use authenicator on the responder's side

fix typo
Add test
2026-02-13 10:52:22 +01:00 · 2026-02-13 06:43:58 +01:00 · 2026-02-13 06:33:30 +01:00 · 2026-02-13 06:10:12 +01:00 · 2026-02-13 05:02:19 +01:00 · 2026-02-13 05:00:22 +01:00
395 changed files with 21440 additions and 24306 deletions
@@ -3,5 +3,4 @@
 .gitignore
 **/node_modules
 **/target
-target-otel
 dist
@@ -3,28 +3,13 @@ name: ci-build-upload-binaries
 on:
  workflow_dispatch:
    inputs:
-      feature_profile:
-        description: "Select a predefined cargo feature profile"
-        required: false
-        default: "none"
-        type: choice
-        options:
-          - none
-          - tokio-console
-          - otel
-          - otel,tokio-console
-      extra_features:
-        description: "Additional comma-separated cargo features (e.g. feat1,feat2)"
-        required: false
-        default: ""
-        type: string
      add_tokio_unstable:
-        description: 'Force RUSTFLAGS="--cfg tokio_unstable" (auto-set when tokio-console is selected)'
-        required: false
+        description: 'True to add RUSTFLAGS="--cfg tokio_unstable"'
+        required: true
        default: false
        type: boolean
      enable_deb:
-        description: "Enable cargo-deb installation and .deb package building"
+        description: "True to enable cargo-deb installation and .deb package building"
        required: false
        default: false
        type: boolean
@@ -36,7 +21,7 @@ jobs:
    strategy:
      fail-fast: false
      matrix:
-        platform: [arc-linux-latest]
+        platform: [ arc-linux-latest ]

    runs-on: ${{ matrix.platform }}
    env:
@@ -51,62 +36,38 @@ jobs:
          OUTPUT_DIR: ci-builds/${{ github.ref_name }}
        run: |
          rm -rf ci-builds || true
-          mkdir -p "$OUTPUT_DIR"
-          echo "$OUTPUT_DIR"
-
+          mkdir -p $OUTPUT_DIR
+          echo $OUTPUT_DIR
      - name: Install Dependencies (Linux)
        run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get -y install libudev-dev

-      - name: Resolve cargo features and RUSTFLAGS
-        if: github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch'
-        shell: bash
+      - name: Sets env vars for tokio if set in manual dispatch inputs
+        if: github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.add_tokio_unstable == true
        run: |
-          FEATURES=""
-          PROFILE="${{ inputs.feature_profile }}"
-          EXTRA="${{ inputs.extra_features }}"
-
-          if [[ "$PROFILE" != "none" && -n "$PROFILE" ]]; then
-            FEATURES="$PROFILE"
-          fi
-
-          if [[ -n "$EXTRA" ]]; then
-            if [[ -n "$FEATURES" ]]; then
-              FEATURES="${FEATURES},${EXTRA}"
-            else
-              FEATURES="$EXTRA"
-            fi
-          fi
-
-          if [[ -n "$FEATURES" ]]; then
-            echo "CARGO_FEATURES=--features ${FEATURES}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
-            echo "::notice::Selected cargo features: $FEATURES"
-          else
-            echo "::notice::No additional cargo features selected"
-          fi
-
-          if [[ "$FEATURES" == *"tokio-console"* ]] || [[ "${{ inputs.add_tokio_unstable }}" == "true" ]]; then
-            echo "RUSTFLAGS=--cfg tokio_unstable" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
-            echo "::notice::Enabled RUSTFLAGS --cfg tokio_unstable"
-          fi
-
+          echo "RUSTFLAGS=--cfg tokio_unstable" >> $GITHUB_ENV
+          echo "CARGO_FEATURES=--features tokio-console" >> $GITHUB_ENV
      - name: Install Rust toolchain
-        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@master
+        uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
        with:
          toolchain: ${{ vars.REQUIRED_RUSTC_VERSION }}

      - name: Build all binaries
-        shell: bash
-        run: cargo build --workspace --release ${{ env.CARGO_FEATURES }}
+        uses: actions-rs/cargo@v1
+        with:
+          command: build
+          args: --workspace --release ${{ env.CARGO_FEATURES }}

      - name: Install cargo-deb
+        uses: actions-rs/cargo@v1
+        with:
+          command: install
+          args: cargo-deb
        if: github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.enable_deb == true
-        shell: bash
-        run: cargo install cargo-deb

      - name: Build deb packages
-        if: github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.enable_deb == true
        shell: bash
        run: make deb
+        if: github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.enable_deb == true

      - name: Upload Artifact
        if: github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch'
@@ -123,22 +84,24 @@ jobs:
            target/release/nym-node
          retention-days: 30

+      # If this was a pull_request or nightly, upload to build server
+
      - name: Prepare build output
+        # if: github.event_name == 'schedule' || github.event_name == 'pull_request'
        shell: bash
        env:
          OUTPUT_DIR: ci-builds/${{ github.ref_name }}
        run: |
-          cp target/release/nym-client "$OUTPUT_DIR"
-          cp target/release/nym-socks5-client "$OUTPUT_DIR"
-          cp target/release/nym-api "$OUTPUT_DIR"
-          cp target/release/nym-network-requester "$OUTPUT_DIR"
-          cp target/release/nymvisor "$OUTPUT_DIR"
-          cp target/release/nym-node "$OUTPUT_DIR"
-          cp target/release/nym-cli "$OUTPUT_DIR"
-          if [[ "${{ github.event_name }}" == "workflow_dispatch" && "${{ inputs.enable_deb }}" == "true" ]]; then
-            cp target/debian/*.deb "$OUTPUT_DIR"
+          cp target/release/nym-client $OUTPUT_DIR
+          cp target/release/nym-socks5-client $OUTPUT_DIR
+          cp target/release/nym-api $OUTPUT_DIR
+          cp target/release/nym-network-requester $OUTPUT_DIR
+          cp target/release/nymvisor $OUTPUT_DIR
+          cp target/release/nym-node $OUTPUT_DIR
+          cp target/release/nym-cli $OUTPUT_DIR
+          if [ ${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.enable_deb == true }} = true ]; then
+            cp target/debian/*.deb $OUTPUT_DIR
          fi
-
      - name: Deploy branch to CI www
        continue-on-error: true
        uses: easingthemes/ssh-deploy@main
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ on:
      - 'nym-api/**'
      - 'nym-authenticator-client/**'
      - 'nym-credential-proxy/**'
-      - 'nym-gateway-probe/**'
      - 'nym-ip-packet-client/**'
      - 'nym-network-monitor/**'
      - 'nym-node/**'
@@ -90,7 +89,7 @@ jobs:
        uses: actions-rs/cargo@v1
        with:
          command: clippy
-          args: --workspace --all-targets --exclude nym-gateway-probe --exclude nym-node-status-api -- -D warnings
+          args: --workspace --all-targets --exclude nym-gateway-probe -- -D warnings

      - name: Clippy (non-macos)
        if: contains(matrix.os, 'linux') || contains(matrix.os, 'windows')
@@ -105,14 +104,6 @@ jobs:
        with:
          command: build

-        # only build on linux because of wg FFI bindings of its dependency (network probe)
-      - name: Build nym-node-status-api (linux only)
-        if: runner.os == 'Linux'
-        uses: actions-rs/cargo@v1
-        with:
-          command: build
-          args: -p nym-node-status-api
-
      - name: Build all examples
        if: contains(matrix.os, 'linux')
        uses: actions-rs/cargo@v1
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: ci-check-ns-api-version
 on:
  pull_request:
    paths:
-      - "nym-node-status-api/nym-node-status-api/**"
+      - "nym-node-status-api/**"

 env:
  WORKING_DIRECTORY: "nym-node-status-api/nym-node-status-api"
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ jobs:
        uses: actions/checkout@v6

      - name: Get version from cargo.toml
-        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.52.2
+        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.50.1
        id: get_version
        with:
          cmd: yq -oy '.package.version' ${{ env.WORKING_DIRECTORY }}/Cargo.toml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ jobs:
        uses: actions/checkout@v6

      - name: Get version from cargo.toml
-        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.52.2
+        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.50.1
        id: get_version
        with:
          cmd: yq -oy '.package.version' ${{ env.WORKING_DIRECTORY }}/Cargo.toml
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
-name: Publish to crates.io (dry run)
-
-on:
-  workflow_dispatch:
-    inputs:
-      version:
-        description: "Version to publish (e.g. 1.21.0)"
-        required: true
-        type: string
-
-env:
-  CI_BOT_AUTHOR: "Nym bot"
-  CI_BOT_EMAIL: "nym-bot@users.noreply.github.com"
-
-jobs:
-  publish-dry-run:
-    runs-on: arc-linux-latest
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout repo
-        uses: actions/checkout@v6
-
-      - name: Configure git identity
-        run: |
-          git config --global user.name "${{ env.CI_BOT_AUTHOR }}"
-          git config --global user.email "${{ env.CI_BOT_EMAIL }}"
-
-      - name: Install rust toolchain
-        uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
-        with:
-          profile: minimal
-          toolchain: stable
-          override: true
-
-      - name: Install cargo-workspaces
-        run: cargo install cargo-workspaces
-
-      - name: Setup Node.js
-        uses: actions/setup-node@v4
-        with:
-          node-version: "20"
-
-      - name: Validate version format
-        run: |
-          if ! npx semver "${{ inputs.version }}"; then
-            echo "Error: '${{ inputs.version }}' is not valid semver"
-            exit 1
-          fi
-
-      - name: Get current version
-        id: current_version
-        run: |
-          VERSION=$(grep -oP '^\s*version\s*=\s*"\K[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+' Cargo.toml | head -1)
-          echo "version=$VERSION" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-
-      - name: Update workspace dependencies
-        run: |
-          sed -i '/path = /s/version = "${{ steps.current_version.outputs.version }}"/version = "${{ inputs.version }}"/g' Cargo.toml
-
-      - name: Bump versions (local only)
-        run: |
-          cargo workspaces version custom ${{ inputs.version }} \
-            --allow-branch ${{ github.ref_name }} \
-            --no-git-commit \
-
-      # Dry run may show cascading dependency errors because packages aren't
-      # actually uploaded - these are expected and ignored. We check for real
-      # errors like packaging failures, missing metadata, or invalid Cargo.toml.
-      - name: Publish (dry run)
-        run: |
-          output=$(cargo workspaces publish --dry-run --allow-dirty 2>&1) || true
-          echo "$output"
-
-          # Check for real errors (not cascading dependency errors)
-          # Cascading errors mention "crates.io index", real errors mention "Cargo.toml"
-          echo "$output" | grep -i "Cargo.toml" && exit 1 || true
-
-      # Show the list of packages published
-      - name: Show package versions
-        run: cargo workspaces list --long
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-# This is in case, for whatever reason, a publication run fails, and we need to restart halfway down the list, of unbumped/unpublished crates.
-name: Resume crates.io publish
-
-on:
-  workflow_dispatch:
-    inputs:
-      resume_after:
-        description: "Last successfully published crate (will start from the next one)"
-        required: true
-        type: string
-      publish_interval:
-        description: "Seconds to wait between publishes"
-        required: false
-        default: "600"
-        type: string
-
-jobs:
-  publish:
-    runs-on: arc-linux-latest
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout repo
-        uses: actions/checkout@v6
-
-      - name: Install rust toolchain
-        uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
-        with:
-          profile: minimal
-          toolchain: stable
-          override: true
-
-      - name: Install cargo-workspaces
-        run: cargo install cargo-workspaces
-
-      # Get crates in publish order, skip up to and including resume_after
-      - name: Publish remaining crates
-        env:
-          CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
-        run: |
-          CRATES=$(cargo workspaces plan 2>/dev/null | sed -n '/^${{ inputs.resume_after }}$/,$p' | tail -n +2)
-
-          if [ -z "$CRATES" ]; then
-            echo "Error: No crates found after '${{ inputs.resume_after }}'"
-            echo "Check the crate name matches exactly from 'cargo workspaces plan'"
-            exit 1
-          fi
-
-          echo "Will publish the following crates:"
-          echo "$CRATES"
-          echo ""
-
-          echo "$CRATES" | while read crate; do
-            echo "Publishing $crate..."
-            cargo publish -p "$crate" --allow-dirty
-            echo "Waiting ${{ inputs.publish_interval }}s before next publish..."
-            sleep ${{ inputs.publish_interval }}
-          done
-
-      - name: Show package versions
-        run: cargo workspaces list --long
@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-name: Publish crates to crates.io
-
-on:
-  workflow_dispatch:
-    inputs:
-      publish_interval:
-        description: "Seconds to wait between publishes (600 for first publish, 60 after)"
-        required: false
-        default: "600"
-        type: string
-      backup_author:
-        description: "Second team member added as owner of the crate"
-        required: false
-        default: "jstuczyn"
-        type: string
-
-jobs:
-  publish:
-    runs-on: arc-linux-latest
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout repo
-        uses: actions/checkout@v6
-
-      - name: Install rust toolchain
-        uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
-        with:
-          profile: minimal
-          toolchain: stable
-          override: true
-
-      - name: Install cargo-workspaces
-        run: cargo install cargo-workspaces
-
-      # `--publish-as-is` skips version bumping since that's done in a separate CI job.
-      - name: Publish
-        env:
-          CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
-        run: |
-          cargo workspaces publish \
-            --publish-as-is \
-            --publish-interval ${{ inputs.publish_interval }}
-
-      - name: Show package versions
-        run: cargo workspaces list --long
-
-      - name: Add team as crate owners
-        env:
-          CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
-        run: |
-          TEAM="github:nymtech:core"
-          echo "Checking and adding $TEAM as owner to workspace crates..."
-
-          cargo workspaces list | while read crate; do
-            echo "Checking $crate..."
-
-            if cargo owner --list "$crate" 2>/dev/null | grep -q "$TEAM"; then
-              echo "  $TEAM already owns $crate, skipping"
-            else
-              echo "  Adding $TEAM as owner of $crate..."
-              cargo owner --add "$TEAM" "$crate"
-              sleep 2
-            fi
-          done
-
-          echo "Done!"
-
-      - name: Add secondary member as crate owner
-        env:
-          CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
-        run: |
-          TEAM_MEMBER="${{ inputs.backup_author }}"
-          echo "Checking and adding $TEAM_MEMBER as owner to workspace crates..."
-
-          cargo workspaces list | while read crate; do
-            echo "Checking $crate..."
-
-            if cargo owner --list "$crate" 2>/dev/null | grep -q "$TEAM_MEMBER"; then
-              echo "  $TEAM_MEMBER already owns $crate, skipping"
-            else
-              echo "  Adding $TEAM_MEMBER as owner of $crate..."
-              cargo owner --add "$TEAM_MEMBER" "$crate"
-              sleep 2
-            fi
-          done
-
-          echo "Done!"
@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
-name: Bump crate versions
-
-on:
-  workflow_dispatch:
-    inputs:
-      version:
-        description: "Version to set (e.g. 1.21.0)"
-        required: true
-        type: string
-
-env:
-  CI_BOT_AUTHOR: "Nym bot"
-  CI_BOT_EMAIL: "nym-bot@users.noreply.github.com"
-
-jobs:
-  version-bump:
-    runs-on: arc-linux-latest
-    permissions:
-      contents: write
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout repo
-        uses: actions/checkout@v6
-
-      - name: Configure git identity
-        run: |
-          git config --global user.name "${{ env.CI_BOT_AUTHOR }}"
-          git config --global user.email "${{ env.CI_BOT_EMAIL }}"
-
-      - name: Install rust toolchain
-        uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
-        with:
-          profile: minimal
-          toolchain: stable
-          override: true
-
-      - name: Install cargo-workspaces
-        run: cargo install cargo-workspaces
-
-      - name: Setup Node.js
-        uses: actions/setup-node@v4
-        with:
-          node-version: "20"
-
-      - name: Validate version format
-        run: |
-          if ! npx semver "${{ inputs.version }}"; then
-            echo "Error: '${{ inputs.version }}' is not valid semver"
-            exit 1
-          fi
-
-      - name: Get current version
-        id: current_version
-        run: |
-          VERSION=$(grep -oP '^\s*version\s*=\s*"\K[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+' Cargo.toml | head -1)
-          echo "version=$VERSION" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-
-      - name: Update workspace dependencies
-        run: |
-          sed -i '/path = /s/version = "${{ steps.current_version.outputs.version }}"/version = "${{ inputs.version }}"/g' Cargo.toml
-
-      - name: Bump versions
-        run: |
-          cargo workspaces version custom ${{ inputs.version }} \
-            --no-git-commit \
-            --yes
-
-      - name: Commit and push version bump
-        run: |
-          git add -A
-          git commit -m "crates release: bump version to ${{ inputs.version }}"
-          git push
-
-      - name: Show package versions
-        run: cargo workspaces list --long
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-name: ci-docs-linkcheck
-
-on:
-  workflow_dispatch:
-  push:
-    paths:
-      - "documentation/docs/**"
-      - ".github/workflows/ci-docs-linkcheck.yml"
-      - "lychee.toml"
-
-jobs:
-  linkcheck:
-    runs-on: arc-linux-latest
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
-
-      - name: Check links
-        uses: lycheeverse/lychee-action@v2
-        with:
-          args: ${{ github.workspace }}/documentation/docs/ --config ${{ github.workspace }}/lychee.toml --root-dir ${{ github.workspace }}/documentation/docs/pages/
-          fail: true
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+name: Publish to crates.io (dry run)
+
+on:
+  workflow_dispatch:
+    inputs:
+      version:
+        description: "Version to publish (e.g. 1.21.0)"
+        required: true
+        type: string
+
+jobs:
+  publish-dry-run:
+    runs-on: arc-ubuntu-22.04-dind
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout repo
+        uses: actions/checkout@v6
+
+      - name: Install rust toolchain
+        uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
+        with:
+          profile: minimal
+          toolchain: stable
+          override: true
+
+      - name: Install cargo-workspaces
+        run: cargo install cargo-workspaces
+
+      - name: Bump versions (local only)
+        run: |
+          cargo workspaces version ${{ inputs.version }} \
+            --no-git-commit \
+            --no-git-tag \
+            --no-git-push \
+            --yes
+
+      # Note: Dry run may show cascading dependency errors because packages
+      # aren't actually uploaded. Check if the missing dependency has an
+      # "aborting upload due to dry run" message earlier in the output - if so,
+      # it would succeed in a real publish since cargo-workspaces publishes in
+      # dependency order. cargo-workspaces doesn't fail on err, so there isn't
+      # a good way to check this at the moment.
+      - name: Publish (dry run)
+        run: cargo workspaces publish --from-git --dry-run --allow-dirty
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+name: Publish to crates.io
+
+on:
+  workflow_dispatch:
+    inputs:
+      version:
+        description: "Version to publish (e.g. 1.21.0)"
+        required: true
+        type: string
+
+jobs:
+  publish:
+    runs-on: arc-ubuntu-22.04-dind
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout repo
+        uses: actions/checkout@v6
+
+      - name: Install rust toolchain
+        uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
+        with:
+          profile: minimal
+          toolchain: stable
+          override: true
+
+      - name: Install cargo-workspaces
+        run: cargo install cargo-workspaces
+
+      # - name: Configure git
+      #   run: |
+      #     git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
+      #     git config user.email "github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
+
+      - name: Bump versions
+        run: |
+          cargo workspaces version ${{ inputs.version }} \
+            --no-git-push \
+            --no-git-tag \
+            --yes
+
+      - name: Publish
+        env:
+          CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
+        run: cargo workspaces publish --from-git --no-git-commit
+
+      # - name: Push version commit
+      #   run: |
+      #     git push origin HEAD
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ jobs:
          git config --global user.name "Lawrence Stalder"

      - name: Get version from cargo.toml
-        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.52.2
+        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.50.1
        id: get_version
        with:
          cmd: yq -oy '.package.version' ${{ env.WORKING_DIRECTORY }}/nym-credential-proxy/Cargo.toml
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ jobs:
          git config --global user.name "Lawrence Stalder"

      - name: Get version from cargo.toml
-        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.52.2
+        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.50.1
        id: get_version
        with:
          cmd: yq -oy '.package.version' ${{ env.WORKING_DIRECTORY }}/Cargo.toml
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ jobs:
          git config --global user.name "Lawrence Stalder"

      - name: Get version from cargo.toml
-        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.52.2
+        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.50.1
        id: get_version
        with:
          cmd: yq -oy '.package.version' ${{ env.WORKING_DIRECTORY }}/nym-network-monitor/Cargo.toml
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ jobs:
          git config --global user.name "Lawrence Stalder"

      - name: Get version from cargo.toml
-        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.52.2
+        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.50.1
        id: get_version
        with:
          cmd: yq -oy '.package.version' ${{ env.WORKING_DIRECTORY }}/nym-api/Cargo.toml
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ jobs:
          git config --global user.name "Lawrence Stalder"

      - name: Get version from cargo.toml
-        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.52.2
+        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.50.1
        id: get_version
        with:
          cmd: yq -oy '.package.version' ${{ env.WORKING_DIRECTORY }}/Cargo.toml
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ jobs:
          git config --global user.name "Lawrence Stalder"

      - name: Get version from cargo.toml
-        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.52.2
+        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.50.1
        id: get_version
        with:
          cmd: yq -oy '.package.version' ${{ env.WORKING_DIRECTORY }}/Cargo.toml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ env:

 jobs:
  build-container:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    runs-on: arc-ubuntu-22.04-dind
    steps:
      - name: Login to Harbor
        uses: docker/login-action@v3
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ jobs:
          git config --global user.name "Lawrence Stalder"

      - name: Get version from cargo.toml
-        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.52.2
+        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.50.1
        id: get_version
        with:
          cmd: yq -oy '.package.version' ${{ env.WORKING_DIRECTORY }}/Cargo.toml
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ jobs:
          git config --global user.name "Lawrence Stalder"

      - name: Get version from cargo.toml
-        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.52.2
+        uses: mikefarah/yq@v4.50.1
        id: get_version
        with:
          cmd: yq -oy '.package.version' ${{ env.WORKING_DIRECTORY }}/Cargo.toml
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-name: Resume publish to crates.io
-
-on:
-  workflow_dispatch:
-    inputs:
-      resume_after:
-        description: "Last successfully published crate (will start from the next one)"
-        required: true
-        type: string
-
-jobs:
-  publish:
-    runs-on: arc-linux-latest
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout repo
-        uses: actions/checkout@v6
-
-      - name: Install rust toolchain
-        uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
-        with:
-          profile: minimal
-          toolchain: stable
-          override: true
-
-      - name: Install cargo-workspaces
-        run: cargo install cargo-workspaces
-
-      - name: Publish remaining crates
-        env:
-          CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
-        run: |
-          # Get crates in publish order, skip up to and including resume_after
-          cargo workspaces plan 2>/dev/null | sed -n '/^${{ inputs.resume_after }}$/,$p' | tail -n +2 | while read crate; do
-            echo "Publishing $crate..."
-            cargo publish -p "$crate" --allow-dirty
-            echo "Waiting 600s before next publish..."
-            sleep 600
-          done
-
-      - name: Show package versions
-        run: cargo workspaces list --long
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ nym-api/redocly/formatted-openapi.json
 *.profraw
 .beads
 CLAUDE.md
+docs
 .claude
 .superego

@@ -76,4 +77,3 @@ CLAUDE.md
 .claude/settings.json

 /notes
-/target-otel
@@ -4,86 +4,6 @@ Post 1.0.0 release, the changelog format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://

 ## [Unreleased]

-## [2026.3-parmigiano] (2026-02-10)
-
- chore: disable LP on parmigiano branch ([#6422])
- revert mixnet-based client fautly changes from LP ([#6420])
- [LP fix] Registration client with fallback ([#6419])
- Lp/ip pool fixes ([#6412])
- [LP-fix] expose wg psk for the vpn-client ([#6411])
- LP-fix : configurable LP timeouts ([#6409])
- LP-fix : add LP x25519 key to the description ([#6408])
- use rng that is Send ([#6404])
- use local kem key instead of local x25519 ([#6402])
- [LP Gateway Probe] CLI and behavior improvements  ([#6400])
- lp: attempt to negotiate (and use) protocol version ([#6399])
- bugfix: use correct reserved bytes when parsing LpHeader ([#6398])
- Lp/bugfix/share ip allocation ([#6395])
- feat: use hex-encoding for lp key digests ([#6394])
- Add socks5 test to gateway-probe ([#6393])
- [LP Gateway probe] Improve file structure ([#6391])
- Reduce the size of `HttpClientError` ([#6390])
- Lp/two step dvpn reg ([#6386])
- Add extra configured nym api url to env ([#6382])
- Lp/dvpn psk injection ([#6378])
- LP: include signing key digests to LP responses ([#6373])
- Lp/use noise x25519 ([#6372])
- Topology fallback ([#6363])
- NS API socks5 support ([#6361])
- LP: modified LPRemotePeer to dynamically choose required KEM key hash ([#6358])
- Fix KKT Integration into LP ([#6357])
- LP: mixnet reg fixes ([#6356])
- LP: announced KEM key hashes ([#6349])
- revert faulty drop changes ([#6346])
- small qol changes ([#6340])
- Apply configured api urls via env ([#6337])
- lp chore: make sure to take reserved bytes straight from the header ([#6336])
- LP: x25519/ed22519 cleanup round ([#6335])
- Lp/encrypted kkt ([#6331])
- ensure packets with incompatible versions are rejected ([#6326])
- standarise lp serialisation: ([#6324])
- Upgrade to def_guard_wireguard v0.8.0 ([#6315])
- Max/crates io prep v2 ([#6270])
-
-[#6422]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6422
-[#6420]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6420
-[#6419]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6419
-[#6412]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6412
-[#6411]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6411
-[#6409]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6409
-[#6408]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6408
-[#6404]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6404
-[#6402]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6402
-[#6400]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6400
-[#6399]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6399
-[#6398]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6398
-[#6395]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6395
-[#6394]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6394
-[#6393]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6393
-[#6391]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6391
-[#6390]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6390
-[#6386]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6386
-[#6382]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6382
-[#6378]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6378
-[#6373]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6373
-[#6372]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6372
-[#6363]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6363
-[#6361]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6361
-[#6358]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6358
-[#6357]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6357
-[#6356]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6356
-[#6349]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6349
-[#6346]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6346
-[#6340]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6340
-[#6337]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6337
-[#6336]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6336
-[#6335]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6335
-[#6331]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6331
-[#6326]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6326
-[#6324]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6324
-[#6315]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6315
-[#6270]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/6270
-
 ## [2026.2-oscypek] (2026-01-27)

 - bugfix: downgrade gateway protocol to clients proposed version ([#6377])
@@ -173,8 +173,9 @@ members = [
    "wasm/mix-fetch",
    "wasm/node-tester",
    "wasm/zknym-lib",
-    "nym-gateway-probe",
+    #    "nym-gateway-probe",
    "integration-tests", "common/nym-lp-transport", "common/nym-kkt-ciphersuite",
+    "common/nym-lp-sandbox"
 ]

 default-members = [
@@ -185,6 +186,7 @@ default-members = [
    "nym-credential-proxy/nym-credential-proxy",
    "nym-node",
    "nym-node-status-api/nym-node-status-agent",
+    "nym-node-status-api/nym-node-status-api",
    "nym-statistics-api",
    "nym-validator-rewarder",
    "nyx-chain-watcher",
@@ -205,7 +207,7 @@ edition = "2024"
 license = "Apache-2.0"
 rust-version = "1.85"
 readme = "README.md"
-version = "1.20.4"
+version = "1.20.1"

 [workspace.dependencies]
 addr = "0.15.6"
@@ -232,7 +234,7 @@ blake3 = "1.7.0"
 bloomfilter = "3.0.1"
 bs58 = "0.5.1"
 bytecodec = "0.4.15"
-bytes = "1.11.1"
+bytes = "1.10.1"
 cargo_metadata = "0.19.2"
 celes = "2.6.0"
 cfg-if = "1.0.0"
@@ -303,16 +305,13 @@ ledger-transport = "0.10.0"
 ledger-transport-hid = "0.10.0"
 log = "0.4"
 mime = "0.3.17"
-mock_instant = "0.6.0"
 moka = { version = "0.12", features = ["future"] }
 nix = "0.30.1"
 notify = "5.1.0"
 num_enum = "0.7.5"
 once_cell = "1.21.3"
-opentelemetry = "0.31.0"
-opentelemetry_sdk = "0.31.0"
-opentelemetry-otlp = "0.31.0"
-tonic = "0.14.4"
+opentelemetry = "0.19.0"
+opentelemetry-jaeger = "0.18.0"
 parking_lot = "0.12.3"
 pem = "0.8"
 petgraph = "0.6.5"
@@ -322,13 +321,13 @@ publicsuffix = "2.3.0"
 proc_pidinfo = "0.1.3"
 quote = "1"
 rand = "0.8.5"
-rand09 = { package = "rand", version = "=0.9.2" }
+rand09 = { package = "rand", version = "0.9.2" }
 rand_chacha = "0.3"
 rand_core = "0.6.3"
 rand_distr = "0.4"
 rayon = "1.5.1"
 regex = "1.10.6"
-reqwest = { version = "0.13.1", default-features = false }
+reqwest = { version = "0.12.15", default-features = false }
 rs_merkle = "1.5.0"
 schemars = "0.8.22"
 semver = "1.0.26"
@@ -370,8 +369,9 @@ tower = "0.5.2"
 tower-http = "0.6.6"
 tracing = "0.1.41"
 tracing-log = "0.2"
-tracing-opentelemetry = "0.32.1"
+tracing-opentelemetry = "0.19.0"
 tracing-subscriber = "0.3.20"
+tracing-tree = "0.2.2"
 tracing-indicatif = "0.3.9"
 tracing-test = "0.2.5"
 ts-rs = "10.1.0"
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ url = "2.5"
 utoipa = "5.2"
 utoipa-swagger-ui = "8.1"
 utoipauto = "0.2"
-uuid = "1.19.0"
+uuid = "*"
 vergen = { version = "=8.3.1", default-features = false }
 vergen-gitcl = { version = "1.0.8", default-features = false }
 walkdir = "2"
@@ -392,107 +392,119 @@ zeroize = "1.7.0"

 prometheus = { version = "0.14.0" }

+
+# libcrux
+libcrux-kem = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux" }
+libcrux-ecdh = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux" }
+libcrux-chacha20poly1305 = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux" }
+libcrux-psq = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux" }
+libcrux-ml-kem = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux" }
+libcrux-sha3 = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux" }
+libcrux-traits = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux" }
+
+
+
 # Workspace dep definitions required by crates.io publication - we need a workspace version since `cargo workspaces` doesn't work with path imports from crate manifests
-nym-api-requests = { version = "1.20.4", path = "nym-api/nym-api-requests" }
-nym-authenticator-requests = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/authenticator-requests" }
-nym-async-file-watcher = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/async-file-watcher" }
-nym-authenticator-client = { version = "1.20.4", path = "nym-authenticator-client" }
-nym-bandwidth-controller = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/bandwidth-controller" }
-nym-bin-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/bin-common" }
-nym-cache = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nym-cache" }
-nym-client-core = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/client-core", default-features = false }
-nym-client-core-config-types = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/client-core/config-types" }
-nym-client-core-gateways-storage = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/client-core/gateways-storage" }
-nym-client-core-surb-storage = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/client-core/surb-storage" }
-nym-client-websocket-requests = { version = "1.20.4", path = "clients/native/websocket-requests" }
-nym-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nym-common" }
-nym-compact-ecash = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nym_offline_compact_ecash" }
-nym-config = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/config" }
-nym-contracts-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/contracts-common" }
-nym-coconut-dkg-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/coconut-dkg" }
-nym-credential-storage = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/credential-storage" }
-nym-credential-utils = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/credential-utils" }
-nym-credential-proxy-lib = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/credential-proxy" }
-nym-credentials = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/credentials", default-features = false }
-nym-credentials-interface = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/credentials-interface" }
-nym-credential-proxy-requests = { version = "1.20.4", path = "nym-credential-proxy/nym-credential-proxy-requests", default-features = false }
-nym-credential-verification = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/credential-verification" }
-nym-crypto = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/crypto", default-features = false }
-nym-dkg = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/dkg" }
-nym-ecash-contract-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/ecash-contract" }
-nym-ecash-signer-check = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/ecash-signer-check" }
-nym-ecash-signer-check-types = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/ecash-signer-check-types" }
-nym-ecash-time = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/ecash-time" }
-nym-exit-policy = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/exit-policy" }
-nym-ffi-shared = { version = "1.20.4", path = "sdk/ffi/shared" }
-nym-gateway-client = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/client-libs/gateway-client", default-features = false }
-nym-gateway-requests = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/gateway-requests" }
-nym-gateway-storage = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/gateway-storage" }
-nym-gateway-stats-storage = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/gateway-stats-storage" }
-nym-group-contract-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/group-contract" }
-nym-http-api-client = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/http-api-client" }
-nym-http-api-client-macro = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/http-api-client-macro" }
-nym-http-api-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/http-api-common", default-features = false }
-nym-id = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nym-id" }
-nym-ip-packet-client = { version = "1.20.4", path = "nym-ip-packet-client" }
-nym-ip-packet-requests = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/ip-packet-requests" }
+nym-api-requests = { version = "1.20.1", path = "nym-api/nym-api-requests" }
+nym-authenticator-requests = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/authenticator-requests" }
+nym-async-file-watcher = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/async-file-watcher" }
+nym-authenticator-client = { version = "1.20.1", path = "nym-authenticator-client" }
+nym-bandwidth-controller = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/bandwidth-controller" }
+nym-bin-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/bin-common" }
+nym-cache = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nym-cache" }
+nym-client-core = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/client-core", default-features = false }
+nym-client-core-config-types = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/client-core/config-types" }
+nym-client-core-gateways-storage = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/client-core/gateways-storage" }
+nym-client-core-surb-storage = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/client-core/surb-storage" }
+nym-client-websocket-requests = { version = "1.20.1", path = "clients/native/websocket-requests" }
+nym-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nym-common" }
+nym-compact-ecash = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nym_offline_compact_ecash" }
+nym-config = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/config" }
+nym-contracts-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/contracts-common" }
+nym-coconut-dkg-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/coconut-dkg" }
+nym-credential-storage = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/credential-storage" }
+nym-credential-utils = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/credential-utils" }
+nym-credential-proxy-lib = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/credential-proxy" }
+nym-credentials = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/credentials", default-features = false }
+nym-credentials-interface = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/credentials-interface" }
+nym-credential-proxy-requests = { version = "1.20.1", path = "nym-credential-proxy/nym-credential-proxy-requests", default-features = false }
+nym-credential-verification = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/credential-verification" }
+nym-crypto = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/crypto", default-features = false }
+nym-dkg = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/dkg" }
+nym-ecash-contract-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/ecash-contract" }
+nym-ecash-signer-check = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/ecash-signer-check" }
+nym-ecash-signer-check-types = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/ecash-signer-check-types" }
+nym-ecash-time = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/ecash-time" }
+nym-exit-policy = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/exit-policy" }
+nym-ffi-shared = { version = "1.20.1", path = "sdk/ffi/shared" }
+nym-gateway-client = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/client-libs/gateway-client", default-features = false }
+nym-gateway-requests = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/gateway-requests" }
+nym-gateway-storage = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/gateway-storage" }
+nym-gateway-stats-storage = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/gateway-stats-storage" }
+nym-group-contract-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/group-contract" }
+nym-http-api-client = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/http-api-client" }
+nym-http-api-client-macro = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/http-api-client-macro" }
+nym-http-api-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/http-api-common", default-features = false }
+nym-id = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nym-id" }
 nym-kkt-ciphersuite = { path = "common/nym-kkt-ciphersuite" }
-nym-metrics = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nym-metrics" }
-nym-mixnet-client = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/client-libs/mixnet-client" }
-nym-mixnet-contract-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/mixnet-contract" }
-nym-multisig-contract-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/multisig-contract" }
-nym-network-defaults = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/network-defaults" }
-nym-node-tester-utils = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/node-tester-utils" }
-nym-noise = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymnoise" }
-nym-noise-keys = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymnoise/keys" }
-nym-nonexhaustive-delayqueue = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nonexhaustive-delayqueue" }
-nym-node-requests = { version = "1.20.4", path = "nym-node/nym-node-requests", default-features = false }
-nym-node-metrics = { version = "1.20.4", path = "nym-node/nym-node-metrics" }
-nym-ordered-buffer = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/socks5/ordered-buffer" }
-nym-outfox = { version = "1.20.4", path = "nym-outfox" }
-nym-registration-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/registration" }
-nym-pemstore = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/pemstore" }
-nym-performance-contract-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/nym-performance-contract" }
-nym-sdk = { version = "1.20.4", path = "sdk/rust/nym-sdk" }
-nym-serde-helpers = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/serde-helpers" }
-nym-service-providers-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "service-providers/common" }
-nym-service-provider-requests-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/service-provider-requests-common" }
-nym-socks5-client-core = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/socks5-client-core" }
-nym-socks5-proxy-helpers = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/socks5/proxy-helpers" }
-nym-socks5-requests = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/socks5/requests" }
-nym-sphinx = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymsphinx" }
-nym-sphinx-acknowledgements = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymsphinx/acknowledgements" }
-nym-sphinx-addressing = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymsphinx/addressing" }
-nym-sphinx-anonymous-replies = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymsphinx/anonymous-replies" }
-nym-sphinx-chunking = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymsphinx/chunking" }
-nym-sphinx-cover = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymsphinx/cover" }
-nym-sphinx-forwarding = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymsphinx/forwarding" }
-nym-sphinx-framing = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymsphinx/framing" }
-nym-sphinx-params = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymsphinx/params" }
-nym-sphinx-routing = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymsphinx/routing" }
-nym-sphinx-types = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nymsphinx/types" }
-nym-statistics-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/statistics" }
-nym-store-cipher = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/store-cipher" }
-nym-task = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/task" }
-nym-tun = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/tun" }
-nym-test-utils = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/test-utils" }
-nym-ticketbooks-merkle = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/ticketbooks-merkle" }
-nym-topology = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/topology" }
-nym-types = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/types" }
-nym-upgrade-mode-check = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/upgrade-mode-check" }
-nym-validator-client = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/client-libs/validator-client", default-features = false }
-nym-vesting-contract-common = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/vesting-contract" }
-nym-verloc = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/verloc" }
-nym-wireguard = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/wireguard" }
-nym-wireguard-types = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/wireguard-types" }
-nym-wireguard-private-metadata-shared = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/wireguard-private-metadata/shared" }
-nym-wireguard-private-metadata-client = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/wireguard-private-metadata/client" }
-nym-wireguard-private-metadata-server = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/wireguard-private-metadata/server" }
+nym-ip-packet-client = { version = "1.20.1", path = "nym-ip-packet-client" }
+nym-ip-packet-requests = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/ip-packet-requests" }
+nym-metrics = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nym-metrics" }
+nym-mixnet-client = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/client-libs/mixnet-client" }
+nym-mixnet-contract-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/mixnet-contract" }
+nym-multisig-contract-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/multisig-contract" }
+nym-network-defaults = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/network-defaults" }
+nym-node-tester-utils = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/node-tester-utils" }
+nym-noise = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymnoise" }
+nym-noise-keys = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymnoise/keys" }
+nym-nonexhaustive-delayqueue = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nonexhaustive-delayqueue" }
+nym-node-requests = { version = "1.20.1", path = "nym-node/nym-node-requests", default-features = false }
+nym-node-metrics = { version = "1.20.1", path = "nym-node/nym-node-metrics" }
+nym-ordered-buffer = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/socks5/ordered-buffer" }
+nym-outfox = { version = "1.20.1", path = "nym-outfox" }
+nym-registration-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/registration" }
+nym-pemstore = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/pemstore" }
+nym-performance-contract-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/nym-performance-contract" }
+nym-sdk = { version = "1.20.1", path = "sdk/rust/nym-sdk" }
+nym-serde-helpers = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/serde-helpers" }
+nym-service-providers-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "service-providers/common" }
+nym-service-provider-requests-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/service-provider-requests-common" }
+nym-socks5-client-core = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/socks5-client-core" }
+nym-socks5-proxy-helpers = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/socks5/proxy-helpers" }
+nym-socks5-requests = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/socks5/requests" }
+nym-sphinx = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymsphinx" }
+nym-sphinx-acknowledgements = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymsphinx/acknowledgements" }
+nym-sphinx-addressing = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymsphinx/addressing" }
+nym-sphinx-anonymous-replies = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymsphinx/anonymous-replies" }
+nym-sphinx-chunking = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymsphinx/chunking" }
+nym-sphinx-cover = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymsphinx/cover" }
+nym-sphinx-forwarding = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymsphinx/forwarding" }
+nym-sphinx-framing = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymsphinx/framing" }
+nym-sphinx-params = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymsphinx/params" }
+nym-sphinx-routing = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymsphinx/routing" }
+nym-sphinx-types = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nymsphinx/types" }
+nym-statistics-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/statistics" }
+nym-store-cipher = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/store-cipher" }
+nym-task = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/task" }
+nym-tun = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/tun" }
+nym-test-utils = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/test-utils" }
+nym-ticketbooks-merkle = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/ticketbooks-merkle" }
+nym-topology = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/topology" }
+nym-types = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/types" }
+nym-upgrade-mode-check = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/upgrade-mode-check" }
+nym-validator-client = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/client-libs/validator-client", default-features = false }
+nym-vesting-contract-common = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/cosmwasm-smart-contracts/vesting-contract" }
+nym-verloc = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/verloc" }
+nym-wireguard = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/wireguard" }
+nym-wireguard-types = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/wireguard-types" }
+nym-wireguard-private-metadata-shared = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/wireguard-private-metadata/shared" }
+nym-wireguard-private-metadata-client = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/wireguard-private-metadata/client" }
+nym-wireguard-private-metadata-server = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/wireguard-private-metadata/server" }
 nym-sqlx-pool-guard = { version = "1.2.0", path = "nym-sqlx-pool-guard" }
-nym-wasm-client-core = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/wasm/client-core" }
-nym-wasm-storage = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/wasm/storage" }
-nym-wasm-utils = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/wasm/utils", default-features = false }
-nyxd-scraper-shared = { version = "1.20.4", path = "common/nyxd-scraper-shared" }
+nym-wasm-client-core = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/wasm/client-core" }
+nym-wasm-storage = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/wasm/storage" }
+nym-wasm-utils = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/wasm/utils", default-features = false }
+nyxd-scraper-shared = { version = "1.20.1", path = "common/nyxd-scraper-shared" }

