
+                        ciphersuite,
+                        initiator_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
+                        None,
+                    )
+                    .unwrap();
+
+                    let i_frame_bytes = i_frame.to_bytes();
+
+                    let (i_frame_r, r_context) = KKTFrame::from_bytes(&i_frame_bytes).unwrap();
+
+                    let (r_context, r_obtained_key) = responder_ingest_message(
+                        &r_context,
+                        Some(initiator_ed25519_keypair.public_key()),
+                        None,
+                        &i_frame_r,
+                    )
+                    .unwrap();
+
+                    assert!(r_obtained_key.is_none());
+
+                    let r_frame = responder_process(
+                        &r_context,
+                        i_frame_r.session_id(),
+                        responder_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
+                        &responder_kem_public_key,
+                    )
+                    .unwrap();
+
+                    let r_bytes = r_frame.to_bytes();
+
+                    let (i_frame_r, i_context_r) = KKTFrame::from_bytes(&r_bytes).unwrap();
+
+                    let i_obtained_key = initiator_ingest_response(
+                        &i_context,
+                        &i_frame_r,
+                        &i_context_r,
+                        responder_ed25519_keypair.public_key(),
+                        &r_dir_hash,
+                    )
+                    .unwrap();
+
+                    assert_eq!(i_obtained_key.encode(), r_kem_key_bytes)
+                }
+
+                // Initiator, Mutual
+                {
+                    let (i_context, i_frame) = initiator_process(
+                        &mut rng,
+                        crate::context::KKTMode::Mutual,
+                        ciphersuite,
+                        initiator_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
+                        Some(&initiator_kem_public_key),
+                    )
+                    .unwrap();
+
+                    let i_frame_bytes = i_frame.to_bytes();
+
+                    let (i_frame_r, r_context) = KKTFrame::from_bytes(&i_frame_bytes).unwrap();
+
+                    let (r_context, r_obtained_key) = responder_ingest_message(
+                        &r_context,
+                        Some(initiator_ed25519_keypair.public_key()),
+                        Some(&i_dir_hash),
+                        &i_frame_r,
+                    )
+                    .unwrap();
+
+                    assert_eq!(r_obtained_key.unwrap().encode(), i_kem_key_bytes);
+
+                    let r_frame = responder_process(
+                        &r_context,
+                        i_frame_r.session_id(),
+                        responder_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
+                        &responder_kem_public_key,
+                    )
+                    .unwrap();
+
+                    let r_bytes = r_frame.to_bytes();
+
+                    let (i_frame_r, i_context_r) = KKTFrame::from_bytes(&r_bytes).unwrap();
+
+                    let i_obtained_key = initiator_ingest_response(
+                        &i_context,
+                        &i_frame_r,
+                        &i_context_r,
+                        responder_ed25519_keypair.public_key(),
+                        &r_dir_hash,
+                    )
+                    .unwrap();
+
+                    assert_eq!(i_obtained_key.encode(), r_kem_key_bytes)
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn test_kkt_psq_e2e_encrypted() {
+        let mut rng = rand09::rng();
+
+        // generate ed25519 keys
+        let initiator_ed25519_keypair = generate_keypair_ed25519(&mut rng, Some(0));
+        let responder_ed25519_keypair = generate_keypair_ed25519(&mut rng, Some(1));
+
         // generate responder x25519 keys
         let responder_x25519_keypair = generate_keypair_x25519(&mut rng);
 
-        for hash_function in [
-            HashFunction::Blake3,
-            HashFunction::SHA256,
-            HashFunction::Shake128,
-            HashFunction::Shake256,
-        ] {
-            // generate kem public keys
-
-            let responder_mlkem_keypair = generate_keypair_mlkem(&mut rng);
-            let responder_mceliece_keypair = generate_keypair_mceliece(&mut rng);
-
-            let r_dir_hash_mlkem = hash_encapsulation_key(
-                // &ciphersuite.hash_function(),
-                &hash_function,
-                // ciphersuite.hash_len(),
-                HashLength::Default.value(),
-                responder_mlkem_keypair.1.as_slice().as_slice(),
-            );
-
-            let r_dir_hash_mceliece = hash_encapsulation_key(
-                // &ciphersuite.hash_function(),
-                &hash_function,
-                // ciphersuite.hash_len(),
-                HashLength::Default.value(),
-                responder_mceliece_keypair.1.as_ref(),
-            );
-            let initiator_mlkem_keypair = generate_keypair_mlkem(&mut rng);
-            let initiator_mceliece_keypair = generate_keypair_mceliece(&mut rng);
-
-            let _i_dir_hash_mlkem = hash_encapsulation_key(
-                // &ciphersuite.hash_function(),
-                &hash_function,
-                // ciphersuite.hash_len(),
-                HashLength::Default.value(),
-                initiator_mlkem_keypair.1.as_slice().as_slice(),
-            );
-
-            let _i_dir_hash_mceliece = hash_encapsulation_key(
-                // &ciphersuite.hash_function(),
-                &hash_function,
-                // ciphersuite.hash_len(),
-                HashLength::Default.value(),
-                initiator_mceliece_keypair.1.as_ref(),
-            );
-
-            let responder = KKTResponder::new(
-                &responder_x25519_keypair,
-                Some(&responder_mlkem_keypair.1),
-                Some(&responder_mceliece_keypair.1),
-                &[
-                    HashFunction::Blake3,
-                    HashFunction::SHA256,
-                    HashFunction::Shake128,
-                    HashFunction::Shake256,
-                ],
-                &[1],
-                &[SignatureScheme::Ed25519],
-            )
-            .unwrap();
-
-            // OneWay - MlKem
-            {
+        for kem in [KEM::MlKem768, KEM::XWing, KEM::X25519, KEM::McEliece] {
+            for hash_function in [
+                HashFunction::Blake3,
+                HashFunction::SHA256,
+                HashFunction::Shake128,
+                HashFunction::Shake256,
+            ] {
                 let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::resolve_ciphersuite(
-                    KEM::MlKem768,
+                    kem,
                     hash_function,
-                    SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
+                    crate::ciphersuite::SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
                     None,
                 )
                 .unwrap();
-                let (mut initiator, request_bytes) = KKTInitiator::generate_one_way_request(
-                    &mut rng,
-                    &ciphersuite,
-                    &responder_x25519_keypair.pk,
-                    &r_dir_hash_mlkem,
-                    1u8,
-                )
-                .unwrap();
 
-                let (response_bytes, _) = responder.process_request(&request_bytes).unwrap();
+                // generate kem public keys
 
-                let (i_obtained_key, _) = initiator.process_response(&response_bytes).unwrap();
+                let (responder_kem_public_key, initiator_kem_public_key) = match kem {
+                    KEM::MlKem768 => (
+                        EncapsulationKey::MlKem768(
+                            generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1,
+                        ),
+                        EncapsulationKey::MlKem768(
+                            generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1,
+                        ),
+                    ),
+                    KEM::XWing => (
+                        EncapsulationKey::XWing(generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1),
+                        EncapsulationKey::XWing(generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1),
+                    ),
+                    KEM::X25519 => (
+                        EncapsulationKey::X25519(
+                            generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1,
+                        ),
+                        EncapsulationKey::X25519(
+                            generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1,
+                        ),
+                    ),
+                    KEM::McEliece => (
+                        EncapsulationKey::McEliece(generate_keypair_mceliece(&mut rng).1),
+                        EncapsulationKey::McEliece(generate_keypair_mceliece(&mut rng).1),
+                    ),
+                };
 
-                assert_eq!(
-                    i_obtained_key,
-                    responder_mlkem_keypair.1.as_slice().as_slice(),
-                )
-            }
-            // Mutual - MlKem
-            {
-                let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::resolve_ciphersuite(
-                    KEM::MlKem768,
-                    hash_function,
-                    SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
-                    None,
-                )
-                .unwrap();
-                let (mut initiator, request_bytes) = KKTInitiator::generate_one_way_request(
-                    &mut rng,
-                    &ciphersuite,
-                    &responder_x25519_keypair.pk,
-                    &r_dir_hash_mlkem,
-                    1u8,
-                )
-                .unwrap();
+                let i_kem_key_bytes = initiator_kem_public_key.encode();
 
-                let (response_bytes, r_obtained_key) =
-                    responder.process_request(&request_bytes).unwrap();
+                let r_kem_key_bytes = responder_kem_public_key.encode();
 
-                // if we keep unverified keys, this should change
-                assert!(r_obtained_key.is_none());
+                let i_dir_hash = hash_encapsulation_key(
+                    &ciphersuite.hash_function(),
+                    ciphersuite.hash_len(),
+                    &i_kem_key_bytes,
+                );
 
-                let (i_obtained_key, _) = initiator.process_response(&response_bytes).unwrap();
+                let r_dir_hash = hash_encapsulation_key(
+                    &ciphersuite.hash_function(),
+                    ciphersuite.hash_len(),
+                    &r_kem_key_bytes,
+                );
 
-                assert_eq!(
-                    i_obtained_key,
-                    responder_mlkem_keypair.1.as_slice().as_slice(),
-                )
-            }
+                // Anonymous Initiator, OneWay
+                {
+                    let (i_context, i_frame) =
+                        anonymous_initiator_process(&mut rng, ciphersuite).unwrap();
 
-            // OneWay - McEliece
-            {
-                let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::resolve_ciphersuite(
-                    KEM::McEliece,
-                    hash_function,
-                    SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
-                    None,
-                )
-                .unwrap();
-                let (mut initiator, request_bytes) = KKTInitiator::generate_one_way_request(
-                    &mut rng,
-                    &ciphersuite,
-                    &responder_x25519_keypair.pk,
-                    &r_dir_hash_mceliece,
-                    1u8,
-                )
-                .unwrap();
+                    // encryption - initiator frame
 
-                let (response_bytes, _) = responder.process_request(&request_bytes).unwrap();
+                    let (i_session_secret, i_bytes) = encrypt_initial_kkt_frame(
+                        &mut rng,
+                        responder_x25519_keypair.public_key(),
+                        &i_frame,
+                    )
+                    .unwrap();
 
-                let (i_obtained_key, _) = initiator.process_response(&response_bytes).unwrap();
+                    // decryption - initiator frame
 
-                assert_eq!(i_obtained_key, responder_mceliece_keypair.1.as_ref(),)
-            }
-            // Mutual - MlKem
-            {
-                let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::resolve_ciphersuite(
-                    KEM::McEliece,
-                    hash_function,
-                    SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
-                    None,
-                )
-                .unwrap();
-                let (mut initiator, request_bytes) = KKTInitiator::generate_one_way_request(
-                    &mut rng,
-                    &ciphersuite,
-                    &responder_x25519_keypair.pk,
-                    &r_dir_hash_mceliece,
-                    1u8,
-                )
-                .unwrap();
+                    let (r_session_secret, i_frame_r, i_context_r) =
+                        decrypt_initial_kkt_frame(responder_x25519_keypair.private_key(), &i_bytes)
+                            .unwrap();
 
-                let (response_bytes, r_obtained_key) =
-                    responder.process_request(&request_bytes).unwrap();
+                    let (r_context, _) =
+                        responder_ingest_message(&i_context_r, None, None, &i_frame_r).unwrap();
 
-                // if we keep unverified keys, this should change
-                assert!(r_obtained_key.is_none());
+                    let r_frame = responder_process(
+                        &r_context,
+                        i_frame_r.session_id(),
+                        responder_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
+                        &responder_kem_public_key,
+                    )
+                    .unwrap();
 
-                let (i_obtained_key, _) = initiator.process_response(&response_bytes).unwrap();
+                    // encryption - responder frame
+                    let r_bytes =
+                        encrypt_kkt_frame(&mut rng, &r_session_secret, &r_frame, KKT_RESPONSE_AAD)
+                            .unwrap();
 
-                assert_eq!(i_obtained_key, responder_mceliece_keypair.1.as_ref(),)
+                    // decryption - responder frame
+
+                    let (i_frame_r, i_context_r) =
+                        decrypt_kkt_frame(&i_session_secret, &r_bytes, KKT_RESPONSE_AAD).unwrap();
+
+                    let i_obtained_key = initiator_ingest_response(
+                        &i_context,
+                        &i_frame_r,
+                        &i_context_r,
+                        responder_ed25519_keypair.public_key(),
+                        &r_dir_hash,
+                    )
+                    .unwrap();
+
+                    assert_eq!(i_obtained_key.encode(), r_kem_key_bytes)
+                }
+                // Initiator, OneWay
+                {
+                    let (i_context, i_frame) = initiator_process(
+                        &mut rng,
+                        crate::context::KKTMode::OneWay,
+                        ciphersuite,
+                        initiator_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
+                        None,
+                    )
+                    .unwrap();
+
+                    // encryption - initiator frame
+
+                    let (i_session_secret, i_bytes) = encrypt_initial_kkt_frame(
+                        &mut rng,
+                        responder_x25519_keypair.public_key(),
+                        &i_frame,
+                    )
+                    .unwrap();
+
+                    // decryption - initiator frame
+
+                    let (r_session_secret, i_frame_r, r_context) =
+                        decrypt_initial_kkt_frame(responder_x25519_keypair.private_key(), &i_bytes)
+                            .unwrap();
+
+                    let (r_context, r_obtained_key) = responder_ingest_message(
+                        &r_context,
+                        Some(initiator_ed25519_keypair.public_key()),
+                        None,
+                        &i_frame_r,
+                    )
+                    .unwrap();
+
+                    assert!(r_obtained_key.is_none());
+
+                    let r_frame = responder_process(
+                        &r_context,
+                        i_frame_r.session_id(),
+                        responder_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
+                        &responder_kem_public_key,
+                    )
+                    .unwrap();
+
+                    // encryption - responder frame
+                    let r_bytes =
+                        encrypt_kkt_frame(&mut rng, &r_session_secret, &r_frame, KKT_RESPONSE_AAD)
+                            .unwrap();
+
+                    // decryption - responder frame
+
+                    let (i_frame_r, i_context_r) =
+                        decrypt_kkt_frame(&i_session_secret, &r_bytes, KKT_RESPONSE_AAD).unwrap();
+
+                    let i_obtained_key = initiator_ingest_response(
+                        &i_context,
+                        &i_frame_r,
+                        &i_context_r,
+                        responder_ed25519_keypair.public_key(),
+                        &r_dir_hash,
+                    )
+                    .unwrap();
+
+                    assert_eq!(i_obtained_key.encode(), r_kem_key_bytes)
+                }
+
+                // Initiator, Mutual
+                {
+                    let (i_context, i_frame) = initiator_process(
+                        &mut rng,
+                        crate::context::KKTMode::Mutual,
+                        ciphersuite,
+                        initiator_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
+                        Some(&initiator_kem_public_key),
+                    )
+                    .unwrap();
+
+                    // encryption - initiator frame
+
+                    let (i_session_secret, i_bytes) = encrypt_initial_kkt_frame(
+                        &mut rng,
+                        responder_x25519_keypair.public_key(),
+                        &i_frame,
+                    )
+                    .unwrap();
+
+                    // decryption - initiator frame
+
+                    let (r_session_secret, i_frame_r, i_context_r) =
+                        decrypt_initial_kkt_frame(responder_x25519_keypair.private_key(), &i_bytes)
+                            .unwrap();
+
+                    let (r_context, r_obtained_key) = responder_ingest_message(
+                        &i_context_r,
+                        Some(initiator_ed25519_keypair.public_key()),
+                        Some(&i_dir_hash),
+                        &i_frame_r,
+                    )
+                    .unwrap();
+
+                    assert_eq!(r_obtained_key.unwrap().encode(), i_kem_key_bytes);
+
+                    let r_frame = responder_process(
+                        &r_context,
+                        i_frame_r.session_id(),
+                        responder_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
+                        &responder_kem_public_key,
+                    )
+                    .unwrap();
+
+                    // encryption - responder frame
+                    let r_bytes =
+                        encrypt_kkt_frame(&mut rng, &r_session_secret, &r_frame, KKT_RESPONSE_AAD)
+                            .unwrap();
+
+                    // decryption - responder frame
+
+                    let (i_frame_r, i_context_r) =
+                        decrypt_kkt_frame(&i_session_secret, &r_bytes, KKT_RESPONSE_AAD).unwrap();
+
+                    let i_obtained_key = initiator_ingest_response(
+                        &i_context,
+                        &i_frame_r,
+                        &i_context_r,
+                        responder_ed25519_keypair.public_key(),
+                        &r_dir_hash,
+                    )
+                    .unwrap();
+
+                    assert_eq!(i_obtained_key.encode(), r_kem_key_bytes)
+                }
             }
         }
     }

common/nym-kkt/src/masked_byte.rs

@@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
-use nym_crypto::{blake3, hmac::hmac::digest::ExtendableOutput};
-
-use crate::error::{
-    MaskedByteError,
-    MaskedByteError::{Failure, InvalidLength},
-};
-
-pub const MASKED_BYTE_LEN: usize = 16;
-pub const MASKED_BYTE_CONTEXT_STR: &[u8] = b"NYM_MASKED_BYTE_V1";
-
-const U8_RANGE: [u8; 256] = [
-    0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
-    26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49,
-    50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73,
-    74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97,
-    98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116,
-    117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135,
-    136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154,
-    155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173,
-    174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192,
-    193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211,
-    212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230,
-    231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249,
-    250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255,
-];
-
-#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
-pub struct MaskedByte([u8; MASKED_BYTE_LEN]);
-
-impl MaskedByte {
-    /// Mask a byte by hashing it with some mask.
-    /// Outputs Blake3_Hash(MASKED_BYTE_CONTEXT_STR || mask || 0xFF || byte)
-    pub fn new(byte: u8, mask: &[u8]) -> Self {
-        let mut output: [u8; MASKED_BYTE_LEN] = [0u8; MASKED_BYTE_LEN];
-        let mut hasher = blake3::Hasher::new();
-        hasher.update(MASKED_BYTE_CONTEXT_STR);
-        hasher.update(mask);
-        // avoid zero update
-        hasher.update(&[0xFF, byte]);
-        hasher.finalize_xof_into(&mut output);
-
-        Self(output)
-    }
-    /// Unmasks a byte by trial hashing.
-    /// This function runs Blake3_Hash(MASKED_BYTE_CONTEXT_STR || mask || 0xFF).
-    /// This Hasher state is then cloned updated with `i: u8` in (0..=u8::max).
-    /// If we find an `i` which yields back the hash input, then we found the masked byte.
-    /// Otherwise, the function returns an error.
-    pub fn unmask(&self, mask: &[u8]) -> Result<u8, MaskedByteError> {
-        self.unmask_check_version(mask, &U8_RANGE)
-    }
-
-    // This could be more efficient than unmask,
-    // because we just could check against a smaller list of supported versions.
-    pub fn unmask_check_version(
-        &self,
-        mask: &[u8],
-        supported_versions: &[u8],
-    ) -> Result<u8, MaskedByteError> {
-        let mut buf: [u8; MASKED_BYTE_LEN] = [0u8; MASKED_BYTE_LEN];
-        let mut hasher = blake3::Hasher::new();
-        hasher.update(MASKED_BYTE_CONTEXT_STR);
-        hasher.update(mask);
-        // avoid zero update
-        hasher.update(&[0xFF]);
-        for i in supported_versions {
-            let mut t_hasher = hasher.clone();
-            t_hasher.update(&[*i]);
-            t_hasher.finalize_xof_into(&mut buf);
-            if buf == self.0 {
-                return Ok(*i);
-            }
-        }
-        Err(Failure)
-    }
-
-    pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
-        &self.0
-    }
-
-    pub fn to_bytes(self) -> [u8; 16] {
-        self.0
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<[u8; MASKED_BYTE_LEN]> for MaskedByte {
-    fn from(value: [u8; MASKED_BYTE_LEN]) -> Self {
-        MaskedByte(value)
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<&[u8; MASKED_BYTE_LEN]> for MaskedByte {
-    fn from(value: &[u8; MASKED_BYTE_LEN]) -> Self {
-        MaskedByte(value.to_owned())
-    }
-}
-
-impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for MaskedByte {
-    type Error = MaskedByteError;
-
-    fn try_from(value: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        if value.len() != MASKED_BYTE_LEN {
-            Err(InvalidLength {
-                expected: MASKED_BYTE_LEN,
-                actual: value.len(),
-            })
-        } else {
-            Ok(Self::from(value.as_chunks::<MASKED_BYTE_LEN>().0[0]))
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod test {
-
-    use crate::masked_byte::MASKED_BYTE_LEN;
-
-    use super::MaskedByte;
-    use rand09::{Rng, RngCore, rng};
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_masking() {
-        let mut mask: [u8; 256] = [0u8; 256];
-        let mut wire_bytes: [u8; MASKED_BYTE_LEN];
-
-        // why not
-        for i in 0..=u8::MAX {
-            // gen mask
-            rng().fill_bytes(&mut mask);
-            let masked_byte = MaskedByte::new(i, &mask);
-            wire_bytes = masked_byte.to_bytes();
-
-            let decoded_masked_byte = MaskedByte::from(wire_bytes);
-            let output = decoded_masked_byte.unmask(&mask).unwrap();
-
-            assert_eq!(i, output);
-
-            // flip bit
-            let mut with_flipped_bit = decoded_masked_byte.to_bytes();
-
-            let byte_idx: usize = rng().random_range(0..MASKED_BYTE_LEN);
-            let bit_idx = rng().random_range(0..8);
-            with_flipped_bit[byte_idx] ^= 1 << bit_idx;
-
-            let decoded_masked_byte = MaskedByte::from(with_flipped_bit);
-            assert!(decoded_masked_byte.unmask(&mask).is_err());
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_decoding() {
-        let mut mask: [u8; 256] = [0u8; 256];
-
-        // gen mask
-        rng().fill_bytes(&mut mask);
-        let byte = rng().random();
-        let masked_byte = MaskedByte::new(byte, &mask);
-        let wire_bytes: [u8; MASKED_BYTE_LEN] = masked_byte.to_bytes();
-
-        // should succeed
-        let decoded_masked_byte = MaskedByte::try_from(wire_bytes.as_slice()).unwrap();
-        let output = decoded_masked_byte.unmask(&mask).unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(byte, output);
-
-        let empty_slice: &[u8] = &[];
-        // should fail
-        assert!(MaskedByte::try_from(empty_slice).is_err());
-
-        let mut wire_bytes_messy = Vec::from(wire_bytes);
-
-        // add more one more byte
-        wire_bytes_messy.push(0x42);
-        assert!(wire_bytes_messy.len() == MASKED_BYTE_LEN + 1);
-        // should fail
-        assert!(MaskedByte::try_from(wire_bytes_messy.as_slice()).is_err());
-
-        // pop the added byte
-        _ = wire_bytes_messy.pop();
-        assert!(wire_bytes_messy.len() == MASKED_BYTE_LEN);
-        // should succeed
-        assert!(MaskedByte::try_from(wire_bytes_messy.as_slice()).is_ok());
-
-        // pop one more byte
-        _ = wire_bytes_messy.pop();
-        assert!(wire_bytes_messy.len() == MASKED_BYTE_LEN - 1);
-        // should fail
-        assert!(MaskedByte::try_from(wire_bytes_messy.as_slice()).is_err());
-    }
-}