 # coconut/DKG related
 # unfortunately until https://github.com/zkcrypto/nym-bls12_381-fork/issues/10 is resolved, we have to rely on the fork
@@ -542,6 +554,7 @@ wasm-bindgen-test = "0.3.49"
 wasmtimer = "0.4.1"
 web-sys = "0.3.76"

+
 # for local development:
 #[patch.crates-io]
 #sphinx-packet = { path = "../sphinx" }
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "nym-client"
-version = "1.1.70"
+version = "1.1.69"
 authors = ["Dave Hrycyszyn <futurechimp@users.noreply.github.com>", "Jędrzej Stuczyński <andrew@nymtech.net>"]
 description = "Implementation of the Nym Client"
 edition = "2021"
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "devDependencies": {
    "clean-webpack-plugin": "^4.0.0",
-    "webpack": "^5.105.0",
+    "webpack": "^5.76.0",
    "webpack-cli": "^4.9.2",
    "webpack-dev-server": "^4.7.4"
  },
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "nym-socks5-client"
-version = "1.1.70"
+version = "1.1.69"
 authors = ["Dave Hrycyszyn <futurechimp@users.noreply.github.com>"]
 description = "A SOCKS5 localhost proxy that converts incoming messages to Sphinx and sends them to a Nym address"
 edition = "2021"
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ mod util;
 mod version;

 pub use error::Error;
-pub use util::{authenticator_ipv4_to_ipv6, authenticator_ipv6_to_ipv4};
 pub use v6 as latest;
 pub use version::AuthenticatorVersion;

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ use crate::traits::{
    TopUpBandwidthResponse, UpgradeModeStatus,
 };
 use crate::{v2, v3, v4, v5, v6};
-use nym_sphinx::addressing::Recipient;

 #[derive(Debug)]
 pub enum AuthenticatorResponse {
@@ -18,17 +17,6 @@ pub enum AuthenticatorResponse {
    UpgradeMode(Box<dyn UpgradeModeStatus + Send + Sync + 'static>),
 }

-pub struct SerialisedResponse {
-    pub bytes: Vec<u8>,
-    pub reply_to: Option<Recipient>,
-}
-
-impl SerialisedResponse {
-    pub fn new(bytes: Vec<u8>, reply_to: Option<Recipient>) -> Self {
-        Self { bytes, reply_to }
-    }
-}
-
 impl UpgradeModeStatus for AuthenticatorResponse {
    fn upgrade_mode_status(&self) -> CurrentUpgradeModeStatus {
        match self {
@@ -1,38 +1,6 @@
 // Copyright 2024 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

-use nym_network_defaults::{WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V4, WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6};
-use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};
-
-pub fn authenticator_ipv6_to_ipv4(addr: Ipv6Addr) -> Ipv4Addr {
-    let before_last_byte = addr.octets()[14];
-    let last_byte = addr.octets()[15];
-
-    Ipv4Addr::new(
-        WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V4.octets()[0],
-        WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V4.octets()[1],
-        before_last_byte,
-        last_byte,
-    )
-}
-
-pub fn authenticator_ipv4_to_ipv6(addr: Ipv4Addr) -> Ipv6Addr {
-    let before_last_byte = addr.octets()[2];
-    let last_byte = addr.octets()[3];
-
-    let last_bytes = ((before_last_byte as u16) << 8) | last_byte as u16;
-    Ipv6Addr::new(
-        WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[0],
-        WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[1],
-        WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[2],
-        WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[3],
-        WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[4],
-        WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[5],
-        WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[6],
-        last_bytes,
-    )
-}
-
 #[cfg(test)]
 pub(crate) mod tests {
    pub(crate) const CREDENTIAL_BYTES: [u8; 1245] = [
@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

 use crate::error::Error;
-use crate::util::{authenticator_ipv4_to_ipv6, authenticator_ipv6_to_ipv4};
 use base64::{Engine, engine::general_purpose};
 use nym_credentials_interface::CredentialSpendingData;
+use nym_network_defaults::constants::{WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V4, WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6};
 use nym_wireguard_types::PeerPublicKey;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use std::collections::HashMap;
@@ -56,11 +56,27 @@ impl fmt::Display for IpPair {

 impl From<IpAddr> for IpPair {
    fn from(value: IpAddr) -> Self {
-        let (ipv4, ipv6) = match value {
-            IpAddr::V4(ipv4) => (ipv4, authenticator_ipv4_to_ipv6(ipv4)),
-            IpAddr::V6(ipv6_addr) => (authenticator_ipv6_to_ipv4(ipv6_addr), ipv6_addr),
+        let (before_last_byte, last_byte) = match value {
+            std::net::IpAddr::V4(ipv4_addr) => (ipv4_addr.octets()[2], ipv4_addr.octets()[3]),
+            std::net::IpAddr::V6(ipv6_addr) => (ipv6_addr.octets()[14], ipv6_addr.octets()[15]),
        };
-
+        let last_bytes = ((before_last_byte as u16) << 8) | last_byte as u16;
+        let ipv4 = Ipv4Addr::new(
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V4.octets()[0],
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V4.octets()[1],
+            before_last_byte,
+            last_byte,
+        );
+        let ipv6 = Ipv6Addr::new(
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[0],
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[1],
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[2],
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[3],
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[4],
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[5],
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[6],
+            last_bytes,
+        );
        IpPair::new(ipv4, ipv6)
    }
 }
@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

 use crate::error::Error;
-use crate::util::{authenticator_ipv4_to_ipv6, authenticator_ipv6_to_ipv4};
 use base64::{Engine, engine::general_purpose};
 use nym_credentials_interface::CredentialSpendingData;
+use nym_network_defaults::constants::{WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V4, WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6};
 use nym_wireguard_types::PeerPublicKey;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use std::collections::HashMap;
@@ -54,11 +54,27 @@ impl fmt::Display for IpPair {

 impl From<IpAddr> for IpPair {
    fn from(value: IpAddr) -> Self {
-        let (ipv4, ipv6) = match value {
-            IpAddr::V4(ipv4) => (ipv4, authenticator_ipv4_to_ipv6(ipv4)),
-            IpAddr::V6(ipv6_addr) => (authenticator_ipv6_to_ipv4(ipv6_addr), ipv6_addr),
+        let (before_last_byte, last_byte) = match value {
+            std::net::IpAddr::V4(ipv4_addr) => (ipv4_addr.octets()[2], ipv4_addr.octets()[3]),
+            std::net::IpAddr::V6(ipv6_addr) => (ipv6_addr.octets()[14], ipv6_addr.octets()[15]),
        };
-
+        let last_bytes = ((before_last_byte as u16) << 8) | last_byte as u16;
+        let ipv4 = Ipv4Addr::new(
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V4.octets()[0],
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V4.octets()[1],
+            before_last_byte,
+            last_byte,
+        );
+        let ipv6 = Ipv6Addr::new(
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[0],
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[1],
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[2],
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[3],
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[4],
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[5],
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[6],
+            last_bytes,
+        );
        IpPair::new(ipv4, ipv6)
    }
 }
@@ -3,12 +3,13 @@

 use crate::error::Error;
 use crate::models::BandwidthClaim;
-use crate::util::{authenticator_ipv4_to_ipv6, authenticator_ipv6_to_ipv4};
 use base64::{Engine, engine::general_purpose};
+use nym_network_defaults::constants::{WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V4, WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6};
 use nym_wireguard_types::PeerPublicKey;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use std::collections::HashMap;
 use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};
+use std::time::SystemTime;
 use std::{fmt, ops::Deref, str::FromStr};

 #[cfg(feature = "verify")]
@@ -19,11 +20,13 @@ use nym_crypto::asymmetric::x25519::{PrivateKey, PublicKey};
 use sha2::Sha256;

 pub type PendingRegistrations = HashMap<PeerPublicKey, RegistrationData>;
+pub type PrivateIPs = HashMap<IpPair, Taken>;

 #[cfg(feature = "verify")]
 pub type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;

 pub type Nonce = u64;
+pub type Taken = Option<SystemTime>;

 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct IpPair {
@@ -51,11 +54,27 @@ impl fmt::Display for IpPair {

 impl From<IpAddr> for IpPair {
    fn from(value: IpAddr) -> Self {
-        let (ipv4, ipv6) = match value {
-            IpAddr::V4(ipv4) => (ipv4, authenticator_ipv4_to_ipv6(ipv4)),
-            IpAddr::V6(ipv6_addr) => (authenticator_ipv6_to_ipv4(ipv6_addr), ipv6_addr),
+        let (before_last_byte, last_byte) = match value {
+            IpAddr::V4(ipv4_addr) => (ipv4_addr.octets()[2], ipv4_addr.octets()[3]),
+            IpAddr::V6(ipv6_addr) => (ipv6_addr.octets()[14], ipv6_addr.octets()[15]),
        };
-
+        let last_bytes = ((before_last_byte as u16) << 8) | last_byte as u16;
+        let ipv4 = Ipv4Addr::new(
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V4.octets()[0],
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V4.octets()[1],
+            before_last_byte,
+            last_byte,
+        );
+        let ipv6 = Ipv6Addr::new(
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[0],
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[1],
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[2],
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[3],
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[4],
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[5],
+            WG_TUN_DEVICE_IP_ADDRESS_V6.segments()[6],
+            last_bytes,
+        );
        IpPair::new(ipv4, ipv6)
    }
 }
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ pub struct MockBandwidthController {
 impl BandwidthTicketProvider for MockBandwidthController {
    async fn get_ecash_ticket(
        &self,
-        ticket_type: TicketType,
+        _ticket_type: TicketType,
        _gateway_id: PublicKey,
        tickets_to_spend: u32,
    ) -> Result<PreparedCredential, BandwidthControllerError> {
@@ -100,10 +100,6 @@ impl BandwidthTicketProvider for MockBandwidthController {
        let mut credential = CredentialSpendingData::try_from_bytes(&CREDENTIAL_BYTES)
            .expect("Failed to deserialize test credential - this is a bug in the test harness");

-        // change the ticket type to the requested ticket
-        // note that verification outside mocks is going to fail
-        credential.payment.t_type = ticket_type.to_repr() as u8;
-
        // Update spend_date to today to pass validation
        credential.spend_date = OffsetDateTime::now_utc().date();

@@ -57,22 +57,3 @@ where
        Ok(Some(token))
    }
 }
-
-#[cfg_attr(target_arch = "wasm32", async_trait(?Send))]
-#[cfg_attr(not(target_arch = "wasm32"), async_trait)]
-impl<T: BandwidthTicketProvider + ?Sized + Send> BandwidthTicketProvider for Box<T> {
-    async fn get_ecash_ticket(
-        &self,
-        ticket_type: TicketType,
-        gateway_id: ed25519::PublicKey,
-        tickets_to_spend: u32,
-    ) -> Result<PreparedCredential, BandwidthControllerError> {
-        (**self)
-            .get_ecash_ticket(ticket_type, gateway_id, tickets_to_spend)
-            .await
-    }
-
-    async fn get_upgrade_mode_token(&self) -> Result<Option<String>, BandwidthControllerError> {
-        (**self).get_upgrade_mode_token().await
-    }
-}
@@ -19,15 +19,12 @@ serde_json = { workspace = true, optional = true }

 ## tracing
 tracing-subscriber = { workspace = true, features = ["env-filter"], optional = true }
+tracing-tree = { workspace = true, optional = true }
 tracing = { workspace = true, optional = true }
+opentelemetry-jaeger = { workspace = true, features = ["rt-tokio", "collector_client", "isahc_collector_client"], optional = true }
 tracing-opentelemetry = { workspace = true, optional = true }
 utoipa = { workspace = true, optional = true }
-opentelemetry = { workspace = true, features = ["trace"], optional = true }
-
-## otel-otlp (modern OTLP export to SigNoz/any OTLP collector)
-opentelemetry_sdk = { workspace = true, features = ["trace"], optional = true }
-opentelemetry-otlp = { workspace = true, features = ["grpc-tonic", "trace", "tls-roots"], optional = true }
-tonic = { workspace = true, optional = true }
+opentelemetry = { workspace = true, features = ["rt-tokio"], optional = true }


 [build-dependencies]
@@ -38,14 +35,13 @@ default = []
 openapi = ["utoipa"]
 output_format = ["serde_json", "dep:clap"]
 bin_info_schema = ["schemars"]
-basic_tracing = ["dep:tracing", "dep:tracing-subscriber"]
-otel-otlp = [
+basic_tracing = ["dep:tracing", "tracing-subscriber"]
+tracing = [
    "basic_tracing",
-    "dep:opentelemetry",
-    "dep:opentelemetry_sdk",
-    "dep:opentelemetry-otlp",
-    "dep:tracing-opentelemetry",
-    "dep:tonic",
+    "tracing-tree",
+    "opentelemetry-jaeger",
+    "tracing-opentelemetry",
+    "opentelemetry",
 ]
 clap = ["dep:clap", "dep:clap_complete", "dep:clap_complete_fig"]
 models = []
@@ -4,9 +4,16 @@
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use std::io::IsTerminal;

-// Re-export tracing_subscriber for consumers that need to compose layers
-#[cfg(feature = "basic_tracing")]
+#[cfg(feature = "tracing")]
+pub use opentelemetry;
+#[cfg(feature = "tracing")]
+pub use opentelemetry_jaeger;
+#[cfg(feature = "tracing")]
+pub use tracing_opentelemetry;
+#[cfg(feature = "tracing")]
 pub use tracing_subscriber;
+#[cfg(feature = "tracing")]
+pub use tracing_tree;

 #[derive(Debug, Default, Copy, Clone, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize)]
 #[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
@@ -62,106 +69,40 @@ pub fn setup_tracing_logger() {
    build_tracing_logger().init()
 }

-/// Initialize an OpenTelemetry tracing layer that exports spans via OTLP/gRPC.
-///
-/// This produces a layer compatible with `tracing_subscriber::registry()` that
-/// sends traces to any OTLP-compatible collector (SigNoz, Grafana Tempo, etc).
-///
-/// Returns both the tracing layer and the [`SdkTracerProvider`] so the caller
-/// can invoke [`SdkTracerProvider::shutdown`] for graceful flush on exit.
-///
-/// # Arguments
-/// * `service_name` - The service name reported to the collector (e.g. "nym-node")
-/// * `endpoint` - The OTLP/gRPC collector endpoint (e.g. "http://localhost:4317"
-///   or "https://ingest.eu.signoz.cloud:443" for SigNoz Cloud)
-/// * `ingestion_key` - Optional SigNoz Cloud ingestion key. When provided, it is
-///   sent as the `signoz-ingestion-key` gRPC metadata header on every export.
-/// * `environment` - Deployment environment label (e.g. "sandbox", "mainnet", "canary").
-///   Attached as the `deployment.environment` OTel resource attribute.
-/// * `sample_ratio` - Trace sampling ratio in 0.0..=1.0 (e.g. 0.1 = 10% of traces).
-///   Used to limit cost when exporting from many nodes; clamped to [0.0, 1.0].
-/// * `export_timeout_secs` - Timeout in seconds for each OTLP export batch. Prevents
-///   unbounded blocking if the collector is slow or unreachable.
-#[cfg(feature = "otel-otlp")]
-pub fn init_otel_layer<S>(
-    service_name: &str,
-    endpoint: &str,
-    ingestion_key: Option<&str>,
-    environment: &str,
-    sample_ratio: f64,
-    export_timeout_secs: u64,
-) -> Result<
-    (
-        tracing_opentelemetry::OpenTelemetryLayer<S, opentelemetry_sdk::trace::SdkTracer>,
-        opentelemetry_sdk::trace::SdkTracerProvider,
-    ),
-    Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>,
->
-where
-    S: tracing::Subscriber + for<'a> tracing_subscriber::registry::LookupSpan<'a>,
-{
-    use opentelemetry::trace::TracerProvider as _;
-    use opentelemetry_otlp::WithExportConfig;
-    use opentelemetry_otlp::WithTonicConfig;
-    use opentelemetry_sdk::trace::Sampler;
-    use std::time::Duration;
+// TODO: This has to be a macro, running it as a function does not work for the file_appender for some reason
+#[cfg(feature = "tracing")]
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! setup_tracing {
+    ($service_name: expr) => {
+        use nym_bin_common::logging::tracing_subscriber::layer::SubscriberExt;
+        use nym_bin_common::logging::tracing_subscriber::util::SubscriberInitExt;

-    // Validate endpoint URI early to fail with a clear message
-    if !endpoint.starts_with("http://") && !endpoint.starts_with("https://") {
-        return Err(format!(
-            "invalid OTLP endpoint URI: {endpoint} (must start with http:// or https://)"
-        )
-        .into());
-    }
+        let registry = nym_bin_common::logging::tracing_subscriber::Registry::default()
+            .with(nym_bin_common::logging::tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::from_default_env())
+            .with(
+                nym_bin_common::logging::tracing_tree::HierarchicalLayer::new(4)
+                    .with_targets(true)
+                    .with_bracketed_fields(true),
+            );

-    let sample_ratio_clamped = sample_ratio.clamp(0.0, 1.0);
+        let tracer = nym_bin_common::logging::opentelemetry_jaeger::new_collector_pipeline()
+            .with_endpoint("http://44.199.230.10:14268/api/traces")
+            .with_service_name($service_name)
+            .with_isahc()
+            .with_trace_config(
+                nym_bin_common::logging::opentelemetry::sdk::trace::config().with_sampler(
+                    nym_bin_common::logging::opentelemetry::sdk::trace::Sampler::TraceIdRatioBased(
+                        0.1,
+                    ),
+                ),
+            )
+            .install_batch(nym_bin_common::logging::opentelemetry::runtime::Tokio)
+            .expect("Could not init tracer");

-    let mut builder = opentelemetry_otlp::SpanExporter::builder()
-        .with_tonic()
-        .with_endpoint(endpoint)
-        .with_timeout(Duration::from_secs(export_timeout_secs));
+        let telemetry = nym_bin_common::logging::tracing_opentelemetry::layer().with_tracer(tracer);

-    // Explicitly configure TLS when the endpoint uses HTTPS
-    if endpoint.starts_with("https://") {
-        builder =
-            builder.with_tls_config(tonic::transport::ClientTlsConfig::new().with_native_roots());
-    }
-
-    if let Some(key) = ingestion_key {
-        let mut metadata = tonic::metadata::MetadataMap::new();
-        metadata.insert(
-            "signoz-ingestion-key",
-            key.parse()
-                .map_err(|_| "invalid ingestion key format (value redacted)")?,
-        );
-        builder = builder.with_metadata(metadata);
-    }
-
-    let exporter = builder
-        .build()
-        .map_err(|e| format!("failed to build OTLP exporter for endpoint {endpoint}: {e}"))?;
-
-    let tracer_provider = opentelemetry_sdk::trace::SdkTracerProvider::builder()
-        .with_sampler(Sampler::TraceIdRatioBased(sample_ratio_clamped))
-        .with_batch_exporter(exporter)
-        .with_resource(
-            opentelemetry_sdk::Resource::builder()
-                .with_service_name(service_name.to_owned())
-                .with_attribute(opentelemetry::KeyValue::new(
-                    "deployment.environment",
-                    environment.to_owned(),
-                ))
-                .build(),
-        )
-        .build();
-
-    opentelemetry::global::set_tracer_provider(tracer_provider.clone());
-    let tracer = tracer_provider.tracer(service_name.to_owned());
-
-    Ok((
-        tracing_opentelemetry::layer().with_tracer(tracer),
-        tracer_provider,
-    ))
+        registry.with(telemetry).init();
+    };
 }

 pub fn banner(crate_name: &str, crate_version: &str) -> String {
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ use crate::{
    error::ClientCoreError,
 };
 #[cfg(all(not(target_arch = "wasm32"), feature = "fs-credentials-storage"))]
-pub use nym_credential_storage::persistent_storage::PersistentStorage as PersistentCredentialStorage;
+use nym_credential_storage::persistent_storage::PersistentStorage as PersistentCredentialStorage;

 pub use nym_client_core_gateways_storage as gateways_storage;
 pub use nym_client_core_gateways_storage::{GatewaysDetailsStore, InMemGatewaysDetails};
@@ -128,95 +128,54 @@ impl ManagedConnection {

    async fn run(self) {
        let address = self.address;
-        let reconnection_attempt = self.current_reconnection.load(Ordering::Acquire);
-        let connect_start = tokio::time::Instant::now();
        let connection_fut = TcpStream::connect(address);

        let conn = match tokio::time::timeout(self.connection_timeout, connection_fut).await {
            Ok(stream_res) => match stream_res {
                Ok(stream) => {
-                    let connect_ms = connect_start.elapsed().as_millis() as u64;
-                    debug!(
-                        peer = %address,
-                        connect_ms,
-                        "Managed to establish connection to {}", self.address
-                    );
+                    debug!("Managed to establish connection to {}", self.address);

-                    let noise_start = tokio::time::Instant::now();
                    let noise_stream =
                        match upgrade_noise_initiator(stream, &self.noise_config).await {
                            Ok(noise_stream) => noise_stream,
                            Err(err) => {
-                                let noise_handshake_ms = noise_start.elapsed().as_millis() as u64;
-                                warn!(
-                                    event = "connection.failed.noise",
-                                    peer = %address,
-                                    error = %err,
-                                    connect_ms,
-                                    noise_handshake_ms,
-                                    reconnection_attempt,
-                                    exit_reason = "noise_error",
-                                    "Failed to perform Noise initiator handshake with {address}"
-                                );
+                                error!("Failed to perform Noise handshake with {address} - {err}");
+                                // we failed to finish the noise handshake - increase reconnection attempt
                                self.current_reconnection.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
                                return;
                            }
                        };
-                    let noise_handshake_ms = noise_start.elapsed().as_millis() as u64;
+                    // if we managed to connect AND do the noise handshake, reset the reconnection count (whatever it might have been)
                    self.current_reconnection.store(0, Ordering::Release);
-                    debug!(
-                        peer = %address,
-                        connect_ms,
-                        noise_handshake_ms,
-                        "Noise initiator handshake completed for {:?}", address
-                    );
+                    debug!("Noise initiator handshake completed for {:?}", address);
                    Framed::new(noise_stream, NymCodec)
                }
                Err(err) => {
-                    let connect_ms = connect_start.elapsed().as_millis() as u64;
-                    warn!(
-                        event = "connection.failed.connect",
-                        peer = %address,
-                        error = %err,
-                        connect_ms,
-                        reconnection_attempt,
-                        exit_reason = "connect_error",
-                        "failed to establish connection to {address}"
-                    );
+                    debug!("failed to establish connection to {address} (err: {err})",);
                    return;
                }
            },
            Err(_) => {
-                let connect_ms = connect_start.elapsed().as_millis() as u64;
-                warn!(
-                    event = "connection.failed.timeout",
-                    peer = %address,
-                    timeout_ms = self.connection_timeout.as_millis() as u64,
-                    connect_ms,
-                    reconnection_attempt,
-                    exit_reason = "timeout",
+                debug!(
                    "failed to connect to {address} within {:?}",
                    self.connection_timeout
                );
+
+                // we failed to connect - increase reconnection attempt
                self.current_reconnection.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
                return;
            }
        };

+        // Take whatever the receiver channel produces and put it on the connection.
+        // We could have as well used conn.send_all(receiver.map(Ok)), but considering we don't care
+        // about neither receiver nor the connection, it doesn't matter which one gets consumed
        if let Err(err) = self.message_receiver.map(Ok).forward(conn).await {
-            warn!(
-                event = "connection.forward_error",
-                peer = %address,
-                error = %err,
-                exit_reason = "forward_error",
-                "Failed to forward packets to {address}: {err}"
-            );
+            warn!("Failed to forward packets to {address}: {err}");
        }

        debug!(
-            peer = %address,
-            exit_reason = "sender_dropped",
-            "connection manager to {address} finished"
+            "connection manager to {address} is finished. Either the connection failed or mixnet client got dropped",
        );
    }
 }
@@ -313,18 +272,16 @@ impl SendWithoutResponse for Client {
        trace!("Sending packet to {address}");

        // TODO: optimisation for the future: rather than constantly using legacy encoding,
-        // use the mix packet type / flags to pick encoding per packet
+        // once we're addressing by node_id (and thus have full node info here),
+        // we could simply infer supported encoding based on their version
        let framed_packet =
            FramedNymPacket::from_mix_packet(packet, self.config.use_legacy_packet_encoding);

        let Some(sender) = self.active_connections.get_mut(&address) else {
            // there was never a connection to begin with
-            debug!(
-                event = "mixclient.try_send",
-                peer = %address,
-                result = "not_connected",
-                "establishing initial connection to {address}"
-            );
+            debug!("establishing initial connection to {address}");
+            // it's not a 'big' error, but we did not manage to send the packet, but queue the packet
+            // for sending for as soon as the connection is created
            self.make_connection(address, framed_packet);
            return Err(io::Error::new(
                io::ErrorKind::NotConnected,
@@ -332,24 +289,15 @@ impl SendWithoutResponse for Client {
            ));
        };

-        let channel_capacity = sender.channel.max_capacity();
-        let channel_available = sender.channel.capacity();
-        let channel_used = channel_capacity - channel_available;
-
        let sending_res = sender.channel.try_send(framed_packet);
        drop(sender);

        sending_res.map_err(|err| {
            match err {
                TrySendError::Full(_) => {
-                    warn!(
-                        event = "mixclient.try_send",
-                        peer = %address,
-                        result = "full_dropped",
-                        channel_capacity,
-                        channel_used,
-                        "dropping packet: connection buffer to {address} is full ({channel_used}/{channel_capacity})"
-                    );
+                    debug!("Connection to {address} seems to not be able to handle all the traffic - dropping the current packet");
+                    // it's not a 'big' error, but we did not manage to send the packet
+                    // if the queue is full, we can't really do anything but to drop the packet
                    io::Error::new(
                        io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock,
                        "connection queue is full",
@@ -357,13 +305,11 @@ impl SendWithoutResponse for Client {
                }
                TrySendError::Closed(dropped) => {
                    debug!(
-                        event = "mixclient.try_send",
-                        peer = %address,
-                        result = "closed_reconnecting",
-                        channel_capacity,
-                        channel_used,
-                        "connection to {address} dead, attempting re-establishment"
+                        "Connection to {address} seems to be dead. attempting to re-establish it...",
                    );
+
+                    // it's not a 'big' error, but we did not manage to send the packet, but queue
+                    // it up to send it as soon as the connection is re-established
                    self.make_connection(address, dropped);
                    io::Error::new(
                        io::ErrorKind::ConnectionAborted,
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ features = ["json"]

 [target."cfg(not(target_arch = \"wasm32\"))".dependencies.reqwest]
 workspace = true
-features = ["json", "rustls"]
+features = ["json", "rustls-tls"]

 [dev-dependencies]
 anyhow = { workspace = true }
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ use nym_api_requests::ecash::{
 };
 use nym_api_requests::models::{
    ApiHealthResponse, GatewayCoreStatusResponse, HistoricalPerformanceResponse,
-    MixnodeCoreStatusResponse, NymNodeDescriptionV1,
+    MixnodeCoreStatusResponse, NymNodeDescriptionV1, NymNodeDescriptionV2,
 };
 use nym_api_requests::nym_nodes::{
    NodesByAddressesResponse, SemiSkimmedNodesWithMetadata, SkimmedNode, SkimmedNodesWithMetadata,
@@ -273,18 +273,18 @@ impl<C, S> Client<C, S> {
        Ok(history)
    }

-    // #[deprecated(note = "use get_all_cached_described_nodes_v2 instead")]
+    #[deprecated(note = "use get_all_cached_described_nodes_v2 instead")]
    pub async fn get_all_cached_described_nodes(
        &self,
    ) -> Result<Vec<NymNodeDescriptionV1>, ValidatorClientError> {
        Ok(self.nym_api.get_all_described_nodes().await?)
    }

-    // pub async fn get_all_cached_described_nodes_v2(
-    //     &self,
-    // ) -> Result<Vec<NymNodeDescriptionV2>, ValidatorClientError> {
-    //     Ok(self.nym_api.get_all_described_nodes_v2().await?)
-    // }
+    pub async fn get_all_cached_described_nodes_v2(
+        &self,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<NymNodeDescriptionV2>, ValidatorClientError> {
+        Ok(self.nym_api.get_all_described_nodes_v2().await?)
+    }

    pub async fn get_all_cached_bonded_nym_nodes(
        &self,
@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ impl NymApiClient {
        Ok(self.nym_api.health().await?)
    }

-    // #[deprecated(note = "use .get_all_described_nodes_v2 instead")]
+    #[deprecated(note = "use .get_all_described_nodes_v2 instead")]
    pub async fn get_all_described_nodes(
        &self,
    ) -> Result<Vec<NymNodeDescriptionV1>, ValidatorClientError> {
@@ -495,29 +495,29 @@ impl NymApiClient {
        Ok(descriptions)
    }

-    // pub async fn get_all_described_nodes_v2(
-    //     &self,
-    // ) -> Result<Vec<NymNodeDescriptionV2>, ValidatorClientError> {
-    //     // TODO: deal with paging in macro or some helper function or something, because it's the same pattern everywhere
-    //     let mut page = 0;
-    //     let mut descriptions = Vec::new();
-    //
-    //     loop {
-    //         let mut res = self
-    //             .nym_api
-    //             .get_nodes_described_v2(Some(page), None)
-    //             .await?;
-    //
-    //         descriptions.append(&mut res.data);
-    //         if descriptions.len() < res.pagination.total {
-    //             page += 1
-    //         } else {
-    //             break;
-    //         }
-    //     }
-    //
-    //     Ok(descriptions)
-    // }
+    pub async fn get_all_described_nodes_v2(
+        &self,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<NymNodeDescriptionV2>, ValidatorClientError> {
+        // TODO: deal with paging in macro or some helper function or something, because it's the same pattern everywhere
+        let mut page = 0;
+        let mut descriptions = Vec::new();
+
+        loop {
+            let mut res = self
+                .nym_api
+                .get_nodes_described_v2(Some(page), None)
+                .await?;
+
+            descriptions.append(&mut res.data);
+            if descriptions.len() < res.pagination.total {
+                page += 1
+            } else {
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+
+        Ok(descriptions)
+    }

    pub async fn get_all_bonded_nym_nodes(
        &self,
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ use nym_api_requests::ecash::VerificationKeyResponse;
 use nym_api_requests::models::{
    AnnotationResponse, ApiHealthResponse, BinaryBuildInformationOwned, ChainBlocksStatusResponse,
    ChainStatusResponse, KeyRotationInfoResponse, NodePerformanceResponse, NodeRefreshBody,
-    NymNodeDescriptionV1, PerformanceHistoryResponse, RewardedSetResponse,
+    NymNodeDescriptionV1, NymNodeDescriptionV2, PerformanceHistoryResponse, RewardedSetResponse,
    SignerInformationResponse,
 };
 use nym_api_requests::nym_nodes::{
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ pub trait NymApiClientExt: ApiClient {
    }

    #[tracing::instrument(level = "debug", skip_all)]
-    // #[deprecated(note = "use .get_nodes_described_v2 instead")]
+    #[deprecated(note = "use .get_nodes_described_v2 instead")]
    async fn get_nodes_described(
        &self,
        page: Option<u32>,
@@ -144,32 +144,32 @@ pub trait NymApiClientExt: ApiClient {
        .await
    }

-    // #[tracing::instrument(level = "debug", skip_all)]
-    // async fn get_nodes_described_v2(
-    //     &self,
-    //     page: Option<u32>,
-    //     per_page: Option<u32>,
-    // ) -> Result<PaginatedResponse<NymNodeDescriptionV2>, NymAPIError> {
-    //     let mut params = Vec::new();
-    //
-    //     if let Some(page) = page {
-    //         params.push(("page", page.to_string()))
-    //     }
-    //
-    //     if let Some(per_page) = per_page {
-    //         params.push(("per_page", per_page.to_string()))
-    //     }
-    //
-    //     self.get_json(
-    //         &[
-    //             routes::V2_API_VERSION,
-    //             routes::NYM_NODES_ROUTES,
-    //             routes::NYM_NODES_DESCRIBED,
-    //         ],
-    //         &params,
-    //     )
-    //     .await
-    // }
+    #[tracing::instrument(level = "debug", skip_all)]
+    async fn get_nodes_described_v2(
+        &self,
+        page: Option<u32>,
+        per_page: Option<u32>,
+    ) -> Result<PaginatedResponse<NymNodeDescriptionV2>, NymAPIError> {
+        let mut params = Vec::new();
+
+        if let Some(page) = page {
+            params.push(("page", page.to_string()))
+        }
+
+        if let Some(per_page) = per_page {
+            params.push(("per_page", per_page.to_string()))
+        }
+
+        self.get_json(
+            &[
+                routes::V2_API_VERSION,
+                routes::NYM_NODES_ROUTES,
+                routes::NYM_NODES_DESCRIBED,
+            ],
+            &params,
+        )
+        .await
+    }

    async fn get_current_rewarded_set(&self) -> Result<RewardedSetResponse, NymAPIError> {
        self.get_rewarded_set().await
@@ -302,8 +302,8 @@ pub trait NymApiClientExt: ApiClient {
        Ok(SkimmedNodesWithMetadata::new(nodes, metadata))
    }

-    // #[deprecated(note = "use .get_all_described_nodes_v2 instead")]
-    // #[allow(deprecated)]
+    #[deprecated(note = "use .get_all_described_nodes_v2 instead")]
+    #[allow(deprecated)]
    async fn get_all_described_nodes(&self) -> Result<Vec<NymNodeDescriptionV1>, NymAPIError> {
        // TODO: deal with paging in macro or some helper function or something, because it's the same pattern everywhere
        let mut page = 0;
@@ -323,24 +323,24 @@ pub trait NymApiClientExt: ApiClient {
        Ok(descriptions)
    }

-    // async fn (&self) -> Result<Vec<NymNodeDescriptionV2>, NymAPIError> {
-    //     // TODO: deal with paging in macro or some helper function or something, because it's the same pattern everywhere
-    //     let mut page = 0;
-    //     let mut descriptions = Vec::new();
-    //
-    //     loop {
-    //         let mut res = self.get_nodes_described_v2(Some(page), None).await?;
-    //
-    //         descriptions.append(&mut res.data);
-    //         if descriptions.len() < res.pagination.total {
-    //             page += 1
-    //         } else {
-    //             break;
-    //         }
-    //     }
-    //
-    //     Ok(descriptions)
-    // }
+    async fn get_all_described_nodes_v2(&self) -> Result<Vec<NymNodeDescriptionV2>, NymAPIError> {
+        // TODO: deal with paging in macro or some helper function or something, because it's the same pattern everywhere
+        let mut page = 0;
+        let mut descriptions = Vec::new();
+
+        loop {
+            let mut res = self.get_nodes_described_v2(Some(page), None).await?;
+
+            descriptions.append(&mut res.data);
+            if descriptions.len() < res.pagination.total {
+                page += 1
+            } else {
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+
+        Ok(descriptions)
+    }

    #[tracing::instrument(level = "debug", skip_all)]
    async fn get_nym_nodes(
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ pub struct Args {
 }

 pub async fn query(args: Args, client: &QueryClientWithNyxd) {
-    match client.get_all_cached_described_nodes().await {
+    match client.get_all_cached_described_nodes_v2().await {
        Ok(res) => match args.identity_key {
            Some(identity_key) => {
                let node = res.iter().find(|node| {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ pub struct Args {
 }

 pub async fn query(args: Args, client: &QueryClientWithNyxd) {
-    match client.get_all_cached_described_nodes().await {
+    match client.get_all_cached_described_nodes_v2().await {
        Ok(res) => match args.identity_key {
            Some(identity_key) => {
                let node = res.iter().find(|node| {
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ bs58 = { workspace = true }
 futures = { workspace = true }
 humantime = { workspace = true }
 rand = { workspace = true }
-reqwest = { workspace = true, features = ["rustls"] }
+reqwest = { workspace = true, features = ["rustls-tls"] }
 serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
 serde_json = { workspace = true }
 strum = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
@@ -22,8 +22,6 @@ pub mod ecash;
 pub mod error;
 pub mod upgrade_mode;

-const MOCK_BANDWIDTH: i64 = 2024 * 1024 * 1024;
-
 // Histogram buckets for ecash verification duration (in seconds)
 const ECASH_VERIFICATION_DURATION_BUCKETS: &[f64] =
    &[0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 5.0];
@@ -113,13 +111,6 @@ impl CredentialVerifier {
    }

    pub async fn verify(&mut self) -> Result<i64> {
-        if self.ecash_verifier.is_mock() {
-            // if we're in the mock mode (local testing), skip cryptographic verification
-            // and just return a dummy bandwidth value since we don't have blockchain access
-            // Return a reasonable test bandwidth value (e.g., 1GB in bytes)
-            return Ok(MOCK_BANDWIDTH);
-        }
-
        let start = Instant::now();
        nym_metrics::inc!("ecash_verification_attempts");

@@ -291,40 +291,3 @@ struct UpgradeModeStateInner {
    // (and dealing with the async consequences of that)
    status: UpgradeModeStatus,
 }
-
-pub mod testing {
-    use crate::UpgradeModeState;
-    use crate::upgrade_mode::{
-        CheckRequest, UpgradeModeCheckConfig, UpgradeModeCheckRequestSender, UpgradeModeDetails,
-    };
-    use futures::channel::mpsc::UnboundedReceiver;
-    use nym_crypto::asymmetric::ed25519;
-    use std::time::Duration;
-
-    pub fn mock_dummy_upgrade_mode_details() -> (UpgradeModeDetails, UnboundedReceiver<CheckRequest>)
-    {
-        let (um_recheck_tx, um_recheck_rx) = futures::channel::mpsc::unbounded();
-
-        const DUMMY_ATTESTER_ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY: [u8; 32] = [
-            108, 49, 193, 21, 126, 161, 249, 85, 242, 207, 74, 195, 238, 6, 64, 149, 201, 140, 248,
-            163, 122, 170, 79, 198, 87, 85, 36, 29, 243, 92, 64, 161,
-        ];
-
-        pub(crate) fn dummy_attester_public_key() -> ed25519::PublicKey {
-            let private_key =
-                ed25519::PrivateKey::from_bytes(&DUMMY_ATTESTER_ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY).unwrap();
-            private_key.public_key()
-        }
-
-        let upgrade_mode_state = UpgradeModeState::new(dummy_attester_public_key());
-        let upgrade_mode_details = UpgradeModeDetails::new(
-            UpgradeModeCheckConfig {
-                // essentially we never want to trigger this in our tests
-                min_staleness_recheck: Duration::from_nanos(1),
-            },
-            UpgradeModeCheckRequestSender::new(um_recheck_tx),
-            upgrade_mode_state.clone(),
-        );
-        (upgrade_mode_details, um_recheck_rx)
-    }
-}
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ cipher = { workspace = true, optional = true }
 x25519-dalek = { workspace = true, features = ["static_secrets"], optional = true }
 ed25519-dalek = { workspace = true, features = ["rand_core"], optional = true }
 rand = { workspace = true, optional = true }
+rand09 = { workspace = true }
 serde_bytes = { workspace = true, optional = true }
 serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"], optional = true }
 sha2 = { workspace = true, optional = true }
@@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ thiserror = { workspace = true }
 zeroize = { workspace = true, optional = true, features = ["zeroize_derive"] }

 # internal
-nym-sphinx-types = { workspace = true, optional = true }
+nym-sphinx-types = { workspace = true }
 nym-pemstore = { workspace = true }

 [dev-dependencies]
@@ -51,7 +52,7 @@ serde = ["dep:serde", "serde_bytes", "ed25519-dalek/serde", "x25519-dalek/serde"
 asymmetric = ["x25519-dalek", "ed25519-dalek", "curve25519-dalek", "sha2", "zeroize"]
 hashing = ["blake3", "digest", "hkdf", "hmac", "generic-array", "sha2", "zeroize"]
 stream_cipher = ["aes", "ctr", "cipher", "generic-array"]
-sphinx = ["nym-sphinx-types", "nym-sphinx-types/sphinx"]
+sphinx = ["nym-sphinx-types/sphinx"]

 [lints]
 workspace = true
@@ -109,3 +109,152 @@ impl DerivationMaterial {
        }
    }
 }
+
+pub mod blake3 {
+
+    //! Key Derivation Functions using Blake3.
+
+    use blake3::Hasher;
+
+    use rand09::{RngCore, rng};
+    use zeroize::Zeroize;
+
+    pub fn derive_key_blake3_multi_input(
+        info: &str,
+        input_key_material: &[&[u8]],
+        salt: &[u8],
+    ) -> [u8; 32] {
+        let mut hasher = Hasher::new_derive_key(info);
+
+        for input_key in input_key_material {
+            hasher.update(input_key);
+        }
+
+        hasher.update(salt);
+
+        hasher.finalize().as_bytes().to_owned()
+    }
+
+    /// Derives a 32-byte key using Blake3's key derivation mode.
+    ///
+    /// Uses Blake3's built-in `derive_key` function with domain separation via context string.
+    ///
+    /// # Arguments
+    /// * `info` - Context string for domain separation (e.g., "nym-lp-psk-v1")
+    /// * `input_key_material` - Input key material (shared secret from ECDH, etc.)
+    /// * `salt` - Additional salt for freshness (nonce)
+    ///
+    /// # Returns
+    /// 32-byte derived key suitable for use as PSK
+    ///
+    /// # Example
+    /// ```ignore
+    /// let psk = derive_key_blake3("nym-lp-psk-v1", shared_secret.as_bytes(), &salt);
+    /// ```
+    pub fn derive_key_blake3(info: &str, input_key_material: &[u8], salt: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
+        derive_key_blake3_multi_input(info, &[input_key_material], salt)
+    }
+
+    pub fn derive_fresh_key_blake3_multi_input(
+        info: &str,
+        input_key_material: &[&[u8]],
+    ) -> [u8; 32] {
+        let mut salt = [0u8; 32];
+        rng().fill_bytes(&mut salt);
+
+        let derived_key = derive_key_blake3_multi_input(info, input_key_material, &salt);
+
+        // Zeroize salt
+        salt.zeroize();
+
+        derived_key
+    }
+
+    /// Derives a fresh 32-byte key using Blake3's key derivation mode.
+    /// The function calls a random number generator to generate a fresh salt.
+    /// Uses Blake3's built-in `derive_key` function with domain separation via context string.
+    ///
+    /// # Arguments
+    /// * `info` - Context string for domain separation (e.g., "nym-lp-psk-v1")
+    /// * `input_key_material` - Input key material (shared secret from ECDH, etc.)
+    ///
+    /// # Returns
+    /// 32-byte derived key suitable for use as PSK
+    ///
+    /// # Example
+    /// ```ignore
+    /// let psk = derive_fresh_key_blake3("nym-lp-psk-v1", shared_secret.as_bytes());
+    /// ```
+    pub fn derive_fresh_key_blake3(info: &str, input_key_material: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
+        derive_fresh_key_blake3_multi_input(info, &[input_key_material])
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    mod tests {
+        use super::*;
+
+        #[test]
+        fn test_deterministic_derivation() {
+            let context = "test-context";
+            let key_material = b"shared_secret_12345";
+            let salt = b"salt_67890";
+
+            let key1 = derive_key_blake3(context, key_material, salt);
+            let key2 = derive_key_blake3(context, key_material, salt);
+
+            assert_eq!(key1, key2, "Same inputs should produce same output");
+        }
+
+        #[test]
+        fn test_different_contexts_produce_different_keys() {
+            let key_material = b"shared_secret";
+            let salt = b"salt";
+
+            let key1 = derive_key_blake3("context1", key_material, salt);
+            let key2 = derive_key_blake3("context2", key_material, salt);
+
+            assert_ne!(
+                key1, key2,
+                "Different contexts should produce different keys"
+            );
+        }
+
+        #[test]
+        fn test_different_salts_produce_different_keys() {
+            let context = "test-context";
+            let key_material = b"shared_secret";
+
+            let key1 = derive_key_blake3(context, key_material, b"salt1");
+            let key2 = derive_key_blake3(context, key_material, b"salt2");
+
+            assert_ne!(key1, key2, "Different salts should produce different keys");
+        }
+
+        #[test]
+        fn test_different_key_material_produces_different_keys() {
+            let context = "test-context";
+            let salt = b"salt";
+
+            let key1 = derive_key_blake3(context, b"secret1", salt);
+            let key2 = derive_key_blake3(context, b"secret2", salt);
+
+            assert_ne!(
+                key1, key2,
+                "Different key material should produce different keys"
+            );
+        }
+
+        #[test]
+        fn test_output_length() {
+            let key = derive_key_blake3("test", b"key", b"salt");
+            assert_eq!(key.len(), 32, "Output should be exactly 32 bytes");
+        }
+
+        #[test]
+        fn test_empty_inputs() {
+            // Should not panic with empty inputs
+            let key = derive_key_blake3("test", b"", b"");
+            assert_eq!(key.len(), 32);
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2025 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-//! Key Derivation Functions using Blake3.
-
-/// Derives a 32-byte key using Blake3's key derivation mode.
-///
-/// Uses Blake3's built-in `derive_key` function with domain separation via context string.
-///
-/// # Arguments
-/// * `context` - Context string for domain separation (e.g., "nym-lp-psk-v1")
-/// * `key_material` - Input key material (shared secret from ECDH, etc.)
-/// * `salt` - Additional salt for freshness (timestamp + nonce)
-///
-/// # Returns
-/// 32-byte derived key suitable for use as PSK
-///
-/// # Example
-/// ```ignore
-/// let psk = derive_key_blake3("nym-lp-psk-v1", shared_secret.as_bytes(), &salt);
-/// ```
-pub fn derive_key_blake3(context: &str, key_material: &[u8], salt: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
-    // Concatenate key_material and salt as input
-    let input = [key_material, salt].concat();
-
-    // Use Blake3's derive_key with context for domain separation
-    // blake3::derive_key returns [u8; 32] directly
-    blake3::derive_key(context, &input)
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_deterministic_derivation() {
-        let context = "test-context";
-        let key_material = b"shared_secret_12345";
-        let salt = b"salt_67890";
-
-        let key1 = derive_key_blake3(context, key_material, salt);
-        let key2 = derive_key_blake3(context, key_material, salt);
-
-        assert_eq!(key1, key2, "Same inputs should produce same output");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_different_contexts_produce_different_keys() {
-        let key_material = b"shared_secret";
-        let salt = b"salt";
-
-        let key1 = derive_key_blake3("context1", key_material, salt);
-        let key2 = derive_key_blake3("context2", key_material, salt);
-
-        assert_ne!(
-            key1, key2,
-            "Different contexts should produce different keys"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_different_salts_produce_different_keys() {
-        let context = "test-context";
-        let key_material = b"shared_secret";
-
-        let key1 = derive_key_blake3(context, key_material, b"salt1");
-        let key2 = derive_key_blake3(context, key_material, b"salt2");
-
-        assert_ne!(key1, key2, "Different salts should produce different keys");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_different_key_material_produces_different_keys() {
-        let context = "test-context";
-        let salt = b"salt";
-
-        let key1 = derive_key_blake3(context, b"secret1", salt);
-        let key2 = derive_key_blake3(context, b"secret2", salt);
-
-        assert_ne!(
-            key1, key2,
-            "Different key material should produce different keys"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_output_length() {
-        let key = derive_key_blake3("test", b"key", b"salt");
-        assert_eq!(key.len(), 32, "Output should be exactly 32 bytes");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_empty_inputs() {
-        // Should not panic with empty inputs
-        let key = derive_key_blake3("test", b"", b"");
-        assert_eq!(key.len(), 32);
-    }
-}
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@ pub mod crypto_hash;
 pub mod hkdf;
 #[cfg(feature = "hashing")]
 pub mod hmac;
-#[cfg(feature = "hashing")]
-pub mod kdf;
 #[cfg(all(feature = "asymmetric", feature = "hashing", feature = "stream_cipher"))]
 pub mod shared_key;
 pub mod symmetric;
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ description = "Functions to interact with zknym signers, checking their status a
 futures = { workspace = true }
 thiserror = { workspace = true }
 semver = { workspace = true }
-serde = { workspace = true }
 tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["time"] }
 tracing = { workspace = true }
 url = { workspace = true }
@@ -3,9 +3,14 @@

 use crate::client_check::check_client;
 use futures::stream::{FuturesUnordered, StreamExt};
-use nym_ecash_signer_check_types::status::{SignerResult, Status};
 use nym_network_defaults::NymNetworkDetails;
 use nym_validator_client::QueryHttpRpcNyxdClient;
+use nym_validator_client::nyxd::contract_traits::{DkgQueryClient, PagedDkgQueryClient};
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use url::Url;
+
+pub use error::SignerCheckError;
+use nym_ecash_signer_check_types::status::{SignerResult, Status};
 use nym_validator_client::ecash::models::EcashSignerStatusResponse;
 use nym_validator_client::models::{
    ChainBlocksStatusResponse, ChainStatusResponse, SignerInformationResponse,
@@ -13,12 +18,6 @@ use nym_validator_client::models::{
 use nym_validator_client::nyxd::contract_traits::dkg_query_client::{
    ContractVKShare, DealerDetails, Epoch,
 };
-use nym_validator_client::nyxd::contract_traits::{DkgQueryClient, PagedDkgQueryClient};
-use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
-use std::collections::HashMap;
-use url::Url;
-
-pub use error::SignerCheckError;

 mod client_check;
 pub mod error;
@@ -32,7 +31,6 @@ pub type TypedSignerResult = SignerResult<
 pub type LocalChainStatus = Status<ChainStatusResponse, ChainBlocksStatusResponse>;
 pub type SigningStatus = Status<SignerInformationResponse, EcashSignerStatusResponse>;

-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct SignersTestResult {
    pub threshold: Option<u64>,
    pub results: Vec<TypedSignerResult>,
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ debug-inventory = ["nym-http-api-client-macro/debug-inventory"]
 async-trait = { workspace = true }
 bincode = { workspace = true }
 cfg-if = { workspace = true}
-reqwest = { workspace = true, features = ["json", "gzip", "deflate", "brotli", "zstd", "rustls"] }
+reqwest = { workspace = true, features = ["json", "gzip", "deflate", "brotli", "zstd", "rustls-tls"] }
 http.workspace = true
 url = { workspace = true }
 once_cell = { workspace = true }
@@ -46,10 +46,7 @@ use std::{
    collections::HashMap,
    net::{IpAddr, SocketAddr},
    str::FromStr,
-    sync::{
-        Arc, LazyLock,
-        atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering::Relaxed},
-    },
+    sync::{Arc, LazyLock},
    time::Duration,
 };

@@ -73,23 +70,14 @@ pub(crate) const DEFAULT_QUERY_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5);

 impl ClientBuilder {
    /// Override the DNS resolver implementation used by the underlying http client.
-    /// This forces the use of an independent request executor (via [`Self::non_shared`]).
    pub fn dns_resolver<R: Resolve + 'static>(mut self, resolver: Arc<R>) -> Self {
-        self = self.non_shared();
-        // because of the call to non-shared this conditional should always run.
-        if let Some(rb) = self.reqwest_client_builder {
-            self.reqwest_client_builder = Some(rb.dns_resolver(resolver));
-        }
+        self.reqwest_client_builder = self.reqwest_client_builder.dns_resolver(resolver);
        self.use_secure_dns = false;
        self
    }

-    /// Override the DNS resolver implementation used by the underlying http client. If
-    /// [`Self::dns_resolver`] is called directly that will take priority over this, there is no
-    /// need to call both.
-    /// This forces the use of an independent request executor (via [`Self::non_shared`]).
+    /// Override the DNS resolver implementation used by the underlying http client.
    pub fn no_hickory_dns(mut self) -> Self {
-        self = self.non_shared();
        self.use_secure_dns = false;
        self
    }
@@ -141,8 +129,7 @@ pub struct HickoryDnsResolver {
    // Tokio Runtime in initialization, so we must delay the actual
    // construction of the resolver.
    state: Arc<OnceCell<TokioResolver>>,
-    use_system: Arc<AtomicBool>,
-    system_resolver: Arc<OnceCell<TokioResolver>>,
+    fallback: Option<Arc<OnceCell<TokioResolver>>>,
    static_base: Option<Arc<OnceCell<StaticResolver>>>,
    use_shared: bool,
    /// Overall timeout for dns lookup associated with any individual host resolution. For example,
@@ -154,8 +141,7 @@ impl Default for HickoryDnsResolver {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self {
            state: Default::default(),
-            use_system: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
-            system_resolver: Default::default(),
+            fallback: Default::default(),
            static_base: Some(Default::default()),
            use_shared: true,
            overall_dns_timeout: DEFAULT_OVERALL_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT,
@@ -165,28 +151,16 @@ impl Default for HickoryDnsResolver {

 impl Resolve for HickoryDnsResolver {
    fn resolve(&self, name: Name) -> Resolving {
-        let use_system = self.use_system.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
-        let use_shared = self.use_shared;
-        let resolver = if use_system {
-            match self
-                .system_resolver
-                .get_or_try_init(|| HickoryDnsResolver::new_resolver_system(use_shared))
-            {
-                Ok(r) => r.clone(),
-                Err(e) => return Box::pin(return_err(e)),
-            }
-        } else {
-            self.state
-                .get_or_init(|| HickoryDnsResolver::new_resolver(use_shared))
-                .clone()
-        };
-
+        let resolver = self.state.clone();
+        let maybe_fallback = self.fallback.clone();
        let maybe_static = self.static_base.clone();
+        let use_shared = self.use_shared;
        let overall_dns_timeout = self.overall_dns_timeout;
        Box::pin(async move {
            resolve(
                name,
                resolver,
+                maybe_fallback,
                maybe_static,
                use_shared,
                overall_dns_timeout,
@@ -197,17 +171,16 @@ impl Resolve for HickoryDnsResolver {
    }
 }

-async fn return_err(e: ResolveError) -> Result<Addrs, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
-    Err(Box::new(e) as Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>)
-}
-
 async fn resolve(
    name: Name,
-    resolver: TokioResolver,
+    resolver: Arc<OnceCell<TokioResolver>>,
+    maybe_fallback: Option<Arc<OnceCell<TokioResolver>>>,
    maybe_static: Option<Arc<OnceCell<StaticResolver>>>,
    independent: bool,
    overall_dns_timeout: Duration,
 ) -> Result<Addrs, ResolveError> {
+    let resolver = resolver.get_or_init(|| HickoryDnsResolver::new_resolver(independent));
+
    // try checking the static table to see if any of the addresses in the table have been
    // looked up previously within the timeout to where we are not yet ready to try the
    // default resolver yet again.
@@ -241,6 +214,22 @@ async fn resolve(
        }
    };

+    // If the primary resolver encountered an error, attempt a lookup using the fallback
+    // resolver if one is configured.
+    if let Some(ref fallback) = maybe_fallback {
+        let resolver =
+            fallback.get_or_try_init(|| HickoryDnsResolver::new_resolver_system(independent))?;
+
+        let resolve_fut =
+            tokio::time::timeout(overall_dns_timeout, resolver.lookup_ip(name.as_str()));
+        if let Ok(Ok(lookup)) = resolve_fut.await {
+            let addrs: Addrs = Box::new(SocketAddrs {
+                iter: lookup.into_iter(),
+            });
+            return Ok(addrs);
+        }
+    }
+
    // If no record has been found and a static map of fallback addresses is configured
    // check the table for our entry
    if let Some(ref static_resolver) = maybe_static {
@@ -269,11 +258,6 @@ impl Iterator for SocketAddrs {
 }

 impl HickoryDnsResolver {
-    /// Returns an instance of the shared resolver.
-    pub fn shared() -> Self {
-        SHARED_RESOLVER.clone()
-    }
-
    /// Attempt to resolve a domain name to a set of ['IpAddr']s
    pub async fn resolve_str(
        &self,
@@ -281,20 +265,10 @@ impl HickoryDnsResolver {
    ) -> Result<impl Iterator<Item = IpAddr> + use<>, ResolveError> {
        let n =
            Name::from_str(name).map_err(|_| ResolveError::InvalidNameError(name.to_string()))?;
-        let use_system = self.use_system.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
-        let resolver = if use_system {
-            self.system_resolver
-                .get_or_try_init(|| HickoryDnsResolver::new_resolver_system(self.use_shared))?
-                .clone()
-        } else {
-            self.state
-                .get_or_init(|| HickoryDnsResolver::new_resolver(self.use_shared))
-                .clone()
-        };
-
        resolve(
            n,
-            resolver,
+            self.state.clone(),
+            self.fallback.clone(),
            self.static_base.clone(),
            self.use_shared,
            self.overall_dns_timeout,
@@ -324,11 +298,13 @@ impl HickoryDnsResolver {
    fn new_resolver_system(use_shared: bool) -> Result<TokioResolver, ResolveError> {
        // using a closure here is slightly gross, but this makes sure that if the
        // lazy-init returns an error it can be handled by the client
-        if !use_shared {
+        if !use_shared || SHARED_RESOLVER.fallback.is_none() {
            new_resolver_system()
        } else {
            Ok(SHARED_RESOLVER
-                .system_resolver
+                .fallback
+                .as_ref()
+                .unwrap()
                .get_or_try_init(new_resolver_system)?
                .clone())
        }
@@ -344,80 +320,45 @@ impl HickoryDnsResolver {
        }
    }

-    /// Swap the primary internal resolver to the system resolver rather than the
-    /// configured custom resolver.
-    pub fn use_system_resolver(&self) {
-        self.use_system.store(true, Relaxed);
+    /// Enable fallback to the system default resolver if the primary (DoX) resolver fails
+    pub fn enable_system_fallback(&mut self) -> Result<(), ResolveError> {
+        self.fallback = Some(Default::default());
+        let _ = self
+            .fallback
+            .as_ref()
+            .unwrap()
+            .get_or_try_init(new_resolver_system)?;

-        if self.use_shared {
-            SHARED_RESOLVER.use_system_resolver();
-        }
+        // IF THIS INSTANCE IS A FRONT FOR THE SHARED RESOLVER SHOULDN'T THIS FN ENABLE THE SYSTEM FALLBACK FOR THE SHARED RESOLVER TOO?
+        // if self.use_shared {
+        //     SHARED_RESOLVER.enable_system_fallback()?;
+        // }
+        Ok(())
    }

-    /// Swap the primary internal resolver to the configured custom resolver rather than the
-    /// system resolver.
-    pub fn use_configured_resolver(&self) {
-        self.use_system.store(false, Relaxed);
+    /// Disable fallback resolution. If the primary resolver fails the error is
+    /// returned immediately
+    pub fn disable_system_fallback(&mut self) {
+        self.fallback = None;

-        if self.use_shared {
-            SHARED_RESOLVER.use_configured_resolver();
-        }
+        // // IF THIS INSTANCE IS A FRONT FOR THE SHARED RESOLVER SHOULDN'T THIS FN ENABLE THE SYSTEM FALLBACK FOR THE SHARED RESOLVER TOO?
+        // if self.use_shared {
+        //     SHARED_RESOLVER.fallback = None;
+        // }
    }

-    /// Clear entries from the static table that would return entries during the pre-resolve stage.
-    /// This means that all lookups will attempt to use the network resolver again before the static
-    /// table is consulted.
-    ///  
-    /// Entries elevated to pre-resolve from fallback (added from default or using
-    /// [`set_fallback`]`) will have their cache timeout cleared. Entries added directly to
-    /// pre-resolve (using [`Self::set_static_preresolve`]) will be removed.
-    pub fn clear_preresolve(&self) {
-        debug!("clearing pre-resolve table");
-        if let Some(cell) = &self.static_base
-            && let Some(static_base) = cell.get()
-        {
-            static_base.clear_preresolve()
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Get the current map of hostnames to addresses used in the fallback static lookup stage if one
+    /// Get the current map of hostname to address in use by the fallback static lookup if one
    /// exists.
    pub fn get_static_fallbacks(&self) -> Option<HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>>> {
-        Some(self.static_base.as_ref()?.get()?.get_fallback_addrs())
+        Some(self.static_base.as_ref()?.get()?.get_addrs())
    }

    /// Set (or overwrite) the map of addresses used in the fallback static hostname lookup
-    pub fn set_fallback_addrs(&mut self, addrs: HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>>) {
-        debug!("setting fallback entries for {:?}", addrs.keys());
-        if self.static_base.is_none() {
-            let cell = OnceCell::new();
-            self.static_base = Some(Arc::new(cell));
-        }
-        self.static_base
-            .as_ref()
-            .unwrap()
-            .get_or_init(|| Self::new_static_fallback(self.use_shared))
-            .set_fallback(addrs);
-    }
-
-    /// Get the current map of hostnames to addresses used in the preresolve static lookup stage
-    /// if one exists.
-    pub fn get_static_preresolve(&self) -> Option<HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>>> {
-        Some(self.static_base.as_ref()?.get()?.get_preresolve_addrs())
-    }
-
-    /// Set (or overwrite) the map of addresses used in the preresolve static hostname lookup
-    pub fn set_static_preresolve(&mut self, addrs: HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>>) {
-        debug!("setting pre-resolve entries for {:?}", addrs.keys());
-        if self.static_base.is_none() {
-            let cell = OnceCell::new();
-            self.static_base = Some(Arc::new(cell));
-        }
-        self.static_base
-            .as_ref()
-            .unwrap()
-            .get_or_init(|| Self::new_static_fallback(self.use_shared))
-            .set_preresolve(addrs);
+    pub fn set_static_fallbacks(&mut self, addrs: HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>>) {
+        let cell = OnceCell::new();
+        cell.set(StaticResolver::new(addrs))
+            .expect("infallible assign");
+        self.static_base = Some(Arc::new(cell));
    }

    /// Successfully resolved addresses are cached for a minimum of 30 minutes
@@ -554,7 +495,7 @@ fn new_resolver_system() -> Result<TokioResolver, ResolveError> {
 }

 fn new_default_static_fallback() -> StaticResolver {
-    StaticResolver::new().with_fallback(constants::default_static_addrs())
+    StaticResolver::new(constants::default_static_addrs())
 }

 /// Do a trial resolution using each nameserver individually to test which are working and which
@@ -591,7 +532,10 @@ mod test {
    use super::*;
    use itertools::Itertools;
    use std::collections::HashMap;
-    use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};
+    use std::{
+        net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr},
+        time::Instant,
+    };

    /// IP addresses guaranteed to fail attempts to resolve
    ///
@@ -608,7 +552,7 @@ mod test {
        let var_name = HickoryDnsResolver::default();
        let resolver = var_name;
        let client = reqwest::ClientBuilder::new()
-            .dns_resolver(resolver)
+            .dns_resolver(resolver.into())
            .build()
            .unwrap();

@@ -653,7 +597,7 @@ mod test {
        let example_ip6: IpAddr = "dead::beef".parse().unwrap();
        addr_map.insert(example_domain.to_string(), vec![example_ip4, example_ip6]);

-        resolver.set_fallback_addrs(addr_map);
+        resolver.set_static_fallbacks(addr_map);

        let mut addrs = resolver.resolve_str(example_domain).await?;
        assert!(addrs.contains(&example_ip4));
@@ -794,19 +738,18 @@ mod test {
        }

        #[tokio::test]
-        #[cfg(any())] // #[ignore] we run --ignore in CI/CD assuming it just means slow -_-
-        // This test impacts the state of the shared resolver and as such is disabled to avoid
-        // interference with other tests.
-        //
-        // this test is dependent of external network setup -- i.e. blocking all traffic to the
-        // default resolvers. Otherwise the default resolvers will succeed without using the static
-        // fallback, making the test pointless
+        #[ignore]
+        // this test is dependent of external network setup -- i.e. blocking all traffic to the default
+        // resolvers. Otherwise the default resolvers will succeed without using the static fallback,
+        // making the test pointless
        async fn dns_lookup_failure_on_shared() -> Result<(), ResolveError> {
-            let resolver1 = HickoryDnsResolver::shared();
+            let time_start = Instant::now();
+            let r = OnceCell::new();
+            r.set(build_broken_resolver().expect("failed to build resolver"))
+                .expect("broken resolver init error");

-            let time_start = std::time::Instant::now();
-            // create a new resolver that uses the shared resolver
-            let resolver = HickoryDnsResolver::shared();
+            // create a new resolver that won't mess with the shared resolver used by other tests
+            let resolver = HickoryDnsResolver::default();

            // successful lookup using fallback to static resolver
            let domain = "rpc.nymtech.net";
@@ -815,27 +758,9 @@ mod test {
                .await
                .expect("failed to resolve address in static lookup");

-            let lookup_dur = Instant::now() - time_start;
-            assert!(
-                lookup_dur > resolver.overall_dns_timeout,
-                "expected lookup timeout - took {}ms",
-                (lookup_dur).as_millis()
-            );
-
-            let time_start = std::time::Instant::now();
-            // successful lookup using pre-resolve entry promoted from fallback
-            let domain = "rpc.nymtech.net";
-            let _ = resolver1
-                .resolve_str(domain)
-                .await
-                .expect("domain expected to be in pre-resolve");
-
-            // this lookup should basically be instant as we are using pre-resolve
-            let lookup_dur = std::time::Instant::now() - time_start;
-            assert!(
-                lookup_dur < Duration::from_millis(10),
-                "expected instant - took {}ms",
-                (lookup_dur).as_millis()
+            println!(
+                "{}ms resolved {domain}",
+                (Instant::now() - time_start).as_millis()
            );

            // unsuccessful lookup - primary times out, and not in static table
@@ -846,62 +771,5 @@ mod test {
            // assert!(result.is_err_and(|e| matches!(e, ResolveError::ResolveError(e) if e.is_nx_domain())));
            Ok(())
        }
-
-        #[tokio::test]
-        #[cfg(any())] // #[ignore] we run --ignore in CI/CD assuming it just means slow -_-
-        // This test impacts the state of the shared resolver and as such is disabled to avoid
-        // interference with other tests.
-        async fn setting_dns_fallbacks_with_shared_resolver() -> Result<(), ResolveError> {
-            let resolver1 = HickoryDnsResolver::shared();
-
-            // create a new resolver that uses the shared resolver
-            let mut resolver = HickoryDnsResolver::shared();
-
-            let example_domains = [
-                String::from("static1.nymvpn.com"),
-                String::from("static2.nymvpn.com"),
-            ];
-            let mut addr_map1 = HashMap::new();
-            addr_map1.insert(
-                example_domains[0].clone(),
-                vec![Ipv4Addr::new(10, 10, 10, 10).into()],
-            );
-            addr_map1.insert(
-                example_domains[1].clone(),
-                vec![Ipv4Addr::new(1, 1, 1, 1).into()],
-            );
-
-            resolver.set_static_preresolve(addr_map1);
-
-            let time_start = std::time::Instant::now();
-            // successful lookup using pre-resolve entry promoted from fallback
-            let _ = resolver1
-                .resolve_str(&example_domains[0])
-                .await
-                .expect("domain expected to be in pre-resolve");
-
-            // this lookup should basically be instant as we are using pre-resolve
-            let lookup_dur = std::time::Instant::now() - time_start;
-            assert!(
-                lookup_dur < Duration::from_millis(10),
-                "expected instant - took {}ms",
-                (lookup_dur).as_millis()
-            );
-
-            // After clearing the pre-resolve in one instance of the shared resolver ...
-            resolver.clear_preresolve();
-
-            // ... other instances have their pre-resolve entries cleared.
-            let prereslve_lookup = resolver1
-                .static_base
-                .as_ref()
-                .unwrap()
-                .get()
-                .unwrap()
-                .pre_resolve(&example_domains[0]);
-            assert!(prereslve_lookup.is_none());
-
-            Ok(())
-        }
    }
 }
@@ -51,9 +51,6 @@ pub const VERCEL_COM_IPS: &[IpAddr] = &[
    IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(198, 169, 1, 193)),
 ];

-pub const NYM_API_CDN: &str = "cdn1.media-platform.net";
-pub const NYM_API_CDN_IPS: &[IpAddr] = &[IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(172, 104, 178, 252))];
-
 pub const NYM_COM_DOMAIN: &str = "nym.com";
 pub const NYM_COM_IPS: &[IpAddr] = &[IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(76, 76, 21, 22))];

@@ -72,12 +69,6 @@ pub const NYM_RPC_IPS: &[IpAddr] = &[
    )),
 ];

-#[allow(unused)]
-pub fn empty_static_addrs() -> HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>> {
-    HashMap::new()
-}
-
-#[allow(unused)]
 pub fn default_static_addrs() -> HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>> {
    let mut m = HashMap::new();
    m.insert(NYM_API_DOMAIN.to_string(), NYM_API_IPS.to_vec());
@@ -97,7 +88,6 @@ pub fn default_static_addrs() -> HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>> {
    m.insert(YELP_FASTLY_DOMAIN.to_string(), YELP_FASTLY_IPS.to_vec());
    m.insert(VERCEL_APP_DOMAIN.to_string(), VERCEL_APP_IPS.to_vec());
    m.insert(VERCEL_COM_DOMAIN.to_string(), VERCEL_COM_IPS.to_vec());
-    m.insert(NYM_API_CDN.to_string(), NYM_API_CDN_IPS.to_vec());
    m.insert(NYM_COM_DOMAIN.to_string(), NYM_COM_IPS.to_vec());
    m.insert(NYM_STATS_API_DOMAIN.to_string(), NYM_STATS_API_IPS.to_vec());
    m.insert(NYM_RPC_DOMAIN.to_string(), NYM_RPC_IPS.to_vec());
@@ -14,78 +14,42 @@ const DEFAULT_PRE_RESOLVE_TIMEOUT: Duration = super::DEFAULT_POSITIVE_LOOKUP_CAC

 #[derive(Debug, Default, Clone)]
 pub struct StaticResolver {
-    fallback_addr_map: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>>>>,
-    preresolve_addr_map: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, Entry>>>,
+    static_addr_map: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, Entry>>>,
    pre_resolve_timeout: Option<Duration>,
 }

-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
-enum PreResolveStatus {
-    #[default]
-    Valid,
-    ValidUntil(Instant),
-}
-
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
 struct Entry {
-    status: PreResolveStatus,
+    valid_for_pre_resolve_until: Option<Instant>,
    addrs: Vec<IpAddr>,
 }

 impl Entry {
    fn new(addrs: Vec<IpAddr>) -> Self {
        Self {
-            status: PreResolveStatus::Valid,
+            valid_for_pre_resolve_until: None,
            addrs,
        }
    }
-
-    fn new_timeout(addrs: Vec<IpAddr>, timeout: Duration) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            status: PreResolveStatus::ValidUntil(Instant::now() + timeout),
-            addrs,
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn is_valid(&self) -> bool {
-        match self.status {
-            PreResolveStatus::Valid => true,
-            PreResolveStatus::ValidUntil(t) => t > Instant::now(),
-        }
-    }
 }

 impl StaticResolver {
-    pub fn new() -> StaticResolver {
+    pub fn new(static_entries: HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>>) -> StaticResolver {
+        debug!("building static resolver");
+        let static_entries = static_entries
+            .into_iter()
+            .map(|(name, ips)| (name, Entry::new(ips)))
+            .collect();
        Self {
-            fallback_addr_map: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
-            preresolve_addr_map: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
+            static_addr_map: Arc::new(Mutex::new(static_entries)),
            pre_resolve_timeout: Some(DEFAULT_PRE_RESOLVE_TIMEOUT),
        }
    }

-    /// Initialize the contents of the pre-resolve table for this instance of the static resolver
-    #[allow(unused)]
-    pub fn with_preresolve(mut self, entries: HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>>) -> Self {
-        let entries = entries
-            .into_iter()
-            .map(|(name, ips)| (name, Entry::new(ips)))
-            .collect();
-        self.preresolve_addr_map = Arc::new(Mutex::new(entries));
-        self
-    }
-
-    /// Initialize the contenes of the fallback table for this instance of the static resolver
-    pub fn with_fallback(mut self, entries: HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>>) -> Self {
-        self.fallback_addr_map = Arc::new(Mutex::new(entries));
-        self
-    }
-
-    /// Return the set of domain names and associated addresses stored in the pre-resolve static
-    /// lookup table
-    pub fn get_preresolve_addrs(&self) -> HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>> {
+    /// Return the full set of domain names and associated addresses stored in this static lookup table
+    pub fn get_addrs(&self) -> HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>> {
        let mut out = HashMap::new();
-        self.preresolve_addr_map
+        self.static_addr_map
            .lock()
            .unwrap()
            .iter()
@@ -95,38 +59,6 @@ impl StaticResolver {
        out
    }