common/nym-kkt/src/rekey.rs

@@ -1,232 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2026 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-//! Post-Quantum Re-Key Protocol
-/// This module implements a stateless post-quantum re-keying protocol in one round-trip.
-/// We currently support MlKem768 and XWing.
-///
-/// This protocol is safe if it runs under a trusted secure channel.
-///
-/// Bandwidth costs:
-/// Request (MlKem768): 1216 bytes
-/// Response (MlKem768): 1088 bytes
-/// Request (XWing): 1248 bytes
-/// Response (XWing): 1120 bytes
-use libcrux_kem::*;
-use nym_crypto::hkdf::blake3::derive_key_blake3;
-use nym_kkt_ciphersuite::{KEM, mceliece, ml_kem768, x25519, xwing};
-use rand09::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
-use zeroize::Zeroize;
-
-use crate::error::KKTError;
-
-/// Context string to be used with the Blake3 KDF.
-const REKEY_CONTEXT: &str = "NYM_PQ_REKEY_v1";
-
-pub struct RekeyInitiator {
-    algorithm: Algorithm,
-    decapsulation_key: PrivateKey,
-    salt: [u8; 32],
-}
-
-impl RekeyInitiator {
-    /// The Initiator generates an ephemeral KEM keypair and a 32-byte salt.
-    /// The Initiator keeps the decapsulation key and generates a request message.
-    /// The request message contains the salt and an encoding of the encapsulation key as follows
-    ///      salt        encapsulation_key
-    /// [0 ........ 32 | 32 .............. ]
-    ///
-    /// Inputs:
-    /// rng: something that implements CryptoRng + RngCore
-    /// kem: a KEM algorithm (we currently support MlKem768 and XWing)
-    ///
-    /// Outputs:
-    /// RekeyInitiator: A struct which contains the decapsulation key, the salt and the kem algorithm in use.
-    /// Vec<u8>: The request message as explained above. This is to be sent to the responder as-is.
-    pub fn generate_request<R>(rng: &mut R, kem: KEM) -> Result<(RekeyInitiator, Vec<u8>), KKTError>
-    where
-        R: CryptoRng + RngCore,
-    {
-        let (algorithm, buffer_size) = match kem {
-            KEM::XWing => (Algorithm::XWingKemDraft06, 32 + xwing::PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH),
-            KEM::MlKem768 => (Algorithm::MlKem768, 32 + ml_kem768::PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH),
-            // We don't support McEliece because the keys are massive.
-            // If this is a deal-breaker, users can start a new session with PSQ which can use McEliece.
-            KEM::McEliece => {
-                return Err(KKTError::UnsupportedAlgorithm {
-                    info: "McEliece is not supported for re-keying",
-                });
-            }
-            // We don't support X25519 because it's not post-quantum secure.
-            KEM::X25519 => {
-                return Err(KKTError::UnsupportedAlgorithm {
-                    info: "X25519 is not supported for re-keying",
-                });
-            }
-        };
-
-        // Generate the Initiator's salt
-        let mut salt = [0u8; 32];
-        rng.fill_bytes(&mut salt);
-
-        // Create the buffer for the request message and copy the salt into it.
-        let mut request_buffer = Vec::with_capacity(buffer_size);
-        request_buffer.extend_from_slice(&salt);
-
-        // Generate the ephemeral KEM keypair based on the algorithm from the function's input.
-        let (decapsulation_key, encapsulation_key) = key_gen(algorithm, rng)?;
-
-        // Append the encoding of the KEM encapsulation key to the initiator's randomness.
-        request_buffer.extend(encapsulation_key.encode());
-
-        Ok((
-            // The Initiator should store this until they use `RekeyInitiator::finalize`.
-            RekeyInitiator {
-                algorithm,
-                decapsulation_key,
-                salt,
-            },
-            // This is to be sent to the responder.
-            request_buffer,
-        ))
-    }
-
-    /// The Initiator will attempt to decapsulate the `pre_key` generated by the responder
-    /// secret. This `pre_key` will be combined with the Initiator's previously generated salt
-    /// as input to a Blake3 KDF call to generate the new shared secret.
-    ///
-    /// This function fails if the ciphertext cannot be decoded or decapsulated.
-    ///
-    /// Input:
-    /// response_message: the responder's message which contains an encapsulation of `pre_key`.
-    /// Output:
-    /// [u8; 32]: the new shared secret.
-    pub fn finalize(mut self, response_message: &[u8]) -> Result<[u8; 32], KKTError> {
-        // Decode the responder's ciphertext.
-        let ciphertext = Ct::decode(self.algorithm, response_message)?;
-        // Decapsulate the `pre_key` using the Initiator's decapsulation key.
-        let pre_key = ciphertext.decapsulate(&self.decapsulation_key)?;
-
-        // Encode the `pre_key` into bytes
-        let pre_key_bytes = pre_key.encode();
-
-        let new_secret: [u8; 32] = derive_key_blake3(REKEY_CONTEXT, &pre_key_bytes, &self.salt);
-
-        // Zeroize the Initiator's salt
-        self.salt.zeroize();
-
-        // TODO: zeroize the decapsulation key
-
-        Ok(new_secret)
-    }
-}
-
-/// The responder parses the request message.
-/// The first 32 bytes are the Initiator's salt,
-/// and the remainder is the encoding of the public key.
-/// Given that XWing and MlKem768 have different key lengths,
-/// we could deduce the algorithm from that.
-///
-/// If the message is badly formatted, or the encapsulation received is invalid,
-/// this function will produce an error.
-///
-/// If everything is alright, the responder generates and encapsulates a key `pre_key` to send to the Initiator.
-/// Then, the responder calls a Blake3 KDF over `pre_key` and the Initiator's salt to obtain
-/// the new shared secret.
-///
-/// Inputs:
-/// rng: something that implements CryptoRng + RngCore
-/// request_message: the Initiator's request message (contains the salt and encapsulation key)
-///
-/// Outputs:
-/// [u8; 32]: new shared secret
-/// Vec<u8>: response which contains an encapsulation of a secret value generated by the responder.
-/// This is to be sent back to the Initiator as-is.
-pub fn responder_process<R>(
-    rng: &mut R,
-    mut request_message: Vec<u8>,
-) -> Result<([u8; 32], Vec<u8>), KKTError>
-where
-    R: CryptoRng + RngCore,
-{
-    // Deduce the KEM algorithm from the message length
-    let algorithm = match request_message.len().checked_sub(32) {
-        //
-        Some(num) => match num {
-            // If message length is 1216 (32 + 1184) then the algorithm should be MlKem768
-            ml_kem768::PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH => Algorithm::MlKem768,
-            // If message length is 1248 (32 + 1216) then the algorithm should be MlKem768
-            xwing::PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH => Algorithm::XWingKemDraft06,
-            // We don't support McEliece because the keys are massive.
-            // If this is a deal-breaker, users can start a new session with PSQ which can use McEliece.
-            mceliece::PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH => {
-                return Err(KKTError::UnsupportedAlgorithm {
-                    info: "McEliece is not supported for re-keying",
-                });
-            }
-            // We don't support X25519 because it's not post-quantum secure.
-            x25519::PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH => {
-                return Err(KKTError::UnsupportedAlgorithm {
-                    info: "McEliece is not supported for re-keying",
-                });
-            }
-            // Reject if the size does not match any of the above.
-            _ => {
-                return Err(KKTError::UnsupportedAlgorithm {
-                    info: "Unknown Algorithm",
-                });
-            }
-        },
-        // Reject if message length is less than 32.
-        None => {
-            return Err(KKTError::DecodingError {
-                info: "Invalid rekey request: size is too small",
-            });
-        }
-    };
-
-    // Split the message to get the Initiator's salt (first 32 bytes)
-    // and the encoding of the Initiator's public key.
-    let (remote_salt, remote_encapsulation_key_bytes) = request_message.split_at_mut(32);
-
-    // Attempt to decode the Initiator's encapsulation key.
-    let remote_encapsulation_key = PublicKey::decode(algorithm, remote_encapsulation_key_bytes)?;
-
-    // Encapsulate a fresh `pre_key` using the Initiator's encapsulation key into `ciphertext`.
-    let (pre_key, ciphertext) = remote_encapsulation_key.encapsulate(rng)?;
-    // Encode the ciphertext into bytes to send back to the initiator.
-    let message = ciphertext.encode();
-
-    // Encode the `pre_key` into bytes
-    let pre_key_bytes = pre_key.encode();
-
-    let new_secret: [u8; 32] = derive_key_blake3(REKEY_CONTEXT, &pre_key_bytes, remote_salt);
-
-    // Zeroize the Initiator's salt
-    remote_salt.zeroize();
-
-    Ok((new_secret, message))
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use crate::rekey::{RekeyInitiator, responder_process};
-    use nym_kkt_ciphersuite::KEM;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn rekey_test() {
-        let mut rng = rand09::rng();
-
-        for kem in [KEM::MlKem768, KEM::XWing] {
-            let (rekey_state, request_message) =
-                RekeyInitiator::generate_request(&mut rng, kem).unwrap();
-
-            let (responder_secret, response_message) =
-                responder_process(&mut rng, request_message).unwrap();
-
-            let initiator_secret = rekey_state.finalize(&response_message).unwrap();
-
-            assert_eq!(initiator_secret, responder_secret);
-        }
-    }
-}

common/nym-kkt/src/responder.rs

@@ -1,214 +0,0 @@
-use std::collections::HashSet;
-
-use crate::key_utils::validate_encapsulation_key;
-use crate::{
-    context::{KKTContext, KKTMode, KKTRole, KKTStatus},
-    error::KKTError,
-    frame::KKTFrame,
-};
-use libcrux_psq::handshake::types::DHKeyPair;
-use nym_kkt_ciphersuite::{Ciphersuite, HashFunction, KEM, SignatureScheme};
-pub struct KKTResponder<'a> {
-    x25519_keypair: &'a DHKeyPair,
-    mlkem_encapsulation_key: Option<&'a libcrux_kem::MlKem768PublicKey>,
-    mceliece_encapsulation_key: Option<&'a libcrux_psq::classic_mceliece::PublicKey>,
-    supported_hash_functions: HashSet<HashFunction>,
-    supported_signature_schemes: HashSet<SignatureScheme>,
-    supported_outer_protocol_versions: HashSet<u8>,
-}
-impl<'a> KKTResponder<'a> {
-    pub fn new(
-        x25519_keypair: &'a DHKeyPair,
-        mlkem_encapsulation_key: Option<&'a libcrux_kem::MlKem768PublicKey>,
-        mceliece_encapsulation_key: Option<&'a libcrux_psq::classic_mceliece::PublicKey>,
-        supported_hash_functions: &[HashFunction],
-        supported_outer_protocol_versions: &[u8],
-        supported_signature_schemes: &[SignatureScheme],
-    ) -> Result<Self, KKTError> {
-        let hash_functions: HashSet<HashFunction> =
-            supported_hash_functions.iter().copied().collect();
-
-        if hash_functions.is_empty() {
-            Err(KKTError::FunctionInputError {
-                info: "Did not provide a supported HashFunction when instaciating a KKTResponder",
-            })
-        } else {
-            let signature_schemes: HashSet<SignatureScheme> =
-                supported_signature_schemes.iter().copied().collect();
-
-            if signature_schemes.is_empty() {
-                Err(KKTError::FunctionInputError {
-                    info: "Did not provide a supported SignatureScheme when instaciating a KKTResponder",
-                })
-            } else {
-                let outer_protocol_versions: HashSet<u8> =
-                    supported_outer_protocol_versions.iter().copied().collect();
-
-                if outer_protocol_versions.is_empty() {
-                    Err(KKTError::FunctionInputError {
-                        info: "Did not provide a supported outer protocol version when instaciating a KKTResponder",
-                    })
-                } else {
-                    if mlkem_encapsulation_key.is_none() && mceliece_encapsulation_key.is_none() {
-                        return Err(KKTError::FunctionInputError {
-                            info: "Did not provide an encapsulation key when instanciating a KKTResponder.",
-                        });
-                    } else {
-                        Ok(Self {
-                            x25519_keypair,
-                            mlkem_encapsulation_key,
-                            mceliece_encapsulation_key,
-                            supported_hash_functions: hash_functions,
-                            supported_signature_schemes: signature_schemes,
-                            supported_outer_protocol_versions: outer_protocol_versions,
-                        })
-                    }
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    fn supported_protocol_versions(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.supported_outer_protocol_versions
-            .iter()
-            .copied()
-            .collect()
-    }
-
-    fn check_ciphersuite_compatiblity(
-        &self,
-        remote_ciphersuite: &Ciphersuite,
-    ) -> Result<(), KKTError> {
-        if !self
-            .supported_hash_functions
-            .contains(remote_ciphersuite.hash_function())
-        {
-            Err(KKTError::IncompatibilityError {
-                info: "Unsupported HashFunction",
-            })
-        } else {
-            if !self
-                .supported_signature_schemes
-                .contains(remote_ciphersuite.signature_scheme())
-            {
-                Err(KKTError::IncompatibilityError {
-                    info: "Unsupported SignatureScheme",
-                })
-            } else {
-                if match remote_ciphersuite.kem() {
-                    KEM::MlKem768 => self.mlkem_encapsulation_key.is_some(),
-                    KEM::McEliece => self.mceliece_encapsulation_key.is_some(),
-                    _ => false,
-                } {
-                    Ok(())
-                } else {
-                    Err(KKTError::IncompatibilityError {
-                        info: "Unsupported KEM",
-                    })
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    // When this function fails, we do that silently (i.e. we dont generate a response to the initiator).
-
-    pub fn process_request(
-        &self,
-        request_bytes: &[u8],
-    ) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Option<Vec<u8>>), KKTError> {
-        let (mut carrier, remote_frame, remote_context) = KKTFrame::decrypt_initiator_frame(
-            self.x25519_keypair,
-            request_bytes,
-            &self.supported_protocol_versions(),
-        )?;
-
-        self.check_ciphersuite_compatiblity(remote_context.ciphersuite())?;
-
-        let (local_context, remote_encapsulation_key) = match remote_context.mode() {
-            KKTMode::OneWay => responder_ingest_message(&remote_context, None, &remote_frame)?,
-            KKTMode::Mutual => {
-                // So we can either fetch the remote hash here using some async call to the directory,
-                // which might make registration hang or accept the sent key then verify later.
-
-                // If we choose to not accept, the response's status will be KKTStatus::UnverifiedKEMKey.
-                // The response would still contain the responder's encapsulation key.
-                responder_ingest_message(&remote_context, None, &remote_frame)?
-            }
-        };
-
-        let frame = if local_context.ciphersuite().kem() == &KEM::MlKem768 {
-            KKTFrame::new(
-                &local_context,
-                // SAFETY: the self.check_ciphersuite_compatibility call above guarantees that we will have a key in the right place
-                #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-                &self.mlkem_encapsulation_key.unwrap().as_slice().as_slice(),
-            )?
-        } else {
-            KKTFrame::new(
-                &local_context,
-                // SAFETY: the self.check_ciphersuite_compatibility call above guarantees that we will have a key in the right place
-                #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-                &self.mceliece_encapsulation_key.unwrap().as_ref(),
-            )?
-        };
-
-        // encryption - responder frame
-        let response_bytes = carrier.encrypt(&frame.to_bytes())?;
-        Ok((response_bytes, remote_encapsulation_key))
-    }
-}
-
-pub fn responder_ingest_message(
-    remote_context: &KKTContext,
-    expected_hash: Option<&[u8]>,
-    remote_frame: &KKTFrame,
-) -> Result<(KKTContext, Option<Vec<u8>>), KKTError> {
-    let mut own_context = remote_context.derive_responder_header()?;
-
-    match remote_context.role() {
-        KKTRole::Initiator => {
-            // using own_context here because maybe for whatever reason we want to ignore the remote kem key
-            match own_context.mode() {
-                KKTMode::OneWay => Ok((own_context, None)),
-                KKTMode::Mutual => {
-                    match expected_hash {
-                        Some(expected_hash) => {
-                            if validate_encapsulation_key(
-                                own_context.ciphersuite().hash_function(),
-                                own_context.ciphersuite().hash_len(),
-                                remote_frame.body_ref(),
-                                expected_hash,
-                            ) {
-                                Ok((own_context, Some(remote_frame.body_ref().to_vec())))
-                            }
-                            // The key does not match the hash obtained from the directory
-                            else {
-                                Err(KKTError::KEMError {
-                                    info: "Hash of received encapsulation key does not match the value stored on the directory.",
-                                })
-                            }
-                        }
-                        None => {
-                            own_context.update_status(KKTStatus::UnverifiedKEMKey);
-                            // we don't store an unverified key
-                            // changing the status notifies the initiator that we didn't
-
-                            // we could still keep it here and then verify later...
-                            // let received_encapsulation_key = EncapsulationKey::decode(
-                            //     own_context.ciphersuite().kem(),
-                            //     remote_frame.body_ref(),
-                            // )?;
-                            //  Ok((own_context, Some(received_encapsulation_key)))
-                            //
-
-                            Ok((own_context, None))
-                        }
-                    }
-                }
-            }
-        }
-
-        KKTRole::Responder => Err(KKTError::IncompatibilityError {
-            info: "Responder received a request from another responder.",
-        }),
-    }
-}

common/nym-kkt/src/session.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+use nym_crypto::asymmetric::ed25519::{self, Signature};
+use rand09::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
+
+use crate::frame::KKTSessionId;
+use crate::{
+    ciphersuite::{Ciphersuite, EncapsulationKey},
+    context::{KKTContext, KKTMode, KKTRole, KKTStatus},
+    error::KKTError,
+    frame::{KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN, KKTFrame},
+    key_utils::validate_encapsulation_key,
+};
+
+pub fn initiator_process<'a, R>(
+    rng: &mut R,
+    mode: KKTMode,
+    ciphersuite: Ciphersuite,
+    signing_key: &ed25519::PrivateKey,
+    own_encapsulation_key: Option<&EncapsulationKey<'a>>,
+) -> Result<(KKTContext, KKTFrame), KKTError>
+where
+    R: CryptoRng + RngCore,
+{
+    let context = KKTContext::new(KKTRole::Initiator, mode, ciphersuite)?;
+
+    let context_bytes = context.encode()?;
+
+    let mut session_id = [0; KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN];
+    // Generate Session ID
+    rng.fill_bytes(&mut session_id);
+
+    let body: &[u8] = match mode {
+        KKTMode::OneWay => &[],
+        KKTMode::Mutual => match own_encapsulation_key {
+            Some(encaps_key) => &encaps_key.encode(),
+
+            // Missing key
+            None => {
+                return Err(KKTError::FunctionInputError {
+                    info: "KEM Key Not Provided",
+                });
+            }
+        },
+    };
+
+    let mut bytes_to_sign =
+        Vec::with_capacity(context.full_message_len() - context.signature_len());
+    bytes_to_sign.extend_from_slice(&context_bytes);
+    bytes_to_sign.extend_from_slice(body);
+    bytes_to_sign.extend_from_slice(&session_id);
+
+    let signature = signing_key.sign(bytes_to_sign).to_bytes();
+
+    Ok((
+        context,
+        KKTFrame::new(context_bytes, body, session_id, &signature),
+    ))
+}
+
+pub fn anonymous_initiator_process<R>(
+    rng: &mut R,
+    ciphersuite: Ciphersuite,
+) -> Result<(KKTContext, KKTFrame), KKTError>
+where
+    R: CryptoRng + RngCore,
+{
+    let context = KKTContext::new(KKTRole::AnonymousInitiator, KKTMode::OneWay, ciphersuite)?;
+    let context_bytes = context.encode()?;
+
+    let mut session_id = [0u8; KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN];
+    rng.fill_bytes(&mut session_id);
+
+    Ok((context, KKTFrame::new(context_bytes, &[], session_id, &[])))
+}
+
+pub fn initiator_ingest_response<'a>(
+    own_context: &KKTContext,
+    remote_frame: &KKTFrame,
+    remote_context: &KKTContext,
+    remote_verification_key: &ed25519::PublicKey,
+    expected_hash: &[u8],
+) -> Result<EncapsulationKey<'a>, KKTError> {
+    check_compatibility(own_context, remote_context)?;
+    match remote_context.status() {
+        KKTStatus::Ok => {
+            let mut bytes_to_verify: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(
+                remote_context.full_message_len() - remote_context.signature_len(),
+            );
+            bytes_to_verify.extend_from_slice(&remote_context.encode()?);
+            bytes_to_verify.extend_from_slice(remote_frame.body_ref());
+            bytes_to_verify.extend_from_slice(remote_frame.session_id_ref());
+
+            match Signature::from_bytes(remote_frame.signature_ref()) {
+                Ok(sig) => match remote_verification_key.verify(bytes_to_verify, &sig) {
+                    Ok(()) => {
+                        let received_encapsulation_key = EncapsulationKey::decode(
+                            own_context.ciphersuite().kem(),
+                            remote_frame.body_ref(),
+                        )?;
+
+                        match validate_encapsulation_key(
+                            &own_context.ciphersuite().hash_function(),
+                            own_context.ciphersuite().hash_len(),
+                            remote_frame.body_ref(),
+                            expected_hash,
+                        ) {
+                            true => Ok(received_encapsulation_key),
+
+                            // The key does not match the hash obtained from the directory
+                            false => Err(KKTError::KEMError {
+                                info: "Hash of received encapsulation key does not match the value stored on the directory.",
+                            }),
+                        }
+                    }
+                    Err(_) => Err(KKTError::SigVerifError),
+                },
+                Err(_) => Err(KKTError::SigConstructorError),
+            }
+        }
+        _ => Err(KKTError::ResponderFlaggedError {
+            status: remote_context.status(),
+        }),
+    }
+}
+
+// todo: figure out how to handle errors using status codes
+
+pub fn responder_ingest_message<'a>(
+    remote_context: &KKTContext,
+    remote_verification_key: Option<&ed25519::PublicKey>,
+    expected_hash: Option<&[u8]>,
+    remote_frame: &KKTFrame,
+) -> Result<(KKTContext, Option<EncapsulationKey<'a>>), KKTError> {
+    let own_context = remote_context.derive_responder_header()?;
+
+    match remote_context.role() {
+        KKTRole::AnonymousInitiator => Ok((own_context, None)),
+
+        KKTRole::Initiator => {
+            match remote_verification_key {
+                Some(remote_verif_key) => {
+                    let mut bytes_to_verify: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(
+                        own_context.full_message_len() - own_context.signature_len(),
+                    );
+                    bytes_to_verify.extend_from_slice(remote_frame.context_ref());
+                    bytes_to_verify.extend_from_slice(remote_frame.body_ref());
+                    bytes_to_verify.extend_from_slice(remote_frame.session_id_ref());
+
+                    match Signature::from_bytes(remote_frame.signature_ref()) {
+                        Ok(sig) => match remote_verif_key.verify(bytes_to_verify, &sig) {
+                            Ok(()) => {
+                                // using own_context here because maybe for whatever reason we want to ignore the remote kem key
+                                match own_context.mode() {
+                                    KKTMode::OneWay => Ok((own_context, None)),
+                                    KKTMode::Mutual => {
+                                        match expected_hash {
+                                            Some(expected_hash) => {
+                                                let received_encapsulation_key =
+                                                    EncapsulationKey::decode(
+                                                        own_context.ciphersuite().kem(),
+                                                        remote_frame.body_ref(),
+                                                    )?;
+                                                if validate_encapsulation_key(
+                                                    &own_context.ciphersuite().hash_function(),
+                                                    own_context.ciphersuite().hash_len(),
+                                                    remote_frame.body_ref(),
+                                                    expected_hash,
+                                                ) {
+                                                    Ok((
+                                                        own_context,
+                                                        Some(received_encapsulation_key),
+                                                    ))
+                                                }
+                                                // The key does not match the hash obtained from the directory
+                                                else {
+                                                    Err(KKTError::KEMError {
+                                                        info: "Hash of received encapsulation key does not match the value stored on the directory.",
+                                                    })
+                                                }
+                                            }
+                                            None => Err(KKTError::FunctionInputError {
+                                                info: "Expected hash of the remote encapsulation key is not provided.",
+                                            }),
+                                        }
+                                    }
+                                }
+                            }
+                            Err(_) => Err(KKTError::SigVerifError),
+                        },
+                        Err(_) => Err(KKTError::SigConstructorError),
+                    }
+                }
+                None => Err(KKTError::FunctionInputError {
+                    info: "Remote Signature Verification Key Not Provided",
+                }),
+            }
+        }
+        KKTRole::Responder => Err(KKTError::IncompatibilityError {
+            info: "Responder received a request from another responder.",
+        }),
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn responder_process<'a>(
+    own_context: &KKTContext,
+    session_id: KKTSessionId,
+    signing_key: &ed25519::PrivateKey,
+    encapsulation_key: &EncapsulationKey<'a>,
+) -> Result<KKTFrame, KKTError> {
+    let body = encapsulation_key.encode();
+
+    let context_bytes = own_context.encode()?;
+
+    let mut bytes_to_sign =
+        Vec::with_capacity(own_context.full_message_len() - own_context.signature_len());
+    bytes_to_sign.extend_from_slice(&own_context.encode()?);
+    bytes_to_sign.extend_from_slice(&body);
+    bytes_to_sign.extend_from_slice(&session_id);
+
+    let signature = signing_key.sign(bytes_to_sign).to_bytes();
+
+    Ok(KKTFrame::new(context_bytes, &body, session_id, &signature))
+}
+
+fn check_compatibility(
+    _own_context: &KKTContext,
+    _remote_context: &KKTContext,
+) -> Result<(), KKTError> {
+    // todo: check ciphersuite/context compatibility
+    Ok(())
+}

common/nym-lp-sandbox/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-[package]
-name = "nym-lp-sandbox"
-version = "0.1.0"
-edition = { workspace = true }
-license = { workspace = true }
-publish = false
-
-[dependencies]
-thiserror = { workspace = true }
-parking_lot = { workspace = true }
-snow = { workspace = true }
-bs58 = { workspace = true }
-serde = { workspace = true }
-bytes = { workspace = true }
-dashmap = { workspace = true }
-sha2 = { workspace = true }
-tracing = { workspace = true }
-rand = { workspace = true }
-rand09 = { workspace = true }
-
-
-nym-crypto = { path = "../crypto", features = ["hashing", "asymmetric"] }
-nym-kkt = { path = "../nym-kkt" }
-nym-lp-common = { path = "../nym-lp-common" }
-
-nym-kkt-ciphersuite = { path ="../nym-kkt-ciphersuite" }
-
-# libcrux dependencies for PSQ (Post-Quantum PSK derivation)
-libcrux-psq = { workspace = true, features = ["test-utils"] }
-libcrux-kem = { workspace = true }
-tls_codec = { workspace = true }
-num_enum = { workspace = true }
-chacha20poly1305 = { workspace = true }
-zeroize = { workspace = true, features = ["zeroize_derive"] }
-
-[dev-dependencies]
-criterion = { version = "0.5", features = ["html_reports"] }
-rand_chacha = "0.3"
-nym-crypto = { path = "../crypto", features = ["rand"] }
-nym-test-utils = { workspace = true }
-
-

common/nym-lp-sandbox/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,262 +0,0 @@
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-
-    use libcrux_psq::{
-        Channel, IntoSession,
-        handshake::{
-            builders::{CiphersuiteBuilder, PrincipalBuilder},
-            ciphersuites::CiphersuiteName,
-            types::{Authenticator, PQEncapsulationKey},
-        },
-        session::{Session, SessionBinding},
-    };
-    use nym_kkt::{
-        initiator::KKTInitiator,
-        key_utils::{
-            generate_keypair_mceliece, generate_keypair_mlkem, generate_keypair_x25519,
-            hash_encapsulation_key,
-        },
-        responder::KKTResponder,
-    };
-    use nym_kkt_ciphersuite::{Ciphersuite, HashFunction, HashLength, KEM, SignatureScheme};
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_e2e_client_node() {
-        let mut rng = rand09::rng();
-
-        // we should add these as consts
-        let aad_initiator_outer = b"Test Data I Outer";
-        let aad_initiator_inner = b"Test Data I Inner";
-        let aad_responder = b"Test Data R";
-        let ctx = b"Test Context";
-
-        // generate responder x25519 keys
-        let responder_x25519_keypair = generate_keypair_x25519(&mut rng);
-        let hash_function = HashFunction::Blake3;
-        // generate kem public keys
-
-        let responder_mlkem_keypair = generate_keypair_mlkem(&mut rng);
-        let responder_mceliece_keypair = generate_keypair_mceliece(&mut rng);
-
-        let r_dir_hash_mlkem = hash_encapsulation_key(
-            // &ciphersuite.hash_function(),
-            &hash_function,
-            // ciphersuite.hash_len(),
-            HashLength::Default.value(),
-            responder_mlkem_keypair.1.as_slice().as_slice(),
-        );
-
-        let _r_dir_hash_mceliece = hash_encapsulation_key(
-            // &ciphersuite.hash_function(),
-            &hash_function,
-            // ciphersuite.hash_len(),
-            HashLength::Default.value(),
-            responder_mceliece_keypair.1.as_ref(),
-        );
-
-        let kkt_responder = KKTResponder::new(
-            &responder_x25519_keypair,
-            Some(&responder_mlkem_keypair.1),
-            Some(&responder_mceliece_keypair.1),
-            &[
-                HashFunction::Blake3,
-                HashFunction::SHA256,
-                HashFunction::Shake128,
-                HashFunction::Shake256,
-            ],
-            &[1],
-            &[SignatureScheme::Ed25519],
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        // OneWay - MlKem
-        let psq_ciphersuite = CiphersuiteName::X25519_MLKEM768_X25519_AESGCM128_HKDFSHA256;
-
-        let responder_ciphersuite = CiphersuiteBuilder::new(psq_ciphersuite)
-            .longterm_x25519_keys(&responder_x25519_keypair)
-            .longterm_mlkem_encapsulation_key(&responder_mlkem_keypair.1)
-            .longterm_mlkem_decapsulation_key(&responder_mlkem_keypair.0)
-            .build_responder_ciphersuite()
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let mut responder = PrincipalBuilder::new(rand09::rng())
-            .context(ctx)
-            .outer_aad(aad_responder)
-            .recent_keys_upper_bound(30)
-            .build_responder(responder_ciphersuite)
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::resolve_ciphersuite(
-            KEM::MlKem768,
-            hash_function,
-            SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
-            None,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        let (mut initiator, request_bytes) = KKTInitiator::generate_one_way_request(
-            &mut rng,
-            &ciphersuite,
-            &responder_x25519_keypair.pk,
-            &r_dir_hash_mlkem,
-            1u8,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        let (response_bytes, _) = kkt_responder.process_request(&request_bytes).unwrap();
-
-        let (i_obtained_key, _) = initiator.process_response(&response_bytes).unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            i_obtained_key,
-            responder_mlkem_keypair.1.as_slice().as_slice(),
-        );
-
-        let mlkem_key =
-            libcrux_kem::MlKem768PublicKey::try_from(i_obtained_key.as_slice()).unwrap();
-
-        let initiator_psq_keys = generate_keypair_x25519(&mut rng);
-        let initiator_cbuilder = CiphersuiteBuilder::new(psq_ciphersuite)
-            .longterm_x25519_keys(&initiator_psq_keys)
-            .peer_longterm_x25519_pk(&responder_x25519_keypair.pk)
-            .peer_longterm_mlkem_pk(&mlkem_key);
-
-        let initiator_ciphersuite = initiator_cbuilder.build_initiator_ciphersuite().unwrap();
-
-        let mut msg_channel = vec![0u8; 8192];
-        let mut payload_buf_responder = vec![0u8; 4096];
-        let mut payload_buf_initiator = vec![0u8; 4096];
-
-        let mut initiator = PrincipalBuilder::new(rand09::rng())
-            .outer_aad(aad_initiator_outer)
-            .inner_aad(aad_initiator_inner)
-            .context(ctx)
-            .build_registration_initiator(initiator_ciphersuite)
-            .unwrap();
-
-        // Send first message
-        let registration_payload_initiator = b"Registration_init";
-        let len_i = initiator
-            .write_message(registration_payload_initiator, &mut msg_channel)
-            .unwrap();
-
-        // Read first message
-        let (len_r_deserialized, len_r_payload) = responder
-            .read_message(&msg_channel, &mut payload_buf_responder)
-            .unwrap();
-
-        // We read the same amount of data.
-        assert_eq!(len_r_deserialized, len_i);
-        assert_eq!(len_r_payload, registration_payload_initiator.len());
-        assert_eq!(
-            &payload_buf_responder[0..len_r_payload],
-            registration_payload_initiator
-        );
-
-        // Get the authenticator out here, so we can deserialize the session later.
-        let Some(initiator_authenticator) = responder.initiator_authenticator() else {
-            panic!("No initiator authenticator found")
-        };
-
-        // Respond
-        let registration_payload_responder = b"Registration_respond";
-        let len_r = responder
-            .write_message(registration_payload_responder, &mut msg_channel)
-            .unwrap();
-
-        // Finalize on registration initiator
-        let (len_i_deserialized, len_i_payload) = initiator
-            .read_message(&msg_channel, &mut payload_buf_initiator)
-            .unwrap();
-
-        // We read the same amount of data.
-        assert_eq!(len_r, len_i_deserialized);
-        assert_eq!(registration_payload_responder.len(), len_i_payload);
-        assert_eq!(
-            &payload_buf_initiator[0..len_i_payload],
-            registration_payload_responder
-        );
-
-        // Ready for transport mode
-        assert!(initiator.is_handshake_finished());
-        assert!(responder.is_handshake_finished());
-
-        let i_transport = initiator.into_session().unwrap();
-        let r_transport = responder.into_session().unwrap();
-
-        // test serialization, deserialization
-        let mut session_storage = vec![0u8; 4096];
-        i_transport
-            .serialize(
-                &mut session_storage,
-                SessionBinding {
-                    initiator_authenticator: &Authenticator::Dh(initiator_psq_keys.pk),
-                    responder_ecdh_pk: &responder_x25519_keypair.pk,
-                    responder_pq_pk: Some(PQEncapsulationKey::MlKem(&mlkem_key)),
-                },
-            )
-            .unwrap();
-        let mut i_transport = Session::deserialize(
-            &session_storage,
-            SessionBinding {
-                initiator_authenticator: &Authenticator::Dh(initiator_psq_keys.pk),
-                responder_ecdh_pk: &responder_x25519_keypair.pk,
-                responder_pq_pk: Some(PQEncapsulationKey::MlKem(&mlkem_key)),
-            },
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        r_transport
-            .serialize(
-                &mut session_storage,
-                SessionBinding {
-                    initiator_authenticator: &initiator_authenticator,
-                    responder_ecdh_pk: &responder_x25519_keypair.pk,
-                    responder_pq_pk: Some(PQEncapsulationKey::MlKem(&mlkem_key)),
-                },
-            )
-            .unwrap();
-        let mut r_transport = Session::deserialize(
-            &session_storage,
-            SessionBinding {
-                initiator_authenticator: &initiator_authenticator,
-                responder_ecdh_pk: &responder_x25519_keypair.pk,
-                responder_pq_pk: Some(PQEncapsulationKey::MlKem(&mlkem_key)),
-            },
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        let mut channel_i = i_transport.transport_channel().unwrap();
-        let mut channel_r = r_transport.transport_channel().unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(channel_i.identifier(), channel_r.identifier());
-
-        let app_data_i = b"Derived session hey".as_slice();
-        let app_data_r = b"Derived session ho".as_slice();
-
-        let len_i = channel_i
-            .write_message(app_data_i, &mut msg_channel)
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let (len_r_deserialized, len_r_payload) = channel_r
-            .read_message(&msg_channel, &mut payload_buf_responder)
-            .unwrap();
-
-        // We read the same amount of data.
-        assert_eq!(len_r_deserialized, len_i);
-        assert_eq!(len_r_payload, app_data_i.len());
-        assert_eq!(&payload_buf_responder[0..len_r_payload], app_data_i);
-
-        let len_r = channel_r
-            .write_message(app_data_r, &mut msg_channel)
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let (len_i_deserialized, len_i_payload) = channel_i
-            .read_message(&msg_channel, &mut payload_buf_initiator)
-            .unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(len_r, len_i_deserialized);
-        assert_eq!(app_data_r.len(), len_i_payload);
-        assert_eq!(&payload_buf_initiator[0..len_i_payload], app_data_r);
-    }
-}

common/nym-lp-transport/Cargo.toml

@@ -12,8 +12,9 @@ readme.workspace = true
 publish = false
 
 [dependencies]
-tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["net"] }
+tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["net", "io-util"] }
 nym-test-utils = { path = "../test-utils", optional = true }
+tracing = { workspace = true }
 
 [features]
 io-mocks = ["nym-test-utils"]

common/nym-lp-transport/src/traits.rs

@@ -4,15 +4,100 @@
 #[cfg(feature = "io-mocks")]
 use nym_test_utils::mocks::async_read_write::MockIOStream;
 use std::net::SocketAddr;
-use tokio::io::{AsyncRead, AsyncWrite};
+use tokio::io::{AsyncRead, AsyncReadExt, AsyncWrite, AsyncWriteExt};
 use tokio::net::TcpStream;
+use tracing::debug;
 
 // only used in internal code (and tests)
 #[allow(async_fn_in_trait)]
-pub trait LpTransport: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Sized {
+pub trait LpTransport: Sized {
     async fn connect(endpoint: SocketAddr) -> std::io::Result<Self>;
 
     fn set_no_delay(&mut self, nodelay: bool) -> std::io::Result<()>;
+
+    /// Sends a serialised (and optionally encrypted) LP packet over the data stream with length-prefixed framing.
+    ///
+    /// Format: 4-byte big-endian u32 length + packet bytes
+    ///
+    /// # Arguments
+    /// * `packet_data` - The serialised LP packet to send
+    ///
+    /// # Errors
+    /// Returns an error on network transmission fails.
+    async fn send_serialised_packet(&mut self, packet_data: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<()>;
+
+    /// Receives an LP packet from a TCP stream with length-prefixed framing.
+    ///
+    /// Format: 4-byte big-endian u32 length + packet bytes
+    ///
+    /// # Errors
+    /// Returns an error on network transmission fails.
+    async fn receive_raw_packet(&mut self) -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>>;
+}
+
+async fn send_serialised_packet_async_write<W>(
+    writer: &mut W,
+    packet_data: &[u8],
+) -> std::io::Result<()>
+where
+    W: AsyncWrite + Unpin,
+{
+    // Send 4-byte length prefix (u32 big-endian)
+    let len = packet_data.len() as u32;
+    writer
+        .write_all(&len.to_be_bytes())
+        .await
+        .inspect_err(|e| debug!("Failed to send packet length: {e}"))?;
+
+    // Send the actual packet data
+    writer
+        .write_all(packet_data)
+        .await
+        .inspect_err(|e| debug!("Failed to send packet data: {e}"))?;
+
+    // Flush to ensure data is sent immediately
+    writer
+        .flush()
+        .await
+        .inspect_err(|e| debug!("Failed to flush stream: {e}"))?;
+
+    tracing::trace!(
+        "Sent LP packet ({} bytes + 4 byte header)",
+        packet_data.len()
+    );
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+async fn receive_raw_packet_async_read<R>(reader: &mut R) -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>>
+where
+    R: AsyncRead + Unpin,
+{
+    // Read 4-byte length prefix (u32 big-endian)
+    let mut len_buf = [0u8; 4];
+    reader
+        .read_exact(&mut len_buf)
+        .await
+        .inspect_err(|e| debug!("Failed to read packet length: {e}"))?;
+
+    let packet_len = u32::from_be_bytes(len_buf) as usize;
+
+    // Sanity check to prevent huge allocations
+    const MAX_PACKET_SIZE: usize = 65536; // 64KB max
+    if packet_len > MAX_PACKET_SIZE {
+        return Err(std::io::Error::other(format!(
+            "Packet size {packet_len} exceeds maximum {MAX_PACKET_SIZE}",
+        )));
+    }
+
+    // Read the actual packet data
+    let mut packet_buf = vec![0u8; packet_len];
+    reader
+        .read_exact(&mut packet_buf)
+        .await
+        .inspect_err(|e| debug!("Failed to read packet data: {e}"))?;
+
+    tracing::trace!("Received LP packet ({packet_len} bytes + 4 byte header)");
+    Ok(packet_buf)
 }
 
 impl LpTransport for TcpStream {
@@ -24,6 +109,14 @@ impl LpTransport for TcpStream {
         // Set TCP_NODELAY for low latency
         self.set_nodelay(nodelay)
     }
+
+    async fn send_serialised_packet(&mut self, packet_data: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<()> {
+        send_serialised_packet_async_write(self, packet_data).await
+    }
+
+    async fn receive_raw_packet(&mut self) -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        receive_raw_packet_async_read(self).await
+    }
 }
 
 #[cfg(feature = "io-mocks")]
@@ -35,4 +128,12 @@ impl LpTransport for MockIOStream {
     fn set_no_delay(&mut self, _nodelay: bool) -> std::io::Result<()> {
         Ok(())
     }
+
+    async fn send_serialised_packet(&mut self, packet_data: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<()> {
+        send_serialised_packet_async_write(self, packet_data).await
+    }
+
+    async fn receive_raw_packet(&mut self) -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        receive_raw_packet_async_read(self).await
+    }
 }

common/nym-lp/Cargo.toml

@@ -16,27 +16,40 @@ dashmap = { workspace = true }
 sha2 = { workspace = true }
 tracing = { workspace = true }
 rand = { workspace = true }
+# rand 0.9 for KKT integration (nym-kkt uses rand 0.9)
 rand09 = { workspace = true }
-ouroboros = "0.18.5"
 
 nym-crypto = { path = "../crypto", features = ["hashing", "asymmetric"] }
 nym-kkt = { path = "../nym-kkt" }
 nym-lp-common = { path = "../nym-lp-common" }
+nym-lp-transport = { path = "../nym-lp-transport" }
 
 # libcrux dependencies for PSQ (Post-Quantum PSK derivation)
-libcrux-psq = { workspace = true, features = ["test-utils"] }
-libcrux-kem = { workspace = true }
+libcrux-psq = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux", features = [
+    "test-utils",
+] }
+libcrux-kem = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux" }
+libcrux-traits = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux" }
 tls_codec = { workspace = true }
 num_enum = { workspace = true }
 chacha20poly1305 = { workspace = true }
 zeroize = { workspace = true, features = ["zeroize_derive"] }
 
+# needed for the 'mock 'feature
+nym-test-utils = { workspace = true, optional = true }
+
 [dev-dependencies]
 criterion = { version = "0.5", features = ["html_reports"] }
-rand_chacha = "0.3"
+#rand_chacha = "0.3"
+mock_instant = { workspace = true }
 nym-crypto = { path = "../crypto", features = ["rand"] }
 nym-test-utils = { workspace = true }
+anyhow = { workspace = true }
+tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["rt-multi-thread", "macros"] }
+nym-lp-transport = { path = "../nym-lp-transport", features = ["io-mocks"] }
 
+[features]
+mock = ["nym-test-utils", "nym-crypto/rand"]
 
 [[bench]]
 name = "replay_protection"

common/nym-lp/benches/replay_protection.rs

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 use criterion::{BenchmarkId, Criterion, Throughput, black_box, criterion_group, criterion_main};
 use nym_lp::replay::ReceivingKeyCounterValidator;
+use nym_test_utils::helpers::u64_seeded_rng;
 use parking_lot::Mutex;
-use rand::{Rng, SeedableRng};
-use rand_chacha::ChaCha8Rng;
+use rand::Rng;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 
 fn bench_sequential_counters(c: &mut Criterion) {
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ fn bench_out_of_order_counters(c: &mut Criterion) {
                 let validator = ReceivingKeyCounterValidator::default();
 
                 // Create random counters within a valid window
-                let mut rng = ChaCha8Rng::seed_from_u64(42);
+                let mut rng = u64_seeded_rng(42);
                 let counters: Vec<u64> = (0..size).map(|_| rng.gen_range(0..1024)).collect();
 
                 b.iter(|| {

common/nym-lp/src/codec.rs

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ use zeroize::{Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop};
 /// Size of outer header (receiver_idx + counter) - always cleartext
 pub const OUTER_HEADER_SIZE: usize = OuterHeader::SIZE; // 12 bytes
 
-// georgio: maybe remove this?
 /// Size of inner prefix (proto + reserved) - cleartext or encrypted depending on mode
 const INNER_PREFIX_SIZE: usize = 4; // proto(1) + reserved(3)
 
@@ -39,7 +38,6 @@ const INNER_PREFIX_SIZE: usize = 4; // proto(1) + reserved(3)
 /// 3. **No PSK persistence**: PSK handles are not stored/reused across sessions.
 ///    Each connection performs fresh KKT+PSQ handshake.
 ///
-// noiserm
 #[derive(Clone, Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
 pub struct OuterAeadKey {
     key: [u8; 32],
@@ -54,7 +52,7 @@ impl OuterAeadKey {
     /// Uses Blake3 KDF with domain separation to avoid key reuse
     /// between the outer AEAD layer and the inner Noise layer.
     pub fn from_psk(psk: &[u8; 32]) -> Self {
-        let key = nym_crypto::hkdf::blake3::derive_key_blake3(Self::KDF_CONTEXT, psk, &[]);
+        let key = nym_crypto::kdf::derive_key_blake3(Self::KDF_CONTEXT, psk, &[]);
         Self { key }
     }
 
@@ -72,7 +70,6 @@ impl std::fmt::Debug for OuterAeadKey {
     }
 }
 
-// noiserm
 /// Build 12-byte nonce from 8-byte counter (zero-padded).
 ///
 /// Format: counter (8 bytes LE) || 0x00000000 (4 bytes)
@@ -180,7 +177,6 @@ pub fn parse_lp_packet(src: &[u8], outer_key: Option<&OuterAeadKey>) -> Result<L
                 trailer,
             })
         }
-        // noiserm (potentially)
         Some(key) => {
             // AEAD decryption mode
             // AAD is the outer header (12 bytes)
@@ -228,7 +224,6 @@ pub fn parse_lp_packet(src: &[u8], outer_key: Option<&OuterAeadKey>) -> Result<L
     }
 }
 
-// georgio: start with no outer_key
 /// Serializes an LpPacket into the provided BytesMut buffer.
 ///
 /// ## Unified Packet Format
@@ -323,7 +318,7 @@ mod tests {
     use super::{OuterAeadKey, parse_lp_packet, serialize_lp_packet};
     // Keep necessary imports
     use crate::LpError;
-    use crate::message::{EncryptedDataPayload, LpMessage, MessageType, PSQRequestData};
+    use crate::message::{EncryptedDataPayload, HandshakeData, LpMessage, MessageType};
     use crate::packet::{LpHeader, LpPacket, TRAILER_LEN};
     use bytes::BytesMut;
     use nym_crypto::asymmetric::{ed25519, x25519};
@@ -378,7 +373,7 @@ mod tests {
                 receiver_idx: 42,
                 counter: 123,
             },
-            message: LpMessage::PSQRequest(PSQRequestData(payload.clone())),
+            message: LpMessage::Handshake(HandshakeData(payload.clone())),
             trailer: [0; TRAILER_LEN],
         };
 
@@ -395,8 +390,8 @@ mod tests {
 
         // Verify message type and data
         match decoded.message {
-            LpMessage::PSQRequest(decoded_payload) => {
-                assert_eq!(decoded_payload, PSQRequestData(payload));
+            LpMessage::Handshake(decoded_payload) => {
+                assert_eq!(decoded_payload, HandshakeData(payload));
             }
             _ => panic!("Expected Handshake message"),
         }
@@ -560,7 +555,7 @@ mod tests {
         buf.extend_from_slice(&[1, 0, 0, 0]); // Version + reserved
         buf.extend_from_slice(&42u32.to_le_bytes()); // Sender index
         buf.extend_from_slice(&123u64.to_le_bytes()); // Counter
-        buf.extend_from_slice(&255u16.to_le_bytes()); // Invalid message type
+        buf.extend_from_slice(&231u16.to_le_bytes()); // Invalid message type
         // Need payload and trailer to meet min_size requirement
         let payload_size = 10; // Arbitrary
         buf.extend_from_slice(&vec![0u8; payload_size]); // Some data
@@ -570,7 +565,7 @@ mod tests {
         let result = parse_lp_packet(&buf, None);
         assert!(result.is_err());
         match result {
-            Err(LpError::InvalidMessageType(255)) => {} // Expected error
+            Err(LpError::InvalidMessageType(231)) => {} // Expected error
             Err(e) => panic!("Expected InvalidMessageType error, got {:?}", e),
             Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error, but got Ok"),
         }
@@ -633,7 +628,7 @@ mod tests {
                 receiver_idx: 42,
                 counter: 123,
             },
-            message: LpMessage::ClientHello(hello_data.clone()),
+            message: LpMessage::ClientHello(hello_data),
             trailer: [0; TRAILER_LEN],
         };
 
@@ -686,7 +681,7 @@ mod tests {
                 receiver_idx: 100,
                 counter: 200,
             },
-            message: LpMessage::ClientHello(hello_data.clone()),
+            message: LpMessage::ClientHello(hello_data),
             trailer: [55; TRAILER_LEN],
         };
 
@@ -762,12 +757,12 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     #[test]
-    fn test_forward_packet_encode_decode_roundtrip() {
+    fn test_forward_packet_encode_decode_roundtrip_v4() {
         let mut dst = BytesMut::new();
 
         let forward_data = crate::message::ForwardPacketData {
             target_gateway_identity: [77u8; 32],
-            target_lp_address: "1.2.3.4:41264".to_string(),
+            target_lp_address: "1.2.3.4:41264".parse().unwrap(),
             inner_packet_bytes: vec![0xa, 0xb, 0xc, 0xd],
         };
 
@@ -794,7 +789,50 @@ mod tests {
 
         if let LpMessage::ForwardPacket(data) = decoded.message {
             assert_eq!(data.target_gateway_identity, [77u8; 32]);
-            assert_eq!(data.target_lp_address, "1.2.3.4:41264");
+            assert_eq!(data.target_lp_address, "1.2.3.4:41264".parse().unwrap());
+            assert_eq!(data.inner_packet_bytes, vec![0xa, 0xb, 0xc, 0xd]);
+        } else {
+            panic!("Expected ForwardPacket message");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_forward_packet_encode_decode_roundtrip_v6() {
+        let mut dst = BytesMut::new();
+
+        let forward_data = crate::message::ForwardPacketData {
+            target_gateway_identity: [77u8; 32],
+            target_lp_address: "[dead:beef:4242:c0ff:ee00::1111]:41264".parse().unwrap(),
+            inner_packet_bytes: vec![0xa, 0xb, 0xc, 0xd],
+        };
+
+        let packet = LpPacket {
+            header: LpHeader {
+                protocol_version: 1,
+                reserved: [0u8; 3],
+                receiver_idx: 999,
+                counter: 555,
+            },
+            message: LpMessage::ForwardPacket(forward_data),
+            trailer: [0xff; TRAILER_LEN],
+        };
+
+        // Serialize
+        serialize_lp_packet(&packet, &mut dst, None).unwrap();
+
+        // Parse back
+        let decoded = parse_lp_packet(&dst, None).unwrap();
+
+        // Verify LP protocol handling works correctly
+        assert_eq!(decoded.header.receiver_idx, 999);
+        assert!(matches!(decoded.message.typ(), MessageType::ForwardPacket));
+
+        if let LpMessage::ForwardPacket(data) = decoded.message {
+            assert_eq!(data.target_gateway_identity, [77u8; 32]);
+            assert_eq!(
+                data.target_lp_address,
+                "[dead:beef:4242:c0ff:ee00::1111]:41264".parse().unwrap()
+            );
             assert_eq!(data.inner_packet_bytes, vec![0xa, 0xb, 0xc, 0xd]);
         } else {
             panic!("Expected ForwardPacket message");
@@ -1055,7 +1093,7 @@ mod tests {
                 receiver_idx: 99999,
                 counter: 2,
             },
-            message: LpMessage::PSQRequest(PSQRequestData(handshake_data.clone())),
+            message: LpMessage::Handshake(HandshakeData(handshake_data.clone())),
             trailer: [0; TRAILER_LEN],
         };
 
@@ -1065,7 +1103,7 @@ mod tests {
         let decoded = parse_lp_packet(&encrypted, Some(&outer_key)).unwrap();
 
         match decoded.message {
-            LpMessage::PSQResponse(data) => {
+            LpMessage::Handshake(data) => {
                 assert_eq!(data.0, handshake_data);
             }
             _ => panic!("Expected Handshake message"),
@@ -1251,4 +1289,37 @@ mod tests {
             _ => panic!("Expected SubsessionKK1 message"),
         }
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_serialize_parse_error() {
+        use crate::message::ErrorPacketData;
+
+        let mut dst = BytesMut::new();
+
+        let error_data = ErrorPacketData {
+            message: "this is an error".to_string(),
+        };
+
+        let packet = LpPacket {
+            header: LpHeader {
+                protocol_version: 1,
+                reserved: [0u8; 3],
+                receiver_idx: 42,
+                counter: 200,
+            },
+            message: LpMessage::Error(error_data.clone()),
+            trailer: [0; TRAILER_LEN],
+        };
+
+        serialize_lp_packet(&packet, &mut dst, None).unwrap();
+        let decoded = parse_lp_packet(&dst, None).unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(decoded.header.receiver_idx, 42);
+        match decoded.message {
+            LpMessage::Error(data) => {
+                assert_eq!(data.message, "this is an error");
+            }
+            _ => panic!("Expected Error message"),
+        }
+    }
 }

common/nym-lp/src/config.rs

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ pub const DEFAULT_PSK_TTL_SECS: u64 = 3600;
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct LpConfig {
     /// KEM algorithm for PSQ key encapsulation.
-    /// Supported KEMs: MlKem768, McEliece
+    /// X25519 = classical (testing), MlKem768 = PQ, XWing = hybrid.
     #[serde(with = "kem_serde")]
     pub kem_algorithm: KEM,
 