-    /// Return the set of domain names and associated addresses stored in the fallback static lookup
-    /// table
-    pub fn get_fallback_addrs(&self) -> HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>> {
-        self.fallback_addr_map.lock().unwrap().clone()
-    }
-
-    /// Set (or overwrite) the map of static addresses to be returned only after attempting a lookup
-    /// over the network resolver.
-    pub fn set_fallback(&self, addrs: HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>>) {
-        self.fallback_addr_map.lock().unwrap().extend(addrs);
-    }
-
-    /// Clear entries from the static table that would return entries during the pre-resolve stage.
-    /// This means that all lookups will attempt to use the network resolver again before the static
-    /// table is consulted.
-    ///  
-    /// Entries elevated to pre-resolve from fallback (added from default or using
-    /// [`set_fallback`]`) will have their cache timeout cleared. Entries added directly to
-    /// pre-resolve (using [`Self::preresolve_to_addrs`]) will be removed.
-    pub fn clear_preresolve(&self) {
-        *self.preresolve_addr_map.lock().unwrap() = HashMap::new();
-    }
-
-    /// Set (or overwrite) the map of static addresses and mark these domains to be returned
-    /// WITHOUT attempting a lookup over the network resolver.
-    pub fn set_preresolve(&self, addrs: HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>>) {
-        let mut current_map = self.preresolve_addr_map.lock().unwrap();
-        for (domain, ips) in addrs.into_iter() {
-            _ = current_map.insert(domain, Entry::new(ips))
-        }
-    }
-
    /// Change the timeout for which domains can be pre-resolved after they are looked up in the
    /// static lookup table.
    #[allow(unused)]
@@ -139,58 +71,44 @@ impl StaticResolver {
    /// recently (within the configured timeout) looked it up previously in this static table using
    /// a regular resolve.
    pub fn pre_resolve(&self, name: &str) -> Option<Vec<IpAddr>> {
-        self.preresolve_addr_map
+        debug!("found {name:?} in pre-resolve static table resolver");
+
+        self.pre_resolve_timeout?;
+
+        self.static_addr_map
            .lock()
            .unwrap()
            .get(name)
-            .filter(|entry| entry.is_valid())
-            .map(|entry| {
-                debug!("pre-resolve lookup hit for \"{name:?}\" in static table resolver");
-                entry.addrs.clone()
+            .filter(|e| {
+                e.valid_for_pre_resolve_until
+                    .is_some_and(|t| t > Instant::now())
            })
+            .map(|e| e.addrs.clone())
    }

    #[allow(unused)]
    pub fn resolve_str(&self, name: &str) -> Option<Vec<IpAddr>> {
        Self::resolve_inner(
-            self.fallback_addr_map.lock().unwrap(),
-            self.preresolve_addr_map.lock().unwrap(),
+            self.static_addr_map.lock().unwrap(),
            name,
            self.pre_resolve_timeout,
        )
+        .map(|e| e.addrs)
    }

    fn resolve_inner(
-        fallback_table: MutexGuard<'_, HashMap<String, Vec<IpAddr>>>,
-        mut preresolve_table: MutexGuard<'_, HashMap<String, Entry>>,
+        mut table: MutexGuard<'_, HashMap<String, Entry>>,
        name: &str,
-        pre_resolve_cache_timeout: Option<Duration>,
-    ) -> Option<Vec<IpAddr>> {
-        let resolved = fallback_table.get(name)?;
+        timeout: Option<Duration>,
+    ) -> Option<Entry> {
+        let resolved = table.get_mut(name)?;

-        debug!("lookup hit for \"{name:?}\" in static table resolver");
+        debug!("found {name:?} in static table resolver");

-        // We had to look this entry up and a pre-resolve duration is defined, so it will
-        // trigger in pre-resolve lookups for the next _timeout_ window if it wasn't already
-        // triggering.
-        if let Some(pre_resolve_timeout) = pre_resolve_cache_timeout {
-            match preresolve_table.get_mut(name) {
-                None => {
-                    _ = preresolve_table.insert(
-                        name.to_string(),
-                        Entry::new_timeout(resolved.clone(), pre_resolve_timeout),
-                    );
-                }
-                // Not sure how we would get cases where this is Some( ) -- it requires having a
-                // Valid entry in the preresolve table and still doing a lookup against fallback.
-                Some(entry) if matches!(entry.status, PreResolveStatus::ValidUntil(_)) => {
-                    _ = preresolve_table.insert(
-                        name.to_string(),
-                        Entry::new_timeout(resolved.clone(), pre_resolve_timeout),
-                    );
-                }
-                _ => {}
-            }
+        if let Some(pre_resolve_timeout) = timeout {
+            // We had to look this entry up and a pre-resolve duration is defined, so it will
+            // trigger in pre-resolve lookups for the next _timeout_ window.
+            resolved.valid_for_pre_resolve_until = Some(Instant::now() + pre_resolve_timeout);
        }
        Some(resolved.clone())
    }
@@ -199,23 +117,13 @@ impl StaticResolver {
 impl Resolve for StaticResolver {
    fn resolve(&self, name: Name) -> Resolving {
        debug!("looking up {name:?} in static resolver");
-        // these should clone arcs, not the actual tables
-        let fallback_addr_map = self.fallback_addr_map.clone();
-        let presesolve_addr_map = self.preresolve_addr_map.clone();
+        let addr_map = self.static_addr_map.clone();
        let timeout = self.pre_resolve_timeout;
-        // Also the returned future doesn't try to take the lock on the tables until the
-        // future is awaited, so no blocking issues.
        Box::pin(async move {
-            let fallback_addr_map = fallback_addr_map.lock().unwrap();
-            let presesolve_addr_map = presesolve_addr_map.lock().unwrap();
-            let lookup = match Self::resolve_inner(
-                fallback_addr_map,
-                presesolve_addr_map,
-                name.as_str(),
-                timeout,
-            ) {
+            let addr_map = addr_map.lock().unwrap();
+            let lookup = match Self::resolve_inner(addr_map, name.as_str(), timeout) {
                None => return Err(ResolveError::StaticLookupMiss.into()),
-                Some(addrs) => addrs,
+                Some(entry) => entry.addrs,
            };
            let addrs: Addrs = Box::new(
                lookup
@@ -234,7 +142,6 @@ mod test {

    use super::*;
    use std::error::Error as StdError;
-    use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
    use std::str::FromStr;

    #[tokio::test]
@@ -242,7 +149,7 @@ mod test {
        let example_domain = String::from("static.nymvpn.com");

        // lookup for domain for which there is no entry
-        let resolver = StaticResolver::new();
+        let resolver = StaticResolver::new(HashMap::new());

        let url = reqwest::dns::Name::from_str(&example_domain).unwrap();
        let result = resolver.resolve(url).await;
@@ -259,7 +166,7 @@ mod test {
        addr_map.insert(example_domain.clone(), vec![example_ip4, example_ip6]);

        let url = reqwest::dns::Name::from_str(&example_domain).unwrap();
-        let resolver = StaticResolver::new().with_fallback(addr_map);
+        let resolver = StaticResolver::new(addr_map);
        let mut addrs = resolver.resolve(url).await?;
        assert!(addrs.contains(&SocketAddr::new(example_ip4, 0)));
        assert!(addrs.contains(&SocketAddr::new(example_ip6, 0)));
@@ -268,7 +175,7 @@ mod test {
    }

    #[test]
-    fn elevate_fallback_to_pre_resolve() {
+    fn static_lookup_pre_resolve() {
        let example_duration = Duration::from_secs(3);
        let example_domain = String::from("static.nymvpn.com");
        let mut addr_map = HashMap::new();
@@ -276,23 +183,24 @@ mod test {
        let example_ip6: IpAddr = "dead::beef".parse().unwrap();
        addr_map.insert(example_domain.clone(), vec![example_ip4, example_ip6]);

-        let resolver = StaticResolver::new()
-            .with_fallback(addr_map)
-            .with_pre_resolve_timeout(example_duration);
+        let resolver = StaticResolver::new(addr_map).with_pre_resolve_timeout(example_duration);

        // ensure that attempting to pre-resolve without first resolving returns none
        let result = resolver.pre_resolve(&example_domain);
        assert!(result.is_none());

        // resolving should now update the pre-resolve validity timeout for the entry
-        let _addrs = resolver
-            .resolve_str(&example_domain)
-            .expect("entry should exist");
-        assert!(matches!(
-            resolver.preresolve_status(&example_domain),
-            Some(PreResolveStatus::ValidUntil(t))
-                if t < Instant::now() + example_duration
-        ));
+        let entry = StaticResolver::resolve_inner(
+            resolver.static_addr_map.lock().unwrap(),
+            &example_domain,
+            Some(example_duration),
+        )
+        .expect("missing entry???!!!!");
+        assert!(
+            entry
+                .valid_for_pre_resolve_until
+                .is_some_and(|t| t < Instant::now() + example_duration)
+        );

        // check that pre-resolve now returns the expected record
        let addrs = resolver
@@ -306,139 +214,4 @@ mod test {
        let result = resolver.pre_resolve(&example_domain);
        assert!(result.is_none());
    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn set_and_use_preresolve() {
-        let example_duration = Duration::from_secs(3);
-        let example_domains = [
-            String::from("static1.nymvpn.com"),
-            String::from("static2.nymvpn.com"),
-            String::from("preresolve.nymvpn.com"),
-        ];
-        let mut addr_map1 = HashMap::new();
-        addr_map1.insert(
-            example_domains[0].clone(),
-            vec![Ipv4Addr::new(10, 10, 10, 10).into()],
-        );
-        addr_map1.insert(
-            example_domains[1].clone(),
-            vec![Ipv4Addr::new(1, 1, 1, 1).into()],
-        );
-
-        let mut addr_map2 = HashMap::new();
-        addr_map2.insert(
-            example_domains[1].clone(),
-            vec![Ipv4Addr::new(1, 1, 1, 1).into()],
-        );
-        addr_map2.insert(
-            example_domains[2].clone(),
-            vec![Ipv4Addr::new(8, 8, 8, 8).into()],
-        );
-
-        let resolver = StaticResolver::new()
-            .with_fallback(addr_map1)
-            .with_pre_resolve_timeout(example_duration);
-
-        // Attempting to pre-resolve without setting the table returns none
-        let result = resolver.pre_resolve(&example_domains[0]);
-        assert!(result.is_none());
-
-        resolver.set_preresolve(addr_map2);
-
-        // After setting the pre-resolve, addresses in the the table are returned
-        let result = resolver.pre_resolve(&example_domains[1]);
-        assert!(result.is_some());
-
-        // If the domain wasn't in the pre-resolve table it returns none.
-        let result = resolver.pre_resolve(&example_domains[0]);
-        assert!(result.is_none());
-
-        resolver.clear_preresolve();
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn preresolve_with_fallback() {
-        let example_duration = Duration::from_secs(3);
-        let example_domains = [
-            String::from("static1.nymvpn.com"),
-            String::from("static2.nymvpn.com"),
-            String::from("preresolve.nymvpn.com"),
-        ];
-        let mut addr_map1 = HashMap::new();
-        addr_map1.insert(
-            example_domains[0].clone(),
-            vec![Ipv4Addr::new(10, 10, 10, 10).into()],
-        );
-        addr_map1.insert(
-            example_domains[1].clone(),
-            vec![Ipv4Addr::new(1, 1, 1, 1).into()],
-        );
-
-        let mut addr_map2 = HashMap::new();
-        addr_map2.insert(
-            example_domains[1].clone(),
-            vec![Ipv4Addr::new(1, 1, 1, 1).into()],
-        );
-        addr_map2.insert(
-            example_domains[2].clone(),
-            vec![Ipv4Addr::new(8, 8, 8, 8).into()],
-        );
-
-        let resolver = StaticResolver::new()
-            .with_fallback(addr_map1)
-            .with_preresolve(addr_map2)
-            .with_pre_resolve_timeout(example_duration);
-
-        // when using both pre-resolve and fallback elevating entries from fallback to pre-resolve
-        // leaves the entries as `Valid`.
-        assert!(matches!(
-            resolver.preresolve_status(&example_domains[1]),
-            Some(PreResolveStatus::Valid)
-        ));
-        let _addrs = resolver
-            .resolve_str(&example_domains[1])
-            .expect("entry should exist");
-        assert!(matches!(
-            resolver.preresolve_status(&example_domains[1]),
-            Some(PreResolveStatus::Valid)
-        ));
-
-        // entries not already in pre-resolve get elevated with a timeout.
-        assert!(!resolver.preresolve_contains(&example_domains[0]));
-        let _addrs = resolver
-            .resolve_str(&example_domains[0])
-            .expect("entry should exist");
-        assert!(resolver.preresolve_contains(&example_domains[0]));
-        assert!(matches!(
-            resolver.preresolve_status(&example_domains[0]),
-            Some(PreResolveStatus::ValidUntil(_))
-        ));
-
-        // clearing the pre-resolve table doesn't impact the fallback table.
-        resolver.clear_preresolve();
-        assert!(!resolver.preresolve_contains(&example_domains[0]));
-        assert!(!resolver.preresolve_contains(&example_domains[1]));
-        assert!(!resolver.preresolve_contains(&example_domains[2]));
-        assert!(!resolver.fallback_contains(&example_domains[0]));
-        assert!(!resolver.fallback_contains(&example_domains[1]));
-    }
-
-    /// convenience functions for testing
-    impl StaticResolver {
-        fn preresolve_status(&self, name: &str) -> Option<PreResolveStatus> {
-            self.preresolve_addr_map
-                .lock()
-                .unwrap()
-                .get(name)
-                .map(|e| e.status.clone())
-        }
-
-        fn preresolve_contains(&self, name: &str) -> bool {
-            self.preresolve_addr_map.lock().unwrap().contains_key(name)
-        }
-
-        fn fallback_contains(&self, name: &str) -> bool {
-            self.preresolve_addr_map.lock().unwrap().contains_key(name)
-        }
-    }
 }
@@ -3,21 +3,15 @@

 //! Utilities for and implementation of request tunneling

-use std::sync::{
-    Arc, LazyLock, RwLock,
-    atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering},
-};
+use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
 use tracing::warn;

-use crate::{Client, ClientBuilder};
-
-static SHARED_FRONTING_POLICY: LazyLock<Arc<RwLock<FrontPolicy>>> =
-    LazyLock::new(|| Arc::new(RwLock::new(FrontPolicy::Off)));
+use crate::ClientBuilder;

 // #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
 #[derive(Debug)]
 pub(crate) struct Front {
-    pub(crate) policy: Arc<RwLock<FrontPolicy>>,
+    pub(crate) policy: FrontPolicy,
    enabled: AtomicBool,
 }

@@ -25,7 +19,7 @@ impl Clone for Front {
    fn clone(&self) -> Self {
        Self {
            policy: self.policy.clone(),
-            enabled: AtomicBool::new(false),
+            enabled: AtomicBool::new(self.enabled.load(Ordering::Relaxed)),
        }
    }
 }
@@ -33,30 +27,13 @@ impl Clone for Front {
 impl Front {
    pub(crate) fn new(policy: FrontPolicy) -> Self {
        Self {
-            enabled: AtomicBool::new(false),
-            policy: Arc::new(RwLock::new(policy)),
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub(crate) fn off() -> Self {
-        Self::new(FrontPolicy::Off)
-    }
-
-    pub(crate) fn shared() -> Self {
-        let policy = SHARED_FRONTING_POLICY.clone();
-        Self {
-            enabled: AtomicBool::new(false),
+            enabled: AtomicBool::new(policy == FrontPolicy::Always),
            policy,
        }
    }

-    pub(crate) fn set_policy(&self, policy: FrontPolicy) {
-        *self.policy.write().unwrap() = policy;
-        self.enabled.store(false, Ordering::Relaxed);
-    }
-
    pub(crate) fn is_enabled(&self) -> bool {
-        match *self.policy.read().unwrap() {
+        match self.policy {
            FrontPolicy::Off => false,
            FrontPolicy::OnRetry => self.enabled.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
            FrontPolicy::Always => true,
@@ -69,13 +46,14 @@ impl Front {
        if self.is_enabled() {
            return;
        }
-        if matches!(*self.policy.read().unwrap(), FrontPolicy::OnRetry) {
+        if matches!(self.policy, FrontPolicy::OnRetry) {
            self.enabled.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed);
        }
    }
 }

 #[derive(Debug, Default, PartialEq, Clone)]
+#[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
 /// Policy for when to use domain fronting for HTTP requests.
 pub enum FrontPolicy {
    /// Always use domain fronting for all requests.
@@ -88,208 +66,29 @@ pub enum FrontPolicy {
 }

 impl ClientBuilder {
-    /// Enable and configure request tunneling for API requests. If no front policy is
-    /// provided the shared fronting policy will be used.
-    pub fn with_fronting(mut self, policy: Option<FrontPolicy>) -> Self {
-        let front = if let Some(p) = policy {
-            Front::new(p)
-        } else {
-            Front::shared()
-        };
+    /// Enable and configure request tunneling for API requests.
+    #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
+    pub fn with_fronting(mut self, policy: FrontPolicy) -> Self {
+        let front = Front::new(policy);

        // Check if any of the supplied urls even support fronting
        if !self.urls.iter().any(|url| url.has_front()) {
            warn!(
-                "fronting is enabled, but none of the supplied urls have configured fronting domains: {:?}",
-                self.urls
+                "fronting is enabled, but none of the supplied urls have configured fronting domains"
            );
        }

-        self.front = front;
+        self.front = Some(front);

        self
    }
 }

-impl Client {
-    /// Set the policy for enabling fronting. If fronting was previously unset this will set it, and
-    /// make it possible to enable (i.e [`FrontPolicy::Off`] will not enable it).
-    ///
-    /// Calling this function sets a custom policy for this client, disconnecting it from the shared
-    /// fronting policy -- i.e. changes applied through [`Client::set_shared_front_policy`] will not
-    /// be impact this client.
-    pub fn set_front_policy(&mut self, policy: FrontPolicy) {
-        self.front.set_policy(policy)
-    }
-
-    /// Set the fronting policy for this client to follow the shared policy.
-    pub fn use_shared_front_policy(&mut self) {
-        self.front = Front::shared();
-    }
-
-    /// Set the fronting policy for all clients using the shared policy.
-    //
-    // NOTE: this does not reset the per-instance enabled flag like it will when using
-    // [`Front::set_front_policy`]. So if a client is using shared policy with the `OnRetry` policy
-    // and this function is used to swap that policy away from and then back to `OnRetry` the
-    // fronting will still be enabled. Noting this here just in case this triggers any corner cases
-    // down the road.
-    pub fn set_shared_front_policy(policy: FrontPolicy) {
-        *SHARED_FRONTING_POLICY.write().unwrap() = policy;
-    }
-}
-
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use crate::{ApiClientCore, NO_PARAMS, Url};

-    impl Front {
-        pub(crate) fn policy(&self) -> FrontPolicy {
-            self.policy.read().unwrap().clone()
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Policy can be set for an independent client and the update is applied properly
-    #[test]
-    fn set_policy_independent_client() {
-        let url1 = Url::new(
-            "https://validator.global.ssl.fastly.net",
-            Some(vec!["https://yelp.global.ssl.fastly.net"]),
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        let mut client1 = ClientBuilder::new(url1.clone())
-            .unwrap()
-            .with_fronting(Some(FrontPolicy::Off))
-            .build()
-            .unwrap();
-        assert!(client1.front.policy() == FrontPolicy::Off);
-
-        let client2 = ClientBuilder::new(url1.clone())
-            .unwrap()
-            .with_fronting(Some(FrontPolicy::OnRetry))
-            .build()
-            .unwrap();
-
-        // Ensure that setting the policy for a client it gets properly applied.
-        client1.set_front_policy(FrontPolicy::Always);
-        assert!(client1.front.policy() == FrontPolicy::Always);
-
-        // ensure that setting the policy in a client NOT using the shared policy does NOT update
-        // the policy used by another client.
-        assert!(client2.front.policy() == FrontPolicy::OnRetry);
-
-        // Ensure that the policy takes effect and is applied when setting host headers on outgoing
-        // requests
-        let req = client1
-            .create_request(reqwest::Method::GET, &["/"], NO_PARAMS, None::<&()>)
-            .unwrap()
-            .build()
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let expected_host = url1.host_str().unwrap();
-        assert!(
-            req.headers()
-                .get(reqwest::header::HOST)
-                .is_some_and(|h| h.to_str().unwrap() == expected_host),
-            "{:?} != {:?}",
-            expected_host,
-            req,
-        );
-
-        let expected_front = url1.front_str().unwrap();
-        assert!(
-            req.url()
-                .host()
-                .is_some_and(|url| url.to_string() == expected_front),
-            "{:?} != {:?}",
-            expected_front,
-            req,
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// Policy can be set for the shared client and the update is applied properly
-    // NOTE THIS TEST IS DISABLED BECAUSE IT INTERACTS WITH THE SHARED POLICY AND AS SUCH CAN HAVE
-    // AN IMPACT ON OTHER TESTS
-    #[test]
-    #[cfg(any())] // #[ignore] we run --ignore in CI/CD assuming it just means slow -_-
-    fn set_policy_shared_client() {
-        let url1 = Url::new(
-            "https://validator.global.ssl.fastly.net",
-            Some(vec!["https://yelp.global.ssl.fastly.net"]),
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        Client::set_shared_front_policy(FrontPolicy::Off);
-        assert!(*SHARED_FRONTING_POLICY.read().unwrap() == FrontPolicy::Off);
-
-        let client1 = ClientBuilder::new(url1.clone())
-            .unwrap()
-            .with_fronting(None)
-            .build()
-            .unwrap();
-        assert!(client1.front.policy() == FrontPolicy::Off);
-
-        let mut client2 = ClientBuilder::new(url1.clone())
-            .unwrap()
-            .with_fronting(Some(FrontPolicy::Off))
-            .build()
-            .unwrap();
-
-        // Ensure that setting the shared policy gets properly applied
-        Client::set_shared_front_policy(FrontPolicy::Always);
-        assert!(client1.front.policy() == FrontPolicy::Always);
-
-        // Setting the shared policy should NOT update clients NOT using the shared policy.
-        assert!(client2.front.policy() == FrontPolicy::Off);
-
-        // Ensure that the policy takes effect and is applied when setting host headers on outgoing
-        // requests
-        let req = client1
-            .create_request(reqwest::Method::GET, &["/"], NO_PARAMS, None::<&()>)
-            .unwrap()
-            .build()
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let expected_host = url1.host_str().unwrap();
-        assert!(
-            req.headers()
-                .get(reqwest::header::HOST)
-                .is_some_and(|h| h.to_str().unwrap() == expected_host),
-            "{:?} != {:?}",
-            expected_host,
-            req,
-        );
-
-        let expected_front = url1.front_str().unwrap();
-        assert!(
-            req.url()
-                .host()
-                .is_some_and(|url| url.to_string() == expected_front),
-            "{:?} != {:?}",
-            expected_front,
-            req,
-        );
-
-        // ensure that setting to the shared policy works
-        client2.use_shared_front_policy();
-        assert!(client2.front.policy() == FrontPolicy::Always);
-
-        // ensure that if the policy is OnRetry then the `enabled` fields are still independent,
-        // despite the policy being shared.
-        Client::set_shared_front_policy(FrontPolicy::OnRetry);
-        assert!(client1.front.policy() == FrontPolicy::OnRetry);
-        assert!(client2.front.policy() == FrontPolicy::OnRetry);
-
-        assert!(!client1.front.is_enabled());
-        assert!(!client2.front.is_enabled());
-
-        client1.front.retry_enable();
-        assert!(client1.front.is_enabled());
-        assert!(!client2.front.is_enabled());
-    }
-
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn nym_api_works() {
        let url1 = Url::new(
@@ -305,7 +104,7 @@ mod tests {

        let client = ClientBuilder::new(url1)
            .expect("bad url")
-            .with_fronting(Some(FrontPolicy::Always))
+            .with_fronting(FrontPolicy::Always)
            .build()
            .expect("failed to build client");

@@ -341,7 +140,7 @@ mod tests {

        let client = ClientBuilder::new_with_urls(vec![url1, url2])
            .expect("bad url")
-            .with_fronting(Some(FrontPolicy::Always))
+            .with_fronting(FrontPolicy::Always)
            .build()
            .expect("failed to build client");

@@ -136,7 +136,6 @@
 //! ```
 #![warn(missing_docs)]

-use http::header::USER_AGENT;
 pub use inventory;
 pub use reqwest;
 pub use reqwest::ClientBuilder as ReqwestClientBuilder;
@@ -148,7 +147,6 @@ pub mod registry;
 use crate::path::RequestPath;
 use async_trait::async_trait;
 use bytes::Bytes;
-use cfg_if::cfg_if;
 use http::HeaderMap;
 use http::header::{ACCEPT, CONTENT_TYPE};
 use itertools::Itertools;
@@ -163,7 +161,9 @@ use std::time::Duration;
 use thiserror::Error;
 use tracing::{debug, instrument, warn};

-use std::sync::{Arc, LazyLock};
+#[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
+use std::net::SocketAddr;
+use std::sync::Arc;

 #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
 mod fronted;
@@ -195,8 +195,6 @@ use nym_http_api_client_macro::client_defaults;
 /// high and chatty protocols take a while to complete.
 pub const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);

-const NYM_OUTER_SNI_HEADER: &str = "NYM-ORIGINAL-OUTER-SNI";
-
 #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
 client_defaults!(
    priority = -100;
@@ -208,24 +206,6 @@ client_defaults!(
    user_agent = format!("nym-http-api-client/{}", env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"))
 );

-static SHARED_CLIENT: LazyLock<reqwest::Client> = LazyLock::new(|| {
-    tracing::info!("Initializing shared HTTP client");
-    cfg_if! {
-        if #[cfg(target_arch = "wasm32")] {
-            reqwest::ClientBuilder::new().build()
-                .expect("failed to initialize shared http client")
-        } else {
-            let mut builder = default_builder();
-
-            builder = builder.dns_resolver(Arc::new(HickoryDnsResolver::default()));
-
-            builder
-                .build()
-                .expect("failed to initialize shared http client")
-        }
-    }
-});
-
 /// Collection of URL Path Segments
 pub type PathSegments<'a> = &'a [&'a str];
 /// Collection of HTTP Request Parameters
@@ -347,22 +327,16 @@ pub enum HttpClientError {
        source: reqwest::Error,
    },

-    #[error("failed to parse header value: {source}")]
-    InvalidHeaderValue {
-        #[source]
-        source: http::Error,
-    },
-
    #[error("failed to send request for {url}: {source}")]
    RequestSendFailure {
-        url: Box<reqwest::Url>,
+        url: reqwest::Url,
        #[source]
        source: ReqwestErrorWrapper,
    },

    #[error("failed to read response body from {url}: {source}")]
    ResponseReadFailure {
-        url: Box<reqwest::Url>,
+        url: reqwest::Url,
        headers: Box<HeaderMap>,
        status: StatusCode,
        #[source]
@@ -379,7 +353,7 @@ pub enum HttpClientError {
    },

    #[error("the requested resource could not be found at {url}")]
-    NotFound { url: Box<reqwest::Url> },
+    NotFound { url: reqwest::Url },

    #[error("attempted to use domain fronting and clone a request containing stream data")]
    AttemptedToCloneStreamRequest,
@@ -391,7 +365,7 @@ pub enum HttpClientError {
        "the request for {url} failed with status '{status}'. no additional error message provided. response headers: {headers:?}"
    )]
    RequestFailure {
-        url: Box<reqwest::Url>,
+        url: reqwest::Url,
        status: StatusCode,
        headers: Box<HeaderMap>,
    },
@@ -400,7 +374,7 @@ pub enum HttpClientError {
        "the returned response from {url} was empty. status: '{status}'. response headers: {headers:?}"
    )]
    EmptyResponse {
-        url: Box<reqwest::Url>,
+        url: reqwest::Url,
        status: StatusCode,
        headers: Box<HeaderMap>,
    },
@@ -409,7 +383,7 @@ pub enum HttpClientError {
        "failed to resolve request for {url}. status: '{status}'. response headers: {headers:?}. additional error message: {error}"
    )]
    EndpointFailure {
-        url: Box<reqwest::Url>,
+        url: reqwest::Url,
        status: StatusCode,
        headers: Box<HeaderMap>,
        error: String,
@@ -479,7 +453,7 @@ impl HttpClientError {

    pub fn request_send_error(url: reqwest::Url, source: reqwest::Error) -> Self {
        HttpClientError::RequestSendFailure {
-            url: Box::new(url),
+            url,
            source: ReqwestErrorWrapper(source),
        }
    }
@@ -580,19 +554,6 @@ pub trait ApiClientCore {
        let req = self.create_request(method, path, params, json_body)?;
        self.send(req).await
    }
-
-    /// If multiple base urls are available rotate to next (e.g. when the current one resulted in an error)
-    ///
-    /// Takes an optional URL argument. If this is none, the current host will be updated automatically.
-    /// If a url is provided first check that the CURRENT host matches the hostname in the URL before
-    /// triggering a rotation. This is meant to prevent parallel requests that fail from rotating the host
-    /// multiple times.
-    fn maybe_rotate_hosts(&self, offending_url: Option<Url>);
-
-    /// If the fronting policy for the client is set to `OnRetry` this function will enable the
-    /// fronting if not already enabled.
-    #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
-    fn maybe_enable_fronting(&self, context: impl std::fmt::Debug);
 }

 /// A `ClientBuilder` can be used to create a [`Client`] with custom configuration applied consistently
@@ -601,18 +562,16 @@ pub struct ClientBuilder {
    urls: Vec<Url>,

    timeout: Option<Duration>,
-    custom_user_agent: Option<HeaderValue>,
-    reqwest_client_builder: Option<reqwest::ClientBuilder>,
+    custom_user_agent: bool,
+    reqwest_client_builder: reqwest::ClientBuilder,
    #[allow(dead_code)] // not dead code, just unused in wasm
    use_secure_dns: bool,

    #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
-    front: fronted::Front,
+    front: Option<fronted::Front>,

    retry_limit: usize,
    serialization: SerializationFormat,
-
-    error: Option<HttpClientError>,
 }

 impl ClientBuilder {
@@ -683,10 +642,10 @@ impl ClientBuilder {

        let mut builder = Self::new_with_urls(urls)?;

-        // Enable domain fronting using the shared fronting policy
+        // Enable domain fronting by default (on retry)
        #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
        {
-            builder = builder.with_fronting(None);
+            builder = builder.with_fronting(FrontPolicy::OnRetry);
        }

        Ok(builder)
@@ -700,31 +659,26 @@ impl ClientBuilder {

        let urls = Self::check_urls(urls);

+        #[cfg(target_arch = "wasm32")]
+        let reqwest_client_builder = reqwest::ClientBuilder::new();
+
+        #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
+        let reqwest_client_builder = default_builder();
+
        Ok(ClientBuilder {
            urls,
            timeout: None,
-            custom_user_agent: None,
-            reqwest_client_builder: None,
+            custom_user_agent: false,
+            reqwest_client_builder,
            use_secure_dns: true,
            #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
-            front: fronted::Front::off(),
+            front: None,

            retry_limit: 0,
            serialization: SerializationFormat::Json,
-            error: None,
        })
    }

-    /// Configure use of an independent HTTP request executor. This prevents use of beneficial
-    /// features like connection pooling under the hood.
-    #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
-    pub fn non_shared(mut self) -> Self {
-        if self.reqwest_client_builder.is_none() {
-            self.reqwest_client_builder = Some(default_builder());
-        }
-        self
-    }
-
    /// Add an additional URL to the set usable by this constructed `Client`
    pub fn add_url(mut self, url: Url) -> Self {
        self.urls.push(url);
@@ -769,7 +723,7 @@ impl ClientBuilder {

    /// Provide a pre-configured [`reqwest::ClientBuilder`]
    pub fn with_reqwest_builder(mut self, reqwest_builder: reqwest::ClientBuilder) -> Self {
-        self.reqwest_client_builder = Some(reqwest_builder);
+        self.reqwest_client_builder = reqwest_builder;
        self
    }

@@ -779,12 +733,18 @@ impl ClientBuilder {
        V: TryInto<HeaderValue>,
        V::Error: Into<http::Error>,
    {
-        match value.try_into() {
-            Ok(v) => self.custom_user_agent = Some(v),
-            Err(err) => {
-                self.error = Some(HttpClientError::InvalidHeaderValue { source: err.into() })
-            }
-        }
+        self.custom_user_agent = true;
+        self.reqwest_client_builder = self.reqwest_client_builder.user_agent(value);
+        self
+    }
+
+    /// Override DNS resolution for specific domains to particular IP addresses.
+    ///
+    /// Set the port to `0` to use the conventional port for the given scheme (e.g. 80 for http).
+    /// Ports in the URL itself will always be used instead of the port in the overridden addr.
+    #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
+    pub fn resolve_to_addrs(mut self, domain: &str, addrs: &[SocketAddr]) -> ClientBuilder {
+        self.reqwest_client_builder = self.reqwest_client_builder.resolve_to_addrs(domain, addrs);
        self
    }

@@ -801,33 +761,30 @@ impl ClientBuilder {

    /// Returns a Client that uses this ClientBuilder configuration.
    pub fn build(self) -> Result<Client, HttpClientError> {
-        if let Some(err) = self.error {
-            return Err(err);
-        }
-
        #[cfg(target_arch = "wasm32")]
-        let reqwest_client = Some(reqwest::ClientBuilder::new().build()?);
+        let reqwest_client = self.reqwest_client_builder.build()?;

+        // TODO: we should probably be propagating the error rather than panicking,
+        // but that'd break bunch of things due to type changes
        #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
-        let reqwest_client = self
-            .reqwest_client_builder
-            .map(|mut builder| {
-                // unless explicitly disabled use the DoT/DoH enabled resolver
-                if self.use_secure_dns {
-                    builder = builder.dns_resolver(Arc::new(HickoryDnsResolver::default()));
-                }
+        let reqwest_client = {
+            let mut builder = self.reqwest_client_builder;

-                builder
-                    .build()
-                    .map_err(HttpClientError::reqwest_client_build_error)
-            })
-            .transpose()?;
+            // unless explicitly disabled use the DoT/DoH enabled resolver
+            if self.use_secure_dns {
+                builder = builder.dns_resolver(Arc::new(HickoryDnsResolver::default()));
+            }
+
+            builder
+                .build()
+                .map_err(HttpClientError::reqwest_client_build_error)?
+        };

        let client = Client {
            base_urls: self.urls,
            current_idx: Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0)),
            reqwest_client,
-            custom_user_agent: self.custom_user_agent,
+            using_secure_dns: self.use_secure_dns,

            #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
            front: self.front,
@@ -847,11 +804,11 @@ impl ClientBuilder {
 pub struct Client {
    base_urls: Vec<Url>,
    current_idx: Arc<AtomicUsize>,
-    reqwest_client: Option<reqwest::Client>,
-    custom_user_agent: Option<HeaderValue>,
+    reqwest_client: reqwest::Client,
+    using_secure_dns: bool,

    #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
-    front: fronted::Front,
+    front: Option<fronted::Front>,

    #[cfg(target_arch = "wasm32")]
    request_timeout: Duration,
@@ -905,8 +862,8 @@ impl Client {
        Client {
            base_urls: vec![new_url],
            current_idx: Arc::new(Default::default()),
-            reqwest_client: None,
-            custom_user_agent: None,
+            reqwest_client: self.reqwest_client.clone(),
+            using_secure_dns: self.using_secure_dns,

            #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
            front: self.front.clone(),
@@ -940,7 +897,9 @@ impl Client {

    #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
    fn matches_current_host(&self, url: &Url) -> bool {
-        if self.front.is_enabled() {
+        if let Some(ref front) = self.front
+            && front.is_enabled()
+        {
            url.host_str() == self.current_url().front_str()
        } else {
            url.host_str() == self.current_url().host_str()
@@ -967,7 +926,9 @@ impl Client {
        }

        #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
-        if self.front.is_enabled() {
+        if let Some(ref front) = self.front
+            && front.is_enabled()
+        {
            // if we are using fronting, try updating to the next front
            let url = self.current_url();

@@ -987,7 +948,9 @@ impl Client {

            // if fronting is enabled we want to update to a host that has fronts configured
            #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
-            if self.front.is_enabled() {
+            if let Some(ref front) = self.front
+                && front.is_enabled()
+            {
                while next != orig {
                    if self.base_urls[next].has_front() {
                        // we have a front for the next host, so we can use it
@@ -1018,12 +981,14 @@ impl Client {
    /// this method. For example, if the client is configured to rotate hosts after each error, this
    /// method should be called after the host has been updated -- i.e. as part of the subsequent
    /// send.
-    pub(crate) fn apply_hosts_to_req(&self, r: &mut reqwest::Request) -> (&str, Option<&str>) {
+    fn apply_hosts_to_req(&self, r: &mut reqwest::Request) -> (&str, Option<&str>) {
        let url = self.current_url();
        r.url_mut().set_host(url.host_str()).unwrap();

        #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
-        if self.front.is_enabled() {
+        if let Some(ref front) = self.front
+            && front.is_enabled()
+        {
            if let Some(front_host) = url.front_str() {
                if let Some(actual_host) = url.host_str() {
                    tracing::debug!(
@@ -1043,13 +1008,6 @@ impl Client {
                        .headers_mut()
                        .insert(reqwest::header::HOST, actual_host_header);

-                    // Set a custom header to capture the outer host (used in the SNI) of the request
-                    let front_host_header: HeaderValue =
-                        front_host.parse().unwrap_or(HeaderValue::from_static(""));
-                    _ = r
-                        .headers_mut()
-                        .insert(NYM_OUTER_SNI_HEADER, front_host_header);
-
                    return (url.as_str(), url.front_str());
                } else {
                    tracing::debug!(
@@ -1090,21 +1048,12 @@ impl ApiClientCore for Client {

        self.apply_hosts_to_req(&mut req);

-        let client = if let Some(client) = &self.reqwest_client {
-            client.clone()
-        } else {
-            SHARED_CLIENT.clone()
-        };
-        let mut rb = RequestBuilder::from_parts(client, req);
+        let mut rb = RequestBuilder::from_parts(self.reqwest_client.clone(), req);

        rb = rb
            .header(ACCEPT, self.serialization.content_type())
            .header(CONTENT_TYPE, self.serialization.content_type());

-        if let Some(user_agent) = &self.custom_user_agent {
-            rb = rb.header(USER_AGENT, user_agent.clone());
-        }
-
        if let Some(body) = body {
            match self.serialization {
                SerializationFormat::Json => {
@@ -1147,19 +1096,16 @@ impl ApiClientCore for Client {

            #[cfg(target_arch = "wasm32")]
            let response: Result<Response, HttpClientError> = {
-                let client = self.reqwest_client.as_ref().unwrap_or(&*SHARED_CLIENT);
-                Ok(
-                    wasmtimer::tokio::timeout(self.request_timeout, client.execute(req))
-                        .await
-                        .map_err(|_timeout| HttpClientError::RequestTimeout)??,
+                Ok(wasmtimer::tokio::timeout(
+                    self.request_timeout,
+                    self.reqwest_client.execute(req),
                )
+                .await
+                .map_err(|_timeout| HttpClientError::RequestTimeout)??)
            };

            #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
-            let response = {
-                let client = self.reqwest_client.as_ref().unwrap_or(&*SHARED_CLIENT);
-                client.execute(req).await
-            };
+            let response = self.reqwest_client.execute(req).await;

            match response {
                Ok(resp) => return Ok(resp),
@@ -1175,10 +1121,20 @@ impl ApiClientCore for Client {

                    if is_network_err {
                        // if we have multiple urls, update to the next
-                        self.maybe_rotate_hosts(Some(url.clone()));
+                        self.update_host(Some(url.clone()));