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ pub struct LpConfig {
 impl Default for LpConfig {
     fn default() -> Self {
         Self {
-            kem_algorithm: KEM::MlKem768,
+            kem_algorithm: KEM::X25519,
             psk_ttl_secs: DEFAULT_PSK_TTL_SECS,
             enable_kkt: true,
         }
@@ -55,10 +55,10 @@ mod kem_serde {
         S: Serializer,
     {
         match kem {
+            KEM::X25519 => "X25519",
             KEM::MlKem768 => "MlKem768",
+            KEM::XWing => "XWing",
             KEM::McEliece => "McEliece",
-            KEM::X25519 => return Err(serde::ser::Error::custom("Unsupported KEM: X25519")),
-            KEM::XWing => return Err(serde::ser::Error::custom("Unsupported KEM: XWing")),
         }
         .serialize(serializer)
     }
@@ -69,10 +69,10 @@ mod kem_serde {
     {
         let s = String::deserialize(deserializer)?;
         match s.as_str() {
+            "X25519" => Ok(KEM::X25519),
             "MlKem768" => Ok(KEM::MlKem768),
+            "XWing" => Ok(KEM::XWing),
             "McEliece" => Ok(KEM::McEliece),
-            "X25519" => Err(serde::de::Error::custom("Unsupported KEM: X25519")),
-            "XWing" => Err(serde::de::Error::custom("Unsupported KEM: XWing")),
             _ => Err(serde::de::Error::custom(format!("Unknown KEM: {}", s))),
         }
     }

common/nym-lp/src/error.rs

@@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
 // Copyright 2025 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 
+use crate::message::MessageType;
 use crate::{noise_protocol::NoiseError, replay::ReplayError};
-use libcrux_psq::handshake::builders::BuilderError;
 use nym_crypto::asymmetric::ed25519::Ed25519RecoveryError;
-use nym_kkt::{
-    ciphersuite::{HashFunction, KEM},
-    error::KKTError,
-};
+use nym_kkt::ciphersuite::{HashFunction, KEM};
+use nym_kkt::error::KKTError;
 use thiserror::Error;
 
 #[derive(Error, Debug)]
@@ -15,21 +13,15 @@ pub enum LpError {
     #[error("IO Error: {0}")]
     IoError(#[from] std::io::Error),
 
-    // noiserm
     #[error("Snow Error: {0}")]
     SnowKeyError(#[from] snow::Error),
 
-    // noiserm
     #[error("Snow Pattern Error: {0}")]
     SnowPatternError(String),
 
-    // noiserm
     #[error("Noise Protocol Error: {0}")]
     NoiseError(#[from] NoiseError),
 
-    #[error("PSQ Error: {0}")]
-    PSQError(String),
-
     #[error("Replay detected: {0}")]
     Replay(#[from] ReplayError),
 
@@ -102,8 +94,8 @@ pub enum LpError {
     #[error("incompatible LP packet version. got: {got}, lowest supported: {lowest_supported}")]
     IncompatibleLegacyPacketVersion { got: u8, lowest_supported: u8 },
 
-    #[error("attempted to create an LP responder without providing a valid KEM key for {kem} ")]
-    ResponderWithMissingKEMKey { kem: KEM },
+    #[error("attempted to create an LP responder without providing a valid KEM key")]
+    ResponderWithMissingKEMKey,
 
     #[error(
         "there are no known digests for remote's KEM key with {kem} KEM and {hash_function} hash function"
@@ -112,10 +104,25 @@ pub enum LpError {
         kem: KEM,
         hash_function: HashFunction,
     },
+
+    #[error("failed to complete KKT/PSQ handshake: {0}")]
+    KKTPSQHandshake(String),
+
+    #[error("failed to complete the KKT exchange: {source}")]
+    KKTFailure {
+        #[from]
+        source: KKTError,
+    },
 }
 
-impl From<KKTError> for LpError {
-    fn from(err: KKTError) -> Self {
-        LpError::KKTError(format!("KKT Error: {:?}", err))
+impl LpError {
+    pub fn kkt_psq_handshake(msg: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
+        Self::KKTPSQHandshake(msg.into())
+    }
+
+    pub fn unexpected_handshake_response(got: MessageType, expected: MessageType) -> LpError {
+        Self::KKTPSQHandshake(format!(
+            "received unexpected response, got: {got:?}, expected: {expected:?}"
+        ))
     }
 }

common/nym-lp/src/lib.rs

@@ -2,25 +2,22 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 
 pub mod codec;
-// georgio: config does not seem to be used anywhere
-// pub mod config;
-// pub use config::LpConfig;
-
+pub mod config;
 pub mod error;
-// georgio: no use for this
 // pub mod kkt_orchestrator;
 pub mod message;
 pub mod noise_protocol;
 pub mod packet;
 pub mod peer;
 pub mod psk;
-pub mod psq;
+mod psq;
 pub mod replay;
 pub mod session;
 mod session_integration;
 pub mod session_manager;
 pub mod state_machine;
 
+pub use config::LpConfig;
 pub use error::LpError;
 pub use message::{ClientHelloData, LpMessage};
 pub use packet::{BOOTSTRAP_RECEIVER_IDX, LpPacket, OuterHeader};
@@ -29,30 +26,135 @@ pub use session::LpSession;
 pub use session_manager::SessionManager;
 pub use state_machine::LpStateMachine;
 
-// noiserm
 pub const NOISE_PATTERN: &str = "Noise_XKpsk3_25519_ChaChaPoly_SHA256";
 pub const NOISE_PSK_INDEX: u8 = 3;
 
-#[cfg(test)]
-pub fn kem_list() -> Vec<nym_kkt::ciphersuite::KEM> {
-    use nym_kkt::ciphersuite::KEM;
-    vec![KEM::MlKem768, KEM::McEliece, KEM::X25519]
+#[cfg(any(feature = "mock", test))]
+pub struct SessionsMock {
+    pub initiator: LpSession,
+    pub responder: LpSession,
 }
-#[cfg(test)]
-pub fn sessions_for_tests<'a>(kem: nym_kkt::ciphersuite::KEM) -> (LpSession<'a>, LpSession<'a>) {
-    let (init, resp) = crate::peer::mock_peers(kem);
 
-    // Use a fixed receiver_index for deterministic tests
-    let receiver_index: u32 = 12345;
+#[cfg(any(feature = "mock", test))]
+impl SessionsMock {
+    pub fn mock_post_handshake(session_id: u32) -> SessionsMock {
+        use crate::peer::mock_peers;
+        use nym_kkt::ciphersuite::{DecapsulationKey, EncapsulationKey};
 
-    let initiator_session =
-        LpSession::new(receiver_index, true, init.clone(), resp.as_remote(), &salt)
-            .expect("Test session creation failed");
+        let (init, resp) = mock_peers();
+        let resp_remote = resp.as_remote();
+        let init_remote = init.as_remote();
+        let salt = [42u8; 32];
+        let session_id_bytes = session_id.to_le_bytes();
 
-    let responder_session = LpSession::new(receiver_index, false, resp, init.as_remote(), &salt)
-        .expect("Test session creation failed");
+        // skip KKT by just deriving the kem key locally
+        let kem_keys = resp.kem_psq.as_ref().unwrap();
 
-    (initiator_session, responder_session)
+        let libcrux_private_key = libcrux_kem::PrivateKey::decode(
+            libcrux_kem::Algorithm::X25519,
+            kem_keys.private_key().as_bytes(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let decapsulation_key = DecapsulationKey::X25519(libcrux_private_key);
+
+        let libcrux_public_key = libcrux_kem::PublicKey::decode(
+            libcrux_kem::Algorithm::X25519,
+            kem_keys.public_key().as_bytes(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let encapsulation_key = EncapsulationKey::X25519(libcrux_public_key);
+
+        // INIT -> RESP: PSQ MSG1
+        let psq_initiator = crate::psk::psq_initiator_create_message(
+            init.x25519.private_key(),
+            &resp_remote.x25519_public,
+            &encapsulation_key,
+            init.ed25519.private_key(),
+            init.ed25519.public_key(),
+            &salt,
+            &session_id_bytes,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let psk = psq_initiator.psk;
+        let psq_payload = psq_initiator.payload;
+        let outer_aead_key = crate::codec::OuterAeadKey::from_psk(&psk);
+
+        let noise_state_init = snow::Builder::new(crate::noise_protocol::NoiseProtocol::params())
+            .local_private_key(init.x25519().private_key().as_bytes())
+            .remote_public_key(resp_remote.x25519_public.as_bytes())
+            .psk(crate::NOISE_PSK_INDEX, &psk)
+            .build_initiator()
+            .unwrap();
+        let mut noise_protocol_init = crate::noise_protocol::NoiseProtocol::new(noise_state_init);
+        let noise_msg1 = noise_protocol_init.get_bytes_to_send().unwrap().unwrap();
+
+        let psq_responder = crate::psk::psq_responder_process_message(
+            resp.x25519.private_key(),
+            &init_remote.x25519_public,
+            (&decapsulation_key, &encapsulation_key),
+            &init_remote.ed25519_public,
+            &psq_payload,
+            &salt,
+            &session_id_bytes,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let noise_state_resp = snow::Builder::new(crate::noise_protocol::NoiseProtocol::params())
+            .local_private_key(resp.x25519().private_key().as_bytes())
+            .remote_public_key(init_remote.x25519_public.as_bytes())
+            .psk(crate::NOISE_PSK_INDEX, &psk)
+            .build_responder()
+            .unwrap();
+        let mut noise_protocol_resp = crate::noise_protocol::NoiseProtocol::new(noise_state_resp);
+        noise_protocol_resp.read_message(&noise_msg1).unwrap();
+
+        let noise_msg2 = noise_protocol_resp.get_bytes_to_send().unwrap().unwrap();
+        noise_protocol_init.read_message(&noise_msg2).unwrap();
+        let noise_msg3 = noise_protocol_init.get_bytes_to_send().unwrap().unwrap();
+
+        assert!(noise_protocol_init.is_handshake_finished());
+
+        noise_protocol_resp.read_message(&noise_msg3).unwrap();
+        assert!(noise_protocol_resp.is_handshake_finished());
+
+        SessionsMock {
+            initiator: LpSession::new(
+                session_id,
+                1,
+                outer_aead_key.clone(),
+                init,
+                resp_remote,
+                crate::session::PqSharedSecret::new(psq_initiator.pq_shared_secret),
+                noise_protocol_init,
+            ),
+            responder: LpSession::new(
+                session_id,
+                1,
+                outer_aead_key,
+                resp,
+                init_remote,
+                crate::session::PqSharedSecret::new(psq_responder.pq_shared_secret),
+                noise_protocol_resp,
+            ),
+        }
+    }
+
+    // we just need a dummy 'valid' session for simpler tests
+    pub fn mock_initiator() -> LpSession {
+        Self::mock_post_handshake(1234).initiator
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(any(feature = "mock", test))]
+pub fn sessions_for_tests() -> (LpSession, LpSession) {
+    let sessions = SessionsMock::mock_post_handshake(69);
+    (sessions.initiator, sessions.responder)
+}
+
+#[cfg(any(feature = "mock", test))]
+pub fn mock_session_for_test() -> LpSession {
+    SessionsMock::mock_initiator()
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]
@@ -60,243 +162,218 @@ mod tests {
     use crate::message::LpMessage;
     use crate::packet::{LpHeader, LpPacket, TRAILER_LEN};
     use crate::session_manager::SessionManager;
-    use crate::{LpError, kem_list, sessions_for_tests};
+    use crate::{LpError, SessionsMock, mock_session_for_test};
     use bytes::BytesMut;
-    use nym_kkt::ciphersuite::{Ciphersuite, HashFunction, SignatureScheme};
 
     // Import the new standalone functions
     use crate::codec::{parse_lp_packet, serialize_lp_packet};
-    use crate::peer::mock_peers;
 
     #[test]
     fn test_replay_protection_integration() {
-        for kem in kem_list() {
-            // Create session
-            let session = sessions_for_tests(kem).0;
+        // Create session
+        let mut session = mock_session_for_test();
 
-            // === Packet 1 (Counter 0 - Should succeed) ===
-            let packet1 = LpPacket {
-                header: LpHeader {
-                    protocol_version: 1,
-                    reserved: [0u8; 3],
-                    receiver_idx: 42, // Matches session's sending_index assumption for this test
-                    counter: 0,
-                },
-                message: LpMessage::Busy,
-                trailer: [0u8; TRAILER_LEN],
-            };
+        // === Packet 1 (Counter 0 - Should succeed) ===
+        let packet1 = LpPacket {
+            header: LpHeader {
+                protocol_version: 1,
+                reserved: [0u8; 3],
+                receiver_idx: 42, // Matches session's sending_index assumption for this test
+                counter: 0,
+            },
+            message: LpMessage::Busy,
+            trailer: [0u8; TRAILER_LEN],
+        };
 
-            // Serialize packet
-            let mut buf1 = BytesMut::new();
-            serialize_lp_packet(&packet1, &mut buf1, None).unwrap();
+        // Serialize packet
+        let mut buf1 = BytesMut::new();
+        serialize_lp_packet(&packet1, &mut buf1, None).unwrap();
 
-            // Parse packet
-            let parsed_packet1 = parse_lp_packet(&buf1, None).unwrap();
+        // Parse packet
+        let parsed_packet1 = parse_lp_packet(&buf1, None).unwrap();
 
-            // Perform replay check (should pass)
-            session
-                .receiving_counter_quick_check(parsed_packet1.header.counter)
-                .expect("Initial packet failed replay check");
+        // Perform replay check (should pass)
+        session
+            .receiving_counter_quick_check(parsed_packet1.header.counter)
+            .expect("Initial packet failed replay check");
 
-            // Mark received (simulating successful processing)
-            session
-                .receiving_counter_mark(parsed_packet1.header.counter)
-                .expect("Failed to mark initial packet received");
+        // Mark received (simulating successful processing)
+        session
+            .receiving_counter_mark(parsed_packet1.header.counter)
+            .expect("Failed to mark initial packet received");
 
-            // === Packet 2 (Counter 0 - Replay, should fail check) ===
-            let packet2 = LpPacket {
-                header: LpHeader {
-                    protocol_version: 1,
-                    reserved: [0u8; 3],
-                    receiver_idx: 42,
-                    counter: 0, // Same counter as before (replay)
-                },
-                message: LpMessage::Busy,
-                trailer: [0u8; TRAILER_LEN],
-            };
+        // === Packet 2 (Counter 0 - Replay, should fail check) ===
+        let packet2 = LpPacket {
+            header: LpHeader {
+                protocol_version: 1,
+                reserved: [0u8; 3],
+                receiver_idx: 42,
+                counter: 0, // Same counter as before (replay)
+            },
+            message: LpMessage::Busy,
+            trailer: [0u8; TRAILER_LEN],
+        };
 
-            // Serialize packet
-            let mut buf2 = BytesMut::new();
-            serialize_lp_packet(&packet2, &mut buf2, None).unwrap();
+        // Serialize packet
+        let mut buf2 = BytesMut::new();
+        serialize_lp_packet(&packet2, &mut buf2, None).unwrap();
 
-            // Parse packet
-            let parsed_packet2 = parse_lp_packet(&buf2, None).unwrap();
+        // Parse packet
+        let parsed_packet2 = parse_lp_packet(&buf2, None).unwrap();
 
-            // Perform replay check (should fail)
-            let replay_result =
-                session.receiving_counter_quick_check(parsed_packet2.header.counter);
-            assert!(replay_result.is_err());
-            match replay_result.unwrap_err() {
-                LpError::Replay(e) => {
-                    assert!(matches!(e, crate::replay::ReplayError::DuplicateCounter));
-                }
-                e => panic!("Expected replay error, got {:?}", e),
+        // Perform replay check (should fail)
+        let replay_result = session.receiving_counter_quick_check(parsed_packet2.header.counter);
+        assert!(replay_result.is_err());
+        match replay_result.unwrap_err() {
+            LpError::Replay(e) => {
+                assert!(matches!(e, crate::replay::ReplayError::DuplicateCounter));
             }
-            // Do not mark received as it failed validation
-
-            // === Packet 3 (Counter 1 - Should succeed) ===
-            let packet3 = LpPacket {
-                header: LpHeader {
-                    protocol_version: 1,
-                    reserved: [0u8; 3],
-                    receiver_idx: 42,
-                    counter: 1, // Incremented counter
-                },
-                message: LpMessage::Busy,
-                trailer: [0u8; TRAILER_LEN],
-            };
-
-            // Serialize packet
-            let mut buf3 = BytesMut::new();
-            serialize_lp_packet(&packet3, &mut buf3, None).unwrap();
-
-            // Parse packet
-            let parsed_packet3 = parse_lp_packet(&buf3, None).unwrap();
-
-            // Perform replay check (should pass)
-            session
-                .receiving_counter_quick_check(parsed_packet3.header.counter)
-                .expect("Packet 3 failed replay check");
-
-            // Mark received
-            session
-                .receiving_counter_mark(parsed_packet3.header.counter)
-                .expect("Failed to mark packet 3 received");
-
-            // Verify validator state directly on the session
-            let state = session.current_packet_cnt();
-            assert_eq!(state.0, 2); // Next expected counter (correct - was 1, now expects 2)
-            assert_eq!(state.1, 2); // Total marked received (correct - packets 1 and 3)
+            e => panic!("Expected replay error, got {:?}", e),
         }
+        // Do not mark received as it failed validation
+
+        // === Packet 3 (Counter 1 - Should succeed) ===
+        let packet3 = LpPacket {
+            header: LpHeader {
+                protocol_version: 1,
+                reserved: [0u8; 3],
+                receiver_idx: 42,
+                counter: 1, // Incremented counter
+            },
+            message: LpMessage::Busy,
+            trailer: [0u8; TRAILER_LEN],
+        };
+
+        // Serialize packet
+        let mut buf3 = BytesMut::new();
+        serialize_lp_packet(&packet3, &mut buf3, None).unwrap();
+
+        // Parse packet
+        let parsed_packet3 = parse_lp_packet(&buf3, None).unwrap();
+
+        // Perform replay check (should pass)
+        session
+            .receiving_counter_quick_check(parsed_packet3.header.counter)
+            .expect("Packet 3 failed replay check");
+
+        // Mark received
+        session
+            .receiving_counter_mark(parsed_packet3.header.counter)
+            .expect("Failed to mark packet 3 received");
+
+        // Verify validator state directly on the session
+        let state = session.current_packet_cnt();
+        assert_eq!(state.0, 2); // Next expected counter (correct - was 1, now expects 2)
+        assert_eq!(state.1, 2); // Total marked received (correct - packets 1 and 3)
     }
+
     #[test]
     fn test_session_manager_integration() {
         // Create session manager
         let mut local_manager = SessionManager::new();
         let mut remote_manager = SessionManager::new();
 
-        for kem in kem_list() {
-            // Generate Ed25519 keypairs for PSQ authentication
-            let (init, resp) = mock_peers(kem);
+        // Use fixed receiver_index for deterministic test
+        let receiver_index: u32 = 54321;
 
-            let mut ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::resolve_ciphersuite(
-                kem,
-                HashFunction::Blake3,
-                SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
-                None,
-            );
+        let sessions = SessionsMock::mock_post_handshake(receiver_index);
+        let local_session = sessions.initiator;
+        let remote_session = sessions.responder;
 
-            // Use fixed receiver_index for deterministic test
-            let receiver_index: u32 = 54321;
+        // Create a session via manager
+        let _ = local_manager.create_session_state_machine(local_session);
+        let _ = remote_manager.create_session_state_machine(remote_session);
 
-            // Test salt
-            let salt = [46u8; 32];
+        // === Packet 1 (Counter 0 - Should succeed) ===
+        let packet1 = LpPacket {
+            header: LpHeader {
+                protocol_version: 1,
+                reserved: [0u8; 3],
+                receiver_idx: receiver_index,
+                counter: 0,
+            },
+            message: LpMessage::Busy,
+            trailer: [0u8; TRAILER_LEN],
+        };
 
-            // Create a session via manager
-            let _ = local_manager
-                .create_session_state_machine(
-                    receiver_index,
-                    true,
-                    init.clone(),
-                    resp.as_remote(),
-                    &salt,
-                )
-                .unwrap();
+        // Serialize
+        let mut buf1 = BytesMut::new();
+        serialize_lp_packet(&packet1, &mut buf1, None).unwrap();
 
-            let _ = remote_manager
-                .create_session_state_machine(receiver_index, false, resp, init.as_remote(), &salt)
-                .unwrap();
-            // === Packet 1 (Counter 0 - Should succeed) ===
-            let packet1 = LpPacket {
-                header: LpHeader {
-                    protocol_version: 1,
-                    reserved: [0u8; 3],
-                    receiver_idx: receiver_index,
-                    counter: 0,
-                },
-                message: LpMessage::Busy,
-                trailer: [0u8; TRAILER_LEN],
-            };
+        // Parse
+        let parsed_packet1 = parse_lp_packet(&buf1, None).unwrap();
 
-            // Serialize
-            let mut buf1 = BytesMut::new();
-            serialize_lp_packet(&packet1, &mut buf1, None).unwrap();
+        // Process via SessionManager method (which should handle checks + marking)
+        // NOTE: We might need a method on SessionManager/LpSession like `process_incoming_packet`
+        //       that encapsulates parse -> check -> process_noise -> mark.
+        //       For now, we simulate the steps using the retrieved session.
 
-            // Parse
-            let parsed_packet1 = parse_lp_packet(&buf1, None).unwrap();
+        // Perform replay check
+        local_manager
+            .receiving_counter_quick_check(receiver_index, parsed_packet1.header.counter)
+            .expect("Packet 1 check failed");
+        // Mark received
+        local_manager
+            .receiving_counter_mark(receiver_index, parsed_packet1.header.counter)
+            .expect("Packet 1 mark failed");
 
-            // Process via SessionManager method (which should handle checks + marking)
-            // NOTE: We might need a method on SessionManager/LpSession like `process_incoming_packet`
-            //       that encapsulates parse -> check -> process_noise -> mark.
-            //       For now, we simulate the steps using the retrieved session.
+        // === Packet 2 (Counter 1 - Should succeed on same session) ===
+        let packet2 = LpPacket {
+            header: LpHeader {
+                protocol_version: 1,
+                reserved: [0u8; 3],
+                receiver_idx: receiver_index,
+                counter: 1,
+            },
+            message: LpMessage::Busy,
+            trailer: [0u8; TRAILER_LEN],
+        };
 
-            // Perform replay check
-            local_manager
-                .receiving_counter_quick_check(receiver_index, parsed_packet1.header.counter)
-                .expect("Packet 1 check failed");
-            // Mark received
-            local_manager
-                .receiving_counter_mark(receiver_index, parsed_packet1.header.counter)
-                .expect("Packet 1 mark failed");
+        // Serialize
+        let mut buf2 = BytesMut::new();
+        serialize_lp_packet(&packet2, &mut buf2, None).unwrap();
 
-            // === Packet 2 (Counter 1 - Should succeed on same session) ===
-            let packet2 = LpPacket {
-                header: LpHeader {
-                    protocol_version: 1,
-                    reserved: [0u8; 3],
-                    receiver_idx: receiver_index,
-                    counter: 1,
-                },
-                message: LpMessage::Busy,
-                trailer: [0u8; TRAILER_LEN],
-            };
+        // Parse
+        let parsed_packet2 = parse_lp_packet(&buf2, None).unwrap();
 
-            // Serialize
-            let mut buf2 = BytesMut::new();
-            serialize_lp_packet(&packet2, &mut buf2, None).unwrap();
+        // Perform replay check
+        local_manager
+            .receiving_counter_quick_check(receiver_index, parsed_packet2.header.counter)
+            .expect("Packet 2 check failed");
+        // Mark received
+        local_manager
+            .receiving_counter_mark(receiver_index, parsed_packet2.header.counter)
+            .expect("Packet 2 mark failed");
 
-            // Parse
-            let parsed_packet2 = parse_lp_packet(&buf2, None).unwrap();
+        // === Packet 3 (Counter 0 - Replay, should fail check) ===
+        let packet3 = LpPacket {
+            header: LpHeader {
+                protocol_version: 1,
+                reserved: [0u8; 3],
+                receiver_idx: receiver_index,
+                counter: 0, // Replay of first packet
+            },
+            message: LpMessage::Busy,
+            trailer: [0u8; TRAILER_LEN],
+        };
 
-            // Perform replay check
-            local_manager
-                .receiving_counter_quick_check(receiver_index, parsed_packet2.header.counter)
-                .expect("Packet 2 check failed");
-            // Mark received
-            local_manager
-                .receiving_counter_mark(receiver_index, parsed_packet2.header.counter)
-                .expect("Packet 2 mark failed");
+        // Serialize
+        let mut buf3 = BytesMut::new();
+        serialize_lp_packet(&packet3, &mut buf3, None).unwrap();
 
-            // === Packet 3 (Counter 0 - Replay, should fail check) ===
-            let packet3 = LpPacket {
-                header: LpHeader {
-                    protocol_version: 1,
-                    reserved: [0u8; 3],
-                    receiver_idx: receiver_index,
-                    counter: 0, // Replay of first packet
-                },
-                message: LpMessage::Busy,
-                trailer: [0u8; TRAILER_LEN],
-            };
+        // Parse
+        let parsed_packet3 = parse_lp_packet(&buf3, None).unwrap();
 
-            // Serialize
-            let mut buf3 = BytesMut::new();
-            serialize_lp_packet(&packet3, &mut buf3, None).unwrap();
-
-            // Parse
-            let parsed_packet3 = parse_lp_packet(&buf3, None).unwrap();
-
-            // Perform replay check (should fail)
-            let replay_result = local_manager
-                .receiving_counter_quick_check(receiver_index, parsed_packet3.header.counter);
-            assert!(replay_result.is_err());
-            match replay_result.unwrap_err() {
-                LpError::Replay(e) => {
-                    assert!(matches!(e, crate::replay::ReplayError::DuplicateCounter));
-                }
-                e => panic!("Expected replay error for packet 3, got {:?}", e),
+        // Perform replay check (should fail)
+        let replay_result = local_manager
+            .receiving_counter_quick_check(receiver_index, parsed_packet3.header.counter);
+        assert!(replay_result.is_err());
+        match replay_result.unwrap_err() {
+            LpError::Replay(e) => {
+                assert!(matches!(e, crate::replay::ReplayError::DuplicateCounter));
             }
-            // Do not mark received
+            e => panic!("Expected replay error for packet 3, got {:?}", e),
         }
+        // Do not mark received
     }
 }

common/nym-lp/src/message.rs

@@ -1,17 +1,19 @@
 // Copyright 2025 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 
+use crate::packet::LpHeader;
 use crate::peer::LpRemotePeer;
-use crate::{BOOTSTRAP_RECEIVER_IDX, LpError};
+use crate::{BOOTSTRAP_RECEIVER_IDX, LpError, LpPacket};
 use bytes::{BufMut, BytesMut};
 use num_enum::{IntoPrimitive, TryFromPrimitive};
 use nym_crypto::asymmetric::{ed25519, x25519};
 use rand::RngCore;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
-use std::fmt::{self, Display, write};
+use std::fmt::{self, Display};
+use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr, SocketAddr};
 
 /// Data structure for the ClientHello message
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
 pub struct ClientHelloData {
     /// Client-proposed receiver index for session identification (4 bytes)
     /// Auto-generated randomly by the client
@@ -20,16 +22,25 @@ pub struct ClientHelloData {
     pub client_lp_public_key: x25519::PublicKey,
     /// Client's Ed25519 public key (32 bytes) - for PSQ authentication
     pub client_ed25519_public_key: ed25519::PublicKey,
-    // noiserm
     /// Salt for PSK derivation (32 bytes: 8-byte timestamp + 24-byte nonce)
     pub salt: [u8; 32],
 }
 
 impl ClientHelloData {
-    // noiserm (remove 32 bytes for salt)
     // 4 bytes for receiver index + 32 bytes for client lp key, 32 bytes for client ed25519 key + 32 bytes for salt
     pub const LEN: usize = 100;
 
+    pub fn into_lp_packet(self, protocol_version: u8) -> LpPacket {
+        LpPacket::new(
+            LpHeader::new(
+                BOOTSTRAP_RECEIVER_IDX, // session_id not yet established
+                0,                      // counter starts at 0
+                protocol_version,
+            ),
+            LpMessage::ClientHello(self),
+        )
+    }
+
     fn len(&self) -> usize {
         Self::LEN
     }
@@ -43,7 +54,6 @@ impl ClientHelloData {
         }
     }
 
-    // noiserm
     /// Generates a new ClientHelloData with fresh salt.
     ///
     /// Salt format: 8 bytes timestamp (u64 LE) + 24 bytes random nonce
@@ -72,7 +82,7 @@ impl ClientHelloData {
             salt,
         }
     }
-    // noiserm
+
     /// Extracts the timestamp from the salt.
     ///
     /// # Returns
@@ -87,7 +97,6 @@ impl ClientHelloData {
         dst.put_u32_le(self.receiver_index);
         dst.put_slice(self.client_lp_public_key.as_bytes());
         dst.put_slice(self.client_ed25519_public_key.as_bytes());
-        // noiserm
         dst.put_slice(&self.salt);
     }
 
@@ -111,7 +120,6 @@ impl ClientHelloData {
             client_ed25519_public_key: ed25519::PublicKey::from_byte_array(
                 client_ed25519_public_key_bytes,
             )?,
-            // noiserm
             salt: b[68..].try_into().unwrap(),
         })
     }
@@ -138,8 +146,6 @@ pub enum MessageType {
     Ack = 0x0008,
     /// Subsession request - client initiates subsession creation
     SubsessionRequest = 0x0009,
-
-    // georgio: this should be the psq msg
     /// Subsession KK1 - first message of Noise KK handshake
     SubsessionKK1 = 0x000A,
     /// Subsession KK2 - second message of Noise KK handshake
@@ -148,6 +154,8 @@ pub enum MessageType {
     SubsessionReady = 0x000C,
     /// Subsession abort - race winner tells loser to become responder
     SubsessionAbort = 0x000D,
+    /// General error
+    Error = 0x00FF,
 }
 
 impl MessageType {
@@ -164,6 +172,9 @@ impl MessageType {
 pub struct HandshakeData(pub Vec<u8>);
 
 impl HandshakeData {
+    pub(crate) fn new(bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
+        Self(bytes)
+    }
     fn len(&self) -> usize {
         self.0.len()
     }
@@ -181,6 +192,11 @@ impl HandshakeData {
 pub struct EncryptedDataPayload(pub Vec<u8>);
 
 impl EncryptedDataPayload {
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
+    pub(crate) fn new(bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
+        Self(bytes)
+    }
+
     fn len(&self) -> usize {
         self.0.len()
     }
@@ -199,6 +215,10 @@ impl EncryptedDataPayload {
 pub struct KKTRequestData(pub Vec<u8>);
 
 impl KKTRequestData {
+    pub(crate) fn new(bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
+        Self(bytes)
+    }
+
     fn len(&self) -> usize {
         self.0.len()
     }
@@ -217,6 +237,10 @@ impl KKTRequestData {
 pub struct KKTResponseData(pub Vec<u8>);
 
 impl KKTResponseData {
+    pub(crate) fn new(bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
+        Self(bytes)
+    }
+
     fn len(&self) -> usize {
         self.0.len()
     }
@@ -230,39 +254,49 @@ impl KKTResponseData {
     }
 }
 
-/// PSQ request frame data (serialized bytes)
+/// General human-readable error message
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub struct PSQRequestData(pub Vec<u8>);
-
-impl PSQRequestData {
-    fn len(&self) -> usize {
-        self.0.len()
-    }
-
-    fn encode(&self, dst: &mut BytesMut) {
-        dst.put_slice(&self.0);
-    }
-
-    fn decode(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, LpError> {
-        Ok(PSQRequestData(bytes.to_vec()))
-    }
+pub struct ErrorPacketData {
+    pub message: String,
 }
 
-/// PSQ response frame data (serialized bytes)
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub struct PSQResponseData(pub Vec<u8>);
+impl ErrorPacketData {
+    pub(crate) fn new(message: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
+        ErrorPacketData {
+            message: message.into(),
+        }
+    }
 
-impl PSQResponseData {
     fn len(&self) -> usize {
-        self.0.len()
+        // length-encoding + message
+        4 + self.message.len()
     }
 
     fn encode(&self, dst: &mut BytesMut) {
-        dst.put_slice(&self.0);
+        dst.put_u32_le(self.message.len() as u32);
+        dst.put_slice(self.message.as_bytes());
     }
 
     fn decode(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, LpError> {
-        Ok(PSQResponseData(bytes.to_vec()))
+        if bytes.len() < 4 {
+            return Err(LpError::DeserializationError(format!(
+                "Too few bytes to deserialise ErrorPacketData. got {}",
+                bytes.len()
+            )));
+        }
+
+        let message_len = u32::from_le_bytes([bytes[0], bytes[1], bytes[2], bytes[3]]) as usize;
+        if bytes[4..].len() != message_len {
+            return Err(LpError::DeserializationError(format!(
+                "Wrong number of bytes to deserialise ErrorPacketData. got {}. Expected {}",
+                bytes.len(),
+                4 + message_len
+            )));
+        }
+
+        let message = String::from_utf8_lossy(&bytes[4..]).to_string();
+
+        Ok(ErrorPacketData { message })
     }
 }
 
@@ -272,9 +306,8 @@ pub struct ForwardPacketData {
     /// Target gateway's Ed25519 identity (32 bytes)
     pub target_gateway_identity: [u8; 32],
 
-    // TODO: replace it with `SocketAddr`
     /// Target gateway's LP address (IP:port string)
-    pub target_lp_address: String,
+    pub target_lp_address: SocketAddr,
 
     /// Complete inner LP packet bytes (serialized LpPacket)
     /// This is the CLIENT→EXIT gateway packet, encrypted for exit
@@ -282,23 +315,46 @@ pub struct ForwardPacketData {
 }
 
 impl ForwardPacketData {
+    pub fn new(
+        target_gateway_identity: ed25519::PublicKey,
+        target_lp_address: SocketAddr,
+        inner_packet_bytes: Vec<u8>,
+    ) -> Self {
+        ForwardPacketData {
+            target_gateway_identity: target_gateway_identity.to_bytes(),
+            target_lp_address,
+            inner_packet_bytes,
+        }
+    }
+
     fn len(&self) -> usize {
         // 32 bytes target gateway identity
         // +
-        // 4 bytes length of target lp address
+        // 1 byte length of target lp address type
         // +
-        // target_lp_address.len()
+        // {4,16} target_lp_address IPv{4,6}
+        // +
+        // 2 bytes target_lp_address port
         // +
         // 4 bytes of length of inner packet bytes
         // +
         // inner_packet_bytes.len()
-        32 + 4 + self.target_lp_address.len() + 4 + self.inner_packet_bytes.len()
+        match self.target_lp_address {
+            SocketAddr::V4(_) => 32 + 1 + 4 + 2 + 4 + self.inner_packet_bytes.len(),
+            SocketAddr::V6(_) => 32 + 1 + 16 + 2 + 4 + self.inner_packet_bytes.len(),
+        }
     }
 
     fn encode(&self, dst: &mut BytesMut) {
+        let (is_ipv6, ip_bytes) = match &self.target_lp_address {
+            SocketAddr::V4(address) => (false, address.ip().octets().to_vec()),
+            SocketAddr::V6(address) => (true, address.ip().octets().to_vec()),
+        };
+
         dst.put_slice(&self.target_gateway_identity);
-        dst.put_u16_le(self.target_lp_address.len() as u16);
-        dst.put_slice(self.target_lp_address.as_bytes());
+        dst.put_u8(is_ipv6 as u8); // IP type , 0 for ipv4
+        dst.put_slice(&ip_bytes); // IP bytes
+        dst.put_u16_le(self.target_lp_address.port()); // Port
         dst.put_u32_le(self.inner_packet_bytes.len() as u32);
         dst.put_slice(&self.inner_packet_bytes);
     }
@@ -310,42 +366,56 @@ impl ForwardPacketData {
     }
 
     pub fn decode(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, LpError> {
-        // smallest possible packet with empty address and empty data
-        if bytes.len() < 38 {
+        // smallest possible packet with ipv4 and empty data
+        if bytes.len() < 43 {
+            // 32 + 1 + 4 + 2 + 4 + 0
             return Err(LpError::DeserializationError(format!(
-                "Too few bytes to deserialise ForwardPacketData[1]. got {}",
+                "Too few bytes to deserialise ForwardPacketData. got {}",
                 bytes.len()
             )));
         }
         // SAFETY: we ensured we have sufficient data
         #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
         let target_gateway_identity = bytes[0..32].try_into().unwrap();
-        let target_lp_address_len = u16::from_le_bytes([bytes[32], bytes[33]]);
+        let target_lp_address_is_ipv6 = bytes[32] != 0;
 
-        // smallest possible packet with empty data
-        if bytes[34..].len() < 4 + target_lp_address_len as usize {
-            return Err(LpError::DeserializationError(format!(
-                "Too few bytes to deserialise ForwardPacketData[2]. got {}",
-                bytes.len()
-            )));
-        }
+        let (target_lp_address, next_index) = if target_lp_address_is_ipv6 {
+            // IPv6, first check we have actually enough bytes
+            // smallest possible packet with ipv6 and empty data
+            if bytes.len() < 55 {
+                // 32 + 1 + 16 + 2 + 4 + 0
+                return Err(LpError::DeserializationError(format!(
+                    "Too few bytes to deserialise ipv6 ForwardPacketData. got {}",
+                    bytes.len()
+                )));
+            }
+            // SAFETY: we ensured we have sufficient data, and the length is correct for casting
+            #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
+            let ipv6 = IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::from_octets(bytes[33..49].try_into().unwrap()));
+            let port = u16::from_le_bytes([bytes[49], bytes[50]]);
+            (SocketAddr::new(ipv6, port), 51)
+        } else {
+            // IPv4. Length check done at the start
+            // SAFETY: we ensured we have sufficient data, and the length is correct for casting
+            #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
+            let ipv4 = IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::from_octets(bytes[33..37].try_into().unwrap()));
+            let port = u16::from_le_bytes([bytes[37], bytes[38]]);
+            (SocketAddr::new(ipv4, port), 39)
+        };
 
-        let target_lp_address =
-            String::from_utf8_lossy(&bytes[34..34 + target_lp_address_len as usize]).to_string();
         let inner_packet_bytes_len = u32::from_le_bytes([
-            bytes[34 + target_lp_address_len as usize],
-            bytes[34 + target_lp_address_len as usize + 1],
-            bytes[34 + target_lp_address_len as usize + 2],
-            bytes[34 + target_lp_address_len as usize + 3],
+            bytes[next_index],
+            bytes[next_index + 1],
+            bytes[next_index + 2],
+            bytes[next_index + 3],
         ]);
-        if bytes[34 + target_lp_address_len as usize + 4..].len() != inner_packet_bytes_len as usize
-        {
+        if bytes[next_index + 4..].len() != inner_packet_bytes_len as usize {
             return Err(LpError::DeserializationError(format!(
                 "Expected {inner_packet_bytes_len} bytes to deserialise inner packet bytes of ForwardPacketData. got {}",
-                bytes[34 + target_lp_address_len as usize + 4..].len()
+                bytes[next_index + 4..].len()
             )));
         }
-        let inner_packet_bytes = bytes[34 + target_lp_address_len as usize + 4..].to_vec();
+        let inner_packet_bytes = bytes[next_index + 4..].to_vec();
 
         Ok(ForwardPacketData {
             target_gateway_identity,
@@ -355,7 +425,6 @@ impl ForwardPacketData {
     }
 }
 
-// georgio: swap with psq
 /// Subsession KK1 message - first message of Noise KK handshake
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub struct SubsessionKK1Data {
@@ -436,8 +505,7 @@ impl SubsessionReadyData {
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub enum LpMessage {
     Busy,
-    PSQRequest(PSQRequestData),
-    PSQResponse(PSQResponseData),
+    Handshake(HandshakeData),
     EncryptedData(EncryptedDataPayload),
     ClientHello(ClientHelloData),
     KKTRequest(KKTRequestData),
@@ -447,7 +515,6 @@ pub enum LpMessage {
     Collision,
     /// Acknowledgment - gateway confirms receipt of message
     Ack,
-    // georgio: this should become psq stuff
     /// Subsession request - client initiates subsession creation (empty, signal only)
     SubsessionRequest,
     /// Subsession KK1 - first message of Noise KK handshake
@@ -458,12 +525,69 @@ pub enum LpMessage {
     SubsessionReady(SubsessionReadyData),
     /// Subsession abort - race winner tells loser to become responder (empty, signal only)
     SubsessionAbort,
+    /// An error has occurred
+    Error(ErrorPacketData),
+}
+
+impl From<HandshakeData> for LpMessage {
+    fn from(value: HandshakeData) -> Self {
+        LpMessage::Handshake(value)
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<EncryptedDataPayload> for LpMessage {
+    fn from(value: EncryptedDataPayload) -> Self {
+        LpMessage::EncryptedData(value)
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<ClientHelloData> for LpMessage {
+    fn from(value: ClientHelloData) -> Self {
+        LpMessage::ClientHello(value)
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<KKTRequestData> for LpMessage {
+    fn from(value: KKTRequestData) -> Self {
+        LpMessage::KKTRequest(value)
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<KKTResponseData> for LpMessage {
+    fn from(value: KKTResponseData) -> Self {
+        LpMessage::KKTResponse(value)
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<ForwardPacketData> for LpMessage {
+    fn from(value: ForwardPacketData) -> Self {
+        LpMessage::ForwardPacket(value)
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<SubsessionKK1Data> for LpMessage {
+    fn from(value: SubsessionKK1Data) -> Self {
+        LpMessage::SubsessionKK1(value)
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<SubsessionKK2Data> for LpMessage {
+    fn from(value: SubsessionKK2Data) -> Self {
+        LpMessage::SubsessionKK2(value)
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<SubsessionReadyData> for LpMessage {
+    fn from(value: SubsessionReadyData) -> Self {
+        LpMessage::SubsessionReady(value)
+    }
 }
 
 impl Display for LpMessage {
     fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
         match self {
             LpMessage::Busy => write!(f, "Busy"),
+            LpMessage::Handshake(_) => write!(f, "Handshake"),
             LpMessage::EncryptedData(_) => write!(f, "EncryptedData"),
             LpMessage::ClientHello(_) => write!(f, "ClientHello"),
             LpMessage::KKTRequest(_) => write!(f, "KKTRequest"),
@@ -476,16 +600,36 @@ impl Display for LpMessage {
             LpMessage::SubsessionKK2(_) => write!(f, "SubsessionKK2"),
             LpMessage::SubsessionReady(_) => write!(f, "SubsessionReady"),
             LpMessage::SubsessionAbort => write!(f, "SubsessionAbort"),
-            LpMessage::PSQRequest(_) => write!(f, "PSQRequest"),
-            LpMessage::PSQResponse(_) => write!(f, "PSQResponse"),
+            LpMessage::Error(_) => write!(f, "Error"),
         }
     }
 }
 
 impl LpMessage {
+    pub fn payload(&self) -> &[u8] {
+        match self {
+            LpMessage::Busy => &[],
+            LpMessage::Handshake(payload) => payload.0.as_slice(),
+            LpMessage::EncryptedData(payload) => payload.0.as_slice(),
+            LpMessage::ClientHello(_) => &[], // Structured data, serialized in encode_content
+            LpMessage::KKTRequest(payload) => payload.0.as_slice(),
+            LpMessage::KKTResponse(payload) => payload.0.as_slice(),
+            LpMessage::ForwardPacket(_) => &[], // Structured data, serialized in encode_content
+            LpMessage::Collision => &[],
+            LpMessage::Ack => &[],
+            LpMessage::SubsessionRequest => &[],
+            LpMessage::SubsessionKK1(_) => &[], // Structured data, serialized in encode_content
+            LpMessage::SubsessionKK2(_) => &[], // Structured data, serialized in encode_content
+            LpMessage::SubsessionReady(_) => &[], // Structured data, serialized in encode_content
+            LpMessage::SubsessionAbort => &[],
+            LpMessage::Error(_) => &[], // Structured data, serialized in encode_content (?)
+        }
+    }
+
     pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
         match self {
             LpMessage::Busy => true,
+            LpMessage::Handshake(payload) => payload.0.is_empty(),
             LpMessage::EncryptedData(payload) => payload.0.is_empty(),
             LpMessage::ClientHello(_) => false, // Always has data
             LpMessage::KKTRequest(payload) => payload.0.is_empty(),
@@ -498,16 +642,14 @@ impl LpMessage {
             LpMessage::SubsessionKK2(_) => false, // Always has payload
             LpMessage::SubsessionReady(_) => false, // Always has receiver_index
             LpMessage::SubsessionAbort => true,   // Empty signal
-            LpMessage::PSQRequest(payload) => true, // Always had data (?)
-            LpMessage::PSQResponse(payload) => true, // Always had data (?)
+            LpMessage::Error(_) => false,
         }
     }
 
     pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
         match self {
             LpMessage::Busy => 0,
-            LpMessage::PSQRequest(payload) => payload.len(),
-            LpMessage::PSQResponse(payload) => payload.len(),
+            LpMessage::Handshake(payload) => payload.len(),
             LpMessage::EncryptedData(payload) => payload.len(),
             LpMessage::ClientHello(payload) => payload.len(),
             LpMessage::KKTRequest(payload) => payload.len(),
@@ -520,14 +662,14 @@ impl LpMessage {
             LpMessage::SubsessionKK2(payload) => payload.len(),
             LpMessage::SubsessionReady(payload) => payload.len(),
             LpMessage::SubsessionAbort => 0,
+            LpMessage::Error(payload) => payload.len(),
         }
     }
 
     pub fn typ(&self) -> MessageType {
         match self {
             LpMessage::Busy => MessageType::Busy,
-            LpMessage::PSQRequest(_) => todo!(),
-            LpMessage::PSQResponse(_) => todo!(),
+            LpMessage::Handshake(_) => MessageType::Handshake,
             LpMessage::EncryptedData(_) => MessageType::EncryptedData,
             LpMessage::ClientHello(_) => MessageType::ClientHello,
             LpMessage::KKTRequest(_) => MessageType::KKTRequest,
@@ -540,14 +682,14 @@ impl LpMessage {
             LpMessage::SubsessionKK2(_) => MessageType::SubsessionKK2,
             LpMessage::SubsessionReady(_) => MessageType::SubsessionReady,
             LpMessage::SubsessionAbort => MessageType::SubsessionAbort,
+            LpMessage::Error(_) => MessageType::Error,
         }
     }
 
     pub fn encode_content(&self, dst: &mut BytesMut) {
         match self {
             LpMessage::Busy => { /* No content */ }
-            LpMessage::PSQRequest(payload) => payload.encode(dst),
-            LpMessage::PSQResponse(payload) => payload.encode(dst),
+            LpMessage::Handshake(payload) => payload.encode(dst),
             LpMessage::EncryptedData(payload) => payload.encode(dst),
             LpMessage::ClientHello(data) => data.encode(dst),
             LpMessage::KKTRequest(payload) => payload.encode(dst),
@@ -560,6 +702,7 @@ impl LpMessage {
             LpMessage::SubsessionKK2(data) => data.encode(dst),
             LpMessage::SubsessionReady(data) => data.encode(dst),
             LpMessage::SubsessionAbort => { /* No content - signal only */ }
+            LpMessage::Error(data) => data.encode(dst),
         }
     }
 
@@ -573,7 +716,7 @@ impl LpMessage {
                 content.ensure_empty()?;
                 Ok(LpMessage::Busy)
             }
-            MessageType::Handshake => todo!(),
+            MessageType::Handshake => Ok(LpMessage::Handshake(HandshakeData::decode(content)?)),
             MessageType::EncryptedData => Ok(LpMessage::EncryptedData(
                 EncryptedDataPayload::decode(content)?,
             )),
@@ -612,6 +755,7 @@ impl LpMessage {
                 content.ensure_empty()?;
                 Ok(LpMessage::SubsessionAbort)
             }
+            MessageType::Error => Ok(LpMessage::Error(ErrorPacketData::decode(content)?)),
         }
     }
 }

common/nym-lp/src/noise_protocol.rs

@@ -82,6 +82,13 @@ pub enum ReadResult {
 // --- Implementation ---
 
 impl NoiseProtocol {
+    pub fn params() -> NoiseParams {
+        // SAFETY: the hardcoded pattern must be valid
+        // and if for some reason it was not, we MUST fail non-gracefully for there is no possible recovery
+        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
+        crate::NOISE_PATTERN.parse().unwrap()
+    }
+
     /// Creates a new `NoiseProtocol` instance in the Handshaking state.
     ///
     /// Takes an initialized `snow::HandshakeState` (e.g., from `snow::Builder`).
@@ -91,6 +98,46 @@ impl NoiseProtocol {
         }
     }
 