                        #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
-                        self.maybe_enable_fronting(("network", url.as_str(), &err));
+                        if let Some(ref front) = self.front {
+                            // If fronting is set to be enabled on error, enable domain fronting as we
+                            // have encountered an error.
+                            let was_enabled = front.is_enabled();
+                            front.retry_enable();
+                            if !was_enabled && front.is_enabled() {
+                                tracing::info!(
+                                    "Domain fronting activated after connection failure: {err}",
+                                );
+                            }
+                        }
                    }

                    if attempts < self.retry_limit {
@@ -1202,21 +1158,6 @@ impl ApiClientCore for Client {
            }
        }
    }
-
-    fn maybe_rotate_hosts(&self, offending: Option<Url>) {
-        self.update_host(offending);
-    }
-
-    #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
-    fn maybe_enable_fronting(&self, context: impl std::fmt::Debug) {
-        // If fronting is set to be OnRetry, enable domain fronting as we
-        // have encountered an error.
-        let was_enabled = self.front.is_enabled();
-        self.front.retry_enable();
-        if !was_enabled && self.front.is_enabled() {
-            tracing::debug!("Domain fronting activated after failure: {context:?}",);
-        }
-    }
 }

 /// Common usage functionality for the http client.
@@ -1369,35 +1310,6 @@ pub trait ApiClient: ApiClientCore {
        self.get_response(path, params).await
    }

-    /// Attempt to parse a response object from an HTTP response
-    async fn parse_response<T>(
-        &self,
-        res: Response,
-        allow_empty: bool,
-    ) -> Result<T, HttpClientError>
-    where
-        T: DeserializeOwned,
-    {
-        let url = Url::from(res.url());
-        parse_response(res, allow_empty).await.inspect_err(|e| {
-            if matches!(
-                // if we encounter a read error while we attempt to parse it could be caused by censorship and we should
-                // rotate hosts / enable fronting.
-                e,
-                HttpClientError::ResponseReadFailure {
-                    url: _,
-                    headers: _,
-                    status: _,
-                    source: _,
-                }
-            ) {
-                self.maybe_rotate_hosts(Some(url.clone()));
-                #[cfg(feature = "tunneling")]
-                self.maybe_enable_fronting(("parse/read", url.as_str(), e));
-            }
-        })
-    }
-
    /// 'get' data from the segment-defined path, e.g. `["api", "v1", "mixnodes"]`, with tuple
    /// defined key-value parameters, e.g. `[("since", "12345")]`. Attempt to parse the response
    /// into the provided type `T` based on the content type header
@@ -1415,8 +1327,7 @@ pub trait ApiClient: ApiClientCore {
        let res = self
            .send_request(reqwest::Method::GET, path, params, None::<&()>)
            .await?;
-
-        self.parse_response(res, false).await
+        parse_response(res, false).await
    }

    /// 'post' json data to the segment-defined path, e.g. `["api", "v1", "mixnodes"]`, with tuple
@@ -1438,7 +1349,7 @@ pub trait ApiClient: ApiClientCore {
        let res = self
            .send_request(reqwest::Method::POST, path, params, Some(json_body))
            .await?;
-        self.parse_response(res, false).await
+        parse_response(res, false).await
    }

    /// 'delete' json data from the segment-defined path, e.g. `["api", "v1", "mixnodes"]`, with
@@ -1458,7 +1369,7 @@ pub trait ApiClient: ApiClientCore {
        let res = self
            .send_request(reqwest::Method::DELETE, path, params, None::<&()>)
            .await?;
-        self.parse_response(res, false).await
+        parse_response(res, false).await
    }

    /// 'patch' json data at the segment-defined path, e.g. `["api", "v1", "mixnodes"]`, with tuple
@@ -1480,7 +1391,7 @@ pub trait ApiClient: ApiClientCore {
        let res = self
            .send_request(reqwest::Method::PATCH, path, params, Some(json_body))
            .await?;
-        self.parse_response(res, false).await
+        parse_response(res, false).await
    }

    /// `get` json data from the provided absolute endpoint, e.g. `"/api/v1/mixnodes?since=12345"`.
@@ -1492,7 +1403,7 @@ pub trait ApiClient: ApiClientCore {
    {
        let req = self.create_request_endpoint(reqwest::Method::GET, endpoint, None::<&()>)?;
        let res = self.send(req).await?;
-        self.parse_response(res, false).await
+        parse_response(res, false).await
    }

    /// `post` json data to the provided absolute endpoint, e.g. `"/api/v1/mixnodes?since=12345"`.
@@ -1509,7 +1420,7 @@ pub trait ApiClient: ApiClientCore {
    {
        let req = self.create_request_endpoint(reqwest::Method::POST, endpoint, Some(json_body))?;
        let res = self.send(req).await?;
-        self.parse_response(res, false).await
+        parse_response(res, false).await
    }

    /// `delete` json data from the provided absolute endpoint, e.g.
@@ -1521,7 +1432,7 @@ pub trait ApiClient: ApiClientCore {
    {
        let req = self.create_request_endpoint(reqwest::Method::DELETE, endpoint, None::<&()>)?;
        let res = self.send(req).await?;
-        self.parse_response(res, false).await
+        parse_response(res, false).await
    }

    /// `patch` json data at the provided absolute endpoint, e.g. `"/api/v1/mixnodes?since=12345"`.
@@ -1539,7 +1450,7 @@ pub trait ApiClient: ApiClientCore {
        let req =
            self.create_request_endpoint(reqwest::Method::PATCH, endpoint, Some(json_body))?;
        let res = self.send(req).await?;
-        self.parse_response(res, false).await
+        parse_response(res, false).await
    }
 }

@@ -1606,7 +1517,7 @@ where

    if !allow_empty && let Some(0) = res.content_length() {
        return Err(HttpClientError::EmptyResponse {
-            url: Box::new(url),
+            url,
            status,
            headers: Box::new(headers),
        });
@@ -1619,25 +1530,25 @@ where
            .bytes()
            .await
            .map_err(|source| HttpClientError::ResponseReadFailure {
-                url: Box::new(url),
+                url,
                headers: Box::new(headers.clone()),
                status,
                source: ReqwestErrorWrapper(source),
            })?;
        decode_raw_response(&headers, full)
    } else if res.status() == StatusCode::NOT_FOUND {
-        Err(HttpClientError::NotFound { url: Box::new(url) })
+        Err(HttpClientError::NotFound { url })
    } else {
        let Ok(plaintext) = res.text().await else {
            return Err(HttpClientError::RequestFailure {
-                url: Box::new(url),
+                url,
                status,
                headers: Box::new(headers),
            });
        };

        Err(HttpClientError::EndpointFailure {
-            url: Box::new(url),
+            url,
            status,
            headers: Box::new(headers),
            error: plaintext,
@@ -89,8 +89,7 @@ fn sanitizing_urls() {
 // - on error without retries is where we have multiple urls, is the url updated?

 #[tokio::test]
-#[cfg(any())] // #[ignore] we run ignore assuming it just means slow in Ci/CD -_-
-// test relies on external services being available and behaving in a specific way.
+#[ignore] // test relies on external services being available and behaving in a specific way.
 async fn api_client_retry() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
    let client = ClientBuilder::new_with_urls(vec![
        "http://broken.nym.test".parse()?, // This should fail because of DNS NXDomain (rotate)
@@ -200,7 +199,7 @@ fn fronted_host_updating() {
    let url = Url::new("http://nym-api.test", Some(vec!["http://cdn1.test"])).unwrap();
    let mut client = ClientBuilder::new(url)
        .unwrap()
-        .with_fronting(Some(crate::fronted::FrontPolicy::Always))
+        .with_fronting(crate::fronted::FrontPolicy::Always)
        .build()
        .unwrap();

@@ -123,16 +123,6 @@ impl From<reqwest::Url> for Url {
    }
 }

-impl From<&reqwest::Url> for Url {
-    fn from(url: &url::Url) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            url: url.clone(),
-            fronts: None,
-            current_front: Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0)),
-        }
-    }
-}
-
 impl AsRef<url::Url> for Url {
    fn as_ref(&self) -> &url::Url {
        &self.url
@@ -6,9 +6,6 @@ edition.workspace = true
 authors.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true
 repository.workspace = true
-# Exclude build.rs from published crate - it's only used for dev-time sync
-# of env files and requires workspace context
-exclude = ["build.rs"]

 [dependencies]
 dotenvy = { workspace = true, optional = true }
@@ -51,10 +51,6 @@ pub const NYM_APIS: &[ApiUrlConst] = &[
        url: "https://nym-frontdoor.global.ssl.fastly.net/api/",
        front_hosts: Some(&["yelp.global.ssl.fastly.net"]),
    },
-    ApiUrlConst {
-        url: "https://cdn1.media-platform.net/api/",
-        front_hosts: None,
-    },
 ];

 pub const NYM_VPN_API: &str = "https://nymvpn.com/api/";
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ edition = { workspace = true }
 authors = { workspace = true }
 license = { workspace = true }
 repository = { workspace = true }
-publish = false

 [lib]
 name = "nym_kcp"
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ strum = { workspace = true }
 strum_macros = { workspace = true }

 blake3 = { workspace = true, optional = true }
-libcrux-sha3 = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux", optional = true }
+libcrux-sha3 = { workspace = true, optional = true }

 [features]
 digests = ["blake3", "libcrux-sha3"]
@@ -226,6 +226,17 @@ impl KEM {
    }
 }

+// pub const fn map_kem_to_libcrux_kem(kem: &KEM) -> Result<Algorithm, KKTError> {
+//     match kem {
+//         KEM::MlKem768 => Ok(Algorithm::MlKem768),
+//         KEM::XWing => Ok(Algorithm::XWingKemDraft06),
+//         KEM::X25519 => Ok(Algorithm::X25519),
+//         KEM::McEliece => Err(KKTError::KEMMapping {
+//             info: "attempted to map McEliece KEM to libcrux_kem",
+//         }),
+//     }
+// }
+
 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Debug)]
 pub struct Ciphersuite {
    hash_function: HashFunction,
@@ -273,16 +284,16 @@ impl Ciphersuite {
        self.verification_key_length
    }

-    pub fn hash_function(&self) -> HashFunction {
-        self.hash_function
+    pub fn hash_function(&self) -> &HashFunction {
+        &self.hash_function
    }

-    pub fn kem(&self) -> KEM {
-        self.kem
+    pub fn kem(&self) -> &KEM {
+        &self.kem
    }

-    pub fn signature_scheme(&self) -> SignatureScheme {
-        self.signature_scheme
+    pub fn signature_scheme(&self) -> &SignatureScheme {
+        &self.signature_scheme
    }

    pub fn hash_len(&self) -> usize {
@@ -351,6 +362,17 @@ impl Display for Ciphersuite {
    }
 }

+impl Default for Ciphersuite {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        Self::new(
+            KEM::MlKem768,
+            HashFunction::Blake3,
+            SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
+            HashLength::Default,
+        )
+    }
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
    use super::*;
@@ -7,25 +7,23 @@ license.workspace = true
 publish = false

 [dependencies]
-blake3 = { workspace = true }
 thiserror = { workspace = true }
 num_enum = { workspace = true }
 strum = { workspace = true }

-
 # internal
-nym-crypto = { path = "../crypto", features = ["asymmetric", "serde"] }
+nym-crypto = { path = "../crypto", features = ["hashing"] }
 nym-kkt-ciphersuite = { workspace = true, features = ["digests"] }

-libcrux-kem = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux" }
-libcrux-ecdh = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux", features = ["codec"] }
-libcrux-chacha20poly1305 = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux" }
+libcrux-kem = { workspace = true }
+libcrux-ecdh = { workspace = true, features = ["codec"] }
+libcrux-chacha20poly1305 = { workspace = true }

-# rand 0.9 for libcrux integration (libcrux uses rand 0.9)
 rand09 = { workspace = true }
 zeroize = { workspace = true, features = ["zeroize_derive"] }
-classic-mceliece-rust = { git = "https://github.com/georgio/classic-mceliece-rust", features = ["mceliece460896f", "zeroize"] }

+libcrux-psq = { workspace = true, features = ["classic-mceliece"] }
+libcrux-ml-kem = { workspace = true }

 [dev-dependencies]
 rand_chacha = "0.9.0"
@@ -7,29 +7,20 @@

 use criterion::{Criterion, criterion_group, criterion_main};

-use nym_crypto::asymmetric::ed25519;
 use nym_kkt::{
    ciphersuite::{Ciphersuite, EncapsulationKey, HashFunction, KEM, SignatureScheme},
    context::KKTMode,
    frame::KKTFrame,
-    key_utils::{generate_keypair_libcrux, generate_keypair_mceliece, hash_encapsulation_key},
+    key_utils::{
+        generate_keypair_libcrux, generate_keypair_mceliece, generate_keypair_mlkem,
+        hash_encapsulation_key,
+    },
    session::{
-        anonymous_initiator_process, initiator_ingest_response, initiator_process,
-        responder_ingest_message, responder_process,
+        initiator_ingest_response, initiator_process, responder_ingest_message, responder_process,
    },
 };
 use rand09::prelude::*;

-pub fn gen_ed25519_keypair(c: &mut Criterion) {
-    c.bench_function("Generate Ed25519 Keypair", |b| {
-        b.iter(|| {
-            let mut s: [u8; 32] = [0u8; 32];
-            rand09::rng().fill_bytes(&mut s);
-            ed25519::KeyPair::from_secret(s, 0)
-        });
-    });
-}
-
 pub fn gen_mlkem768_keypair(c: &mut Criterion) {
    c.bench_function("Generate MlKem768 Keypair", |b| {
        b.iter(|| {
@@ -41,15 +32,12 @@ pub fn gen_mlkem768_keypair(c: &mut Criterion) {
 pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
    let mut rng = rand09::rng();

-    // generate ed25519 keys
    let mut secret_initiator: [u8; 32] = [0u8; 32];
    rng.fill_bytes(&mut secret_initiator);
-    let initiator_ed25519_keypair = ed25519::KeyPair::from_secret(secret_initiator, 0);

    let mut secret_responder: [u8; 32] = [0u8; 32];
    rng.fill_bytes(&mut secret_responder);

-    let responder_ed25519_keypair = ed25519::KeyPair::from_secret(secret_responder, 1);
    for kem in [KEM::MlKem768, KEM::XWing, KEM::X25519, KEM::McEliece] {
        for hash_function in [
            HashFunction::Blake3,
@@ -69,8 +57,8 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {

            let (responder_kem_public_key, initiator_kem_public_key) = match kem {
                KEM::MlKem768 => (
-                    EncapsulationKey::MlKem768(generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1),
-                    EncapsulationKey::MlKem768(generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1),
+                    EncapsulationKey::MlKem768(generate_keypair_mlkem(&mut rng).1),
+                    EncapsulationKey::MlKem768(generate_keypair_mlkem(&mut rng).1),
                ),
                KEM::XWing => (
                    EncapsulationKey::XWing(generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1),
@@ -107,12 +95,14 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                c.bench_function(
                    &format!("{kem}, {hash_function} | Anonymous Initiator: Generate Request",),
                    |b| {
-                        b.iter(|| anonymous_initiator_process(&mut rng, ciphersuite).unwrap());
+                        b.iter(|| {
+                            initiator_process(&mut rng, KKTMode::OneWay, ciphersuite, None).unwrap()
+                        });
                    },
                );

-                let (i_context, i_frame) =
-                    anonymous_initiator_process(&mut rng, ciphersuite).unwrap();
+                let (mut i_context, i_frame) =
+                    initiator_process(&mut rng, KKTMode::OneWay, ciphersuite, None).unwrap();

                c.bench_function(
                    &format!(
@@ -137,14 +127,12 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                        "{kem}, {hash_function} | Anonymous Initiator: Responder Ingest Frame",
                    ),
                    |b| {
-                        b.iter(|| {
-                            responder_ingest_message(&r_context, None, None, &i_frame_r).unwrap()
-                        });
+                        b.iter(|| responder_ingest_message(&r_context, None, &i_frame_r).unwrap());
                    },
                );

-                let (r_context, _) =
-                    responder_ingest_message(&r_context, None, None, &i_frame_r).unwrap();
+                let (mut r_context, _) =
+                    responder_ingest_message(&r_context, None, &i_frame_r).unwrap();

                c.bench_function(
                    &format!(
@@ -153,9 +141,8 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                    |b| {
                        b.iter(|| {
                            responder_process(
-                                &r_context,
+                                &mut r_context,
                                i_frame_r.session_id(),
-                                responder_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
                                &responder_kem_public_key,
                            )
                            .unwrap()
@@ -163,9 +150,8 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                    },
                );
                let r_frame = responder_process(
-                    &r_context,
+                    &mut r_context,
                    i_frame_r.session_id(),
-                    responder_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
                    &responder_kem_public_key,
                )
                .unwrap();
@@ -184,10 +170,9 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                    |b| {
                        b.iter(|| {
                            initiator_ingest_response(
-                                &i_context,
+                                &mut i_context,
                                &r_frame,
                                &r_frame.context().unwrap(),
-                                responder_ed25519_keypair.public_key(),
                                &r_dir_hash,
                            )
                            .unwrap()
@@ -196,10 +181,9 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                );

                let obtained_key = initiator_ingest_response(
-                    &i_context,
+                    &mut i_context,
                    &r_frame,
                    &r_frame.context().unwrap(),
-                    responder_ed25519_keypair.public_key(),
                    &r_dir_hash,
                )
                .unwrap();
@@ -208,27 +192,14 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
            }
            // Initiator, OneWay
            {
-                let (i_context, i_frame) = initiator_process(
-                    &mut rng,
-                    KKTMode::OneWay,
-                    ciphersuite,
-                    initiator_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
-                    None,
-                )
-                .unwrap();
+                let (mut i_context, i_frame) =
+                    initiator_process(&mut rng, KKTMode::OneWay, ciphersuite, None).unwrap();

                c.bench_function(
                    &format!("{kem}, {hash_function} | Initiator OneWay: Generate Request",),
                    |b| {
                        b.iter(|| {
-                            initiator_process(
-                                &mut rng,
-                                KKTMode::OneWay,
-                                ciphersuite,
-                                initiator_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
-                                None,
-                            )
-                            .unwrap()
+                            initiator_process(&mut rng, KKTMode::OneWay, ciphersuite, None).unwrap()
                        });
                    },
                );
@@ -250,25 +221,12 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                c.bench_function(
                    &format!("{kem}, {hash_function} | Initiator OneWay: Responder Ingest Frame",),
                    |b| {
-                        b.iter(|| {
-                            responder_ingest_message(
-                                &r_context,
-                                Some(initiator_ed25519_keypair.public_key()),
-                                None,
-                                &i_frame_r,
-                            )
-                            .unwrap()
-                        });
+                        b.iter(|| responder_ingest_message(&r_context, None, &i_frame_r).unwrap());
                    },
                );

-                let (r_context, r_obtained_key) = responder_ingest_message(
-                    &r_context,
-                    Some(initiator_ed25519_keypair.public_key()),
-                    None,
-                    &i_frame_r,
-                )
-                .unwrap();
+                let (mut r_context, r_obtained_key) =
+                    responder_ingest_message(&r_context, None, &i_frame_r).unwrap();

                assert!(r_obtained_key.is_none());

@@ -279,9 +237,8 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                    |b| {
                        b.iter(|| {
                            responder_process(
-                                &r_context,
+                                &mut r_context,
                                i_frame_r.session_id(),
-                                responder_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
                                &responder_kem_public_key,
                            )
                            .unwrap()
@@ -290,9 +247,8 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                );

                let r_frame = responder_process(
-                    &r_context,
+                    &mut r_context,
                    i_frame_r.session_id(),
-                    responder_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
                    &responder_kem_public_key,
                )
                .unwrap();
@@ -311,10 +267,9 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                    |b| {
                        b.iter(|| {
                            initiator_ingest_response(
-                                &i_context,
+                                &mut i_context,
                                &r_frame,
                                &r_frame.context().unwrap(),
-                                responder_ed25519_keypair.public_key(),
                                &r_dir_hash,
                            )
                            .unwrap()
@@ -323,10 +278,9 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                );

                let i_obtained_key = initiator_ingest_response(
-                    &i_context,
+                    &mut i_context,
                    &r_frame,
                    &r_frame.context().unwrap(),
-                    responder_ed25519_keypair.public_key(),
                    &r_dir_hash,
                )
                .unwrap();
@@ -344,7 +298,6 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                                &mut rng,
                                KKTMode::Mutual,
                                ciphersuite,
-                                initiator_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
                                Some(&initiator_kem_public_key),
                            )
                            .unwrap()
@@ -352,11 +305,10 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                    },
                );

-                let (i_context, i_frame) = initiator_process(
+                let (mut i_context, i_frame) = initiator_process(
                    &mut rng,
                    KKTMode::Mutual,
                    ciphersuite,
-                    initiator_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
                    Some(&initiator_kem_public_key),
                )
                .unwrap();
@@ -383,24 +335,14 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                    &format!("{kem}, {hash_function} | Initiator Mutual: Responder Ingest Frame",),
                    |b| {
                        b.iter(|| {
-                            responder_ingest_message(
-                                &r_context,
-                                Some(initiator_ed25519_keypair.public_key()),
-                                Some(&i_dir_hash),
-                                &i_frame_r,
-                            )
-                            .unwrap()
+                            responder_ingest_message(&r_context, Some(&i_dir_hash), &i_frame_r)
+                                .unwrap()
                        });
                    },
                );

-                let (r_context, r_obtained_key) = responder_ingest_message(
-                    &r_context,
-                    Some(initiator_ed25519_keypair.public_key()),
-                    Some(&i_dir_hash),
-                    &i_frame_r,
-                )
-                .unwrap();
+                let (mut r_context, r_obtained_key) =
+                    responder_ingest_message(&r_context, Some(&i_dir_hash), &i_frame_r).unwrap();

                assert_eq!(r_obtained_key.unwrap().encode(), i_kem_key_bytes);

@@ -411,9 +353,8 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                    |b| {
                        b.iter(|| {
                            responder_process(
-                                &r_context,
+                                &mut r_context,
                                i_frame_r.session_id(),
-                                responder_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
                                &responder_kem_public_key,
                            )
                            .unwrap()
@@ -422,9 +363,8 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                );

                let r_frame = responder_process(
-                    &r_context,
+                    &mut r_context,
                    i_frame_r.session_id(),
-                    responder_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
                    &responder_kem_public_key,
                )
                .unwrap();
@@ -445,10 +385,9 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                    |b| {
                        b.iter(|| {
                            initiator_ingest_response(
-                                &i_context,
+                                &mut i_context,
                                &r_frame,
                                &r_frame.context().unwrap(),
-                                responder_ed25519_keypair.public_key(),
                                &r_dir_hash,
                            )
                            .unwrap()
@@ -457,10 +396,9 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
                );

                let obtained_key = initiator_ingest_response(
-                    &i_context,
+                    &mut i_context,
                    &r_frame,
                    &r_frame.context().unwrap(),
-                    responder_ed25519_keypair.public_key(),
                    &r_dir_hash,
                )
                .unwrap();
@@ -471,10 +409,5 @@ pub fn kkt_benchmark(c: &mut Criterion) {
    }
 }

-criterion_group!(
-    benches,
-    gen_ed25519_keypair,
-    gen_mlkem768_keypair,
-    kkt_benchmark
-);
+criterion_group!(benches, gen_mlkem768_keypair, kkt_benchmark);
 criterion_main!(benches);
@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+use libcrux_chacha20poly1305::TAG_LEN;
+use libcrux_psq::handshake::types::{DHKeyPair, DHPublicKey};
+use nym_crypto::hkdf::blake3::derive_key_blake3;
+use rand09::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
+use zeroize::{Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop};
+
+use crate::error::KKTError;
+
+// This is arbitrary
+pub const MAX_PAYLOAD_LEN: usize = 1_000_000;
+const CARRIER_KDF_INFO_TX: &str = "CARRIER_V1_KDF_RX";
+const CARRIER_KDF_INFO_RX: &str = "CARRIER_V1_KDF_TX";
+
+#[derive(Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+pub struct Carrier {
+    tx_key: [u8; 32],
+    rx_key: [u8; 32],
+    tx_counter: u64,
+    rx_counter: u64,
+}
+
+pub enum CarrierRole {
+    Initiator,
+    Responder,
+}
+
+fn increment_nonce(nonce: &mut u64) -> Result<(), KKTError> {
+    match nonce.checked_add(1) {
+        Some(incremented_nonce) => {
+            *nonce = incremented_nonce;
+            Ok(())
+        }
+        None => Err(KKTError::AEADError {
+            info: "Nonce maxed out.",
+        }),
+    }
+}
+
+fn as_nonce_bytes(nonce: u64) -> [u8; 12] {
+    let mut bytes = [0u8; 12];
+    let nonce_bytes = nonce.to_le_bytes();
+    bytes[4..].clone_from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
+    bytes
+}
+
+impl Carrier {
+    fn init(tx_key: [u8; 32], rx_key: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            tx_key,
+            rx_key,
+            tx_counter: 1,
+            rx_counter: 1,
+        }
+    }
+    pub fn new<R>(
+        rng: &mut R,
+        remote_public_key: &DHPublicKey,
+        context: &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<(Self, DHPublicKey), KKTError>
+    where
+        R: RngCore + CryptoRng,
+    {
+        let ephemeral_keypair = DHKeyPair::new(rng);
+        let shared_secret = ephemeral_keypair
+            .sk()
+            .diffie_hellman(remote_public_key)
+            .map_err(|_| KKTError::X25519Error {
+                info: "Key Derivation Error",
+            })?;
+
+        Ok((
+            Self::from_secret_slice(shared_secret.as_ref(), context),
+            ephemeral_keypair.pk,
+        ))
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) fn from_secret_slice(secret: &[u8], context: &[u8]) -> Self {
+        let tx_key = derive_key_blake3(CARRIER_KDF_INFO_TX, secret, context);
+        let rx_key = derive_key_blake3(CARRIER_KDF_INFO_RX, secret, context);
+        Self::init(tx_key, rx_key)
+    }
+
+    pub fn from_secret(mut secret: [u8; 32], context: &[u8]) -> Self {
+        let tx_key = derive_key_blake3(CARRIER_KDF_INFO_TX, secret.as_ref(), context);
+        let rx_key = derive_key_blake3(CARRIER_KDF_INFO_RX, secret.as_ref(), context);
+        secret.zeroize();
+        Self::init(tx_key, rx_key)
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) fn flip_keys(self) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            tx_key: self.rx_key,
+            rx_key: self.tx_key,
+            tx_counter: self.rx_counter,
+            rx_counter: self.tx_counter,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn encrypt(&mut self, plaintext: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, KKTError> {
+        if plaintext.len() > MAX_PAYLOAD_LEN {
+            return Err(KKTError::AEADError {
+                info: "Plaintext too large",
+            });
+        }
+        let mut output_buffer = vec![0; plaintext.len() + TAG_LEN];
+        libcrux_chacha20poly1305::encrypt(
+            &self.tx_key,
+            plaintext,
+            &mut output_buffer,
+            b"kkt-carrier-v1",
+            &as_nonce_bytes(self.tx_counter),
+        )?;
+
+        increment_nonce(&mut self.tx_counter)?;
+
+        Ok(output_buffer)
+    }
+    pub fn decrypt(&mut self, ciphertext: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, KKTError> {
+        if ciphertext.len() > MAX_PAYLOAD_LEN + TAG_LEN {
+            return Err(KKTError::AEADError {
+                info: "Ciphertext too large",
+            });
+        }
+        let mut output_buffer = vec![0; ciphertext.len() - TAG_LEN];
+        libcrux_chacha20poly1305::decrypt(
+            &self.rx_key,
+            &mut output_buffer,
+            ciphertext,
+            b"kkt-carrier-v1",
+            &as_nonce_bytes(self.rx_counter),
+        )?;
+
+        increment_nonce(&mut self.rx_counter)?;
+
+        Ok(output_buffer)
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use crate::{carrier::Carrier, key_utils::generate_keypair_x25519};
+    use rand09::RngCore;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_e2e() {
+        let mut rng = rand09::rng();
+
+        // generate responder x25519 keys
+        let r_x25519 = generate_keypair_x25519(&mut rng);
+
+        let mut context: [u8; 32] = [0u8; 32];
+        rng.fill_bytes(&mut context);
+
+        let ephemeral_keypair = generate_keypair_x25519(&mut rng);
+
+        let i_shared_secret = ephemeral_keypair.sk().diffie_hellman(&r_x25519.pk).unwrap();
+
+        let r_shared_secret = r_x25519.sk().diffie_hellman(&ephemeral_keypair.pk).unwrap();
+
+        let mut i_carrier = Carrier::from_secret_slice(i_shared_secret.as_ref(), &context);
+        let mut r_carrier =
+            Carrier::from_secret_slice(r_shared_secret.as_ref(), &context).flip_keys();
+
+        let test1 = b"test1: i>r #1";
+        let ct1 = i_carrier.encrypt(test1).unwrap();
+        let pt1 = r_carrier.decrypt(&ct1).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(pt1, test1);
+
+        let test2 = b"test2: r>i #1";
+        let ct2 = i_carrier.encrypt(test2).unwrap();
+        let pt2 = r_carrier.decrypt(&ct2).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(pt2, test2);
+        let test3 = b"test3: i>r #2";
+
+        let ct3 = i_carrier.encrypt(test3).unwrap();
+        let pt3 = r_carrier.decrypt(&ct3).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(pt3, test3);
+
+        let test4 = b"test4: i>r #3";
+        let ct4 = i_carrier.encrypt(test4).unwrap();
+        let pt4 = r_carrier.decrypt(&ct4).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(pt4, test4);
+
+        let test5 = b"test5: r>i #2";
+        let ct5 = i_carrier.encrypt(test5).unwrap();
+        let pt5 = r_carrier.decrypt(&ct5).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(pt5, test5);
+    }
+}
@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2025 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-use crate::error::KKTError;
-use libcrux_kem::Algorithm;
-
-pub use nym_kkt_ciphersuite::*;
-
-pub enum EncapsulationKey<'a> {
-    MlKem768(libcrux_kem::PublicKey),
-    XWing(libcrux_kem::PublicKey),
-    X25519(libcrux_kem::PublicKey),
-    McEliece(classic_mceliece_rust::PublicKey<'a>),
-}
-
-pub enum DecapsulationKey<'a> {
-    MlKem768(libcrux_kem::PrivateKey),
-    XWing(libcrux_kem::PrivateKey),
-    X25519(libcrux_kem::PrivateKey),
-    McEliece(classic_mceliece_rust::SecretKey<'a>),
-}
-impl<'a> EncapsulationKey<'a> {
-    pub(crate) fn decode(kem: KEM, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, KKTError> {
-        match kem {
-            KEM::McEliece => {
-                if bytes.len() != classic_mceliece_rust::CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES {
-                    Err(KKTError::KEMError {
-                        info: "Received McEliece Encapsulation Key with Invalid Length",
-                    })
-                } else {
-                    let mut public_key_bytes =
-                        Box::new([0u8; classic_mceliece_rust::CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES]);
-                    // Size must be correct due to KKTFrame::from_bytes(message_bytes)?
-                    public_key_bytes.clone_from_slice(bytes);
-                    Ok(EncapsulationKey::McEliece(
-                        classic_mceliece_rust::PublicKey::from(public_key_bytes),
-                    ))
-                }
-            }
-            KEM::X25519 => Ok(EncapsulationKey::X25519(libcrux_kem::PublicKey::decode(
-                map_kem_to_libcrux_kem(kem)?,
-                bytes,
-            )?)),
-            KEM::MlKem768 => Ok(EncapsulationKey::MlKem768(libcrux_kem::PublicKey::decode(
-                map_kem_to_libcrux_kem(kem)?,
-                bytes,
-            )?)),
-            KEM::XWing => Ok(EncapsulationKey::XWing(libcrux_kem::PublicKey::decode(
-                map_kem_to_libcrux_kem(kem)?,
-                bytes,
-            )?)),
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        match self {
-            EncapsulationKey::XWing(public_key)
-            | EncapsulationKey::MlKem768(public_key)
-            | EncapsulationKey::X25519(public_key) => public_key.encode(),
-            EncapsulationKey::McEliece(public_key) => Vec::from(public_key.as_array()),
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-pub const fn map_kem_to_libcrux_kem(kem: KEM) -> Result<Algorithm, KKTError> {
-    match kem {
-        KEM::MlKem768 => Ok(Algorithm::MlKem768),
-        KEM::XWing => Ok(Algorithm::XWingKemDraft06),
-        KEM::X25519 => Ok(Algorithm::X25519),
-        KEM::McEliece => Err(KKTError::KEMMapping {
-            info: "attempted to map McEliece KEM to libcrux_kem",
-        }),
-    }
-}
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 // Copyright 2025 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

-use crate::ciphersuite::CIPHERSUITE_ENCODING_LEN;
-use crate::{KKT_VERSION, ciphersuite::Ciphersuite, error::KKTError, frame::KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN};
+use crate::{KKT_VERSION, error::KKTError};
 use num_enum::{IntoPrimitive, TryFromPrimitive};
+use nym_kkt_ciphersuite::{CIPHERSUITE_ENCODING_LEN, Ciphersuite};
 use std::fmt::Display;

 pub const KKT_CONTEXT_LEN: usize = 3 + CIPHERSUITE_ENCODING_LEN;
@@ -15,11 +15,11 @@ pub enum KKTStatus {
    Ok = 0b0000_0000,
    InvalidRequestFormat = 0b0010_0000,
    InvalidResponseFormat = 0b0100_0000,
-    InvalidSignature = 0b0110_0000,
-    UnsupportedCiphersuite = 0b1000_0000,
-    UnsupportedKKTVersion = 0b1010_0000,
-    InvalidKey = 0b1100_0000,
-    Timeout = 0b1110_0000,
+    UnsupportedCiphersuite = 0b0110_0000,
+    UnsupportedKKTVersion = 0b1000_0000,
+    InvalidKey = 0b1010_0000,
+    Timeout = 0b1100_0000,
+    UnverifiedKEMKey = 0b1110_0000,
 }

 impl Display for KKTStatus {
@@ -28,10 +28,10 @@ impl Display for KKTStatus {
            KKTStatus::Ok => "Ok",
            KKTStatus::InvalidRequestFormat => "Invalid Request Format",
            KKTStatus::InvalidResponseFormat => "Invalid Response Format",
-            KKTStatus::InvalidSignature => "Invalid Signature",
            KKTStatus::UnsupportedCiphersuite => "Unsupported Ciphersuite",
            KKTStatus::UnsupportedKKTVersion => "Unsupported KKT Version",
            KKTStatus::InvalidKey => "Invalid Key",
+            KKTStatus::UnverifiedKEMKey => "Could not verify received encapsulation key",
            KKTStatus::Timeout => "Timeout",
        })
    }
@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ impl Display for KKTStatus {
 pub enum KKTRole {
    Initiator = 0b0000_0000,
    Responder = 0b0000_0001,
-    AnonymousInitiator = 0b0000_0010,
 }

 // bitmask used: 0b0001_1100
@@ -64,20 +63,15 @@ pub struct KKTContext {
    ciphersuite: Ciphersuite,
 }
 impl KKTContext {
-    pub fn new(role: KKTRole, mode: KKTMode, ciphersuite: Ciphersuite) -> Result<Self, KKTError> {
-        if role == KKTRole::AnonymousInitiator && mode != KKTMode::OneWay {
-            return Err(KKTError::IncompatibilityError {
-                info: "Anonymous Initiator can only use OneWay mode",
-            });
-        }
-        Ok(Self {
+    pub fn new(role: KKTRole, mode: KKTMode, ciphersuite: &Ciphersuite) -> Self {
+        Self {
            version: KKT_VERSION,
            message_sequence: 0,
            status: KKTStatus::Ok,
            mode,
            role,
-            ciphersuite,
-        })
+            ciphersuite: *ciphersuite,
+        }
    }

    pub fn derive_responder_header(&self) -> Result<Self, KKTError> {
@@ -107,8 +101,8 @@ impl KKTContext {
    pub fn status(&self) -> KKTStatus {
        self.status
    }
-    pub fn ciphersuite(&self) -> Ciphersuite {
-        self.ciphersuite
+    pub fn ciphersuite(&self) -> &Ciphersuite {
+        &self.ciphersuite
    }
    pub fn role(&self) -> KKTRole {
        self.role
@@ -118,9 +112,10 @@ impl KKTContext {
    }

    pub fn body_len(&self) -> usize {
-        if self.status != KKTStatus::Ok
-            || (self.mode == KKTMode::OneWay
-                && (self.role == KKTRole::Initiator || self.role == KKTRole::AnonymousInitiator))
+        if (self.status != KKTStatus::Ok && self.status != KKTStatus::UnverifiedKEMKey)
+        ||
+        // no payload
+        (self.mode == KKTMode::OneWay && self.role == KKTRole::Initiator)
        {
            0
        } else {
@@ -128,31 +123,12 @@ impl KKTContext {
        }
    }

-    pub fn signature_len(&self) -> usize {
-        match self.role {
-            KKTRole::Initiator | KKTRole::Responder => self.ciphersuite.signature_len(),
-            KKTRole::AnonymousInitiator => 0,
-        }
-    }
-
    pub const fn header_len(&self) -> usize {
        KKT_CONTEXT_LEN
    }

-    pub const fn session_id_len(&self) -> usize {
-        // note: if anyone decides to update this function and changes the constant value,
-        // you will have to adjust encoding/decoding functions
-
-        // match self.role {
-        //     KKTRole::Initiator | KKTRole::Responder => SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
-        // It doesn't make sense to send a session_id if we send messages in the clear
-        //     KKTRole::AnonymousInitiator => 0,
-        // }
-        KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN
-    }
-
    pub fn full_message_len(&self) -> usize {
-        self.body_len() + self.signature_len() + self.header_len() + self.session_id_len()
+        self.body_len() + self.header_len()
    }

    pub fn encode(&self) -> Result<[u8; KKT_CONTEXT_LEN], KKTError> {
@@ -228,9 +204,8 @@ mod tests {
        let valid_context = KKTContext::new(
            KKTRole::Initiator,
            KKTMode::Mutual,
-            Ciphersuite::decode([255, 1, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
-        )
-        .unwrap();
+            &Ciphersuite::decode([255, 1, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
+        );
        let encoded = valid_context.encode().unwrap();
        let decoded = KKTContext::try_decode(encoded).unwrap();

@@ -1,253 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2025-2026 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-use crate::{KKT_INITIAL_FRAME_AAD, context::KKTContext, error::KKTError, frame::KKTFrame};
-use blake3::Hasher;
-use libcrux_chacha20poly1305::{NONCE_LEN, TAG_LEN};
-use nym_crypto::asymmetric::x25519;
-use rand09::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
-use zeroize::Zeroize;
-
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, Zeroize)]
-pub struct KKTSessionSecret([u8; 32]);
-
-impl KKTSessionSecret {
-    pub fn new<R>(rng: &mut R, remote_public_key: &x25519::PublicKey) -> (Self, x25519::PublicKey)
-    where
-        R: RngCore + CryptoRng,
-    {
-        let mut private_key_bytes = [0u8; x25519::PRIVATE_KEY_SIZE];
-        rng.fill_bytes(&mut private_key_bytes);
-
-        let ephemeral_private_key = x25519::PrivateKey::from_secret(private_key_bytes);
-        let ephemeral_public_key = x25519::PublicKey::from(&ephemeral_private_key);
-
-        (
-            Self::derive(&ephemeral_private_key, remote_public_key),
-            ephemeral_public_key,
-        )
-    }
-    pub fn from_bytes(secret: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
-        Self(secret)
-    }
-
-    fn try_derive(private_key: &x25519::PrivateKey, public_key: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, KKTError> {
-        let mut pub_key: [u8; 32] = [0u8; 32];
-        pub_key.copy_from_slice(&public_key[0..x25519::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
-
-        // Todo: check validity of pk...
-        let pk = x25519::PublicKey::from(pub_key);
-        Ok(Self::derive(private_key, &pk))
-    }
-
-    pub fn derive(private_key: &x25519::PrivateKey, public_key: &x25519::PublicKey) -> Self {
-        let mut shared_secret = private_key.diffie_hellman(public_key);
-
-        let mut hasher = Hasher::new();
-
-        hasher.update(&shared_secret);
-        shared_secret.zeroize();
-
-        Self(hasher.finalize().as_bytes().to_owned())
-    }
-    pub fn as_bytes(&self) -> &[u8; 32] {
-        &self.0
-    }
-}
-
-pub fn encrypt_initial_kkt_frame<R>(
-    rng: &mut R,
-    remote_public_key: &x25519::PublicKey,
-    kkt_frame: &KKTFrame,
-) -> Result<(KKTSessionSecret, Vec<u8>), KKTError>
-where
-    R: CryptoRng + RngCore,
-{
-    let (session_secret_key, ephemeral_public_key) = KKTSessionSecret::new(rng, remote_public_key);
-
-    let mut encrypted_frame =
-        encrypt_kkt_frame(rng, &session_secret_key, kkt_frame, KKT_INITIAL_FRAME_AAD)?;
-
-    let mut output_buffer = Vec::with_capacity(encrypted_frame.len() + x25519::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE);
-    output_buffer.extend_from_slice(ephemeral_public_key.as_bytes());
-    output_buffer.append(&mut encrypted_frame);
-
-    // [     32     |  12   | ciphertext | 16];
-    // [eph_pub_key | nonce | ciphertext | tag];
-    Ok((session_secret_key, output_buffer))
-}
-
-pub fn decrypt_initial_kkt_frame(
-    responder_private_key: &x25519::PrivateKey,
-    encrypted_frame_bytes: &[u8],
-) -> Result<(KKTSessionSecret, KKTFrame, KKTContext), KKTError> {
-    if encrypted_frame_bytes.len() < x25519::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE + TAG_LEN + NONCE_LEN {
-        Err(KKTError::AEADError {
-            info: "Encrypted KKT Frame is too short.",
-        })
-    } else {
-        let shared_secret = KKTSessionSecret::try_derive(
-            responder_private_key,
-            &encrypted_frame_bytes[0..x25519::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE],
-        )?;
-
-        let (kkt_frame, kkt_context) = decrypt_kkt_frame(
-            &shared_secret,
-            &encrypted_frame_bytes[x25519::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE..],
-            KKT_INITIAL_FRAME_AAD,
-        )?;
-        Ok((shared_secret, kkt_frame, kkt_context))
-    }
-}
-
-pub fn encrypt_kkt_frame<R>(
-    rng: &mut R,
-    secret_key: &KKTSessionSecret,
-    kkt_frame: &KKTFrame,
-    aad: &[u8],
-) -> Result<Vec<u8>, KKTError>
-where
-    R: CryptoRng + RngCore,
-{
-    let kkt_frame_bytes = kkt_frame.to_bytes();
-
-    // generate nonce
-    let mut nonce: [u8; NONCE_LEN] = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
-    rng.fill_bytes(&mut nonce);
-
-    let mut ciphertext = encrypt(secret_key.as_bytes(), &kkt_frame_bytes, aad, &nonce)?;
-
-    // [  12  | ciphertext | 16];
-    // [nonce | ciphertext | tag];
-    let mut output_buffer: Vec<u8> =
-        Vec::with_capacity(NONCE_LEN + kkt_frame_bytes.len() + TAG_LEN);
-
-    output_buffer.extend_from_slice(&nonce);
-    output_buffer.append(&mut ciphertext);
-
-    Ok(output_buffer)
-}
-
-// kkt_frame_bytes should look like this
-// [  12  | ciphertext | 16];
-// [nonce | ciphertext | tag];
-pub fn decrypt_kkt_frame(
-    secret_key: &KKTSessionSecret,
-    kkt_frame_bytes: &[u8],
-    aad: &[u8],
-) -> Result<(KKTFrame, KKTContext), KKTError> {
-    let mut nonce: [u8; NONCE_LEN] = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
-    nonce.copy_from_slice(&kkt_frame_bytes[0..NONCE_LEN]);
-
-    let plaintext = decrypt(
-        secret_key.as_bytes(),
-        &kkt_frame_bytes[NONCE_LEN..],
-        aad,
-        &nonce,
-    )?;
-
-    KKTFrame::from_bytes(&plaintext)
-}
-
-fn encrypt(
-    secret_key: &[u8; 32],
-    plaintext: &[u8],
-    aad: &[u8],
-    nonce: &[u8; NONCE_LEN],
-) -> Result<Vec<u8>, KKTError> {
-    let mut output_buffer = vec![0; plaintext.len() + TAG_LEN];
-    libcrux_chacha20poly1305::encrypt(secret_key, plaintext, &mut output_buffer, aad, nonce)?;
-    Ok(output_buffer)
-}
-
-fn decrypt(
-    secret_key: &[u8; 32],
-    ciphertext: &[u8],
-    aad: &[u8],
-    nonce: &[u8; NONCE_LEN],
-) -> Result<Vec<u8>, KKTError> {
-    let mut output_buffer = vec![0; ciphertext.len() - TAG_LEN];
-    libcrux_chacha20poly1305::decrypt(secret_key, &mut output_buffer, ciphertext, aad, nonce)?;
-    Ok(output_buffer)
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod test {
-    use crate::ciphersuite::Ciphersuite;
-    use crate::context::{KKTContext, KKTMode, KKTRole};
-    use crate::encryption::{decrypt_kkt_frame, encrypt_kkt_frame};
-    use crate::frame::{KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN, KKTFrame};
-    use crate::{
-        ciphersuite::DEFAULT_HASH_LEN,
-        encryption::{KKTSessionSecret, decrypt, encrypt},
-        key_utils::generate_keypair_x25519,
-    };
-    use rand09::{RngCore, SeedableRng, rng};
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_keygen() {
-        let mut rng = rng();
-        let responder_x25519_keypair = generate_keypair_x25519(&mut rng);
-
-        let (session_secret_key, ephemeral_public_key) =
-            KKTSessionSecret::new(&mut rng, responder_x25519_keypair.public_key());
-
-        let shared_secret = KKTSessionSecret::try_derive(
-            responder_x25519_keypair.private_key(),
-            ephemeral_public_key.as_bytes().as_slice(),
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(shared_secret.as_bytes(), session_secret_key.as_bytes())
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_encryption() {
-        let mut rng = rng();
-
-        let mut secret_key = [0u8; DEFAULT_HASH_LEN];
-        rng.fill_bytes(&mut secret_key);
-
-        let mut plaintext = vec![0; 100];
-        rng.fill_bytes(&mut plaintext);
-
-        let mut nonce = [0; 12];
-        rng.fill_bytes(&mut nonce);
-
-        let mut aad = vec![0; 124];
-        rng.fill_bytes(&mut aad);
-
-        let ciphertext = encrypt(&secret_key, &plaintext, &aad, &nonce).unwrap();
-
-        let o_plaintext = decrypt(&secret_key, &ciphertext, &aad, &nonce).unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(o_plaintext, plaintext)
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn kkt_frame_encryption() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
-        let mut rng = rand_chacha::ChaCha20Rng::seed_from_u64(42);
-        let session_key = KKTSessionSecret::from_bytes([42u8; 32]);
-        let aad = b"my-amazing-aad";
-
-        let valid_context = KKTContext::new(
-            KKTRole::Initiator,
-            KKTMode::Mutual,
-            Ciphersuite::decode([255, 1, 0, 0])?,
-        )?;
-        let dummy_frame = KKTFrame::new(
-            valid_context.encode()?,
-            &[2u8; 32],
-            [3u8; KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN],
-            &[4u8; 64],
-        );
-
-        let ciphertext = encrypt_kkt_frame(&mut rng, &session_key, &dummy_frame, aad.as_slice())?;
-
-        let (frame, context) = decrypt_kkt_frame(&session_key, &ciphertext, aad.as_slice())?;
-
-        assert_eq!(dummy_frame, frame);
-        assert_eq!(context, valid_context);
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
@@ -8,13 +8,12 @@ use thiserror::Error;

 #[derive(Error, Debug)]
 pub enum KKTError {
-    #[error("Signature constructor error")]
-    SigConstructorError,
-    #[error("Signature verification error")]
-    SigVerifError,
    #[error(transparent)]
    CiphersuiteDecodingError(#[from] KKTCiphersuiteError),

+    #[error(transparent)]
+    MaskedByteError(#[from] MaskedByteError),
+
    #[error("KEM mapping failure: {}", info)]
    KEMMapping { info: &'static str },

@@ -48,10 +47,28 @@ pub enum KKTError {
    #[error("{}", info)]
    AEADError { info: &'static str },

+    #[error("{}", info)]
+    DecodingError { info: &'static str },
+
+    #[error("{}", info)]
+    UnsupportedAlgorithm { info: &'static str },
+
    #[error("Generic libcrux error")]
    LibcruxError,
 }

+#[derive(Error, Debug)]
+pub enum MaskedByteError {
+    #[error(
+        "Invalid Masked Byte Length: Expected({}), Actual({}).",
+        expected,
+        actual
+    )]
+    InvalidLength { expected: usize, actual: usize },
+    #[error("Failed to Unmask Byte.")]
+    Failure,
+}
+
 impl From<libcrux_kem::Error> for KKTError {
    fn from(err: libcrux_kem::Error) -> Self {
        match err {
@@ -7,42 +7,120 @@
 // [2..=5] => Ciphersuite
 // [6] => Reserved

+use libcrux_psq::handshake::types::{DHKeyPair, DHPublicKey};
+use nym_kkt_ciphersuite::x25519::PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH;
+use rand09::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
+
 use crate::{
+    carrier::Carrier,
    context::{KKT_CONTEXT_LEN, KKTContext},
    error::KKTError,
+    masked_byte::{MASKED_BYTE_LEN, MaskedByte},
 };

-pub const KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN: usize = 16;
-
-pub type KKTSessionId = [u8; KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN];
+const KKT_CARRIER_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"CARRIER_V1_KKT_V1_KDF";

 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Clone)]
 pub struct KKTFrame {
    context: [u8; KKT_CONTEXT_LEN],
-    session_id: KKTSessionId,
    body: Vec<u8>,
-    signature: Vec<u8>,
 }

-// if oneway and message coming from initiator => body is empty, signature contains signature of context + session id (64 bytes).
-// if message coming from anonymous initiator => body is empty, there is no signature.
-// if mutual and message coming from initiator => body has the initiator's kem public key and the signature is over the context + body + session_id.
-// if coming from responder => body has the responder's kem public key and the signature is over the context + body + session_id.
+// if oneway and message coming from initiator => body is empty.
+// if mutual and message coming from initiator => body has the initiator's kem public key.
+// if coming from responder => body has the responder's kem public key.

 impl KKTFrame {
-    pub fn new(
-        context: [u8; KKT_CONTEXT_LEN],
-        body: &[u8],
-        session_id: [u8; KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN],
-        signature: &[u8],
-    ) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            context,
+    pub fn new(context: &KKTContext, body: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, KKTError> {
+        let context_bytes = context.encode()?;
+        Ok(Self {
+            context: context_bytes,
            body: Vec::from(body),
-            session_id,
-            signature: Vec::from(signature),
-        }
+        })
    }
+
+    pub fn encrypt_initiator_frame<R>(
+        &self,
+        rng: &mut R,
+        responder_public_key: &DHPublicKey,
+        version_byte: u8,
+    ) -> Result<(Carrier, Vec<u8>), KKTError>
+    where
+        R: CryptoRng + RngCore,
+    {
+        let ephemeral_keypair = DHKeyPair::new(rng);
+        let shared_secret = ephemeral_keypair
+            .sk()
+            .diffie_hellman(responder_public_key)
+            .map_err(|_| KKTError::X25519Error {
+                info: "Key Derivation Error",
+            })?;
+
+        let mut mask = Vec::from(ephemeral_keypair.pk.as_ref());
+        mask.extend_from_slice(responder_public_key.as_ref());
+
+        let masked_byte = MaskedByte::new(version_byte, &mask);
+
+        let mut context = Vec::from(masked_byte.as_slice());
+        context.extend_from_slice(KKT_CARRIER_CONTEXT);
+        context.extend_from_slice(ephemeral_keypair.pk.as_ref());
+        context.extend_from_slice(responder_public_key.as_ref());
+
+        let mut carrier = Carrier::from_secret_slice(shared_secret.as_ref(), &context);
+
+        let mut full_kkt_message = Vec::from(ephemeral_keypair.pk.as_ref());
+        full_kkt_message.extend_from_slice(masked_byte.as_slice());
+        let encrypted_kkt_frame = carrier.encrypt(&self.to_bytes())?;
+        full_kkt_message.extend_from_slice(&encrypted_kkt_frame);
+
+        Ok((carrier, full_kkt_message))
+    }
+
+    pub fn decrypt_initiator_frame(
+        responder_keypair: &DHKeyPair,
+        message: &[u8],
+        supported_versions: &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<(Carrier, KKTFrame, KKTContext), KKTError> {
+        let mut initiator_public_key_bytes: [u8; PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH] = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH];
+        initiator_public_key_bytes.clone_from_slice(&message[0..PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH]);
+
+        // check mask
+
+        let masked_byte =
+            MaskedByte::try_from(&message[PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH..PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH + MASKED_BYTE_LEN])?;
+
+        let mut mask = Vec::from(&initiator_public_key_bytes);
+        mask.extend_from_slice(responder_keypair.pk.as_ref());
+
+        // this could be used later when we have multiple versions
+        // if this call fails, it does before the server has to run a DH
+        let _outer_protocol_version =
+            masked_byte.unmask_check_version(&mask, supported_versions)?;
+
+        // now that the version is ok, we can try dh
+
+        let initiator_public_key = DHPublicKey::from_bytes(&initiator_public_key_bytes);
+
+        let shared_secret = responder_keypair
+            .sk()
+            .diffie_hellman(&initiator_public_key)
+            .map_err(|_| KKTError::X25519Error {
+                info: "Key Derivation Error",
+            })?;
+
+        let mut context = Vec::from(masked_byte.as_slice());
+        context.extend_from_slice(KKT_CARRIER_CONTEXT);
+        context.extend_from_slice(initiator_public_key.as_ref());
+        context.extend_from_slice(responder_keypair.pk.as_ref());
+
+        let mut carrier = Carrier::from_secret_slice(shared_secret.as_ref(), &context).flip_keys();
+
+        let decrypted_message = carrier.decrypt(&message[PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH + MASKED_BYTE_LEN..])?;
+        let (frame, context) = KKTFrame::from_bytes(&decrypted_message)?;
+
+        Ok((carrier, frame, context))
+    }
+
    pub fn context_ref(&self) -> &[u8] {
        &self.context
    }
@@ -51,42 +129,22 @@ impl KKTFrame {
        KKTContext::try_decode(self.context)
    }

-    pub fn signature_ref(&self) -> &[u8] {
-        &self.signature
-    }
-
    pub fn body_ref(&self) -> &[u8] {
        &self.body
    }

-    pub fn session_id_ref(&self) -> &[u8] {
-        &self.session_id
-    }
-    pub fn session_id(&self) -> [u8; KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN] {
-        self.session_id
-    }
-
-    pub fn signature_mut(&mut self) -> &mut [u8] {
-        &mut self.signature
-    }
    pub fn body_mut(&mut self) -> &mut [u8] {
        &mut self.body
    }

-    pub fn session_id_mut(&mut self) -> &mut [u8] {
-        &mut self.session_id
-    }
-
    pub fn frame_length(&self) -> usize {
-        self.context.len() + self.session_id.len() + self.body.len() + self.signature.len()
+        self.context.len() + self.body.len()
    }

    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
        let mut bytes = Vec::with_capacity(self.frame_length());
        bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.context);
        bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.body);
-        bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.session_id);
-        bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.signature);
        bytes
    }

@@ -115,7 +173,6 @@ impl KKTFrame {
        }

        let mut body = Vec::new();
-        let mut signature = Vec::new();

        // decode body
        if context.body_len() > 0 {
@@ -123,33 +180,7 @@ impl KKTFrame {
            body.extend_from_slice(body_bytes);
        }

-        let session_bytes = &bytes[KKT_CONTEXT_LEN + context.body_len()
-            ..KKT_CONTEXT_LEN + context.body_len() + KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN];
-        // SAFETY: we're using exactly KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN bytes and we checked for sufficient bytes
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        let session_id = session_bytes.try_into().unwrap();
-
-        // // old code left for reference if session id becomes variable in length:
-        // if context.session_id_len() > 0 {
-        //     session_id.extend_from_slice(
-        //         &bytes[KKT_CONTEXT_LEN + context.body_len()
-        //             ..KKT_CONTEXT_LEN + context.body_len() + context.session_id_len()],
-        //     );
-        // }
-
-        // decode signature
-        if context.signature_len() > 0 {
-            let signature_bytes = &bytes[KKT_CONTEXT_LEN + context.body_len() + KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN
-                ..KKT_CONTEXT_LEN
-                    + context.body_len()
-                    + KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN
-                    + context.signature_len()];
-            signature.extend_from_slice(signature_bytes);
-        }
-
-        Ok((
-            KKTFrame::new(context_bytes, &body, session_id, &signature),
-            context,
-        ))
+        let frame = KKTFrame::new(&context, &body)?;
+        Ok((frame, context))
    }
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+use libcrux_psq::handshake::types::DHPublicKey;
+use nym_kkt_ciphersuite::Ciphersuite;
+use rand09::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
+use zeroize::{Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop};
+
+use crate::{
+    carrier::Carrier,
+    context::{KKTContext, KKTMode, KKTRole, KKTStatus},
+    error::KKTError,
+    frame::KKTFrame,
+    key_utils::validate_encapsulation_key,
+};
+
+pub struct KKTInitiator<'a> {
+    carrier: Carrier,
+    context: KKTContext,
+    expected_hash: &'a [u8],
+}
+impl<'a> Zeroize for KKTInitiator<'a> {
+    fn zeroize(&mut self) {
+        self.carrier.zeroize();
+    }
+}
+impl<'a> ZeroizeOnDrop for KKTInitiator<'a> {}
+
+impl<'a> KKTInitiator<'a> {
+    // to be used by clients
+    pub fn generate_one_way_request<R>(
+        rng: &mut R,
+        ciphersuite: &Ciphersuite,
+        responder_dh_public_key: &DHPublicKey,
+        expected_hash: &'a [u8],
+        outer_protocol_version: u8,
+    ) -> Result<(Self, Vec<u8>), KKTError>
+    where
+        R: CryptoRng + RngCore,
+    {
+        Self::generate_encrypted_request(
+            rng,
+            KKTMode::OneWay,
+            ciphersuite,
+            None,
+            responder_dh_public_key,
+            expected_hash,
+            outer_protocol_version,
+        )
+    }
+
+    // to be used by nodes
+    pub fn generate_mutual_request<'b, R>(
+        rng: &mut R,
+        ciphersuite: &Ciphersuite,
+        local_encapsulation_key: &'b [u8],
+        responder_dh_public_key: &DHPublicKey,
+        expected_hash: &'a [u8],
+        outer_protocol_version: u8,
+    ) -> Result<(Self, Vec<u8>), KKTError>
+    where
+        R: CryptoRng + RngCore,
+    {
+        Self::generate_encrypted_request(
+            rng,
+            KKTMode::Mutual,
+            ciphersuite,
+            Some(local_encapsulation_key),
+            responder_dh_public_key,
+            expected_hash,
+            outer_protocol_version,
+        )
+    }
+
+    fn generate_encrypted_request<'b, R>(
+        rng: &mut R,
+        mode: KKTMode,
+        ciphersuite: &Ciphersuite,
+        local_encapsulation_key: Option<&'b [u8]>,
+        responder_dh_public_key: &DHPublicKey,
+        expected_hash: &'a [u8],
+        outer_protocol_version: u8,
+    ) -> Result<(Self, Vec<u8>), KKTError>
+    where
+        R: CryptoRng + RngCore,
+    {
+        let (context, frame) = initiator_process(mode, ciphersuite, local_encapsulation_key)?;
+        let (carrier, message_bytes) =
+            frame.encrypt_initiator_frame(rng, responder_dh_public_key, outer_protocol_version)?;
+
+        Ok((
+            Self {
+                carrier,
+                context,
+                expected_hash,
+            },
+            message_bytes,
+        ))
+    }
+
+    // bool would be true if the initiator was using mutual mode
+    // and the responder was able to verify the initiator's kem key
+    pub fn process_response(&mut self, response_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, bool), KKTError> {
+        let decrypted_response_bytes = self.carrier.decrypt(response_bytes)?;
+        let (response_frame, remote_context) = KKTFrame::from_bytes(&decrypted_response_bytes)?;
+        initiator_ingest_response(
+            &mut self.context,
+            &response_frame,
+            &remote_context,
+            self.expected_hash,
+        )
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn initiator_process<'a>(
+    mode: KKTMode,
+    ciphersuite: &Ciphersuite,
+    own_encapsulation_key: Option<&'a [u8]>,
+) -> Result<(KKTContext, KKTFrame), KKTError> {
+    let context = KKTContext::new(KKTRole::Initiator, mode, ciphersuite);
+
+    let body: &[u8] = match mode {
+        KKTMode::OneWay => &[],
+        KKTMode::Mutual => match own_encapsulation_key {
+            Some(encaps_key) => encaps_key,
+
+            // Missing key
+            None => {
+                return Err(KKTError::FunctionInputError {
+                    info: "KEM Key Not Provided",
+                });
+            }
+        },
+    };
+
+    let frame = KKTFrame::new(&context, body)?;
+
+    Ok((context, frame))
+}
+
+pub fn initiator_ingest_response(
+    own_context: &mut KKTContext,
+    remote_frame: &KKTFrame,
+    remote_context: &KKTContext,
+    expected_hash: &[u8],
+) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, bool), KKTError> {
+    match remote_context.status() {
+        KKTStatus::Ok | KKTStatus::UnverifiedKEMKey => {
+            match validate_encapsulation_key(
+                own_context.ciphersuite().hash_function(),
+                own_context.ciphersuite().hash_len(),
+                remote_frame.body_ref(),
+                expected_hash,
+            ) {
+                true => Ok((
+                    remote_frame.body_ref().to_vec(),
+                    remote_context.status() != KKTStatus::UnverifiedKEMKey,
+                )),
+
+                // The key does not match the hash obtained from the directory
+                false => Err(KKTError::KEMError {
+                    info: "Hash of received encapsulation key does not match the value stored on the directory.",
+                }),
+            }
+        }
+        _ => Err(KKTError::ResponderFlaggedError {
+            status: remote_context.status(),
+        }),
+    }
+}
@@ -1,70 +1,38 @@
-use crate::ciphersuite::HashFunction;
 use std::collections::HashMap;

-use classic_mceliece_rust::keypair_boxed;
-
-use nym_kkt_ciphersuite::{DEFAULT_HASH_LEN, KeyDigests};
+use libcrux_kem::{MlKem768PrivateKey, MlKem768PublicKey};
+use libcrux_psq::handshake::types::DHKeyPair;
+use nym_kkt_ciphersuite::{DEFAULT_HASH_LEN, HashFunction, KeyDigests};
 use rand09::{CryptoRng, RngCore};

-pub fn generate_keypair_ed25519<R>(
-    rng: &mut R,
-    index: Option<u32>,
-) -> nym_crypto::asymmetric::ed25519::KeyPair
+pub fn generate_keypair_x25519<R>(rng: &mut R) -> DHKeyPair
 where
    R: RngCore + CryptoRng,
 {
-    let mut secret_initiator: [u8; 32] = [0u8; 32];
-    rng.fill_bytes(&mut secret_initiator);
-    nym_crypto::asymmetric::ed25519::KeyPair::from_secret(secret_initiator, index.unwrap_or(0))
+    DHKeyPair::new(rng)
 }

-pub fn generate_keypair_x25519<R>(rng: &mut R) -> nym_crypto::asymmetric::x25519::KeyPair
+pub fn generate_keypair_mlkem<R>(rng: &mut R) -> (MlKem768PrivateKey, MlKem768PublicKey)
 where
    R: RngCore + CryptoRng,
 {
-    let mut secret_initiator: [u8; 32] = [0u8; 32];
-    rng.fill_bytes(&mut secret_initiator);
-
-    let private_key = nym_crypto::asymmetric::x25519::PrivateKey::from_secret(secret_initiator);
-    private_key.into()
+    libcrux_ml_kem::mlkem768::rand::generate_key_pair(rng).into_parts()
 }

 // (decapsulation_key, encapsulation_key)
-pub fn generate_keypair_libcrux<R>(
-    rng: &mut R,
-    kem: crate::ciphersuite::KEM,
-) -> Result<(libcrux_kem::PrivateKey, libcrux_kem::PublicKey), crate::error::KKTError>
-where
-    R: RngCore + CryptoRng,
-{
-    match kem {
-        crate::ciphersuite::KEM::MlKem768 => {
-            Ok(libcrux_kem::key_gen(libcrux_kem::Algorithm::MlKem768, rng)?)
-        }
-        crate::ciphersuite::KEM::XWing => Ok(libcrux_kem::key_gen(
-            libcrux_kem::Algorithm::XWingKemDraft06,
-            rng,
-        )?),
-        crate::ciphersuite::KEM::X25519 => {
-            Ok(libcrux_kem::key_gen(libcrux_kem::Algorithm::X25519, rng)?)
-        }
-        _ => Err(crate::error::KKTError::KEMError {
-            info: "Key Generation Error: Unsupported Libcrux Algorithm",
-        }),
-    }
-}
-// (decapsulation_key, encapsulation_key)
-pub fn generate_keypair_mceliece<'a, R>(
+pub fn generate_keypair_mceliece<R>(
    rng: &mut R,
 ) -> (
-    classic_mceliece_rust::SecretKey<'a>,
-    classic_mceliece_rust::PublicKey<'a>,
+    libcrux_psq::classic_mceliece::SecretKey,
+    libcrux_psq::classic_mceliece::PublicKey,
 )
 where
+    // this is annoying because mceliece lib uses rand 0.8.5...
    R: RngCore + CryptoRng,
 {
-    let (encapsulation_key, decapsulation_key) = keypair_boxed(rng);
-    (decapsulation_key, encapsulation_key)
+    let kp = libcrux_psq::classic_mceliece::KeyPair::generate_key_pair(rng);
+
+    (kp.sk, kp.pk)
 }

 pub fn hash_key_bytes(
@@ -1,449 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2025 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-//! Convenience wrappers around KKT protocol functions for easier integration.
-//!
-//! This module provides simplified APIs for the common use case of exchanging
-//! KEM public keys between a client (initiator) and gateway (responder).
-//!
-//! The underlying KKT protocol is implemented in the `session` module.
-
-use nym_crypto::asymmetric::{ed25519, x25519};
-use rand09::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
-
-use crate::{
-    ciphersuite::{Ciphersuite, EncapsulationKey},
-    context::{KKTContext, KKTMode},
-    encryption::{decrypt_initial_kkt_frame, decrypt_kkt_frame, encrypt_kkt_frame},
-    error::KKTError,
-};
-
-// Re-export core session functions for advanced use cases
-pub use crate::session::{
-    anonymous_initiator_process, initiator_ingest_response, initiator_process,
-    responder_ingest_message, responder_process,
-};
-
-use crate::encryption::{KKTSessionSecret, encrypt_initial_kkt_frame};
-use crate::frame::KKTFrame;
-
-/// Perform an *Encrypted* request for a KEM public key from a responder (OneWay mode).
-///
-/// This is the client-side operation that initiates a KKT exchange.
-/// The request will be signed with the provided signing key.
-///
-/// # Arguments
-/// * `rng` - random number generator
-/// * `ciphersuite` - Negotiated ciphersuite (KEM, hash, signature algorithms)
-/// * `signing_key` - Client's Ed25519 signing key for authentication
-/// * `responder_dh_public_key` - Responder's long-term x25519 Diffie-Hellman public key
-///
-/// # Returns
-/// * `KKTSessionSecret` - Session Secret Key to use when decrypting responses
-/// * `KKTContext` - Context to use when validating the response
-/// * `Vec<u8>` - Contains the client's ephemeral public key and encrypted and signed bytes to send to responder
-///
-/// # Example
-/// ```ignore
-/// let (session_secret, context, request_frame) = request_kem_key(
-///     &mut rng,
-///     ciphersuite,
-///     client_signing_key,
-///     responder_dh_public_key,
-/// )?;
-/// // Send request_frame to gateway
-/// ```
-pub fn request_kem_key<R: CryptoRng + RngCore>(
-    rng: &mut R,
-    ciphersuite: Ciphersuite,
-    signing_key: &ed25519::PrivateKey,
-    responder_dh_public_key: &x25519::PublicKey,
-) -> Result<(KKTSessionSecret, KKTContext, Vec<u8>), KKTError> {
-    // OneWay mode: client only wants responder's KEM key
-    // None: client doesn't send their own KEM key
-    let (initiator_context, initiator_frame) =
-        initiator_process(rng, KKTMode::OneWay, ciphersuite, signing_key, None)?;
-
-    // Generate the session's shared secret and encrypt the Initiator's request
-    let (session_secret, encrypted_request_bytes) =
-        encrypt_initial_kkt_frame(rng, responder_dh_public_key, &initiator_frame)?;
-
-    Ok((session_secret, initiator_context, encrypted_request_bytes))
-}
-
-/// Decrypt, validate an *Encrypted* KKT response and extract the responder's KEM public key.
-///
-/// This is the client-side operation that processes the gateway's response.
-/// It verifies the signature and validates the key hash against the expected value
-/// (typically retrieved from a directory service).
-///
-/// # Arguments
-/// * `context` - Context from the initial request
-/// * `session_secret` - Session Secret Key (generated with request)
-/// * `responder_vk` - Responder's Ed25519 verification key (from directory)
-/// * `expected_key_hash` - Expected hash of responder's KEM key (from directory)
-/// * `response_bytes` - Serialized response frame from responder
-///
-/// # Returns
-/// * `EncapsulationKey` - Authenticated KEM public key of the responder
-///
-/// # Example
-/// ```ignore
-/// let gateway_kem_key = validate_kem_response(
-///     &context,
-///     &session_secret,
-///     &gateway_verification_key,
-///     &expected_hash_from_directory,
-///     &response_bytes,
-/// )?;
-/// // Use gateway_kem_key for PSQ
-/// ```
-pub fn validate_kem_response<'a>(
-    context: &mut KKTContext,
-    session_secret: &KKTSessionSecret,
-    responder_vk: &ed25519::PublicKey,
-    expected_key_hash: &[u8],
-    encrypted_response_bytes: &[u8],
-) -> Result<EncapsulationKey<'a>, KKTError> {
-    let (responder_frame, responder_context) =
-        decrypt_kkt_response_frame(session_secret, encrypted_response_bytes)?;
-
-    initiator_ingest_response(
-        context,
-        &responder_frame,
-        &responder_context,
-        responder_vk,
-        expected_key_hash,
-    )
-}
-
-/// Decrypts and validates an *Encrypted* KKT response
-///
-/// This is the client-side operation that processes the gateway's response.
-pub fn decrypt_kkt_response_frame(
-    session_secret: &KKTSessionSecret,
-    frame_ciphertext: &[u8],
-) -> Result<(KKTFrame, KKTContext), KKTError> {
-    decrypt_kkt_frame(session_secret, frame_ciphertext, KKT_RESPONSE_AAD)
-}
-
-/// Handle an *Encrypted* KKT request and generate a signed response with the responder's KEM key.
-///
-/// This is the gateway-side operation that processes a client's KKT request.
-/// It validates the request signature (if authenticated) and responds with
-/// the gateway's KEM public key, signed for authenticity.
-///
-/// # Arguments
-/// * `encrypted_request_bytes` - encrypted KEM request
-/// * `initiator_vk` - Initiator's Ed25519 verification key (None for anonymous)
-/// * `responder_signing_key` - Gateway's Ed25519 signing key
-/// * `responder_dh_public_key` - Gateway's long-term x25519 Diffie-Hellman private key
-/// * `responder_kem_key` - Gateway's KEM public key to send
-///
-/// # Returns
-/// * `KKTFrame` - Signed response frame containing the KEM public key
-///
-/// # Example
-/// ```ignore
-/// let response_frame = handle_kem_request(
-///     &request_frame,
-///     Some(client_verification_key),  // or None for anonymous
-///     gateway_signing_key,
-///     &gateway_kem_public_key,
-/// )?;
-/// // Send response_frame back to client
-/// ```
-pub fn handle_kem_request<'a, R>(
-    rng: &mut R,
-    encrypted_request_bytes: &[u8],
-    initiator_vk: Option<&ed25519::PublicKey>,
-    responder_signing_key: &ed25519::PrivateKey,
-    responder_dh_private_key: &x25519::PrivateKey,
-    responder_kem_key: &EncapsulationKey<'a>,
-) -> Result<Vec<u8>, KKTError>
-where
-    R: RngCore + CryptoRng,
-{
-    // Compute the session's shared secret, decrypt and parse context from the request frame
-
-    let (session_secret, request_frame, initiator_context) =
-        decrypt_initial_kkt_frame(responder_dh_private_key, encrypted_request_bytes)?;
-
-    // Validate the request (verifies signature if initiator_vk provided)
-    let (mut response_context, _) = responder_ingest_message(
-        &initiator_context,
-        initiator_vk,
-        None, // Not checking initiator's KEM key in OneWay mode
-        &request_frame,
-    )?;
-
-    // Generate signed response with our KEM public key
-    let responder_frame = responder_process(
-        &mut response_context,
-        request_frame.session_id(),
-        responder_signing_key,
-        responder_kem_key,
-    )?;
-
-    // Encrypt the responder's response with the session's shared secret
-    encrypt_kkt_frame(rng, &session_secret, &responder_frame, KKT_RESPONSE_AAD)
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use crate::{
-        ciphersuite::{HashFunction, KEM, SignatureScheme},
-        key_utils::{generate_keypair_libcrux, hash_encapsulation_key},
-    };
-
-    fn random_x25519_key() -> x25519::PrivateKey {
-        let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
-        let mut rng = rand09::rng();
-        rng.fill_bytes(&mut bytes);
-        x25519::PrivateKey::from_secret(bytes)
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_kkt_wrappers_oneway_authenticated() {
-        let mut rng = rand09::rng();
-
-        // Generate Ed25519 keypairs for both parties
-        let mut initiator_secret = [0u8; 32];
-        rng.fill_bytes(&mut initiator_secret);
-        let ed25519_init = ed25519::KeyPair::from_secret(initiator_secret, 0);
-
-        let mut responder_secret = [0u8; 32];
-        rng.fill_bytes(&mut responder_secret);
-        let ed25519_resp = ed25519::KeyPair::from_secret(responder_secret, 1);
-
-        let x25519_resp_priv = random_x25519_key();
-        let x25519_resp_pub = x25519::PublicKey::from(&x25519_resp_priv);
-
-        // Generate responder's KEM keypair (X25519 for testing)
-        let (_, responder_kem_pk) = generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, KEM::X25519).unwrap();
-        let responder_kem_key = EncapsulationKey::X25519(responder_kem_pk);
-
-        // Create ciphersuite
-        let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::resolve_ciphersuite(
-            KEM::X25519,
-            HashFunction::Blake3,
-            SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
-            None,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        // Hash the KEM key (simulating directory storage)
-        let key_hash = hash_encapsulation_key(
-            &ciphersuite.hash_function(),
-            ciphersuite.hash_len(),
-            &responder_kem_key.encode(),
-        );
-
-        // Client: Request KEM key
-        let (session_key, context, request_frame_ciphertext) = request_kem_key(
-            &mut rng,
-            ciphersuite,
-            ed25519_init.private_key(),
-            &x25519_resp_pub,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        // Gateway: Handle request
-        let response_frame_ciphertext = handle_kem_request(
-            &mut rng,
-            &request_frame_ciphertext,
-            Some(ed25519_init.public_key()), // Authenticated
-            ed25519_resp.private_key(),
-            &x25519_resp_priv,
-            &responder_kem_key,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        // Client: Validate response
-        let obtained_key = validate_kem_response(
-            &context,
-            &session_key,
-            ed25519_resp.public_key(),
-            &key_hash,
-            &response_frame_ciphertext,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        // Verify we got the correct KEM key
-        assert_eq!(obtained_key.encode(), responder_kem_key.encode());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_kkt_wrappers_anonymous() {
-        let mut rng = rand09::rng();
-
-        // Only responder has keys
-        let mut responder_secret = [0u8; 32];
-        rng.fill_bytes(&mut responder_secret);
-        let responder_keypair = ed25519::KeyPair::from_secret(responder_secret, 1);
-
-        let (_, responder_kem_pk) = generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, KEM::X25519).unwrap();
-        let responder_kem_key = EncapsulationKey::X25519(responder_kem_pk);
-
-        let x25519_resp_priv = random_x25519_key();
-        let x25519_resp_pub = x25519::PublicKey::from(&x25519_resp_priv);
-
-        let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::resolve_ciphersuite(
-            KEM::X25519,
-            HashFunction::Blake3,
-            SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
-            None,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        let key_hash = hash_encapsulation_key(
-            &ciphersuite.hash_function(),
-            ciphersuite.hash_len(),
-            &responder_kem_key.encode(),
-        );
-
-        // Anonymous initiator
-        let (context, request_frame) = anonymous_initiator_process(&mut rng, ciphersuite).unwrap();
-
-        // Generate the session's shared secret and encrypt the Initiator's request
-        let (session_secret, encrypted_request_bytes) =
-            encrypt_initial_kkt_frame(&mut rng, &x25519_resp_pub, &request_frame).unwrap();
-
-        // Gateway: Handle anonymous request
-        let response_frame = handle_kem_request(
-            &mut rng,
-            &encrypted_request_bytes,
-            None, // Anonymous - no verification key
-            responder_keypair.private_key(),
-            &x25519_resp_priv,
-            &responder_kem_key,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        // Initiator: Validate response
-        let obtained_key = validate_kem_response(
-            &context,
-            &session_secret,
-            responder_keypair.public_key(),
-            &key_hash,
-            &response_frame,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(obtained_key.encode(), responder_kem_key.encode());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_invalid_signature_rejected() {
-        let mut rng = rand09::rng();
-
-        let mut initiator_secret = [0u8; 32];
-        rng.fill_bytes(&mut initiator_secret);
-        let initiator_keypair = ed25519::KeyPair::from_secret(initiator_secret, 0);
-
-        let mut responder_secret = [0u8; 32];
-        rng.fill_bytes(&mut responder_secret);
-        let responder_keypair = ed25519::KeyPair::from_secret(responder_secret, 1);
-
-        let x25519_resp_priv = random_x25519_key();
-        let x25519_resp_pub = x25519::PublicKey::from(&x25519_resp_priv);
-
-        // Different keypair for wrong signature
-        let mut wrong_secret = [0u8; 32];
-        rng.fill_bytes(&mut wrong_secret);
-        let wrong_keypair = ed25519::KeyPair::from_secret(wrong_secret, 2);
-
-        let (_, responder_kem_pk) = generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, KEM::X25519).unwrap();
-        let responder_kem_key = EncapsulationKey::X25519(responder_kem_pk);
-
-        let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::resolve_ciphersuite(
-            KEM::X25519,
-            HashFunction::Blake3,
-            SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
-            None,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        let (_session_key, _context, request_frame_ciphertext) = request_kem_key(
-            &mut rng,
-            ciphersuite,
-            initiator_keypair.private_key(),
-            &x25519_resp_pub,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        // Gateway handles request but we provide WRONG verification key
-        let result = handle_kem_request(
-            &mut rng,
-            &request_frame_ciphertext,
-            Some(wrong_keypair.public_key()), // Wrong key!
-            responder_keypair.private_key(),
-            &x25519_resp_priv,
-            &responder_kem_key,
-        );
-
-        // Should fail signature verification
-        assert!(result.is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_hash_mismatch_rejected() {
-        let mut rng = rand09::rng();
-
-        let mut initiator_secret = [0u8; 32];
-        rng.fill_bytes(&mut initiator_secret);
-        let initiator_keypair = ed25519::KeyPair::from_secret(initiator_secret, 0);
-
-        let mut responder_secret = [0u8; 32];
-        rng.fill_bytes(&mut responder_secret);
-        let responder_keypair = ed25519::KeyPair::from_secret(responder_secret, 1);
-
-        let x25519_resp_priv = random_x25519_key();
-        let x25519_resp_pub = x25519::PublicKey::from(&x25519_resp_priv);
-
-        let (_, responder_kem_pk) = generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, KEM::X25519).unwrap();
-        let responder_kem_key = EncapsulationKey::X25519(responder_kem_pk);
-
-        let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::resolve_ciphersuite(
-            KEM::X25519,
-            HashFunction::Blake3,
-            SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
-            None,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        // Use WRONG hash
-        let wrong_hash = [0u8; 32];
-
-        let (session_key, context, request_frame) = request_kem_key(
-            &mut rng,
-            ciphersuite,
-            initiator_keypair.private_key(),
-            &x25519_resp_pub,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        let response_frame = handle_kem_request(
-            &mut rng,
-            &request_frame,
-            Some(initiator_keypair.public_key()),
-            responder_keypair.private_key(),
-            &x25519_resp_priv,
-            &responder_kem_key,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        // Client validates with WRONG hash
-        let result = validate_kem_response(
-            &context,
-            &session_key,
-            responder_keypair.public_key(),
-            &wrong_hash, // Wrong!
-            &response_frame,
-        );
-
-        // Should fail hash validation
-        assert!(result.is_err());
-    }
-}
@@ -1,498 +1,210 @@
 // Copyright 2025 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