+    fn prepare_handshake_state<'a>(
+        local_private_key: &'a [u8],
+        remote_public_key: &'a [u8],
+        psk: &'a [u8],
+    ) -> snow::Builder<'a> {
+        let psk_index = crate::NOISE_PSK_INDEX;
+        let noise_params = NoiseProtocol::params();
+
+        snow::Builder::new(noise_params)
+            .local_private_key(local_private_key)
+            .remote_public_key(remote_public_key)
+            .psk(psk_index, psk)
+    }
+
+    /// Builds a new `NoiseProtocol` initiator instance with the provided local private key,
+    /// remote public key and psk
+    pub fn build_new_initiator(
+        local_private_key: &[u8],
+        remote_public_key: &[u8],
+        psk: &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<Self, NoiseError> {
+        let handshake_state =
+            Self::prepare_handshake_state(local_private_key, remote_public_key, psk)
+                .build_initiator()?;
+        Ok(Self::new(handshake_state))
+    }
+
+    /// Builds a new `NoiseProtocol` responder instance with the provided local private key,
+    /// remote public key and psk
+    pub fn build_new_responder(
+        local_private_key: &[u8],
+        remote_public_key: &[u8],
+        psk: &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<Self, NoiseError> {
+        let handshake_state =
+            Self::prepare_handshake_state(local_private_key, remote_public_key, psk)
+                .build_responder()?;
+        Ok(Self::new(handshake_state))
+    }
+
     /// Processes a single, complete incoming Noise message frame.
     ///
     /// Assumes the caller handles buffering and framing to provide one full message.
@@ -288,43 +335,3 @@ impl NoiseProtocol {
         }
     }
 }
-
-pub fn create_noise_state(
-    local_private_key: &[u8],
-    remote_public_key: &[u8],
-    psk: &[u8],
-) -> Result<NoiseProtocol, NoiseError> {
-    let pattern_name = crate::NOISE_PATTERN;
-    let psk_index = crate::NOISE_PSK_INDEX;
-    let noise_params: NoiseParams = pattern_name.parse().unwrap();
-
-    let builder = snow::Builder::new(noise_params.clone());
-    // Using dummy remote key as it's not needed for state creation itself
-    // In a real scenario, the key would depend on initiator/responder role
-    let handshake_state = builder
-        .local_private_key(local_private_key)
-        .remote_public_key(remote_public_key) // Use own public as dummy remote
-        .psk(psk_index, psk)
-        .build_initiator()?;
-    Ok(NoiseProtocol::new(handshake_state))
-}
-
-pub fn create_noise_state_responder(
-    local_private_key: &[u8],
-    remote_public_key: &[u8],
-    psk: &[u8],
-) -> Result<NoiseProtocol, NoiseError> {
-    let pattern_name = crate::NOISE_PATTERN;
-    let psk_index = crate::NOISE_PSK_INDEX;
-    let noise_params: NoiseParams = pattern_name.parse().unwrap();
-
-    let builder = snow::Builder::new(noise_params.clone());
-    // Using dummy remote key as it's not needed for state creation itself
-    // In a real scenario, the key would depend on initiator/responder role
-    let handshake_state = builder
-        .local_private_key(local_private_key)
-        .remote_public_key(remote_public_key) // Use own public as dummy remote
-        .psk(psk_index, psk)
-        .build_responder()?;
-    Ok(NoiseProtocol::new(handshake_state))
-}

common/nym-lp/src/packet.rs

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 
 use crate::LpError;
-use crate::message::LpMessage;
+use crate::message::{LpMessage, MessageType};
 use crate::replay::ReceivingKeyCounterValidator;
 use bytes::{BufMut, BytesMut};
 use nym_lp_common::format_debug_bytes;
@@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ impl LpPacket {
         }
     }
 
+    pub fn typ(&self) -> MessageType {
+        self.message.typ()
+    }
+
     /// Compute a hash of the message payload
     ///
     /// This can be used for message integrity verification or deduplication
@@ -203,9 +207,9 @@ impl LpHeader {
 }
 
 impl LpHeader {
-    pub fn new(receiver_idx: u32, counter: u64) -> Self {
+    pub fn new(receiver_idx: u32, counter: u64, protocol_version: u8) -> Self {
         Self {
-            protocol_version: version::CURRENT,
+            protocol_version,
             reserved: [0u8; 3],
             receiver_idx,
             counter,
@@ -265,7 +269,7 @@ impl LpHeader {
 
         Ok(LpHeader {
             protocol_version,
-            reserved: [0u8; 3],
+            reserved,
             receiver_idx,
             counter,
         })

common/nym-lp/src/peer.rs

@@ -1,59 +1,46 @@
 // Copyright 2026 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 
-use libcrux_kem::{MlKem768PrivateKey, MlKem768PublicKey};
-use libcrux_psq::handshake::Responder;
-use libcrux_psq::handshake::types::{DHKeyPair, DHPrivateKey, DHPublicKey};
+use crate::{ClientHelloData, LpError};
 use nym_crypto::asymmetric::{ed25519, x25519};
-use nym_kkt::ciphersuite::{
-    Ciphersuite, DecapsulationKey, EncapsulationKey, KEM, KEMKeyDigests, KemKeyPair,
-    SignatureScheme, SigningKeyDigests,
-};
-use rand::rngs::ThreadRng;
+use nym_kkt::ciphersuite::{Ciphersuite, KEM, KEMKeyDigests, SignatureScheme, SigningKeyDigests};
 use std::collections::HashMap;
-use std::fmt::Debug;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 
-use crate::psq::build_responder;
-
 /// Representation of a local Lewes Protocol peer
 /// encapsulating all the known information and keys.
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub struct LpLocalPeer {
-    pub(crate) ciphersuite: Ciphersuite,
-
     /// Local Ed25519 keys for PSQ authentication
     pub(crate) ed25519: Arc<ed25519::KeyPair>,
 
     /// Local x25519 keys (Noise static key)
-    pub(crate) x25519: Arc<DHKeyPair>,
+    pub(crate) x25519: Arc<x25519::KeyPair>,
 
-    /// Local KEM keys used for PSQ
-    pub(crate) kem_keypairs: HashMap<KEM, Arc<KemKeyPair>>,
+    /// Local KEM key used for PSQ
+    pub(crate) kem_psq: Option<Arc<x25519::KeyPair>>,
 }
 
 impl LpLocalPeer {
-    pub fn new(
-        ciphersuite: Ciphersuite,
-        ed25519: Arc<ed25519::KeyPair>,
-        x25519: Arc<x25519::KeyPair>,
-    ) -> Self {
-        // TODO: make nicer conversion (without cloning) + error handling
-        let initiator_libcrux_x25519_private_key =
-            DHPrivateKey::from_bytes(x25519.private_key().as_bytes()).unwrap();
-        let initiator_x25519_keypair = DHKeyPair::from(initiator_libcrux_x25519_private_key);
-
+    pub fn new(ed25519: Arc<ed25519::KeyPair>, x25519: Arc<x25519::KeyPair>) -> Self {
         LpLocalPeer {
-            ciphersuite,
             ed25519,
-            x25519: Arc::new(initiator_x25519_keypair),
-            kem_keypairs: Default::default(),
+            x25519,
+            kem_psq: None,
         }
     }
 
-    pub fn with_kem_keypair(mut self, keypair: Arc<KemKeyPair>) -> Self {
-        let kem = keypair.kem();
-        self.kem_keypairs.insert(kem, keypair);
+    pub fn build_client_hello_data(&self, timestamp: u64) -> ClientHelloData {
+        ClientHelloData::new_with_fresh_salt(
+            *self.x25519().public_key(),
+            *self.ed25519().public_key(),
+            timestamp,
+        )
+    }
+
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn with_kem_psq_key(mut self, key: Arc<x25519::KeyPair>) -> Self {
+        self.kem_psq = Some(key);
         self
     }
 
@@ -61,48 +48,55 @@ impl LpLocalPeer {
         &self.ed25519
     }
 
-    pub fn x25519(&self) -> &Arc<DHKeyPair> {
+    pub fn x25519(&self) -> &Arc<x25519::KeyPair> {
         &self.x25519
     }
 
-    pub fn kem_key(&self, kem: KEM) -> Option<&Arc<KemKeyPair>> {
-        self.kem_keypairs.get(&kem)
+    /// Returns the reference to the KEM Public key of the peer (if available).
+    pub fn get_kem_key_handle(&self) -> Result<&x25519::PublicKey, LpError> {
+        self.kem_psq
+            .as_ref()
+            .map(|kp| kp.public_key())
+            .ok_or(LpError::ResponderWithMissingKEMKey)
     }
 
     /// Convert this `LpLocalPeer` into a valid `LpRemotePeer` that can be used within tests
     #[doc(hidden)]
     pub fn as_remote(&self) -> LpRemotePeer {
+        let expected_kem_key_digests = match &self.kem_psq {
+            None => HashMap::new(),
+            Some(kem_keys) => {
+                let mut digests = HashMap::new();
+                digests.insert(
+                    KEM::X25519,
+                    nym_kkt::key_utils::produce_key_digests(kem_keys.public_key().as_bytes()),
+                );
+                digests
+            }
+        };
+
         let mut expected_signing_key_digests = HashMap::new();
         expected_signing_key_digests.insert(
             SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
             nym_kkt::key_utils::produce_key_digests(self.ed25519.public_key().as_bytes()),
         );
 
-        let mut expected_kem_key_digests = HashMap::new();
-        for (kem, kem_key) in &self.kem_keypairs {
-            expected_kem_key_digests.insert(
-                *kem,
-                nym_kkt::key_utils::produce_key_digests(&kem_key.encoded_encapsulation_key()),
-            );
-        }
-
         LpRemotePeer {
             ed25519_public: *self.ed25519.public_key(),
-            x25519_public: self.x25519.pk,
+            x25519_public: *self.x25519.public_key(),
             expected_kem_key_digests,
             expected_signing_key_digests,
         }
     }
-}
 
-impl Debug for LpLocalPeer {
-    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
-        f.debug_struct("LpLocalPeer")
-            .field("ciphersuite", &self.ciphersuite)
-            .field("ed25519", &self.ed25519)
-            .field("x25519", &self.x25519.pk)
-            .field("kem_keypairs", &self.kem_keypairs)
-            .finish()
+    // this is only exposed in tests as ideally we should be storing the proper types to begin with
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    pub fn encapsulate_kem_key(&self) -> Option<nym_kkt::ciphersuite::EncapsulationKey<'_>> {
+        let pk_bytes = self.kem_psq.as_ref()?.public_key().to_bytes();
+        let libcrux_pk =
+            libcrux_kem::PublicKey::decode(libcrux_kem::Algorithm::X25519, &pk_bytes).ok()?;
+
+        Some(nym_kkt::ciphersuite::EncapsulationKey::X25519(libcrux_pk))
     }
 }
 
@@ -114,7 +108,7 @@ pub struct LpRemotePeer {
     pub(crate) ed25519_public: ed25519::PublicKey,
 
     /// Remote X25519 public key (Noise static key)
-    pub(crate) x25519_public: DHPublicKey,
+    pub(crate) x25519_public: x25519::PublicKey,
 
     /// Expected digests of the remote's KEM key
     pub(crate) expected_kem_key_digests: HashMap<KEM, KEMKeyDigests>,
@@ -125,11 +119,9 @@ pub struct LpRemotePeer {
 
 impl LpRemotePeer {
     pub fn new(ed25519_public: ed25519::PublicKey, x25519_public: x25519::PublicKey) -> Self {
-        // TODO: make nicer conversion (without cloning) + error handling
-        let responder_x25519_public_key = DHPublicKey::from_bytes(x25519_public.as_bytes());
         LpRemotePeer {
             ed25519_public,
-            x25519_public: responder_x25519_public_key,
+            x25519_public,
             expected_kem_key_digests: Default::default(),
             expected_signing_key_digests: Default::default(),
         }
@@ -139,8 +131,8 @@ impl LpRemotePeer {
         self.ed25519_public
     }
 
-    pub fn x25519(&self) -> &DHPublicKey {
-        &self.x25519_public
+    pub fn x25519(&self) -> x25519::PublicKey {
+        self.x25519_public
     }
 
     #[must_use]
@@ -153,65 +145,53 @@ impl LpRemotePeer {
         self.expected_signing_key_digests = expected_signing_key_digests;
         self
     }
-}
 
-#[cfg(test)]
-pub fn mock_peer(kem: KEM) -> LpLocalPeer {
-    // use deterministic rng
-    let mut rng = nym_test_utils::helpers::deterministic_rng();
+    /// Attempt to retrieve expected KEM key hash of the remote
+    /// for [`nym_kkt::ciphersuite::KEM`] key type and [`nym_kkt::ciphersuite::HashFunction`]
+    /// specified by own [`nym_kkt::ciphersuite::Ciphersuite`]
+    pub(crate) fn expected_kem_key_hash(
+        &self,
+        ciphersuite: Ciphersuite,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, LpError> {
+        let kem = ciphersuite.kem();
+        let hash_function = ciphersuite.hash_function();
 
-    let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::new(
-        kem,
-        nym_kkt::ciphersuite::HashFunction::Blake3,
-        SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
-        nym_kkt::ciphersuite::HashLength::Default,
-    );
+        let digests = self
+            .expected_kem_key_digests
+            .get(&kem)
+            .ok_or(LpError::NoKnownKEMKeyDigests { kem, hash_function })?;
 
-    random_peer(&mut rng, ciphersuite)
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-pub fn random_peer<'a, R: rand::CryptoRng + rand::RngCore>(
-    rng: &mut R,
-    ciphersuite: Ciphersuite,
-) -> LpLocalPeer {
-    use nym_kkt::key_utils::{generate_keypair_mceliece, generate_keypair_mlkem};
-
-    let ed25519 = Arc::new(ed25519::KeyPair::new(rng));
-
-    let mut sk = [0u8; 32];
-    rng.fill_bytes(&mut sk);
-
-    // clamp
-    sk[0] &= 248u8;
-    sk[31] &= 127u8;
-    sk[31] |= 64u8;
-
-    let x25519 = Arc::new(DHKeyPair::from(DHPrivateKey::from_bytes(&sk).unwrap()));
-
-    let default_peer = LpLocalPeer {
-        ciphersuite: Arc::new(ciphersuite),
-        ed25519,
-        x25519,
-        mlkem: None,
-        mceliece: None,
-    };
-
-    match ciphersuite.kem() {
-        KEM::MlKem768 => {
-            let mlkem_keypair = generate_keypair_mlkem(&mut rand09::rng());
-            default_peer.with_mlkem_keypair(&mlkem_keypair.0, &mlkem_keypair.1)
-        }
-        KEM::McEliece => {
-            let mceliece_keypair = generate_keypair_mceliece(&mut rand09::rng());
-            default_peer.with_mceliece_keypair(mceliece_keypair.0, mceliece_keypair.1)
-        }
-        _ => unreachable!(),
+        digests
+            .get(&hash_function)
+            .ok_or(LpError::NoKnownKEMKeyDigests { kem, hash_function })
+            .cloned()
     }
 }
 
-#[cfg(test)]
-pub fn mock_peers(kem: KEM) -> (LpLocalPeer, LpLocalPeer) {
-    println!("KEM: {:?}", kem);
-    (mock_peer(kem), mock_peer(kem))
+#[cfg(any(feature = "mock", test))]
+pub fn mock_peer() -> LpLocalPeer {
+    // use deterministic rng
+    let mut rng = nym_test_utils::helpers::deterministic_rng();
+    random_peer(&mut rng)
+}
+
+#[cfg(any(feature = "mock", test))]
+pub fn random_peer<R: rand::CryptoRng + rand::RngCore>(rng: &mut R) -> LpLocalPeer {
+    let ed25519 = Arc::new(ed25519::KeyPair::new(rng));
+    let x25519 = Arc::new(ed25519.to_x25519());
+    let kem_psq = Some(x25519.clone());
+
+    LpLocalPeer {
+        ed25519,
+        x25519,
+        kem_psq,
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(any(feature = "mock", test))]
+pub fn mock_peers() -> (LpLocalPeer, LpLocalPeer) {
+    // use deterministic rng
+    let mut rng = nym_test_utils::helpers::deterministic_rng();
+
+    (random_peer(&mut rng), random_peer(&mut rng))
 }

common/nym-lp/src/psk.rs

@@ -47,12 +47,11 @@
 //! - **No cleanup needed**: No state was mutated
 
 use crate::LpError;
-use libcrux_psq::handshake::types::{DHPrivateKey, DHPublicKey};
 use libcrux_psq::v1::cred::{Authenticator, Ed25519};
 use libcrux_psq::v1::impls::X25519 as PsqX25519;
 use libcrux_psq::v1::psk_registration::{Initiator, InitiatorMsg, Responder};
 use libcrux_psq::v1::traits::{Ciphertext as PsqCiphertext, PSQ};
-use nym_crypto::asymmetric::ed25519;
+use nym_crypto::asymmetric::{ed25519, x25519};
 use nym_kkt::ciphersuite::{DecapsulationKey, EncapsulationKey};
 use std::time::Duration;
 use tls_codec::{Deserialize as TlsDeserializeTrait, Serialize as TlsSerializeTrait};
@@ -137,15 +136,13 @@ pub struct PsqResponderResult {
 /// // Send ciphertext to gateway
 /// ```
 pub fn derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
-    local_x25519_private: &DHPrivateKey,
-    remote_x25519_public: &DHPublicKey,
+    local_x25519_private: &x25519::PrivateKey,
+    remote_x25519_public: &x25519::PublicKey,
     remote_kem_public: &EncapsulationKey,
     salt: &[u8; 32],
 ) -> Result<([u8; 32], Vec<u8>), LpError> {
     // Step 1: Classical ECDH for baseline security
-    // let ecdh_secret = local_x25519_private.diffie_hellman(remote_x25519_public);
-
-    let ecdh_secret: [u8; 32] = unimplemented!("unexposed by libcrux");
+    let ecdh_secret = local_x25519_private.diffie_hellman(remote_x25519_public);
 
     // Step 2: PSQ encapsulation for post-quantum security
     // KEM algorithm migration path:
@@ -174,7 +171,7 @@ pub fn derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
     combined.extend_from_slice(&psq_psk); // psq_psk is [u8; 32], need &
     combined.extend_from_slice(salt);
 
-    let final_psk = nym_crypto::hkdf::blake3::derive_key_blake3(PSK_PSQ_CONTEXT, &combined, &[]);
+    let final_psk = nym_crypto::kdf::derive_key_blake3(PSK_PSQ_CONTEXT, &combined, &[]);
 
     // Serialize ciphertext using TLS encoding for transport
     let ct_bytes = ciphertext
@@ -222,16 +219,14 @@ pub fn derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
 /// )?;
 /// ```
 pub fn derive_psk_with_psq_responder(
-    local_x25519_private: &DHPrivateKey,
-    remote_x25519_public: &DHPublicKey,
+    local_x25519_private: &x25519::PrivateKey,
+    remote_x25519_public: &x25519::PublicKey,
     local_kem_keypair: (&DecapsulationKey, &EncapsulationKey),
     ciphertext: &[u8],
     salt: &[u8; 32],
 ) -> Result<[u8; 32], LpError> {
     // Step 1: Classical ECDH for baseline security
-    // let ecdh_secret = local_x25519_private.diffie_hellman(remote_x25519_public);
-
-    let ecdh_secret: [u8; 32] = unimplemented!("unexposed by libcrux");
+    let ecdh_secret = local_x25519_private.diffie_hellman(remote_x25519_public);
 
     // Step 2: Extract X25519 keypair from DecapsulationKey/EncapsulationKey
     let (kem_sk, kem_pk) = match (local_kem_keypair.0, local_kem_keypair.1) {
@@ -257,7 +252,7 @@ pub fn derive_psk_with_psq_responder(
     combined.extend_from_slice(&psq_psk); // psq_psk is [u8; 32], need &
     combined.extend_from_slice(salt);
 
-    let final_psk = nym_crypto::hkdf::blake3::derive_key_blake3(PSK_PSQ_CONTEXT, &combined, &[]);
+    let final_psk = nym_crypto::kdf::derive_key_blake3(PSK_PSQ_CONTEXT, &combined, &[]);
 
     Ok(final_psk)
 }
@@ -284,8 +279,8 @@ pub fn derive_psk_with_psq_responder(
 /// # Returns
 /// `PsqInitiatorResult` containing PSK, payload, and raw PQ shared secret
 pub fn psq_initiator_create_message(
-    local_x25519_private: &DHPrivateKey,
-    remote_x25519_public: &DHPublicKey,
+    local_x25519_private: &x25519::PrivateKey,
+    remote_x25519_public: &x25519::PublicKey,
     remote_kem_public: &EncapsulationKey,
     client_ed25519_sk: &ed25519::PrivateKey,
     client_ed25519_pk: &ed25519::PublicKey,
@@ -293,9 +288,7 @@ pub fn psq_initiator_create_message(
     session_context: &[u8],
 ) -> Result<PsqInitiatorResult, LpError> {
     // Step 1: Classical ECDH for baseline security
-    // let ecdh_secret = local_x25519_private.diffie_hellman(remote_x25519_public);
-
-    let ecdh_secret: [u8; 32] = unimplemented!("unexposed by libcrux");
+    let ecdh_secret = local_x25519_private.diffie_hellman(remote_x25519_public);
 
     // Step 2: PSQ v1 with Ed25519 authentication
     // Extract X25519 KEM key from EncapsulationKey
@@ -345,7 +338,7 @@ pub fn psq_initiator_create_message(
     combined.extend_from_slice(psq_psk); // psq_psk is already a &[u8; 32]
     combined.extend_from_slice(salt);
 
-    let final_psk = nym_crypto::hkdf::blake3::derive_key_blake3(PSK_PSQ_CONTEXT, &combined, &[]);
+    let final_psk = nym_crypto::kdf::derive_key_blake3(PSK_PSQ_CONTEXT, &combined, &[]);
 
     // Serialize InitiatorMsg with TLS encoding for transport
     let msg_bytes = initiator_msg
@@ -381,8 +374,8 @@ pub fn psq_initiator_create_message(
 /// # Returns
 /// `PsqResponderResult` containing PSK, PSK handle, and raw PQ shared secret
 pub fn psq_responder_process_message(
-    local_x25519_private: &DHPrivateKey,
-    remote_x25519_public: &DHPublicKey,
+    local_x25519_private: &x25519::PrivateKey,
+    remote_x25519_public: &x25519::PublicKey,
     local_kem_keypair: (&DecapsulationKey, &EncapsulationKey),
     initiator_ed25519_pk: &ed25519::PublicKey,
     psq_payload: &[u8],
@@ -390,8 +383,7 @@ pub fn psq_responder_process_message(
     session_context: &[u8],
 ) -> Result<PsqResponderResult, LpError> {
     // Step 1: Classical ECDH for baseline security
-    // let ecdh_secret = local_x25519_private.diffie_hellman(remote_x25519_public);
-    let ecdh_secret: [u8; 32] = unimplemented!("unexposed by libcrux");
+    let ecdh_secret = local_x25519_private.diffie_hellman(remote_x25519_public);
 
     // Step 2: Extract X25519 keypair from DecapsulationKey/EncapsulationKey
     let (kem_sk, kem_pk) = match (local_kem_keypair.0, local_kem_keypair.1) {
@@ -455,7 +447,7 @@ pub fn psq_responder_process_message(
     combined.extend_from_slice(&psq_psk); // psq_psk is [u8; 32], need &
     combined.extend_from_slice(salt);
 
-    let final_psk = nym_crypto::hkdf::blake3::derive_key_blake3(PSK_PSQ_CONTEXT, &combined, &[]);
+    let final_psk = nym_crypto::kdf::derive_key_blake3(PSK_PSQ_CONTEXT, &combined, &[]);
 
     // Step 7: Serialize ResponderMsg (contains ctxt_B - encrypted PSK handle)
     use tls_codec::Serialize;
@@ -490,7 +482,7 @@ pub fn psq_responder_process_message(
 /// # Returns
 /// 32-byte PSK for Noise KKpsk0 handshake
 pub fn derive_subsession_psk(pq_shared_secret: &[u8; 32], subsession_index: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
-    nym_crypto::hkdf::blake3::derive_key_blake3(
+    nym_crypto::kdf::derive_key_blake3(
         SUBSESSION_PSK_CONTEXT,
         pq_shared_secret,
         &subsession_index.to_le_bytes(),
@@ -500,10 +492,10 @@ pub fn derive_subsession_psk(pq_shared_secret: &[u8; 32], subsession_index: u64)
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
-    use libcrux_psq::handshake::types::DHKeyPair;
+    use rand::thread_rng;
 
-    fn generate_x25519_keypair() -> DHKeyPair {
-        DHKeyPair::new(&mut rand09::rng())
+    fn generate_x25519_keypair() -> x25519::KeyPair {
+        x25519::KeyPair::new(&mut thread_rng())
     }
 
     #[test]
@@ -518,13 +510,18 @@ mod tests {
         let dec_key = DecapsulationKey::X25519(_kem_sk);
 
         // Client derives PSK
-        let (client_psk, ciphertext) =
-            derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(keypair_1.sk(), &keypair_2.pk, &enc_key, &salt).unwrap();
+        let (client_psk, ciphertext) = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
+            keypair_1.private_key(),
+            keypair_2.public_key(),
+            &enc_key,
+            &salt,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
 
         // Gateway derives PSK from their perspective
         let gateway_psk = derive_psk_with_psq_responder(
-            keypair_2.sk(),
-            &keypair_1.pk,
+            keypair_2.private_key(),
+            keypair_1.public_key(),
             (&dec_key, &enc_key),
             &ciphertext,
             &salt,
@@ -548,10 +545,20 @@ mod tests {
         let (_kem_sk, kem_pk) = generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, KEM::X25519).unwrap();
         let enc_key = EncapsulationKey::X25519(kem_pk);
 
-        let psk1 =
-            derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(keypair_1.sk(), &keypair_2.pk, &enc_key, &salt1).unwrap();
-        let psk2 =
-            derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(keypair_1.sk(), &keypair_2.pk, &enc_key, &salt2).unwrap();
+        let psk1 = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
+            keypair_1.private_key(),
+            keypair_2.public_key(),
+            &enc_key,
+            &salt1,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let psk2 = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
+            keypair_1.private_key(),
+            keypair_2.public_key(),
+            &enc_key,
+            &salt2,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
 
         assert_ne!(psk1, psk2, "Different salts should produce different PSKs");
     }
@@ -567,10 +574,20 @@ mod tests {
         let (_kem_sk, kem_pk) = generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, KEM::X25519).unwrap();
         let enc_key = EncapsulationKey::X25519(kem_pk);
 