-pub mod ciphersuite;
+pub mod carrier;
 pub mod context;
-pub mod encryption;
 pub mod error;
 pub mod frame;
+pub mod initiator;
 pub mod key_utils;
-// pub mod kkt;
-pub mod session;
+pub mod masked_byte;
+pub mod rekey;
+pub mod responder;

 // This must be less than 4 bits
 pub const KKT_VERSION: u8 = 1;
 const _: () = assert!(KKT_VERSION < 1 << 4);
-pub const KKT_RESPONSE_AAD: &[u8] = b"KKT_Response";
-pub(crate) const KKT_INITIAL_FRAME_AAD: &[u8] = b"KKT_INITIAL_FRAME";

 #[cfg(test)]
 mod test {
+    use nym_kkt_ciphersuite::{Ciphersuite, HashFunction, HashLength, KEM, SignatureScheme};
+
    use crate::{
-        KKT_RESPONSE_AAD,
-        ciphersuite::{Ciphersuite, EncapsulationKey, HashFunction, KEM},
-        encryption::{
-            decrypt_initial_kkt_frame, decrypt_kkt_frame, encrypt_initial_kkt_frame,
-            encrypt_kkt_frame,
-        },
-        frame::KKTFrame,
+        initiator::KKTInitiator,
        key_utils::{
-            generate_keypair_ed25519, generate_keypair_libcrux, generate_keypair_mceliece,
-            generate_keypair_x25519, hash_encapsulation_key,
-        },
-        session::{
-            anonymous_initiator_process, initiator_ingest_response, initiator_process,
-            responder_ingest_message, responder_process,
+            generate_keypair_mceliece, generate_keypair_mlkem, generate_keypair_x25519,
+            hash_encapsulation_key,
        },
+        responder::KKTResponder,
    };

    #[test]
-    fn test_kkt_psq_e2e_clear() {
+    fn test_kkt_psq_e2e_encrypted_carrier() {
        let mut rng = rand09::rng();

-        // generate ed25519 keys
-        let initiator_ed25519_keypair = generate_keypair_ed25519(&mut rng, Some(0));
-        let responder_ed25519_keypair = generate_keypair_ed25519(&mut rng, Some(1));
-
-        for kem in [KEM::MlKem768, KEM::XWing, KEM::X25519, KEM::McEliece] {
-            for hash_function in [
-                HashFunction::Blake3,
-                HashFunction::SHA256,
-                HashFunction::Shake128,
-                HashFunction::Shake256,
-            ] {
-                let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::resolve_ciphersuite(
-                    kem,
-                    hash_function,
-                    crate::ciphersuite::SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
-                    None,
-                )
-                .unwrap();
-
-                // generate kem public keys
-
-                let (responder_kem_public_key, initiator_kem_public_key) = match kem {
-                    KEM::MlKem768 => (
-                        EncapsulationKey::MlKem768(
-                            generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1,
-                        ),
-                        EncapsulationKey::MlKem768(
-                            generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1,
-                        ),
-                    ),
-                    KEM::XWing => (
-                        EncapsulationKey::XWing(generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1),
-                        EncapsulationKey::XWing(generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1),
-                    ),
-                    KEM::X25519 => (
-                        EncapsulationKey::X25519(
-                            generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1,
-                        ),
-                        EncapsulationKey::X25519(
-                            generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1,
-                        ),
-                    ),
-                    KEM::McEliece => (
-                        EncapsulationKey::McEliece(generate_keypair_mceliece(&mut rng).1),
-                        EncapsulationKey::McEliece(generate_keypair_mceliece(&mut rng).1),
-                    ),
-                };
-
-                let i_kem_key_bytes = initiator_kem_public_key.encode();
-
-                let r_kem_key_bytes = responder_kem_public_key.encode();
-
-                let i_dir_hash = hash_encapsulation_key(
-                    &ciphersuite.hash_function(),
-                    ciphersuite.hash_len(),
-                    &i_kem_key_bytes,
-                );
-
-                let r_dir_hash = hash_encapsulation_key(
-                    &ciphersuite.hash_function(),
-                    ciphersuite.hash_len(),
-                    &r_kem_key_bytes,
-                );
-
-                // Anonymous Initiator, OneWay
-                {
-                    let (i_context, i_frame) =
-                        anonymous_initiator_process(&mut rng, ciphersuite).unwrap();
-
-                    let i_frame_bytes = i_frame.to_bytes();
-
-                    let (i_frame_r, r_context) = KKTFrame::from_bytes(&i_frame_bytes).unwrap();
-
-                    let (r_context, _) =
-                        responder_ingest_message(&r_context, None, None, &i_frame_r).unwrap();
-
-                    let r_frame = responder_process(
-                        &r_context,
-                        i_frame_r.session_id(),
-                        responder_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
-                        &responder_kem_public_key,
-                    )
-                    .unwrap();
-
-                    let r_bytes = r_frame.to_bytes();
-
-                    let (i_frame_r, i_context_r) = KKTFrame::from_bytes(&r_bytes).unwrap();
-
-                    let i_obtained_key = initiator_ingest_response(
-                        &i_context,
-                        &i_frame_r,
-                        &i_context_r,
-                        responder_ed25519_keypair.public_key(),
-                        &r_dir_hash,
-                    )
-                    .unwrap();
-
-                    assert_eq!(i_obtained_key.encode(), r_kem_key_bytes)
-                }
-                // Initiator, OneWay
-                {
-                    let (i_context, i_frame) = initiator_process(
-                        &mut rng,
-                        crate::context::KKTMode::OneWay,
-                        ciphersuite,
-                        initiator_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
-                        None,
-                    )
-                    .unwrap();
-
-                    let i_frame_bytes = i_frame.to_bytes();
-
-                    let (i_frame_r, r_context) = KKTFrame::from_bytes(&i_frame_bytes).unwrap();
-
-                    let (r_context, r_obtained_key) = responder_ingest_message(
-                        &r_context,
-                        Some(initiator_ed25519_keypair.public_key()),
-                        None,
-                        &i_frame_r,
-                    )
-                    .unwrap();
-
-                    assert!(r_obtained_key.is_none());
-
-                    let r_frame = responder_process(
-                        &r_context,
-                        i_frame_r.session_id(),
-                        responder_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
-                        &responder_kem_public_key,
-                    )
-                    .unwrap();
-
-                    let r_bytes = r_frame.to_bytes();
-
-                    let (i_frame_r, i_context_r) = KKTFrame::from_bytes(&r_bytes).unwrap();
-
-                    let i_obtained_key = initiator_ingest_response(
-                        &i_context,
-                        &i_frame_r,
-                        &i_context_r,
-                        responder_ed25519_keypair.public_key(),
-                        &r_dir_hash,
-                    )
-                    .unwrap();
-
-                    assert_eq!(i_obtained_key.encode(), r_kem_key_bytes)
-                }
-
-                // Initiator, Mutual
-                {
-                    let (i_context, i_frame) = initiator_process(
-                        &mut rng,
-                        crate::context::KKTMode::Mutual,
-                        ciphersuite,
-                        initiator_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
-                        Some(&initiator_kem_public_key),
-                    )
-                    .unwrap();
-
-                    let i_frame_bytes = i_frame.to_bytes();
-
-                    let (i_frame_r, r_context) = KKTFrame::from_bytes(&i_frame_bytes).unwrap();
-
-                    let (r_context, r_obtained_key) = responder_ingest_message(
-                        &r_context,
-                        Some(initiator_ed25519_keypair.public_key()),
-                        Some(&i_dir_hash),
-                        &i_frame_r,
-                    )
-                    .unwrap();
-
-                    assert_eq!(r_obtained_key.unwrap().encode(), i_kem_key_bytes);
-
-                    let r_frame = responder_process(
-                        &r_context,
-                        i_frame_r.session_id(),
-                        responder_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
-                        &responder_kem_public_key,
-                    )
-                    .unwrap();
-
-                    let r_bytes = r_frame.to_bytes();
-
-                    let (i_frame_r, i_context_r) = KKTFrame::from_bytes(&r_bytes).unwrap();
-
-                    let i_obtained_key = initiator_ingest_response(
-                        &i_context,
-                        &i_frame_r,
-                        &i_context_r,
-                        responder_ed25519_keypair.public_key(),
-                        &r_dir_hash,
-                    )
-                    .unwrap();
-
-                    assert_eq!(i_obtained_key.encode(), r_kem_key_bytes)
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    #[test]
-    fn test_kkt_psq_e2e_encrypted() {
-        let mut rng = rand09::rng();
-
-        // generate ed25519 keys
-        let initiator_ed25519_keypair = generate_keypair_ed25519(&mut rng, Some(0));
-        let responder_ed25519_keypair = generate_keypair_ed25519(&mut rng, Some(1));
-
        // generate responder x25519 keys
        let responder_x25519_keypair = generate_keypair_x25519(&mut rng);

-        for kem in [KEM::MlKem768, KEM::XWing, KEM::X25519, KEM::McEliece] {
-            for hash_function in [
-                HashFunction::Blake3,
-                HashFunction::SHA256,
-                HashFunction::Shake128,
-                HashFunction::Shake256,
-            ] {
+        for hash_function in [
+            HashFunction::Blake3,
+            HashFunction::SHA256,
+            HashFunction::Shake128,
+            HashFunction::Shake256,
+        ] {
+            // generate kem public keys
+
+            let responder_mlkem_keypair = generate_keypair_mlkem(&mut rng);
+            let responder_mceliece_keypair = generate_keypair_mceliece(&mut rng);
+
+            let r_dir_hash_mlkem = hash_encapsulation_key(
+                // &ciphersuite.hash_function(),
+                &hash_function,
+                // ciphersuite.hash_len(),
+                HashLength::Default.value(),
+                responder_mlkem_keypair.1.as_slice().as_slice(),
+            );
+
+            let r_dir_hash_mceliece = hash_encapsulation_key(
+                // &ciphersuite.hash_function(),
+                &hash_function,
+                // ciphersuite.hash_len(),
+                HashLength::Default.value(),
+                responder_mceliece_keypair.1.as_ref(),
+            );
+            let initiator_mlkem_keypair = generate_keypair_mlkem(&mut rng);
+            let initiator_mceliece_keypair = generate_keypair_mceliece(&mut rng);
+
+            let _i_dir_hash_mlkem = hash_encapsulation_key(
+                // &ciphersuite.hash_function(),
+                &hash_function,
+                // ciphersuite.hash_len(),
+                HashLength::Default.value(),
+                initiator_mlkem_keypair.1.as_slice().as_slice(),
+            );
+
+            let _i_dir_hash_mceliece = hash_encapsulation_key(
+                // &ciphersuite.hash_function(),
+                &hash_function,
+                // ciphersuite.hash_len(),
+                HashLength::Default.value(),
+                initiator_mceliece_keypair.1.as_ref(),
+            );
+
+            let responder = KKTResponder::new(
+                &responder_x25519_keypair,
+                Some(&responder_mlkem_keypair.1),
+                Some(&responder_mceliece_keypair.1),
+                &[
+                    HashFunction::Blake3,
+                    HashFunction::SHA256,
+                    HashFunction::Shake128,
+                    HashFunction::Shake256,
+                ],
+                &[1],
+                &[SignatureScheme::Ed25519],
+            )
+            .unwrap();
+
+            // OneWay - MlKem
+            {
                let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::resolve_ciphersuite(
-                    kem,
+                    KEM::MlKem768,
                    hash_function,
-                    crate::ciphersuite::SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
+                    SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
                    None,
                )
                .unwrap();
+                let (mut initiator, request_bytes) = KKTInitiator::generate_one_way_request(
+                    &mut rng,
+                    &ciphersuite,
+                    &responder_x25519_keypair.pk,
+                    &r_dir_hash_mlkem,
+                    1u8,
+                )
+                .unwrap();

-                // generate kem public keys
+                let (response_bytes, _) = responder.process_request(&request_bytes).unwrap();

-                let (responder_kem_public_key, initiator_kem_public_key) = match kem {
-                    KEM::MlKem768 => (
-                        EncapsulationKey::MlKem768(
-                            generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1,
-                        ),
-                        EncapsulationKey::MlKem768(
-                            generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1,
-                        ),
-                    ),
-                    KEM::XWing => (
-                        EncapsulationKey::XWing(generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1),
-                        EncapsulationKey::XWing(generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1),
-                    ),
-                    KEM::X25519 => (
-                        EncapsulationKey::X25519(
-                            generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1,
-                        ),
-                        EncapsulationKey::X25519(
-                            generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, kem).unwrap().1,
-                        ),
-                    ),
-                    KEM::McEliece => (
-                        EncapsulationKey::McEliece(generate_keypair_mceliece(&mut rng).1),
-                        EncapsulationKey::McEliece(generate_keypair_mceliece(&mut rng).1),
-                    ),
-                };
+                let (i_obtained_key, _) = initiator.process_response(&response_bytes).unwrap();

-                let i_kem_key_bytes = initiator_kem_public_key.encode();
+                assert_eq!(
+                    i_obtained_key,
+                    responder_mlkem_keypair.1.as_slice().as_slice(),
+                )
+            }
+            // Mutual - MlKem
+            {
+                let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::resolve_ciphersuite(
+                    KEM::MlKem768,
+                    hash_function,
+                    SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
+                    None,
+                )
+                .unwrap();
+                let (mut initiator, request_bytes) = KKTInitiator::generate_one_way_request(
+                    &mut rng,
+                    &ciphersuite,
+                    &responder_x25519_keypair.pk,
+                    &r_dir_hash_mlkem,
+                    1u8,
+                )
+                .unwrap();

-                let r_kem_key_bytes = responder_kem_public_key.encode();
+                let (response_bytes, r_obtained_key) =
+                    responder.process_request(&request_bytes).unwrap();

-                let i_dir_hash = hash_encapsulation_key(
-                    &ciphersuite.hash_function(),
-                    ciphersuite.hash_len(),
-                    &i_kem_key_bytes,
-                );
+                // if we keep unverified keys, this should change
+                assert!(r_obtained_key.is_none());

-                let r_dir_hash = hash_encapsulation_key(
-                    &ciphersuite.hash_function(),
-                    ciphersuite.hash_len(),
-                    &r_kem_key_bytes,
-                );
+                let (i_obtained_key, _) = initiator.process_response(&response_bytes).unwrap();

-                // Anonymous Initiator, OneWay
-                {
-                    let (i_context, i_frame) =
-                        anonymous_initiator_process(&mut rng, ciphersuite).unwrap();
+                assert_eq!(
+                    i_obtained_key,
+                    responder_mlkem_keypair.1.as_slice().as_slice(),
+                )
+            }

-                    // encryption - initiator frame
+            // OneWay - McEliece
+            {
+                let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::resolve_ciphersuite(
+                    KEM::McEliece,
+                    hash_function,
+                    SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
+                    None,
+                )
+                .unwrap();
+                let (mut initiator, request_bytes) = KKTInitiator::generate_one_way_request(
+                    &mut rng,
+                    &ciphersuite,
+                    &responder_x25519_keypair.pk,
+                    &r_dir_hash_mceliece,
+                    1u8,
+                )
+                .unwrap();

-                    let (i_session_secret, i_bytes) = encrypt_initial_kkt_frame(
-                        &mut rng,
-                        responder_x25519_keypair.public_key(),
-                        &i_frame,
-                    )
-                    .unwrap();
+                let (response_bytes, _) = responder.process_request(&request_bytes).unwrap();

-                    // decryption - initiator frame
+                let (i_obtained_key, _) = initiator.process_response(&response_bytes).unwrap();

-                    let (r_session_secret, i_frame_r, i_context_r) =
-                        decrypt_initial_kkt_frame(responder_x25519_keypair.private_key(), &i_bytes)
-                            .unwrap();
+                assert_eq!(i_obtained_key, responder_mceliece_keypair.1.as_ref(),)
+            }
+            // Mutual - MlKem
+            {
+                let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::resolve_ciphersuite(
+                    KEM::McEliece,
+                    hash_function,
+                    SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
+                    None,
+                )
+                .unwrap();
+                let (mut initiator, request_bytes) = KKTInitiator::generate_one_way_request(
+                    &mut rng,
+                    &ciphersuite,
+                    &responder_x25519_keypair.pk,
+                    &r_dir_hash_mceliece,
+                    1u8,
+                )
+                .unwrap();

-                    let (r_context, _) =
-                        responder_ingest_message(&i_context_r, None, None, &i_frame_r).unwrap();
+                let (response_bytes, r_obtained_key) =
+                    responder.process_request(&request_bytes).unwrap();

-                    let r_frame = responder_process(
-                        &r_context,
-                        i_frame_r.session_id(),
-                        responder_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
-                        &responder_kem_public_key,
-                    )
-                    .unwrap();
+                // if we keep unverified keys, this should change
+                assert!(r_obtained_key.is_none());

-                    // encryption - responder frame
-                    let r_bytes =
-                        encrypt_kkt_frame(&mut rng, &r_session_secret, &r_frame, KKT_RESPONSE_AAD)
-                            .unwrap();
+                let (i_obtained_key, _) = initiator.process_response(&response_bytes).unwrap();