-        let psk1 =
-            derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(keypair_1.sk(), &keypair_2.pk, &enc_key, &salt).unwrap();
-        let psk2 =
-            derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(keypair_1.sk(), &keypair_3.pk, &enc_key, &salt).unwrap();
+        let psk1 = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
+            keypair_1.private_key(),
+            keypair_2.public_key(),
+            &enc_key,
+            &salt,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let psk2 = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
+            keypair_1.private_key(),
+            keypair_3.public_key(),
+            &enc_key,
+            &salt,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
 
         assert_ne!(
             psk1, psk2,
@@ -599,16 +616,16 @@ mod tests {
 
         // Derive PSK twice with same inputs (initiator side)
         let (_psk1, ct1) = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
-            client_keypair.sk(),
-            &gateway_keypair.pk,
+            client_keypair.private_key(),
+            gateway_keypair.public_key(),
             &enc_key,
             &salt,
         )
         .unwrap();
 
         let (_psk2, _ct2) = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
-            client_keypair.sk(),
-            &gateway_keypair.pk,
+            client_keypair.private_key(),
+            gateway_keypair.public_key(),
             &enc_key,
             &salt,
         )
@@ -617,8 +634,8 @@ mod tests {
         // PSKs will be different due to randomness in PSQ, but ciphertexts too
         // This test verifies the function is deterministic given the SAME ciphertext
         let psk_responder1 = derive_psk_with_psq_responder(
-            gateway_keypair.sk(),
-            &client_keypair.pk,
+            gateway_keypair.private_key(),
+            client_keypair.public_key(),
             (&dec_key, &enc_key),
             &ct1,
             &salt,
@@ -626,8 +643,8 @@ mod tests {
         .unwrap();
 
         let psk_responder2 = derive_psk_with_psq_responder(
-            gateway_keypair.sk(),
-            &client_keypair.pk,
+            gateway_keypair.private_key(),
+            client_keypair.public_key(),
             (&dec_key, &enc_key),
             &ct1, // Same ciphertext
             &salt,
@@ -657,8 +674,8 @@ mod tests {
 
         // Client derives PSK (initiator)
         let (client_psk, ciphertext) = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
-            client_keypair.sk(),
-            &gateway_keypair.pk,
+            client_keypair.private_key(),
+            gateway_keypair.public_key(),
             &enc_key,
             &salt,
         )
@@ -666,8 +683,8 @@ mod tests {
 
         // Gateway derives PSK from ciphertext (responder)
         let gateway_psk = derive_psk_with_psq_responder(
-            gateway_keypair.sk(),
-            &client_keypair.pk,
+            gateway_keypair.private_key(),
+            client_keypair.public_key(),
             (&dec_key, &enc_key),
             &ciphertext,
             &salt,
@@ -697,16 +714,16 @@ mod tests {
         let salt = [3u8; 32];
 
         let (psk1, _) = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
-            client_keypair.sk(),
-            &gateway_keypair.pk,
+            client_keypair.private_key(),
+            gateway_keypair.public_key(),
             &enc_key1,
             &salt,
         )
         .unwrap();
 
         let (psk2, _) = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
-            client_keypair.sk(),
-            &gateway_keypair.pk,
+            client_keypair.private_key(),
+            gateway_keypair.public_key(),
             &enc_key2,
             &salt,
         )
@@ -731,8 +748,8 @@ mod tests {
         let salt = [4u8; 32];
 
         let (psk, _) = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
-            client_keypair.sk(),
-            &gateway_keypair.pk,
+            client_keypair.private_key(),
+            gateway_keypair.public_key(),
             &enc_key,
             &salt,
         )
@@ -755,16 +772,16 @@ mod tests {
         let salt2 = [2u8; 32];
 
         let (psk1, _) = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
-            client_keypair.sk(),
-            &gateway_keypair.pk,
+            client_keypair.private_key(),
+            gateway_keypair.public_key(),
             &enc_key,
             &salt1,
         )
         .unwrap();
 
         let (psk2, _) = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
-            client_keypair.sk(),
-            &gateway_keypair.pk,
+            client_keypair.private_key(),
+            gateway_keypair.public_key(),
             &enc_key,
             &salt2,
         )

common/nym-lp/src/psq.rs

@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
-use libcrux_psq::{
-    Channel,
-    handshake::{
-        RegistrationInitiator, Responder,
-        builders::{CiphersuiteBuilder, PrincipalBuilder},
-        ciphersuites::CiphersuiteName,
-        types::{DHKeyPair, DHPublicKey},
-    },
-};
-use nym_kkt::ciphersuite::{Ciphersuite, DecapsulationKey, EncapsulationKey, KEM, KemKeyPair};
-use rand09::rngs::ThreadRng;
-
-use std::fmt::Debug;
-
-const AAD_INITIATOR_OUTER: &[u8] = b"Test Data I Outer";
-const AAD_INITIATOR_INNER: &[u8] = b"Test Data I Inner";
-const AAD_RESPONDER: &[u8] = b"Test Data R";
-const SESSION_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"Test Context";
-
-pub enum PSQState<'a> {
-    Initiator(RegistrationInitiator<'a, ThreadRng>),
-    Responder(Responder<'a, ThreadRng>),
-}
-impl Debug for PSQState<'_> {
-    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
-        match self {
-            Self::Initiator(_) => f.debug_tuple("PSQ Initiator").finish(),
-            Self::Responder(_) => f.debug_tuple("PSQ Responder").finish(),
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-pub fn initiator_process(initiator: &mut RegistrationInitiator<ThreadRng>) -> Vec<u8> {
-    let mut buffer = vec![0u8; 4096];
-    let msg_len = initiator.write_message(b"", &mut buffer).unwrap();
-    buffer.resize(msg_len, 0);
-    buffer
-}
-
-pub fn build_initiator<'a>(
-    ciphersuite: &'a Ciphersuite,
-    session_context: &'a [u8],
-    local_x25519_keys: &'a DHKeyPair,
-    remote_x25519_public: &'a DHPublicKey,
-    remote_kem_public: &'a EncapsulationKey,
-) -> RegistrationInitiator<'a, rand09::rngs::ThreadRng> {
-    //georgio: handle errors
-
-    let initiator_cbuilder = match ciphersuite.kem() {
-        nym_kkt::ciphersuite::KEM::MlKem768 => match remote_kem_public {
-            EncapsulationKey::MlKem768(ml_kem_public_key) => CiphersuiteBuilder::new(
-                CiphersuiteName::X25519_MLKEM768_X25519_CHACHA20POLY1305_HKDFSHA256,
-            )
-            .peer_longterm_mlkem_pk(ml_kem_public_key),
-            _ => panic!(
-                "wrong key type passed (remote_kem_public should be EncapsulationKey::MlKem768)"
-            ),
-        },
-        nym_kkt::ciphersuite::KEM::McEliece => match remote_kem_public {
-            EncapsulationKey::McEliece(mceliece_public_key) => CiphersuiteBuilder::new(
-                CiphersuiteName::X25519_CLASSICMCELIECE_X25519_CHACHA20POLY1305_HKDFSHA256,
-            )
-            .peer_longterm_cmc_pk(mceliece_public_key),
-            _ => panic!(
-                "wrong key type passed (remote_kem_public should be EncapsulationKey::McEliece)"
-            ),
-        },
-        _ => panic!("undefined"),
-    };
-    let initiator_ciphersuite = initiator_cbuilder
-        .longterm_x25519_keys(local_x25519_keys)
-        .peer_longterm_x25519_pk(remote_x25519_public)
-        .build_initiator_ciphersuite()
-        .unwrap();
-
-    PrincipalBuilder::new(rand09::rng())
-        .outer_aad(AAD_INITIATOR_OUTER)
-        .inner_aad(AAD_INITIATOR_INNER)
-        .context(session_context)
-        .build_registration_initiator(initiator_ciphersuite)
-        .unwrap()
-}
-
-// JS: I have removed the `ciphersuite` argument as it was only matching on the key types,
-// which we already obtained matching on the ciphersuite kem type in `LpSession::new`
-pub fn build_responder<'a>(
-    local_x25519_keys: &'a DHKeyPair,
-    local_kem_keys: &'a KemKeyPair,
-) -> Responder<'a, rand09::rngs::ThreadRng> {
-    let responder_ciphersuite = match local_kem_keys {
-        KemKeyPair::MlKem768 {
-            encapsulation_key,
-            decapsulation_key,
-        } => CiphersuiteBuilder::new(
-            CiphersuiteName::X25519_MLKEM768_X25519_CHACHA20POLY1305_HKDFSHA256,
-        )
-        .longterm_mlkem_encapsulation_key(encapsulation_key)
-        .longterm_mlkem_decapsulation_key(decapsulation_key),
-        KemKeyPair::McEliece {
-            encapsulation_key,
-            decapsulation_key,
-        } => CiphersuiteBuilder::new(
-            CiphersuiteName::X25519_CLASSICMCELIECE_X25519_CHACHA20POLY1305_HKDFSHA256,
-        )
-        .longterm_cmc_encapsulation_key(encapsulation_key)
-        .longterm_cmc_decapsulation_key(decapsulation_key),
-        KemKeyPair::XWing { .. } => panic!("unsupported"),
-        KemKeyPair::X25519 { .. } => panic!("unsupported"),
-    }
-    .longterm_x25519_keys(local_x25519_keys)
-    .build_responder_ciphersuite()
-    .unwrap();
-
-    PrincipalBuilder::new(rand09::rng())
-        .outer_aad(AAD_RESPONDER)
-        .context(SESSION_CONTEXT)
-        .build_responder(responder_ciphersuite)
-        .unwrap()
-}
-
-pub fn psq_responder_process<'a>(
-    responder: &'a mut Responder<ThreadRng>,
-    initiator_message: &[u8],
-) -> Vec<u8> {
-    let mut payload = vec![0u8; 4096];
-    responder
-        .read_message(initiator_message, &mut payload)
-        .unwrap();
-
-    let mut buffer = vec![0u8; 4096];
-    let msg_len = responder.write_message(b"", &mut buffer).unwrap();
-    buffer.resize(msg_len, 0);
-    buffer
-}

common/nym-lp/src/psq/helpers.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+// Copyright 2026 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+
+use crate::codec::{OuterAeadKey, parse_lp_packet, serialize_lp_packet};
+use crate::{LpError, LpPacket};
+use bytes::BytesMut;
+use nym_lp_transport::traits::LpTransport;
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+use mock_instant::thread_local::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
+#[cfg(not(test))]
+use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
+
+pub(crate) fn current_timestamp() -> Result<u64, LpError> {
+    SystemTime::now()
+        .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
+        .map_err(|_| LpError::Internal("System time before UNIX epoch".into()))
+        .map(|d| d.as_secs())
+}
+
+// only used in internal code (and tests)
+#[allow(async_fn_in_trait)]
+pub trait LpTransportHandshakeExt: LpTransport {
+    // the outer key is temporary until the algorithm is changed with psqv2
+    async fn receive_packet(
+        &mut self,
+        outer_key: Option<&OuterAeadKey>,
+    ) -> Result<LpPacket, LpError>
+    where
+        Self: Unpin,
+    {
+        let raw = self.receive_raw_packet().await?;
+        parse_lp_packet(&raw, outer_key)
+    }
+
+    async fn send_packet(
+        &mut self,
+        packet: LpPacket,
+        outer_key: Option<&OuterAeadKey>,
+    ) -> Result<(), LpError>
+    where
+        Self: Unpin,
+    {
+        let mut packet_buf = BytesMut::new();
+
+        serialize_lp_packet(&packet, &mut packet_buf, outer_key)?;
+        self.send_serialised_packet(&packet_buf).await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+impl<T> LpTransportHandshakeExt for T where T: LpTransport {}

common/nym-lp/src/psq/initiator.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,391 @@
+// Copyright 2026 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+
+use crate::codec::OuterAeadKey;
+use crate::message::{HandshakeData, KKTRequestData, MessageType};
+use crate::noise_protocol::NoiseProtocol;
+use crate::peer::LpRemotePeer;
+use crate::psk::psq_initiator_create_message;
+use crate::psq::helpers::{LpTransportHandshakeExt, current_timestamp};
+use crate::psq::{IntermediateHandshakeFailure, PSQHandshakeState};
+use crate::session::PqSharedSecret;
+use crate::{ClientHelloData, LpError, LpMessage, LpSession};
+use nym_kkt::KKT_RESPONSE_AAD;
+use nym_kkt::ciphersuite::EncapsulationKey;
+use nym_kkt::context::KKTContext;
+use nym_kkt::encryption::{KKTSessionSecret, decrypt_kkt_frame, encrypt_initial_kkt_frame};
+use nym_kkt::session::{anonymous_initiator_process, initiator_ingest_response};
+use nym_lp_transport::traits::LpTransport;
+use rand09::rng;
+use tracing::debug;
+
+impl<'a, S> PSQHandshakeState<'a, S>
+where
+    S: LpTransport + Unpin,
+{
+    /// Generate and send client hello to the responder
+    pub(crate) async fn send_client_hello(&mut self) -> Result<ClientHelloData, LpError> {
+        let protocol = self.protocol_version()?;
+
+        // 1. Generate and send ClientHelloData with fresh salt and both public keys
+        let timestamp = current_timestamp()?;
+
+        let client_hello_data = self.local_peer.build_client_hello_data(timestamp);
+        self.connection
+            .send_packet(client_hello_data.into_lp_packet(protocol), None)
+            .await?;
+        Ok(client_hello_data)
+    }
+
+    /// Attempt to receive an ack to sent client hello. returns a boolean indicating
+    /// whether the request has been successful or whether there has been a collision in receiver
+    /// index requiring a retry
+    pub(crate) async fn receive_client_hello_ack(&mut self) -> Result<bool, LpError> {
+        match self.receive_non_error(None).await?.message {
+            LpMessage::Ack => Ok(true),
+            LpMessage::Collision => Ok(false),
+            other => {
+                // TODO: retry on collision
+                Err(LpError::unexpected_handshake_response(
+                    other.typ(),
+                    MessageType::Ack,
+                ))
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Attempt to send KKT request to begin the handshake
+    pub(crate) async fn send_kkt_request(
+        &mut self,
+        session_id: u32,
+        remote_peer: &LpRemotePeer,
+    ) -> Result<(KKTContext, KKTSessionSecret), LpError> {
+        let protocol = self.protocol_version()?;
+
+        let (kkt_context, kkt_frame) = anonymous_initiator_process(&mut rng(), self.ciphersuite)?;
+        let (session_secret, encrypted_frame) =
+            encrypt_initial_kkt_frame(&mut rng(), &remote_peer.x25519_public, &kkt_frame)?;
+        let lp_message = KKTRequestData::new(encrypted_frame).into();
+        let lp_packet = self.next_packet(session_id, protocol, lp_message);
+        self.connection.send_packet(lp_packet, None).await?;
+        Ok((kkt_context, session_secret))
+    }
+
+    /// Attempt to receive a KKT response to the previously sent request and extract (and validate)
+    /// the received encapsulation key
+    pub(crate) async fn receive_kkt_response(
+        &mut self,
+        (kkt_context, session_secret): (KKTContext, KKTSessionSecret),
+        remote_peer: &LpRemotePeer,
+    ) -> Result<EncapsulationKey<'static>, LpError> {
+        let kkt_response = match self.receive_non_error(None).await?.message {
+            LpMessage::KKTResponse(response) => response,
+            other => {
+                return Err(LpError::unexpected_handshake_response(
+                    other.typ(),
+                    MessageType::KKTResponse,
+                ));
+            }
+        };
+        debug!("received KKT response");
+        let expected_kem_key_digest = remote_peer.expected_kem_key_hash(self.ciphersuite)?;
+
+        let (response_frame, remote_context) =
+            decrypt_kkt_frame(&session_secret, &kkt_response.0, KKT_RESPONSE_AAD)?;
+        let encapsulation_key = initiator_ingest_response(
+            &kkt_context,
+            &response_frame,
+            &remote_context,
+            &remote_peer.ed25519_public,
+            &expected_kem_key_digest,
+        )?;
+        Ok(encapsulation_key)
+    }
+
+    /// Attempt to prepare and send initial PSQ msg1
+    pub(crate) async fn send_psq_initiator_message(
+        &mut self,
+        remote_peer: &LpRemotePeer,
+        encapsulation_key: &EncapsulationKey<'_>,
+        salt: &[u8; 32],
+        session_id_bytes: &[u8; 4],
+    ) -> Result<(OuterAeadKey, NoiseProtocol, PqSharedSecret), LpError> {
+        let protocol = self.protocol_version()?;
+        let session_id = u32::from_le_bytes(*session_id_bytes);
+
+        let psq_initiator = psq_initiator_create_message(
+            self.local_peer.x25519.private_key(),
+            &remote_peer.x25519_public,
+            encapsulation_key,
+            self.local_peer.ed25519.private_key(),
+            self.local_peer.ed25519.public_key(),
+            salt,
+            session_id_bytes,
+        )?;
+        let psk = psq_initiator.psk;
+        let psq_payload = psq_initiator.payload;
+
+        // TEMP \/
+        let outer_aead_key = OuterAeadKey::from_psk(&psk);
+        // TEMP /\
+
+        // prepare noise state and msg1
+        let mut noise_protocol = NoiseProtocol::build_new_initiator(
+            self.local_peer.x25519().private_key().as_bytes(),
+            remote_peer.x25519_public.as_bytes(),
+            &psk,
+        )?;
+
+        // prepare noise msg1
+        let noise_msg1 = noise_protocol
+            .get_bytes_to_send()
+            .ok_or_else(|| LpError::kkt_psq_handshake("failed to generate noise msg1"))??;
+        let psq_len = psq_payload.len() as u16;
+        let mut combined = Vec::with_capacity(2 + psq_payload.len() + noise_msg1.len());
+        combined.extend_from_slice(&psq_len.to_le_bytes());
+        combined.extend_from_slice(&psq_payload);
+        combined.extend_from_slice(&noise_msg1);
+
+        let lp_message = HandshakeData::new(combined).into();
+        let lp_packet = self.next_packet(session_id, protocol, lp_message);
+
+        self.connection.send_packet(lp_packet, None).await?;
+        Ok((
+            outer_aead_key,
+            noise_protocol,
+            PqSharedSecret::new(psq_initiator.pq_shared_secret),
+        ))
+    }
+
+    /// Attempt to receive and validate received PSQ msg2
+    pub(crate) async fn receive_psq_responder_message(
+        &mut self,
+        outer_aead_key: &OuterAeadKey,
+        noise_protocol: &mut NoiseProtocol,
+    ) -> Result<(), LpError> {
+        let psq_msg2 = match self
+            .connection
+            .receive_packet(Some(outer_aead_key))
+            .await?
+            .message
+        {
+            LpMessage::Handshake(response) => response.0,
+            other => {
+                return Err(LpError::unexpected_handshake_response(
+                    other.typ(),
+                    MessageType::Handshake,
+                ));
+            }
+        };
+
+        // Extract PSK handle: [u16 handle_len][handle_bytes][noise_msg]
+        if psq_msg2.len() < 2 {
+            return Err(LpError::kkt_psq_handshake("too short msg2 received"));
+        }
+        let handle_len = u16::from_le_bytes([psq_msg2[0], psq_msg2[1]]) as usize;
+        if psq_msg2.len() < 2 + handle_len {
+            return Err(LpError::kkt_psq_handshake("too short msg2 received"));
+        }
+        // Extract and "store" the PSK handle
+        let _psq_handle_bytes = &psq_msg2[2..2 + handle_len];
+        let noise_payload = &psq_msg2[2 + handle_len..];
+
+        // *sigh* ignore the message
+        let _noise_msg2 = noise_protocol.read_message(noise_payload)?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Attempt to prepare and send final PSQ msg3
+    pub(crate) async fn send_final_psq_message(
+        &mut self,
+        session_id: u32,
+        outer_aead_key: &OuterAeadKey,
+        noise_protocol: &mut NoiseProtocol,
+    ) -> Result<(), LpError> {
+        let protocol = self.protocol_version()?;
+
+        let noise_msg3 = noise_protocol
+            .get_bytes_to_send()
+            .ok_or_else(|| LpError::kkt_psq_handshake("failed to generate noise msg3"))??;
+
+        let lp_message = HandshakeData::new(noise_msg3).into();
+        let lp_packet = self.next_packet(session_id, protocol, lp_message);
+        self.connection
+            .send_packet(lp_packet, Some(outer_aead_key))
+            .await?;
+
+        if !noise_protocol.is_handshake_finished() {
+            return Err(LpError::kkt_psq_handshake(
+                "noise handshake not finished after msg3",
+            ));
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Receive final ACK that indicates finalisation of the handshake
+    pub(crate) async fn receive_final_ack(
+        &mut self,
+        outer_aead_key: &OuterAeadKey,
+    ) -> Result<(), LpError> {
+        match self
+            .connection
+            .receive_packet(Some(outer_aead_key))
+            .await?
+            .message
+        {
+            LpMessage::Ack => Ok(()),
+            other => Err(LpError::unexpected_handshake_response(
+                other.typ(),
+                MessageType::Ack,
+            )),
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn complete_as_initiator_inner(
+        &mut self,
+    ) -> Result<LpSession, IntermediateHandshakeFailure>
+    where
+        S: LpTransport + Unpin,
+    {
+        // 0. retrieve the expected kem key hash. if we don't know it,
+        // there's no point in even trying to start the handshake
+        let Some(remote_peer) = self.remote_peer.take() else {
+            return Err(IntermediateHandshakeFailure::plain(
+                LpError::kkt_psq_handshake("initiator can't proceed without remote information"),
+            ));
+        };
+
+        // 1. Generate and send ClientHelloData with fresh salt and both public keys
+        // and keep retrying until we manage to establish a receiver index without collisions
+        let mut attempt = 0;
+        let client_hello_data = loop {
+            attempt += 1;
+
+            debug!("sending client hello");
+            let client_hello = self
+                .send_client_hello()
+                .await
+                .map_err(IntermediateHandshakeFailure::plain)?;
+            if self
+                .receive_client_hello_ack()
+                .await
+                .map_err(IntermediateHandshakeFailure::plain)?
+            {
+                debug!("received client hello ACK");
+                break client_hello;
+            }
+            debug!("received client hello collision");
+
+            // TODO: make it configurable
+            if attempt > 3 {
+                return Err(IntermediateHandshakeFailure::plain(
+                    LpError::kkt_psq_handshake(
+                        "failed to establish receiver index without collision",
+                    ),
+                ));
+            }
+        };
+        let session_id = client_hello_data.receiver_index;
+        let session_id_bytes = session_id.to_le_bytes();
+        let salt = client_hello_data.salt;
+
+        // 3. prepare and send KKT request
+        debug!("sending KKT request");
+        let kkt_data = self
+            .send_kkt_request(session_id, &remote_peer)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|source| IntermediateHandshakeFailure {
+                session_id: Some(session_id),
+                protocol_version: self.protocol_version,
+                outer_aead_key: None,
+                source,
+            })?;
+
+        // 4. receive and process KKT response
+        let encapsulation_key = self
+            .receive_kkt_response(kkt_data, &remote_peer)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|source| IntermediateHandshakeFailure {
+                session_id: Some(session_id),
+                protocol_version: self.protocol_version,
+                outer_aead_key: None,
+                source,
+            })?;
+        debug!("received KKT response");
+
+        // 5. prepare and send PSQ msg1
+        debug!("sending PSQ msg1");
+        let (outer_aead_key, mut noise_protocol, pq_shared_secret) = self
+            .send_psq_initiator_message(&remote_peer, &encapsulation_key, &salt, &session_id_bytes)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|source| IntermediateHandshakeFailure {
+                session_id: Some(session_id),
+                protocol_version: self.protocol_version,
+                outer_aead_key: None,
+                source,
+            })?;
+
+        // 6. receive and process PSQ msg2
+        debug!("received PSQ msg2");
+        if let Err(source) = self
+            .receive_psq_responder_message(&outer_aead_key, &mut noise_protocol)
+            .await
+        {
+            return Err(IntermediateHandshakeFailure {
+                session_id: Some(session_id),
+                protocol_version: self.protocol_version,
+                outer_aead_key: Some(outer_aead_key),
+                source,
+            });
+        }
+
+        // 7. prepare and send PSQ msg3
+        debug!("sending PSQ msg3");
+        if let Err(source) = self
+            .send_final_psq_message(session_id, &outer_aead_key, &mut noise_protocol)
+            .await
+        {
+            return Err(IntermediateHandshakeFailure {
+                session_id: Some(session_id),
+                protocol_version: self.protocol_version,
+                outer_aead_key: Some(outer_aead_key),
+                source,
+            });
+        }
+
+        // 8. receive final ACK and finalise
+        debug!("received final ACK");
+        if let Err(source) = self.receive_final_ack(&outer_aead_key).await {
+            return Err(IntermediateHandshakeFailure {
+                session_id: Some(session_id),
+                protocol_version: self.protocol_version,
+                outer_aead_key: Some(outer_aead_key),
+                source,
+            });
+        }
+
+        #[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
+        Ok(LpSession::new(
+            session_id,
+            self.protocol_version()
+                .expect("protocol version is known at this point"),
+            outer_aead_key,
+            self.local_peer.clone(),
+            remote_peer,
+            pq_shared_secret,
+            noise_protocol,
+        ))
+    }
+
+    // TODO: missing: receive counter check
+    pub async fn complete_as_initiator(mut self) -> Result<LpSession, LpError>
+    where
+        S: LpTransport + Unpin,
+    {
+        match self.complete_as_initiator_inner().await {
+            Ok(res) => Ok(res),
+            Err(err) => Err(self.try_send_error_packet(err).await),
+        }
+    }
+}

common/nym-lp/src/psq/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,340 @@
+// Copyright 2026 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+
+use crate::codec::OuterAeadKey;
+use crate::message::ErrorPacketData;
+use crate::packet::LpHeader;
+use crate::peer::{LpLocalPeer, LpRemotePeer};
+use crate::psq::helpers::LpTransportHandshakeExt;
+use crate::{LpError, LpMessage, LpPacket};
+use nym_kkt::ciphersuite::Ciphersuite;
+use nym_lp_transport::traits::LpTransport;
+use tracing::debug;
+
+mod helpers;
+mod initiator;
+mod responder;
+
+pub(crate) struct IntermediateHandshakeFailure {
+    /// Session id established during exchange if we managed to derive it
+    session_id: Option<u32>,
+
+    /// Protocol version established during the exchange
+    protocol_version: Option<u8>,
+
+    /// Outer aead key established during exchange if we managed to derive it
+    outer_aead_key: Option<OuterAeadKey>,
+
+    /// The error source
+    source: LpError,
+}
+
+impl IntermediateHandshakeFailure {
+    fn plain(source: LpError) -> IntermediateHandshakeFailure {
+        IntermediateHandshakeFailure {
+            session_id: None,
+            protocol_version: None,
+            outer_aead_key: None,
+            source,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+pub struct PSQHandshakeState<'a, S> {
+    /// The underlying connection established for the handshake
+    connection: &'a mut S,
+
+    /// Protocol version used for the exchange.
+    /// either known implicitly through the directory (initiator)
+    /// or established through client hello (responder)
+    protocol_version: Option<u8>,
+
+    /// Ciphersuite selected for the KKT/PSQ exchange
+    ciphersuite: Ciphersuite,
+
+    /// Representation of a local Lewes Protocol peer
+    /// encapsulating all the known information and keys.
+    local_peer: LpLocalPeer,
+
+    /// Representation of a remote Lewes Protocol peer
+    /// encapsulating all the known information and keys.
+    remote_peer: Option<LpRemotePeer>,
+
+    /// Counter for outgoing packets
+    sending_counter: u64,
+}
+
+impl<'a, S> PSQHandshakeState<'a, S>
+where
+    S: LpTransport + Unpin,
+{
+    pub fn new(connection: &'a mut S, ciphersuite: Ciphersuite, local_peer: LpLocalPeer) -> Self {
+        PSQHandshakeState {
+            connection,
+            protocol_version: None,
+            ciphersuite,
+            local_peer,
+            remote_peer: None,
+            sending_counter: 0,
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn with_protocol_version(mut self, protocol_version: u8) -> Self {
+        self.protocol_version = Some(protocol_version);
+        self
+    }
+
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn with_remote_peer(mut self, remote_peer: LpRemotePeer) -> Self {
+        self.remote_peer = Some(remote_peer);
+        self
+    }
+
+    fn protocol_version(&self) -> Result<u8, LpError> {
+        self.protocol_version
+            .ok_or_else(|| LpError::kkt_psq_handshake("unknown protocol version"))
+    }
+
+    /// Generates the next counter value for outgoing packets.
+    pub fn next_counter(&mut self) -> u64 {
+        let counter = self.sending_counter;
+        self.sending_counter += 1;
+        counter
+    }
+
+    pub fn next_packet(
+        &mut self,
+        session_id: u32,
+        protocol_version: u8,
+        message: LpMessage,
+    ) -> LpPacket {
+        let counter = self.next_counter();
+        let header = LpHeader::new(session_id, counter, protocol_version);
+        LpPacket::new(header, message)
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) async fn try_send_error_packet(
+        &mut self,
+        err: IntermediateHandshakeFailure,
+    ) -> LpError {
+        // if session_id is not known, we can't send the packet back (with the current design)
+        let (Some(session_id), Some(protocol)) = (err.session_id, err.protocol_version) else {
+            return err.source;
+        };
+        if let Err(err) = self
+            .send_error_packet(
+                session_id,
+                protocol,
+                err.source.to_string(),
+                err.outer_aead_key.as_ref(),
+            )
+            .await
+        {
+            debug!("failed to send back error response: {err}")
+        }
+        err.source
+    }
+
+    /// Attempt to send an error packet
+    pub(crate) async fn send_error_packet(
+        &mut self,
+        session_id: u32,
+        protocol_version: u8,
+        msg: impl Into<String>,
+        outer_aead_key: Option<&OuterAeadKey>,
+    ) -> Result<(), LpError> {
+        let packet = self.next_packet(
+            session_id,
+            protocol_version,
+            LpMessage::Error(ErrorPacketData::new(msg)),
+        );
+        self.connection.send_packet(packet, outer_aead_key).await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Attempt to receive a packet from connection, explicitly checking for an error response
+    /// and returning corresponding message if received
+    pub(crate) async fn receive_non_error(
+        &mut self,
+        outer_aead_key: Option<&OuterAeadKey>,
+    ) -> Result<LpPacket, LpError> {
+        let packet = self.connection.receive_packet(outer_aead_key).await?;
+
+        match &packet.message {
+            LpMessage::Error(error_packet) => Err(LpError::kkt_psq_handshake(format!(
+                "remote error: {}",
+                error_packet.message
+            ))),
+            _ => Ok(packet),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::peer::mock_peers;
+    use crate::psq::helpers::LpTransportHandshakeExt;
+    use crate::psq::responder::DEFAULT_TIMESTAMP_TOLERANCE;
+    use mock_instant::thread_local::MockClock;
+    use nym_kkt::ciphersuite::{HashFunction, HashLength, KEM, SignatureScheme};
+    use nym_test_utils::mocks::async_read_write::MockIOStream;
+    use nym_test_utils::traits::{Leak, TimeboxedSpawnable};
+    use std::time::Duration;
+    use tokio::join;
+
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
+    async fn extract_error(conn: &mut MockIOStream) -> String {
+        let packet = conn.receive_packet(None).await.unwrap();
+        match packet.message {
+            LpMessage::Error(error) => error.message,
+            _ => panic!("non error packet"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn e2e_psq_handshake() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        let conn_init = MockIOStream::default();
+        let conn_resp = conn_init.try_get_remote_handle();
+
+        // leak the connections (JUST FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS TEST!)
+        // so they'd get 'static lifetime
+        let conn_init = conn_init.leak();
+        let conn_resp = conn_resp.leak();
+
+        let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::new(
+            KEM::X25519,
+            HashFunction::Blake3,
+            SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
+            HashLength::Default,
+        );
+
+        let (init, resp) = mock_peers();
+        let resp_remote = resp.as_remote();
+
+        let handshake_init = PSQHandshakeState::new(conn_init, ciphersuite, init)
+            .with_protocol_version(1)
+            .with_remote_peer(resp_remote);
+        let handshake_resp = PSQHandshakeState::new(conn_resp, ciphersuite, resp);
+
+        let resp_fut = handshake_resp.complete_as_responder().spawn_timeboxed();
+        let init_fut = handshake_init.complete_as_initiator().spawn_timeboxed();
+
+        let (session_init, session_resp) = join!(init_fut, resp_fut);
+
+        let session_init = session_init???;
+        let session_resp = session_resp???;
+
+        assert_eq!(session_init.id(), session_resp.id());
+        assert_eq!(
+            session_init.outer_aead_key().as_bytes(),
+            session_resp.outer_aead_key().as_bytes()
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            session_init.pq_shared_secret().as_bytes(),
+            session_resp.pq_shared_secret().as_bytes()
+        );
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn preparing_client_hello_initiator() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        let mut conn_init = MockIOStream::default();
+        let mut conn_resp = conn_init.try_get_remote_handle();
+
+        let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::new(
+            KEM::X25519,
+            HashFunction::Blake3,
+            SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
+            HashLength::Default,
+        );
+        let (init, resp) = mock_peers();
+        let resp_remote = resp.as_remote();
+
+        // as initiator
+        let mut handshake_init = PSQHandshakeState::new(&mut conn_init, ciphersuite, init)
+            .with_protocol_version(1)
+            .with_remote_peer(resp_remote);
+
+        // you can generate and send (valid) client hello as initiator
+        let client_hello = handshake_init.send_client_hello().await?;
+        let LpMessage::ClientHello(received_client_hello) =
+            conn_resp.receive_packet(None).await?.message
+        else {
+            panic!("wrong message type");
+        };
+        assert_eq!(client_hello, received_client_hello);
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    // essentially make sure you can't accidentally trigger the handshake as the responder
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn preparing_client_hello_responder() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        let conn_init = MockIOStream::default();
+        let mut conn_resp = conn_init.try_get_remote_handle();
+
+        let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::new(
+            KEM::X25519,
+            HashFunction::Blake3,
+            SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
+            HashLength::Default,
+        );
+        let (_, resp) = mock_peers();
+
+        // as initiator
+        let mut handshake_resp = PSQHandshakeState::new(&mut conn_resp, ciphersuite, resp);
+
+        // you can generate and send (valid) client hello as initiator
+        let sending_res = handshake_resp.send_client_hello().await;
+        assert!(sending_res.is_err());
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_receive_client_hello_timestamp_too_skewed() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        let current_time = Duration::from_secs(10000);
+        MockClock::set_system_time(current_time);
+
+        let too_old = current_time - DEFAULT_TIMESTAMP_TOLERANCE - Duration::from_secs(1);
+        let too_recent = current_time + DEFAULT_TIMESTAMP_TOLERANCE + Duration::from_secs(1);
+
+        let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::new(
+            KEM::X25519,
+            HashFunction::Blake3,
+            SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
+            HashLength::Default,
+        );
+
+        // TOO OLD
+        let mut conn_init = MockIOStream::default();
+        let mut conn_resp = conn_init.try_get_remote_handle();
+        let (init, resp) = mock_peers();
+
+        let mut handshake_resp = PSQHandshakeState::new(&mut conn_resp, ciphersuite, resp);
+        let client_hello_too_old = init.build_client_hello_data(too_old.as_secs());
+
+        conn_init
+            .send_packet(client_hello_too_old.into_lp_packet(1), None)
+            .await?;
+        let err = handshake_resp.receive_client_hello().await.unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("too old"));
+
+        // TOO RECENT
+        let mut conn_init = MockIOStream::default();
+        let mut conn_resp = conn_init.try_get_remote_handle();
+        let (init, resp) = mock_peers();
+
+        let mut handshake_resp = PSQHandshakeState::new(&mut conn_resp, ciphersuite, resp);
+        let client_hello_too_recent = init.build_client_hello_data(too_recent.as_secs());
+
+        conn_init
+            .send_packet(client_hello_too_recent.into_lp_packet(1), None)
+            .await?;
+        let err = handshake_resp.receive_client_hello().await.unwrap_err();
+
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("too future"));
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}

common/nym-lp/src/psq/responder.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,461 @@
+// Copyright 2026 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+
+use crate::codec::OuterAeadKey;
+use crate::message::{HandshakeData, KKTResponseData, MessageType};
+use crate::noise_protocol::NoiseProtocol;
+use crate::peer::LpRemotePeer;
+use crate::psk::psq_responder_process_message;
+use crate::psq::helpers::{LpTransportHandshakeExt, current_timestamp};
+use crate::psq::{IntermediateHandshakeFailure, PSQHandshakeState};
+use crate::session::PqSharedSecret;
+use crate::{ClientHelloData, LpError, LpMessage, LpSession};
+use nym_kkt::KKT_RESPONSE_AAD;
+use nym_kkt::ciphersuite::{DecapsulationKey, EncapsulationKey};
+use nym_kkt::context::KKTContext;
+use nym_kkt::encryption::{KKTSessionSecret, decrypt_initial_kkt_frame, encrypt_kkt_frame};
+use nym_kkt::frame::KKTSessionId;
+use nym_kkt::session::{responder_ingest_message, responder_process};
+use nym_lp_transport::traits::LpTransport;
+use rand09::rng;
+use std::time::Duration;
+use tracing::debug;
+
+pub const DEFAULT_TIMESTAMP_TOLERANCE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
+
+// this will be removed anyway, so no point in doing anything more than a hardcoded placeholder
+fn validate_client_hello_timestamp(
+    client_timestamp: u64,
+    tolerance: Duration,
+) -> Result<(), LpError> {
+    let now = current_timestamp()?;
+
+    let age = now.abs_diff(client_timestamp);
+    if age > tolerance.as_secs() {
+        let direction = if now >= client_timestamp {
+            "old"
+        } else {
+            "future"
+        };
+
+        return Err(LpError::kkt_psq_handshake(format!(
+            "ClientHello timestamp is too {direction} (age: {age}s, tolerance: {}s)",
+            tolerance.as_secs()
+        )));
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+impl<'a, S> PSQHandshakeState<'a, S>
+where
+    S: LpTransport + Unpin,
+{
+    pub(crate) fn encapsulated_kem_keys(
+        &self,
+    ) -> Result<(DecapsulationKey<'static>, EncapsulationKey<'static>), LpError> {
+        let kem_keys = self
+            .local_peer
+            .kem_psq
+            .as_ref()
+            .ok_or(LpError::ResponderWithMissingKEMKey)?;
+
+        let libcrux_private_key = libcrux_kem::PrivateKey::decode(
+            libcrux_kem::Algorithm::X25519,
+            kem_keys.private_key().as_bytes(),
+        )
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            LpError::KKTError(format!(
+                "Failed to convert X25519 private key to libcrux PrivateKey: {e:?}",
+            ))
+        })?;
+        let dec_key = DecapsulationKey::X25519(libcrux_private_key);
+
+        let libcrux_public_key = libcrux_kem::PublicKey::decode(
+            libcrux_kem::Algorithm::X25519,
+            kem_keys.public_key().as_bytes(),
+        )
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            LpError::KKTError(format!(
+                "Failed to convert X25519 public key to libcrux PublicKey: {e:?}",
+            ))
+        })?;
+        let enc_key = EncapsulationKey::X25519(libcrux_public_key);
+        Ok((dec_key, enc_key))
+    }
+
+    /// Attempt to receive and validate ClientHello
+    pub(crate) async fn receive_client_hello(
+        &mut self,
+    ) -> Result<(ClientHelloData, LpRemotePeer), LpError> {
+        let client_hello_packet = self.receive_non_error(None).await?;
+        let client_hello = match client_hello_packet.message {
+            LpMessage::ClientHello(client_hello) => client_hello,
+            other => {
+                return Err(LpError::unexpected_handshake_response(
+                    other.typ(),
+                    MessageType::ClientHello,
+                ));
+            }
+        };
+
+        validate_client_hello_timestamp(
+            client_hello.extract_timestamp(),
+            DEFAULT_TIMESTAMP_TOLERANCE,
+        )?;
+
+        // TODO: somehow check for collision
+
+        // set version and remote peer information
+        self.protocol_version = Some(client_hello_packet.header.protocol_version);
+        let remote_peer = LpRemotePeer::new(
+            client_hello.client_ed25519_public_key,
+            client_hello.client_lp_public_key,
+        );
+
+        Ok((client_hello, remote_peer))
+    }
+
+    /// Send client hello ACK
+    pub(crate) async fn send_client_hello_ack(&mut self, session_id: u32) -> Result<(), LpError> {
+        let protocol = self.protocol_version()?;
+
+        let ack = self.next_packet(session_id, protocol, LpMessage::Ack);
+        self.connection.send_packet(ack, None).await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Attempt to receive and process a KKT request
+    pub(crate) async fn receive_kkt_request(
+        &mut self,
+    ) -> Result<(KKTContext, KKTSessionSecret, KKTSessionId), LpError> {
+        let kkt_request = match self.receive_non_error(None).await?.message {
+            LpMessage::KKTRequest(request) => request.0,
+            other => {
+                return Err(LpError::unexpected_handshake_response(
+                    other.typ(),
+                    MessageType::KKTRequest,
+                ));
+            }
+        };
+
+        let (session_secret, request_frame, remote_context) =
+            decrypt_initial_kkt_frame(self.local_peer.x25519.private_key(), &kkt_request)?;
+        let (context, _) = responder_ingest_message(&remote_context, None, None, &request_frame)?;
+
+        Ok((context, session_secret, request_frame.session_id()))
+    }
+
+    /// Attempt to send KKT response to the previously received request
+    pub(crate) async fn send_kkt_response(
+        &mut self,
+        session_id: u32,
+        (kkt_context, session_secret, kkt_session_id): (KKTContext, KKTSessionSecret, KKTSessionId),
+        encapsulation_key: &EncapsulationKey<'_>,
+    ) -> Result<(), LpError> {
+        let protocol = self.protocol_version()?;
+
+        let response_frame = responder_process(
+            &kkt_context,
+            kkt_session_id,
+            self.local_peer.ed25519().private_key(),
+            encapsulation_key,
+        )?;
+        let encrypted_frame = encrypt_kkt_frame(
+            &mut rng(),
+            &session_secret,
+            &response_frame,
+            KKT_RESPONSE_AAD,
+        )?;
+        let lp_message = KKTResponseData::new(encrypted_frame).into();
+        let lp_packet = self.next_packet(session_id, protocol, lp_message);
+
+        self.connection.send_packet(lp_packet, None).await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Attempt to receive and process a PSQ msg1 request
+    pub(crate) async fn receive_psq_initiator_message(
+        &mut self,
+        remote_peer: &LpRemotePeer,
+        local_kem_keypair: (&DecapsulationKey<'_>, &EncapsulationKey<'_>),
+        salt: &[u8; 32],
+        session_id_bytes: &[u8; 4],
+    ) -> Result<(OuterAeadKey, NoiseProtocol, PqSharedSecret, Vec<u8>), LpError> {
+        let psq_msg1 = match self.receive_non_error(None).await?.message {
+            LpMessage::Handshake(response) => response.0,
+            other => {
+                return Err(LpError::unexpected_handshake_response(
+                    other.typ(),
+                    MessageType::Handshake,
+                ));
+            }
+        };
+
+        // Extract PSQ payload: [u16 psq_len][psq_payload][noise_msg]
+        if psq_msg1.len() < 2 {
+            return Err(LpError::kkt_psq_handshake("too short msg1 received"));
+        }
+        let handle_len = u16::from_le_bytes([psq_msg1[0], psq_msg1[1]]) as usize;
+        if psq_msg1.len() < 2 + handle_len {
+            return Err(LpError::kkt_psq_handshake("too short msg1 received"));
+        }
+        let psq_payload = &psq_msg1[2..2 + handle_len];
+        let noise_payload = &psq_msg1[2 + handle_len..];
+
+        // Decapsulate PSK from PSQ payload using X25519 as DHKEM
+        let psq_responder = psq_responder_process_message(
+            self.local_peer.x25519.private_key(),
+            &remote_peer.x25519_public,
+            local_kem_keypair,
+            &remote_peer.ed25519_public,
+            psq_payload,
+            salt,
+            session_id_bytes,
+        )?;
+
+        let psk = psq_responder.psk;
+        let psk_handle = psq_responder.psk_handle;
+
+        // TEMP \/
+        let outer_aead_key = OuterAeadKey::from_psk(&psk);
+        // TEMP /\
+
+        let mut noise_protocol = NoiseProtocol::build_new_responder(
+            self.local_peer.x25519().private_key().as_bytes(),
+            remote_peer.x25519_public.as_bytes(),
+            &psk,
+        )?;
+        noise_protocol.read_message(noise_payload)?;
+
+        Ok((
+            outer_aead_key,
+            noise_protocol,
+            PqSharedSecret::new(psq_responder.pq_shared_secret),
+            psk_handle,
+        ))
+    }
+
+    /// Attempt to prepare and generate a responder PSQ msg2
+    pub(crate) async fn send_psq_responder_message(
+        &mut self,
+        session_id: u32,
+        psk_handle: &[u8],
+        outer_aead_key: &OuterAeadKey,
+        noise_protocol: &mut NoiseProtocol,
+    ) -> Result<(), LpError> {
+        let protocol = self.protocol_version()?;
+
+        let msg2 = noise_protocol
+            .get_bytes_to_send()
+            .ok_or_else(|| LpError::kkt_psq_handshake("failed to generate noise msg2"))??;
+        // Embed PSK handle in message: [u16 handle_len][handle_bytes][noise_msg]
+        let handle_len = psk_handle.len() as u16;
+        let mut combined = Vec::with_capacity(2 + psk_handle.len() + msg2.len());
+        combined.extend_from_slice(&handle_len.to_le_bytes());
+        combined.extend_from_slice(psk_handle);
+        combined.extend_from_slice(&msg2);
+
+        let lp_message = HandshakeData::new(combined).into();
+        let lp_packet = self.next_packet(session_id, protocol, lp_message);
+        self.connection
+            .send_packet(lp_packet, Some(outer_aead_key))
+            .await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Attempt to receive and process final PSQ msg3
+    pub(crate) async fn receive_final_psq_message(
+        &mut self,
+        outer_aead_key: &OuterAeadKey,
+        noise_protocol: &mut NoiseProtocol,
+    ) -> Result<(), LpError> {
+        let psq_msg3 = match self
+            .connection
+            .receive_packet(Some(outer_aead_key))
+            .await?
+            .message
+        {
+            LpMessage::Handshake(response) => response.0,
+            other => {
+                return Err(LpError::unexpected_handshake_response(
+                    other.typ(),
+                    MessageType::Handshake,
+                ));
+            }
+        };
+
+        noise_protocol.read_message(&psq_msg3)?;
+        if !noise_protocol.is_handshake_finished() {
+            return Err(LpError::kkt_psq_handshake(
+                "noise handshake not finished after msg3",
+            ));
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Send final ACK to indicate finalisation of the handshake
+    pub(crate) async fn send_final_ack(
+        &mut self,
+        session_id: u32,
+        outer_aead_key: &OuterAeadKey,
+    ) -> Result<(), LpError> {
+        let protocol = self.protocol_version()?;
+
+        let ack = self.next_packet(session_id, protocol, LpMessage::Ack);
+        self.connection
+            .send_packet(ack, Some(outer_aead_key))
+            .await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    async fn complete_as_responder_inner(
+        &mut self,
+    ) -> Result<LpSession, IntermediateHandshakeFailure>
+    where
+        S: LpTransport + Unpin,
+    {
+        // 1. receive and validate ClientHello
+        let (client_hello_data, remote_peer) =
+            self.receive_client_hello()
+                .await
+                .map_err(|source| IntermediateHandshakeFailure {
+                    session_id: None,
+                    protocol_version: self.protocol_version,
+                    outer_aead_key: None,
+                    source,
+                })?;
+        debug!("received client hello");
+
+        let session_id = client_hello_data.receiver_index;
+        let session_id_bytes = session_id.to_le_bytes();
+        let salt = client_hello_data.salt;
+
+        // 2. send ack
+        debug!("sending client hello ACK");
+        self.send_client_hello_ack(session_id)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|source| IntermediateHandshakeFailure {
+                session_id: Some(session_id),
+                protocol_version: self.protocol_version,
+                outer_aead_key: None,
+                source,
+            })?;
+
+        // 3. receive and process KKT request
+        let kkt_data =
+            self.receive_kkt_request()
+                .await
+                .map_err(|source| IntermediateHandshakeFailure {
+                    session_id: Some(session_id),
+                    protocol_version: self.protocol_version,
+                    outer_aead_key: None,
+                    source,
+                })?;
+        debug!("received KKT request");
+
+        // TEMP: 'derive' KEM keys
+        let (dec_key, enc_key) =
+            self.encapsulated_kem_keys()
+                .map_err(|source| IntermediateHandshakeFailure {
+                    session_id: Some(session_id),
+                    protocol_version: self.protocol_version,
+                    outer_aead_key: None,
+                    source,
+                })?;
+
+        // 4. prepare and send KKT response
+        debug!("sending KKT response");
+        self.send_kkt_response(session_id, kkt_data, &enc_key)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|source| IntermediateHandshakeFailure {
+                session_id: Some(session_id),
+                protocol_version: self.protocol_version,
+                outer_aead_key: None,
+                source,
+            })?;
+
+        // 5. receive and process PSQ msg1
+        debug!("received PSQ msg1");
+        let (outer_aead_key, mut noise_protocol, pq_shared_secret, psk_handle) = self
+            .receive_psq_initiator_message(
+                &remote_peer,
+                (&dec_key, &enc_key),
+                &salt,
+                &session_id_bytes,
+            )
+            .await
+            .map_err(|source| IntermediateHandshakeFailure {
+                session_id: Some(session_id),
+                protocol_version: self.protocol_version,
+                outer_aead_key: None,
+                source,
+            })?;
+
+        // 6. prepare and send PSQ msg2
+        debug!("sending PSQ msg2");
+        if let Err(source) = self
+            .send_psq_responder_message(
+                session_id,
+                &psk_handle,
+                &outer_aead_key,
+                &mut noise_protocol,
+            )
+            .await
+        {
+            return Err(IntermediateHandshakeFailure {
+                session_id: Some(session_id),
+                protocol_version: self.protocol_version,
+                outer_aead_key: Some(outer_aead_key),
+                source,
+            });
+        }
+
+        // 7. receive and process PSQ msg3
+        debug!("received PSQ msg3");
+        if let Err(source) = self
+            .receive_final_psq_message(&outer_aead_key, &mut noise_protocol)
+            .await
+        {
+            return Err(IntermediateHandshakeFailure {
+                session_id: Some(session_id),
+                protocol_version: self.protocol_version,
+                outer_aead_key: Some(outer_aead_key),
+                source,
+            });
+        }
+
+        // 8. [optionally] send ACK to finalise
+        debug!("sending final ACK");
+        if let Err(source) = self.send_final_ack(session_id, &outer_aead_key).await {
+            return Err(IntermediateHandshakeFailure {
+                session_id: Some(session_id),
+                protocol_version: self.protocol_version,
+                outer_aead_key: Some(outer_aead_key),
+                source,
+            });
+        }
+
+        #[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
+        Ok(LpSession::new(
+            session_id,
+            self.protocol_version()
+                .expect("protocol version is known at this point"),
+            outer_aead_key,
+            self.local_peer.clone(),
+            remote_peer,
+            pq_shared_secret,
+            noise_protocol,
+        ))
+    }
+
+    pub async fn complete_as_responder(mut self) -> Result<LpSession, LpError>
+    where
+        S: LpTransport + Unpin,
+    {
+        match self.complete_as_responder_inner().await {
+            Ok(res) => Ok(res),
+            Err(err) => Err(self.try_send_error_packet(err).await),
+        }
+    }
+}