-                    // decryption - responder frame
-
-                    let (i_frame_r, i_context_r) =
-                        decrypt_kkt_frame(&i_session_secret, &r_bytes, KKT_RESPONSE_AAD).unwrap();
-
-                    let i_obtained_key = initiator_ingest_response(
-                        &i_context,
-                        &i_frame_r,
-                        &i_context_r,
-                        responder_ed25519_keypair.public_key(),
-                        &r_dir_hash,
-                    )
-                    .unwrap();
-
-                    assert_eq!(i_obtained_key.encode(), r_kem_key_bytes)
-                }
-                // Initiator, OneWay
-                {
-                    let (i_context, i_frame) = initiator_process(
-                        &mut rng,
-                        crate::context::KKTMode::OneWay,
-                        ciphersuite,
-                        initiator_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
-                        None,
-                    )
-                    .unwrap();
-
-                    // encryption - initiator frame
-
-                    let (i_session_secret, i_bytes) = encrypt_initial_kkt_frame(
-                        &mut rng,
-                        responder_x25519_keypair.public_key(),
-                        &i_frame,
-                    )
-                    .unwrap();
-
-                    // decryption - initiator frame
-
-                    let (r_session_secret, i_frame_r, r_context) =
-                        decrypt_initial_kkt_frame(responder_x25519_keypair.private_key(), &i_bytes)
-                            .unwrap();
-
-                    let (r_context, r_obtained_key) = responder_ingest_message(
-                        &r_context,
-                        Some(initiator_ed25519_keypair.public_key()),
-                        None,
-                        &i_frame_r,
-                    )
-                    .unwrap();
-
-                    assert!(r_obtained_key.is_none());
-
-                    let r_frame = responder_process(
-                        &r_context,
-                        i_frame_r.session_id(),
-                        responder_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
-                        &responder_kem_public_key,
-                    )
-                    .unwrap();
-
-                    // encryption - responder frame
-                    let r_bytes =
-                        encrypt_kkt_frame(&mut rng, &r_session_secret, &r_frame, KKT_RESPONSE_AAD)
-                            .unwrap();
-
-                    // decryption - responder frame
-
-                    let (i_frame_r, i_context_r) =
-                        decrypt_kkt_frame(&i_session_secret, &r_bytes, KKT_RESPONSE_AAD).unwrap();
-
-                    let i_obtained_key = initiator_ingest_response(
-                        &i_context,
-                        &i_frame_r,
-                        &i_context_r,
-                        responder_ed25519_keypair.public_key(),
-                        &r_dir_hash,
-                    )
-                    .unwrap();
-
-                    assert_eq!(i_obtained_key.encode(), r_kem_key_bytes)
-                }
-
-                // Initiator, Mutual
-                {
-                    let (i_context, i_frame) = initiator_process(
-                        &mut rng,
-                        crate::context::KKTMode::Mutual,
-                        ciphersuite,
-                        initiator_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
-                        Some(&initiator_kem_public_key),
-                    )
-                    .unwrap();
-
-                    // encryption - initiator frame
-
-                    let (i_session_secret, i_bytes) = encrypt_initial_kkt_frame(
-                        &mut rng,
-                        responder_x25519_keypair.public_key(),
-                        &i_frame,
-                    )
-                    .unwrap();
-
-                    // decryption - initiator frame
-
-                    let (r_session_secret, i_frame_r, i_context_r) =
-                        decrypt_initial_kkt_frame(responder_x25519_keypair.private_key(), &i_bytes)
-                            .unwrap();
-
-                    let (r_context, r_obtained_key) = responder_ingest_message(
-                        &i_context_r,
-                        Some(initiator_ed25519_keypair.public_key()),
-                        Some(&i_dir_hash),
-                        &i_frame_r,
-                    )
-                    .unwrap();
-
-                    assert_eq!(r_obtained_key.unwrap().encode(), i_kem_key_bytes);
-
-                    let r_frame = responder_process(
-                        &r_context,
-                        i_frame_r.session_id(),
-                        responder_ed25519_keypair.private_key(),
-                        &responder_kem_public_key,
-                    )
-                    .unwrap();
-
-                    // encryption - responder frame
-                    let r_bytes =
-                        encrypt_kkt_frame(&mut rng, &r_session_secret, &r_frame, KKT_RESPONSE_AAD)
-                            .unwrap();
-
-                    // decryption - responder frame
-
-                    let (i_frame_r, i_context_r) =
-                        decrypt_kkt_frame(&i_session_secret, &r_bytes, KKT_RESPONSE_AAD).unwrap();
-
-                    let i_obtained_key = initiator_ingest_response(
-                        &i_context,
-                        &i_frame_r,
-                        &i_context_r,
-                        responder_ed25519_keypair.public_key(),
-                        &r_dir_hash,
-                    )
-                    .unwrap();
-
-                    assert_eq!(i_obtained_key.encode(), r_kem_key_bytes)
-                }
+                assert_eq!(i_obtained_key, responder_mceliece_keypair.1.as_ref(),)
            }
        }
    }
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+use nym_crypto::{blake3, hmac::hmac::digest::ExtendableOutput};
+
+use crate::error::{
+    MaskedByteError,
+    MaskedByteError::{Failure, InvalidLength},
+};
+
+pub const MASKED_BYTE_LEN: usize = 16;
+pub const MASKED_BYTE_CONTEXT_STR: &[u8] = b"NYM_MASKED_BYTE_V1";
+
+const U8_RANGE: [u8; 256] = [
+    0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
+    26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49,
+    50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73,
+    74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97,
+    98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116,
+    117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135,
+    136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154,
+    155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173,
+    174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192,
+    193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211,
+    212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230,
+    231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249,
+    250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255,
+];
+
+#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
+pub struct MaskedByte([u8; MASKED_BYTE_LEN]);
+
+impl MaskedByte {
+    /// Mask a byte by hashing it with some mask.
+    /// Outputs Blake3_Hash(MASKED_BYTE_CONTEXT_STR || mask || 0xFF || byte)
+    pub fn new(byte: u8, mask: &[u8]) -> Self {
+        let mut output: [u8; MASKED_BYTE_LEN] = [0u8; MASKED_BYTE_LEN];
+        let mut hasher = blake3::Hasher::new();
+        hasher.update(MASKED_BYTE_CONTEXT_STR);
+        hasher.update(mask);
+        // avoid zero update
+        hasher.update(&[0xFF, byte]);
+        hasher.finalize_xof_into(&mut output);
+
+        Self(output)
+    }
+    /// Unmasks a byte by trial hashing.
+    /// This function runs Blake3_Hash(MASKED_BYTE_CONTEXT_STR || mask || 0xFF).
+    /// This Hasher state is then cloned updated with `i: u8` in (0..=u8::max).
+    /// If we find an `i` which yields back the hash input, then we found the masked byte.
+    /// Otherwise, the function returns an error.
+    pub fn unmask(&self, mask: &[u8]) -> Result<u8, MaskedByteError> {
+        self.unmask_check_version(mask, &U8_RANGE)
+    }
+
+    // This could be more efficient than unmask,
+    // because we just could check against a smaller list of supported versions.
+    pub fn unmask_check_version(
+        &self,
+        mask: &[u8],
+        supported_versions: &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<u8, MaskedByteError> {
+        let mut buf: [u8; MASKED_BYTE_LEN] = [0u8; MASKED_BYTE_LEN];
+        let mut hasher = blake3::Hasher::new();
+        hasher.update(MASKED_BYTE_CONTEXT_STR);
+        hasher.update(mask);
+        // avoid zero update
+        hasher.update(&[0xFF]);
+        for i in supported_versions {
+            let mut t_hasher = hasher.clone();
+            t_hasher.update(&[*i]);
+            t_hasher.finalize_xof_into(&mut buf);
+            if buf == self.0 {
+                return Ok(*i);
+            }
+        }
+        Err(Failure)
+    }
+
+    pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
+        &self.0
+    }
+
+    pub fn to_bytes(self) -> [u8; 16] {
+        self.0
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<[u8; MASKED_BYTE_LEN]> for MaskedByte {
+    fn from(value: [u8; MASKED_BYTE_LEN]) -> Self {
+        MaskedByte(value)
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<&[u8; MASKED_BYTE_LEN]> for MaskedByte {
+    fn from(value: &[u8; MASKED_BYTE_LEN]) -> Self {
+        MaskedByte(value.to_owned())
+    }
+}
+
+impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for MaskedByte {
+    type Error = MaskedByteError;
+
+    fn try_from(value: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        if value.len() != MASKED_BYTE_LEN {
+            Err(InvalidLength {
+                expected: MASKED_BYTE_LEN,
+                actual: value.len(),
+            })
+        } else {
+            Ok(Self::from(value.as_chunks::<MASKED_BYTE_LEN>().0[0]))
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod test {
+
+    use crate::masked_byte::MASKED_BYTE_LEN;
+
+    use super::MaskedByte;
+    use rand09::{Rng, RngCore, rng};
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_masking() {
+        let mut mask: [u8; 256] = [0u8; 256];
+        let mut wire_bytes: [u8; MASKED_BYTE_LEN];
+
+        // why not
+        for i in 0..=u8::MAX {
+            // gen mask
+            rng().fill_bytes(&mut mask);
+            let masked_byte = MaskedByte::new(i, &mask);
+            wire_bytes = masked_byte.to_bytes();
+
+            let decoded_masked_byte = MaskedByte::from(wire_bytes);
+            let output = decoded_masked_byte.unmask(&mask).unwrap();
+
+            assert_eq!(i, output);
+
+            // flip bit
+            let mut with_flipped_bit = decoded_masked_byte.to_bytes();
+
+            let byte_idx: usize = rng().random_range(0..MASKED_BYTE_LEN);
+            let bit_idx = rng().random_range(0..8);
+            with_flipped_bit[byte_idx] ^= 1 << bit_idx;
+
+            let decoded_masked_byte = MaskedByte::from(with_flipped_bit);
+            assert!(decoded_masked_byte.unmask(&mask).is_err());
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_decoding() {
+        let mut mask: [u8; 256] = [0u8; 256];
+
+        // gen mask
+        rng().fill_bytes(&mut mask);
+        let byte = rng().random();
+        let masked_byte = MaskedByte::new(byte, &mask);
+        let wire_bytes: [u8; MASKED_BYTE_LEN] = masked_byte.to_bytes();
+
+        // should succeed
+        let decoded_masked_byte = MaskedByte::try_from(wire_bytes.as_slice()).unwrap();
+        let output = decoded_masked_byte.unmask(&mask).unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(byte, output);
+
+        let empty_slice: &[u8] = &[];
+        // should fail
+        assert!(MaskedByte::try_from(empty_slice).is_err());
+
+        let mut wire_bytes_messy = Vec::from(wire_bytes);
+
+        // add more one more byte
+        wire_bytes_messy.push(0x42);
+        assert!(wire_bytes_messy.len() == MASKED_BYTE_LEN + 1);
+        // should fail
+        assert!(MaskedByte::try_from(wire_bytes_messy.as_slice()).is_err());
+
+        // pop the added byte
+        _ = wire_bytes_messy.pop();
+        assert!(wire_bytes_messy.len() == MASKED_BYTE_LEN);
+        // should succeed
+        assert!(MaskedByte::try_from(wire_bytes_messy.as_slice()).is_ok());
+
+        // pop one more byte
+        _ = wire_bytes_messy.pop();
+        assert!(wire_bytes_messy.len() == MASKED_BYTE_LEN - 1);
+        // should fail
+        assert!(MaskedByte::try_from(wire_bytes_messy.as_slice()).is_err());
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+// Copyright 2026 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+
+//! Post-Quantum Re-Key Protocol
+/// This module implements a stateless post-quantum re-keying protocol in one round-trip.
+/// We currently support MlKem768 and XWing.
+///
+/// This protocol is safe if it runs under a trusted secure channel.
+///
+/// Bandwidth costs:
+/// Request (MlKem768): 1216 bytes
+/// Response (MlKem768): 1088 bytes
+/// Request (XWing): 1248 bytes
+/// Response (XWing): 1120 bytes
+use libcrux_kem::*;
+use nym_crypto::hkdf::blake3::derive_key_blake3;
+use nym_kkt_ciphersuite::{KEM, mceliece, ml_kem768, x25519, xwing};
+use rand09::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
+use zeroize::Zeroize;
+
+use crate::error::KKTError;
+
+/// Context string to be used with the Blake3 KDF.
+const REKEY_CONTEXT: &str = "NYM_PQ_REKEY_v1";
+
+pub struct RekeyInitiator {
+    algorithm: Algorithm,
+    decapsulation_key: PrivateKey,
+    salt: [u8; 32],
+}
+
+impl RekeyInitiator {
+    /// The Initiator generates an ephemeral KEM keypair and a 32-byte salt.
+    /// The Initiator keeps the decapsulation key and generates a request message.
+    /// The request message contains the salt and an encoding of the encapsulation key as follows
+    ///      salt        encapsulation_key
+    /// [0 ........ 32 | 32 .............. ]
+    ///
+    /// Inputs:
+    /// rng: something that implements CryptoRng + RngCore
+    /// kem: a KEM algorithm (we currently support MlKem768 and XWing)
+    ///
+    /// Outputs:
+    /// RekeyInitiator: A struct which contains the decapsulation key, the salt and the kem algorithm in use.
+    /// Vec<u8>: The request message as explained above. This is to be sent to the responder as-is.
+    pub fn generate_request<R>(rng: &mut R, kem: KEM) -> Result<(RekeyInitiator, Vec<u8>), KKTError>
+    where
+        R: CryptoRng + RngCore,
+    {
+        let (algorithm, buffer_size) = match kem {
+            KEM::XWing => (Algorithm::XWingKemDraft06, 32 + xwing::PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH),
+            KEM::MlKem768 => (Algorithm::MlKem768, 32 + ml_kem768::PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH),
+            // We don't support McEliece because the keys are massive.
+            // If this is a deal-breaker, users can start a new session with PSQ which can use McEliece.
+            KEM::McEliece => {
+                return Err(KKTError::UnsupportedAlgorithm {
+                    info: "McEliece is not supported for re-keying",
+                });
+            }
+            // We don't support X25519 because it's not post-quantum secure.
+            KEM::X25519 => {
+                return Err(KKTError::UnsupportedAlgorithm {
+                    info: "X25519 is not supported for re-keying",
+                });
+            }
+        };
+
+        // Generate the Initiator's salt
+        let mut salt = [0u8; 32];
+        rng.fill_bytes(&mut salt);
+
+        // Create the buffer for the request message and copy the salt into it.
+        let mut request_buffer = Vec::with_capacity(buffer_size);
+        request_buffer.extend_from_slice(&salt);
+
+        // Generate the ephemeral KEM keypair based on the algorithm from the function's input.
+        let (decapsulation_key, encapsulation_key) = key_gen(algorithm, rng)?;
+
+        // Append the encoding of the KEM encapsulation key to the initiator's randomness.
+        request_buffer.extend(encapsulation_key.encode());
+
+        Ok((
+            // The Initiator should store this until they use `RekeyInitiator::finalize`.
+            RekeyInitiator {
+                algorithm,
+                decapsulation_key,
+                salt,
+            },
+            // This is to be sent to the responder.
+            request_buffer,
+        ))
+    }
+
+    /// The Initiator will attempt to decapsulate the `pre_key` generated by the responder
+    /// secret. This `pre_key` will be combined with the Initiator's previously generated salt
+    /// as input to a Blake3 KDF call to generate the new shared secret.
+    ///
+    /// This function fails if the ciphertext cannot be decoded or decapsulated.
+    ///
+    /// Input:
+    /// response_message: the responder's message which contains an encapsulation of `pre_key`.
+    /// Output:
+    /// [u8; 32]: the new shared secret.
+    pub fn finalize(mut self, response_message: &[u8]) -> Result<[u8; 32], KKTError> {
+        // Decode the responder's ciphertext.
+        let ciphertext = Ct::decode(self.algorithm, response_message)?;
+        // Decapsulate the `pre_key` using the Initiator's decapsulation key.
+        let pre_key = ciphertext.decapsulate(&self.decapsulation_key)?;
+
+        // Encode the `pre_key` into bytes
+        let pre_key_bytes = pre_key.encode();
+
+        let new_secret: [u8; 32] = derive_key_blake3(REKEY_CONTEXT, &pre_key_bytes, &self.salt);
+
+        // Zeroize the Initiator's salt
+        self.salt.zeroize();
+
+        // TODO: zeroize the decapsulation key
+
+        Ok(new_secret)
+    }
+}
+
+/// The responder parses the request message.
+/// The first 32 bytes are the Initiator's salt,
+/// and the remainder is the encoding of the public key.
+/// Given that XWing and MlKem768 have different key lengths,
+/// we could deduce the algorithm from that.
+///
+/// If the message is badly formatted, or the encapsulation received is invalid,
+/// this function will produce an error.
+///
+/// If everything is alright, the responder generates and encapsulates a key `pre_key` to send to the Initiator.
+/// Then, the responder calls a Blake3 KDF over `pre_key` and the Initiator's salt to obtain
+/// the new shared secret.
+///
+/// Inputs:
+/// rng: something that implements CryptoRng + RngCore
+/// request_message: the Initiator's request message (contains the salt and encapsulation key)
+///
+/// Outputs:
+/// [u8; 32]: new shared secret
+/// Vec<u8>: response which contains an encapsulation of a secret value generated by the responder.
+/// This is to be sent back to the Initiator as-is.
+pub fn responder_process<R>(
+    rng: &mut R,
+    mut request_message: Vec<u8>,
+) -> Result<([u8; 32], Vec<u8>), KKTError>
+where
+    R: CryptoRng + RngCore,
+{
+    // Deduce the KEM algorithm from the message length
+    let algorithm = match request_message.len().checked_sub(32) {
+        //
+        Some(num) => match num {
+            // If message length is 1216 (32 + 1184) then the algorithm should be MlKem768
+            ml_kem768::PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH => Algorithm::MlKem768,
+            // If message length is 1248 (32 + 1216) then the algorithm should be MlKem768
+            xwing::PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH => Algorithm::XWingKemDraft06,
+            // We don't support McEliece because the keys are massive.
+            // If this is a deal-breaker, users can start a new session with PSQ which can use McEliece.
+            mceliece::PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH => {
+                return Err(KKTError::UnsupportedAlgorithm {
+                    info: "McEliece is not supported for re-keying",
+                });
+            }
+            // We don't support X25519 because it's not post-quantum secure.
+            x25519::PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH => {
+                return Err(KKTError::UnsupportedAlgorithm {
+                    info: "McEliece is not supported for re-keying",
+                });
+            }
+            // Reject if the size does not match any of the above.
+            _ => {
+                return Err(KKTError::UnsupportedAlgorithm {
+                    info: "Unknown Algorithm",
+                });
+            }
+        },
+        // Reject if message length is less than 32.
+        None => {
+            return Err(KKTError::DecodingError {
+                info: "Invalid rekey request: size is too small",
+            });
+        }
+    };
+
+    // Split the message to get the Initiator's salt (first 32 bytes)
+    // and the encoding of the Initiator's public key.
+    let (remote_salt, remote_encapsulation_key_bytes) = request_message.split_at_mut(32);
+
+    // Attempt to decode the Initiator's encapsulation key.
+    let remote_encapsulation_key = PublicKey::decode(algorithm, remote_encapsulation_key_bytes)?;
+
+    // Encapsulate a fresh `pre_key` using the Initiator's encapsulation key into `ciphertext`.
+    let (pre_key, ciphertext) = remote_encapsulation_key.encapsulate(rng)?;
+    // Encode the ciphertext into bytes to send back to the initiator.
+    let message = ciphertext.encode();
+
+    // Encode the `pre_key` into bytes
+    let pre_key_bytes = pre_key.encode();
+
+    let new_secret: [u8; 32] = derive_key_blake3(REKEY_CONTEXT, &pre_key_bytes, remote_salt);
+
+    // Zeroize the Initiator's salt
+    remote_salt.zeroize();
+
+    Ok((new_secret, message))
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use crate::rekey::{RekeyInitiator, responder_process};
+    use nym_kkt_ciphersuite::KEM;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rekey_test() {
+        let mut rng = rand09::rng();
+
+        for kem in [KEM::MlKem768, KEM::XWing] {
+            let (rekey_state, request_message) =
+                RekeyInitiator::generate_request(&mut rng, kem).unwrap();
+
+            let (responder_secret, response_message) =
+                responder_process(&mut rng, request_message).unwrap();
+
+            let initiator_secret = rekey_state.finalize(&response_message).unwrap();
+
+            assert_eq!(initiator_secret, responder_secret);
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+use std::collections::HashSet;
+
+use crate::key_utils::validate_encapsulation_key;
+use crate::{
+    context::{KKTContext, KKTMode, KKTRole, KKTStatus},
+    error::KKTError,
+    frame::KKTFrame,
+};
+use libcrux_psq::handshake::types::DHKeyPair;
+use nym_kkt_ciphersuite::{Ciphersuite, HashFunction, KEM, SignatureScheme};
+pub struct KKTResponder<'a> {
+    x25519_keypair: &'a DHKeyPair,
+    mlkem_encapsulation_key: Option<&'a libcrux_kem::MlKem768PublicKey>,
+    mceliece_encapsulation_key: Option<&'a libcrux_psq::classic_mceliece::PublicKey>,
+    supported_hash_functions: HashSet<HashFunction>,
+    supported_signature_schemes: HashSet<SignatureScheme>,
+    supported_outer_protocol_versions: HashSet<u8>,
+}
+impl<'a> KKTResponder<'a> {
+    pub fn new(
+        x25519_keypair: &'a DHKeyPair,
+        mlkem_encapsulation_key: Option<&'a libcrux_kem::MlKem768PublicKey>,
+        mceliece_encapsulation_key: Option<&'a libcrux_psq::classic_mceliece::PublicKey>,
+        supported_hash_functions: &[HashFunction],
+        supported_outer_protocol_versions: &[u8],
+        supported_signature_schemes: &[SignatureScheme],
+    ) -> Result<Self, KKTError> {
+        let hash_functions: HashSet<HashFunction> =
+            supported_hash_functions.iter().copied().collect();
+
+        if hash_functions.is_empty() {
+            Err(KKTError::FunctionInputError {
+                info: "Did not provide a supported HashFunction when instaciating a KKTResponder",
+            })
+        } else {
+            let signature_schemes: HashSet<SignatureScheme> =
+                supported_signature_schemes.iter().copied().collect();
+
+            if signature_schemes.is_empty() {
+                Err(KKTError::FunctionInputError {
+                    info: "Did not provide a supported SignatureScheme when instaciating a KKTResponder",
+                })
+            } else {
+                let outer_protocol_versions: HashSet<u8> =
+                    supported_outer_protocol_versions.iter().copied().collect();
+
+                if outer_protocol_versions.is_empty() {
+                    Err(KKTError::FunctionInputError {
+                        info: "Did not provide a supported outer protocol version when instaciating a KKTResponder",
+                    })
+                } else {
+                    if mlkem_encapsulation_key.is_none() && mceliece_encapsulation_key.is_none() {
+                        return Err(KKTError::FunctionInputError {
+                            info: "Did not provide an encapsulation key when instanciating a KKTResponder.",
+                        });
+                    } else {
+                        Ok(Self {
+                            x25519_keypair,
+                            mlkem_encapsulation_key,
+                            mceliece_encapsulation_key,
+                            supported_hash_functions: hash_functions,
+                            supported_signature_schemes: signature_schemes,
+                            supported_outer_protocol_versions: outer_protocol_versions,
+                        })
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    fn supported_protocol_versions(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+        self.supported_outer_protocol_versions
+            .iter()
+            .copied()
+            .collect()
+    }
+
+    fn check_ciphersuite_compatiblity(
+        &self,
+        remote_ciphersuite: &Ciphersuite,
+    ) -> Result<(), KKTError> {
+        if !self
+            .supported_hash_functions
+            .contains(remote_ciphersuite.hash_function())
+        {
+            Err(KKTError::IncompatibilityError {
+                info: "Unsupported HashFunction",
+            })
+        } else {
+            if !self
+                .supported_signature_schemes
+                .contains(remote_ciphersuite.signature_scheme())
+            {
+                Err(KKTError::IncompatibilityError {
+                    info: "Unsupported SignatureScheme",
+                })
+            } else {
+                if match remote_ciphersuite.kem() {
+                    KEM::MlKem768 => self.mlkem_encapsulation_key.is_some(),
+                    KEM::McEliece => self.mceliece_encapsulation_key.is_some(),
+                    _ => false,
+                } {
+                    Ok(())
+                } else {
+                    Err(KKTError::IncompatibilityError {
+                        info: "Unsupported KEM",
+                    })
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    // When this function fails, we do that silently (i.e. we dont generate a response to the initiator).
+
+    pub fn process_request(
+        &self,
+        request_bytes: &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Option<Vec<u8>>), KKTError> {
+        let (mut carrier, remote_frame, remote_context) = KKTFrame::decrypt_initiator_frame(
+            self.x25519_keypair,
+            request_bytes,
+            &self.supported_protocol_versions(),
+        )?;
+
+        self.check_ciphersuite_compatiblity(remote_context.ciphersuite())?;
+
+        let (local_context, remote_encapsulation_key) = match remote_context.mode() {
+            KKTMode::OneWay => responder_ingest_message(&remote_context, None, &remote_frame)?,
+            KKTMode::Mutual => {
+                // So we can either fetch the remote hash here using some async call to the directory,
+                // which might make registration hang or accept the sent key then verify later.
+
+                // If we choose to not accept, the response's status will be KKTStatus::UnverifiedKEMKey.
+                // The response would still contain the responder's encapsulation key.
+                responder_ingest_message(&remote_context, None, &remote_frame)?
+            }
+        };
+
+        let frame = if local_context.ciphersuite().kem() == &KEM::MlKem768 {
+            KKTFrame::new(
+                &local_context,
+                // SAFETY: the self.check_ciphersuite_compatibility call above guarantees that we will have a key in the right place
+                #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
+                &self.mlkem_encapsulation_key.unwrap().as_slice().as_slice(),
+            )?
+        } else {
+            KKTFrame::new(
+                &local_context,
+                // SAFETY: the self.check_ciphersuite_compatibility call above guarantees that we will have a key in the right place
+                #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
+                &self.mceliece_encapsulation_key.unwrap().as_ref(),
+            )?
+        };
+
+        // encryption - responder frame
+        let response_bytes = carrier.encrypt(&frame.to_bytes())?;
+        Ok((response_bytes, remote_encapsulation_key))
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn responder_ingest_message(
+    remote_context: &KKTContext,
+    expected_hash: Option<&[u8]>,
+    remote_frame: &KKTFrame,
+) -> Result<(KKTContext, Option<Vec<u8>>), KKTError> {
+    let mut own_context = remote_context.derive_responder_header()?;
+
+    match remote_context.role() {
+        KKTRole::Initiator => {
+            // using own_context here because maybe for whatever reason we want to ignore the remote kem key
+            match own_context.mode() {
+                KKTMode::OneWay => Ok((own_context, None)),
+                KKTMode::Mutual => {
+                    match expected_hash {
+                        Some(expected_hash) => {
+                            if validate_encapsulation_key(
+                                own_context.ciphersuite().hash_function(),
+                                own_context.ciphersuite().hash_len(),
+                                remote_frame.body_ref(),
+                                expected_hash,
+                            ) {
+                                Ok((own_context, Some(remote_frame.body_ref().to_vec())))
+                            }
+                            // The key does not match the hash obtained from the directory
+                            else {
+                                Err(KKTError::KEMError {
+                                    info: "Hash of received encapsulation key does not match the value stored on the directory.",
+                                })
+                            }
+                        }
+                        None => {
+                            own_context.update_status(KKTStatus::UnverifiedKEMKey);
+                            // we don't store an unverified key
+                            // changing the status notifies the initiator that we didn't
+
+                            // we could still keep it here and then verify later...
+                            // let received_encapsulation_key = EncapsulationKey::decode(
+                            //     own_context.ciphersuite().kem(),
+                            //     remote_frame.body_ref(),
+                            // )?;
+                            //  Ok((own_context, Some(received_encapsulation_key)))
+                            //
+
+                            Ok((own_context, None))
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        KKTRole::Responder => Err(KKTError::IncompatibilityError {
+            info: "Responder received a request from another responder.",
+        }),
+    }
+}
@@ -1,230 +0,0 @@
-use nym_crypto::asymmetric::ed25519::{self, Signature};
-use rand09::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
-
-use crate::frame::KKTSessionId;
-use crate::{
-    ciphersuite::{Ciphersuite, EncapsulationKey},
-    context::{KKTContext, KKTMode, KKTRole, KKTStatus},
-    error::KKTError,
-    frame::{KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN, KKTFrame},
-    key_utils::validate_encapsulation_key,
-};
-
-pub fn initiator_process<'a, R>(
-    rng: &mut R,
-    mode: KKTMode,
-    ciphersuite: Ciphersuite,
-    signing_key: &ed25519::PrivateKey,
-    own_encapsulation_key: Option<&EncapsulationKey<'a>>,
-) -> Result<(KKTContext, KKTFrame), KKTError>
-where
-    R: CryptoRng + RngCore,
-{
-    let context = KKTContext::new(KKTRole::Initiator, mode, ciphersuite)?;
-
-    let context_bytes = context.encode()?;
-
-    let mut session_id = [0; KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN];
-    // Generate Session ID
-    rng.fill_bytes(&mut session_id);
-
-    let body: &[u8] = match mode {
-        KKTMode::OneWay => &[],
-        KKTMode::Mutual => match own_encapsulation_key {
-            Some(encaps_key) => &encaps_key.encode(),
-
-            // Missing key
-            None => {
-                return Err(KKTError::FunctionInputError {
-                    info: "KEM Key Not Provided",
-                });
-            }
-        },
-    };
-
-    let mut bytes_to_sign =
-        Vec::with_capacity(context.full_message_len() - context.signature_len());
-    bytes_to_sign.extend_from_slice(&context_bytes);
-    bytes_to_sign.extend_from_slice(body);
-    bytes_to_sign.extend_from_slice(&session_id);
-
-    let signature = signing_key.sign(bytes_to_sign).to_bytes();
-
-    Ok((
-        context,
-        KKTFrame::new(context_bytes, body, session_id, &signature),
-    ))
-}
-
-pub fn anonymous_initiator_process<R>(
-    rng: &mut R,
-    ciphersuite: Ciphersuite,
-) -> Result<(KKTContext, KKTFrame), KKTError>
-where
-    R: CryptoRng + RngCore,
-{
-    let context = KKTContext::new(KKTRole::AnonymousInitiator, KKTMode::OneWay, ciphersuite)?;
-    let context_bytes = context.encode()?;
-
-    let mut session_id = [0u8; KKT_SESSION_ID_LEN];
-    rng.fill_bytes(&mut session_id);
-
-    Ok((context, KKTFrame::new(context_bytes, &[], session_id, &[])))
-}
-
-pub fn initiator_ingest_response<'a>(
-    own_context: &KKTContext,
-    remote_frame: &KKTFrame,
-    remote_context: &KKTContext,
-    remote_verification_key: &ed25519::PublicKey,
-    expected_hash: &[u8],
-) -> Result<EncapsulationKey<'a>, KKTError> {
-    check_compatibility(own_context, remote_context)?;
-    match remote_context.status() {
-        KKTStatus::Ok => {
-            let mut bytes_to_verify: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(
-                remote_context.full_message_len() - remote_context.signature_len(),
-            );
-            bytes_to_verify.extend_from_slice(&remote_context.encode()?);
-            bytes_to_verify.extend_from_slice(remote_frame.body_ref());
-            bytes_to_verify.extend_from_slice(remote_frame.session_id_ref());
-
-            match Signature::from_bytes(remote_frame.signature_ref()) {
-                Ok(sig) => match remote_verification_key.verify(bytes_to_verify, &sig) {
-                    Ok(()) => {
-                        let received_encapsulation_key = EncapsulationKey::decode(
-                            own_context.ciphersuite().kem(),
-                            remote_frame.body_ref(),
-                        )?;
-
-                        match validate_encapsulation_key(
-                            &own_context.ciphersuite().hash_function(),
-                            own_context.ciphersuite().hash_len(),
-                            remote_frame.body_ref(),
-                            expected_hash,
-                        ) {
-                            true => Ok(received_encapsulation_key),
-
-                            // The key does not match the hash obtained from the directory
-                            false => Err(KKTError::KEMError {
-                                info: "Hash of received encapsulation key does not match the value stored on the directory.",
-                            }),
-                        }
-                    }
-                    Err(_) => Err(KKTError::SigVerifError),
-                },
-                Err(_) => Err(KKTError::SigConstructorError),
-            }
-        }
-        _ => Err(KKTError::ResponderFlaggedError {
-            status: remote_context.status(),
-        }),
-    }
-}
-
-// todo: figure out how to handle errors using status codes
-
-pub fn responder_ingest_message<'a>(
-    remote_context: &KKTContext,
-    remote_verification_key: Option<&ed25519::PublicKey>,
-    expected_hash: Option<&[u8]>,
-    remote_frame: &KKTFrame,
-) -> Result<(KKTContext, Option<EncapsulationKey<'a>>), KKTError> {
-    let own_context = remote_context.derive_responder_header()?;
-
-    match remote_context.role() {
-        KKTRole::AnonymousInitiator => Ok((own_context, None)),
-
-        KKTRole::Initiator => {
-            match remote_verification_key {
-                Some(remote_verif_key) => {
-                    let mut bytes_to_verify: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(
-                        own_context.full_message_len() - own_context.signature_len(),
-                    );
-                    bytes_to_verify.extend_from_slice(remote_frame.context_ref());
-                    bytes_to_verify.extend_from_slice(remote_frame.body_ref());
-                    bytes_to_verify.extend_from_slice(remote_frame.session_id_ref());
-
-                    match Signature::from_bytes(remote_frame.signature_ref()) {
-                        Ok(sig) => match remote_verif_key.verify(bytes_to_verify, &sig) {
-                            Ok(()) => {
-                                // using own_context here because maybe for whatever reason we want to ignore the remote kem key
-                                match own_context.mode() {
-                                    KKTMode::OneWay => Ok((own_context, None)),
-                                    KKTMode::Mutual => {
-                                        match expected_hash {
-                                            Some(expected_hash) => {
-                                                let received_encapsulation_key =
-                                                    EncapsulationKey::decode(
-                                                        own_context.ciphersuite().kem(),
-                                                        remote_frame.body_ref(),
-                                                    )?;
-                                                if validate_encapsulation_key(
-                                                    &own_context.ciphersuite().hash_function(),
-                                                    own_context.ciphersuite().hash_len(),
-                                                    remote_frame.body_ref(),
-                                                    expected_hash,
-                                                ) {
-                                                    Ok((
-                                                        own_context,
-                                                        Some(received_encapsulation_key),
-                                                    ))
-                                                }
-                                                // The key does not match the hash obtained from the directory
-                                                else {
-                                                    Err(KKTError::KEMError {
-                                                        info: "Hash of received encapsulation key does not match the value stored on the directory.",
-                                                    })
-                                                }
-                                            }
-                                            None => Err(KKTError::FunctionInputError {
-                                                info: "Expected hash of the remote encapsulation key is not provided.",
-                                            }),
-                                        }
-                                    }
-                                }
-                            }
-                            Err(_) => Err(KKTError::SigVerifError),
-                        },
-                        Err(_) => Err(KKTError::SigConstructorError),
-                    }
-                }
-                None => Err(KKTError::FunctionInputError {
-                    info: "Remote Signature Verification Key Not Provided",
-                }),
-            }
-        }
-        KKTRole::Responder => Err(KKTError::IncompatibilityError {
-            info: "Responder received a request from another responder.",
-        }),
-    }
-}
-
-pub fn responder_process<'a>(
-    own_context: &KKTContext,
-    session_id: KKTSessionId,
-    signing_key: &ed25519::PrivateKey,
-    encapsulation_key: &EncapsulationKey<'a>,
-) -> Result<KKTFrame, KKTError> {
-    let body = encapsulation_key.encode();
-
-    let context_bytes = own_context.encode()?;
-
-    let mut bytes_to_sign =
-        Vec::with_capacity(own_context.full_message_len() - own_context.signature_len());
-    bytes_to_sign.extend_from_slice(&own_context.encode()?);
-    bytes_to_sign.extend_from_slice(&body);
-    bytes_to_sign.extend_from_slice(&session_id);
-
-    let signature = signing_key.sign(bytes_to_sign).to_bytes();
-
-    Ok(KKTFrame::new(context_bytes, &body, session_id, &signature))
-}
-
-fn check_compatibility(
-    _own_context: &KKTContext,
-    _remote_context: &KKTContext,
-) -> Result<(), KKTError> {
-    // todo: check ciphersuite/context compatibility
-    Ok(())
-}
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+[package]
+name = "nym-lp-sandbox"
+version = "0.1.0"
+edition = { workspace = true }
+license = { workspace = true }
+publish = false
+
+[dependencies]
+thiserror = { workspace = true }
+parking_lot = { workspace = true }
+snow = { workspace = true }
+bs58 = { workspace = true }
+serde = { workspace = true }
+bytes = { workspace = true }
+dashmap = { workspace = true }
+sha2 = { workspace = true }
+tracing = { workspace = true }
+rand = { workspace = true }
+rand09 = { workspace = true }
+
+
+nym-crypto = { path = "../crypto", features = ["hashing", "asymmetric"] }
+nym-kkt = { path = "../nym-kkt" }
+nym-lp-common = { path = "../nym-lp-common" }
+
+nym-kkt-ciphersuite = { path ="../nym-kkt-ciphersuite" }
+
+# libcrux dependencies for PSQ (Post-Quantum PSK derivation)
+libcrux-psq = { workspace = true, features = ["test-utils"] }
+libcrux-kem = { workspace = true }
+tls_codec = { workspace = true }
+num_enum = { workspace = true }
+chacha20poly1305 = { workspace = true }
+zeroize = { workspace = true, features = ["zeroize_derive"] }
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+criterion = { version = "0.5", features = ["html_reports"] }
+rand_chacha = "0.3"
+nym-crypto = { path = "../crypto", features = ["rand"] }
+nym-test-utils = { workspace = true }
+
+
@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+
+    use libcrux_psq::{
+        Channel, IntoSession,
+        handshake::{
+            builders::{CiphersuiteBuilder, PrincipalBuilder},
+            ciphersuites::CiphersuiteName,
+            types::{Authenticator, PQEncapsulationKey},
+        },
+        session::{Session, SessionBinding},
+    };
+    use nym_kkt::{
+        initiator::KKTInitiator,
+        key_utils::{
+            generate_keypair_mceliece, generate_keypair_mlkem, generate_keypair_x25519,
+            hash_encapsulation_key,
+        },
+        responder::KKTResponder,
+    };
+    use nym_kkt_ciphersuite::{Ciphersuite, HashFunction, HashLength, KEM, SignatureScheme};
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_e2e_client_node() {
+        let mut rng = rand09::rng();
+
+        // we should add these as consts
+        let aad_initiator_outer = b"Test Data I Outer";
+        let aad_initiator_inner = b"Test Data I Inner";
+        let aad_responder = b"Test Data R";
+        let ctx = b"Test Context";
+
+        // generate responder x25519 keys
+        let responder_x25519_keypair = generate_keypair_x25519(&mut rng);
+        let hash_function = HashFunction::Blake3;
+        // generate kem public keys
+
+        let responder_mlkem_keypair = generate_keypair_mlkem(&mut rng);
+        let responder_mceliece_keypair = generate_keypair_mceliece(&mut rng);
+
+        let r_dir_hash_mlkem = hash_encapsulation_key(
+            // &ciphersuite.hash_function(),
+            &hash_function,
+            // ciphersuite.hash_len(),
+            HashLength::Default.value(),
+            responder_mlkem_keypair.1.as_slice().as_slice(),
+        );
+
+        let _r_dir_hash_mceliece = hash_encapsulation_key(
+            // &ciphersuite.hash_function(),
+            &hash_function,
+            // ciphersuite.hash_len(),
+            HashLength::Default.value(),
+            responder_mceliece_keypair.1.as_ref(),
+        );
+
+        let kkt_responder = KKTResponder::new(
+            &responder_x25519_keypair,
+            Some(&responder_mlkem_keypair.1),
+            Some(&responder_mceliece_keypair.1),
+            &[
+                HashFunction::Blake3,
+                HashFunction::SHA256,
+                HashFunction::Shake128,
+                HashFunction::Shake256,
+            ],
+            &[1],
+            &[SignatureScheme::Ed25519],
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        // OneWay - MlKem
+        let psq_ciphersuite = CiphersuiteName::X25519_MLKEM768_X25519_AESGCM128_HKDFSHA256;
+
+        let responder_ciphersuite = CiphersuiteBuilder::new(psq_ciphersuite)
+            .longterm_x25519_keys(&responder_x25519_keypair)
+            .longterm_mlkem_encapsulation_key(&responder_mlkem_keypair.1)
+            .longterm_mlkem_decapsulation_key(&responder_mlkem_keypair.0)
+            .build_responder_ciphersuite()
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let mut responder = PrincipalBuilder::new(rand09::rng())
+            .context(ctx)
+            .outer_aad(aad_responder)
+            .recent_keys_upper_bound(30)
+            .build_responder(responder_ciphersuite)
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::resolve_ciphersuite(
+            KEM::MlKem768,
+            hash_function,
+            SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
+            None,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let (mut initiator, request_bytes) = KKTInitiator::generate_one_way_request(
+            &mut rng,
+            &ciphersuite,
+            &responder_x25519_keypair.pk,
+            &r_dir_hash_mlkem,
+            1u8,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let (response_bytes, _) = kkt_responder.process_request(&request_bytes).unwrap();
+
+        let (i_obtained_key, _) = initiator.process_response(&response_bytes).unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            i_obtained_key,
+            responder_mlkem_keypair.1.as_slice().as_slice(),
+        );
+
+        let mlkem_key =
+            libcrux_kem::MlKem768PublicKey::try_from(i_obtained_key.as_slice()).unwrap();
+
+        let initiator_psq_keys = generate_keypair_x25519(&mut rng);
+        let initiator_cbuilder = CiphersuiteBuilder::new(psq_ciphersuite)
+            .longterm_x25519_keys(&initiator_psq_keys)
+            .peer_longterm_x25519_pk(&responder_x25519_keypair.pk)
+            .peer_longterm_mlkem_pk(&mlkem_key);
+
+        let initiator_ciphersuite = initiator_cbuilder.build_initiator_ciphersuite().unwrap();
+
+        let mut msg_channel = vec![0u8; 8192];
+        let mut payload_buf_responder = vec![0u8; 4096];
+        let mut payload_buf_initiator = vec![0u8; 4096];
+
+        let mut initiator = PrincipalBuilder::new(rand09::rng())
+            .outer_aad(aad_initiator_outer)
+            .inner_aad(aad_initiator_inner)
+            .context(ctx)
+            .build_registration_initiator(initiator_ciphersuite)
+            .unwrap();
+
+        // Send first message
+        let registration_payload_initiator = b"Registration_init";
+        let len_i = initiator
+            .write_message(registration_payload_initiator, &mut msg_channel)
+            .unwrap();
+
+        // Read first message
+        let (len_r_deserialized, len_r_payload) = responder
+            .read_message(&msg_channel, &mut payload_buf_responder)
+            .unwrap();
+
+        // We read the same amount of data.
+        assert_eq!(len_r_deserialized, len_i);
+        assert_eq!(len_r_payload, registration_payload_initiator.len());
+        assert_eq!(
+            &payload_buf_responder[0..len_r_payload],
+            registration_payload_initiator
+        );
+
+        // Get the authenticator out here, so we can deserialize the session later.
+        let Some(initiator_authenticator) = responder.initiator_authenticator() else {
+            panic!("No initiator authenticator found")
+        };
+
+        // Respond
+        let registration_payload_responder = b"Registration_respond";
+        let len_r = responder
+            .write_message(registration_payload_responder, &mut msg_channel)
+            .unwrap();
+
+        // Finalize on registration initiator
+        let (len_i_deserialized, len_i_payload) = initiator
+            .read_message(&msg_channel, &mut payload_buf_initiator)
+            .unwrap();
+
+        // We read the same amount of data.
+        assert_eq!(len_r, len_i_deserialized);
+        assert_eq!(registration_payload_responder.len(), len_i_payload);
+        assert_eq!(
+            &payload_buf_initiator[0..len_i_payload],
+            registration_payload_responder
+        );
+
+        // Ready for transport mode
+        assert!(initiator.is_handshake_finished());
+        assert!(responder.is_handshake_finished());
+
+        let i_transport = initiator.into_session().unwrap();
+        let r_transport = responder.into_session().unwrap();
+
+        // test serialization, deserialization
+        let mut session_storage = vec![0u8; 4096];
+        i_transport
+            .serialize(
+                &mut session_storage,
+                SessionBinding {
+                    initiator_authenticator: &Authenticator::Dh(initiator_psq_keys.pk),
+                    responder_ecdh_pk: &responder_x25519_keypair.pk,
+                    responder_pq_pk: Some(PQEncapsulationKey::MlKem(&mlkem_key)),
+                },
+            )
+            .unwrap();
+        let mut i_transport = Session::deserialize(
+            &session_storage,
+            SessionBinding {
+                initiator_authenticator: &Authenticator::Dh(initiator_psq_keys.pk),
+                responder_ecdh_pk: &responder_x25519_keypair.pk,
+                responder_pq_pk: Some(PQEncapsulationKey::MlKem(&mlkem_key)),
+            },
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        r_transport
+            .serialize(
+                &mut session_storage,
+                SessionBinding {
+                    initiator_authenticator: &initiator_authenticator,
+                    responder_ecdh_pk: &responder_x25519_keypair.pk,
+                    responder_pq_pk: Some(PQEncapsulationKey::MlKem(&mlkem_key)),
+                },
+            )
+            .unwrap();
+        let mut r_transport = Session::deserialize(
+            &session_storage,
+            SessionBinding {
+                initiator_authenticator: &initiator_authenticator,
+                responder_ecdh_pk: &responder_x25519_keypair.pk,
+                responder_pq_pk: Some(PQEncapsulationKey::MlKem(&mlkem_key)),
+            },
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let mut channel_i = i_transport.transport_channel().unwrap();
+        let mut channel_r = r_transport.transport_channel().unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(channel_i.identifier(), channel_r.identifier());
+
+        let app_data_i = b"Derived session hey".as_slice();
+        let app_data_r = b"Derived session ho".as_slice();
+
+        let len_i = channel_i
+            .write_message(app_data_i, &mut msg_channel)
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let (len_r_deserialized, len_r_payload) = channel_r
+            .read_message(&msg_channel, &mut payload_buf_responder)
+            .unwrap();
+
+        // We read the same amount of data.
+        assert_eq!(len_r_deserialized, len_i);
+        assert_eq!(len_r_payload, app_data_i.len());
+        assert_eq!(&payload_buf_responder[0..len_r_payload], app_data_i);
+
+        let len_r = channel_r
+            .write_message(app_data_r, &mut msg_channel)
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let (len_i_deserialized, len_i_payload) = channel_i
+            .read_message(&msg_channel, &mut payload_buf_initiator)
+            .unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(len_r, len_i_deserialized);
+        assert_eq!(app_data_r.len(), len_i_payload);
+        assert_eq!(&payload_buf_initiator[0..len_i_payload], app_data_r);
+    }
+}
@@ -12,9 +12,8 @@ readme.workspace = true
 publish = false

 [dependencies]
-tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["net", "io-util"] }
+tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["net"] }
 nym-test-utils = { path = "../test-utils", optional = true }
-tracing = { workspace = true }

 [features]
 io-mocks = ["nym-test-utils"]
@@ -4,100 +4,15 @@
 #[cfg(feature = "io-mocks")]
 use nym_test_utils::mocks::async_read_write::MockIOStream;
 use std::net::SocketAddr;
-use tokio::io::{AsyncRead, AsyncReadExt, AsyncWrite, AsyncWriteExt};
+use tokio::io::{AsyncRead, AsyncWrite};
 use tokio::net::TcpStream;
-use tracing::debug;

 // only used in internal code (and tests)
 #[allow(async_fn_in_trait)]
-pub trait LpTransport: Sized {
+pub trait LpTransport: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Sized {
    async fn connect(endpoint: SocketAddr) -> std::io::Result<Self>;

    fn set_no_delay(&mut self, nodelay: bool) -> std::io::Result<()>;
-
-    /// Sends a serialised (and optionally encrypted) LP packet over the data stream with length-prefixed framing.
-    ///
-    /// Format: 4-byte big-endian u32 length + packet bytes
-    ///
-    /// # Arguments
-    /// * `packet_data` - The serialised LP packet to send
-    ///
-    /// # Errors
-    /// Returns an error on network transmission fails.
-    async fn send_serialised_packet(&mut self, packet_data: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<()>;
-
-    /// Receives an LP packet from a TCP stream with length-prefixed framing.
-    ///
-    /// Format: 4-byte big-endian u32 length + packet bytes
-    ///
-    /// # Errors
-    /// Returns an error on network transmission fails.
-    async fn receive_raw_packet(&mut self) -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>>;
-}
-
-async fn send_serialised_packet_async_write<W>(
-    writer: &mut W,
-    packet_data: &[u8],
-) -> std::io::Result<()>
-where
-    W: AsyncWrite + Unpin,
-{
-    // Send 4-byte length prefix (u32 big-endian)
-    let len = packet_data.len() as u32;
-    writer
-        .write_all(&len.to_be_bytes())
-        .await
-        .inspect_err(|e| debug!("Failed to send packet length: {e}"))?;
-
-    // Send the actual packet data
-    writer
-        .write_all(packet_data)
-        .await
-        .inspect_err(|e| debug!("Failed to send packet data: {e}"))?;
-
-    // Flush to ensure data is sent immediately
-    writer
-        .flush()
-        .await
-        .inspect_err(|e| debug!("Failed to flush stream: {e}"))?;
-
-    tracing::trace!(
-        "Sent LP packet ({} bytes + 4 byte header)",
-        packet_data.len()
-    );
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-async fn receive_raw_packet_async_read<R>(reader: &mut R) -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>>
-where
-    R: AsyncRead + Unpin,
-{
-    // Read 4-byte length prefix (u32 big-endian)
-    let mut len_buf = [0u8; 4];
-    reader
-        .read_exact(&mut len_buf)
-        .await
-        .inspect_err(|e| debug!("Failed to read packet length: {e}"))?;
-
-    let packet_len = u32::from_be_bytes(len_buf) as usize;
-
-    // Sanity check to prevent huge allocations
-    const MAX_PACKET_SIZE: usize = 65536; // 64KB max
-    if packet_len > MAX_PACKET_SIZE {
-        return Err(std::io::Error::other(format!(
-            "Packet size {packet_len} exceeds maximum {MAX_PACKET_SIZE}",
-        )));
-    }
-
-    // Read the actual packet data
-    let mut packet_buf = vec![0u8; packet_len];
-    reader
-        .read_exact(&mut packet_buf)
-        .await
-        .inspect_err(|e| debug!("Failed to read packet data: {e}"))?;
-
-    tracing::trace!("Received LP packet ({packet_len} bytes + 4 byte header)");
-    Ok(packet_buf)
 }

 impl LpTransport for TcpStream {
@@ -109,14 +24,6 @@ impl LpTransport for TcpStream {
        // Set TCP_NODELAY for low latency
        self.set_nodelay(nodelay)
    }
-
-    async fn send_serialised_packet(&mut self, packet_data: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<()> {
-        send_serialised_packet_async_write(self, packet_data).await
-    }
-
-    async fn receive_raw_packet(&mut self) -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
-        receive_raw_packet_async_read(self).await
-    }
 }

 #[cfg(feature = "io-mocks")]
@@ -128,12 +35,4 @@ impl LpTransport for MockIOStream {
    fn set_no_delay(&mut self, _nodelay: bool) -> std::io::Result<()> {
        Ok(())
    }
-
-    async fn send_serialised_packet(&mut self, packet_data: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<()> {
-        send_serialised_packet_async_write(self, packet_data).await
-    }
-
-    async fn receive_raw_packet(&mut self) -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
-        receive_raw_packet_async_read(self).await
-    }
 }
@@ -16,40 +16,27 @@ dashmap = { workspace = true }
 sha2 = { workspace = true }
 tracing = { workspace = true }
 rand = { workspace = true }
-# rand 0.9 for KKT integration (nym-kkt uses rand 0.9)
 rand09 = { workspace = true }
+ouroboros = "0.18.5"

 nym-crypto = { path = "../crypto", features = ["hashing", "asymmetric"] }
 nym-kkt = { path = "../nym-kkt" }
 nym-lp-common = { path = "../nym-lp-common" }
-nym-lp-transport = { path = "../nym-lp-transport" }

 # libcrux dependencies for PSQ (Post-Quantum PSK derivation)
-libcrux-psq = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux", features = [
-    "test-utils",
-] }
-libcrux-kem = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux" }
-libcrux-traits = { git = "https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux" }
+libcrux-psq = { workspace = true, features = ["test-utils"] }
+libcrux-kem = { workspace = true }
 tls_codec = { workspace = true }
 num_enum = { workspace = true }
 chacha20poly1305 = { workspace = true }
 zeroize = { workspace = true, features = ["zeroize_derive"] }

-# needed for the 'mock 'feature
-nym-test-utils = { workspace = true, optional = true }
-
 [dev-dependencies]
 criterion = { version = "0.5", features = ["html_reports"] }
-#rand_chacha = "0.3"
-mock_instant = { workspace = true }
+rand_chacha = "0.3"
 nym-crypto = { path = "../crypto", features = ["rand"] }
 nym-test-utils = { workspace = true }
-anyhow = { workspace = true }
-tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["rt-multi-thread", "macros"] }
-nym-lp-transport = { path = "../nym-lp-transport", features = ["io-mocks"] }

-[features]
-mock = ["nym-test-utils", "nym-crypto/rand"]

 [[bench]]
 name = "replay_protection"
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 use criterion::{BenchmarkId, Criterion, Throughput, black_box, criterion_group, criterion_main};
 use nym_lp::replay::ReceivingKeyCounterValidator;
-use nym_test_utils::helpers::u64_seeded_rng;
 use parking_lot::Mutex;
-use rand::Rng;
+use rand::{Rng, SeedableRng};
+use rand_chacha::ChaCha8Rng;
 use std::sync::Arc;

 fn bench_sequential_counters(c: &mut Criterion) {
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ fn bench_out_of_order_counters(c: &mut Criterion) {
                let validator = ReceivingKeyCounterValidator::default();

                // Create random counters within a valid window
-                let mut rng = u64_seeded_rng(42);
+                let mut rng = ChaCha8Rng::seed_from_u64(42);
                let counters: Vec<u64> = (0..size).map(|_| rng.gen_range(0..1024)).collect();

                b.iter(|| {
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ use zeroize::{Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop};
 /// Size of outer header (receiver_idx + counter) - always cleartext
 pub const OUTER_HEADER_SIZE: usize = OuterHeader::SIZE; // 12 bytes

+// georgio: maybe remove this?
 /// Size of inner prefix (proto + reserved) - cleartext or encrypted depending on mode
 const INNER_PREFIX_SIZE: usize = 4; // proto(1) + reserved(3)

@@ -38,6 +39,7 @@ const INNER_PREFIX_SIZE: usize = 4; // proto(1) + reserved(3)
 /// 3. **No PSK persistence**: PSK handles are not stored/reused across sessions.
 ///    Each connection performs fresh KKT+PSQ handshake.
 ///
+// noiserm
 #[derive(Clone, Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
 pub struct OuterAeadKey {
    key: [u8; 32],
@@ -52,7 +54,7 @@ impl OuterAeadKey {
    /// Uses Blake3 KDF with domain separation to avoid key reuse
    /// between the outer AEAD layer and the inner Noise layer.
    pub fn from_psk(psk: &[u8; 32]) -> Self {
-        let key = nym_crypto::kdf::derive_key_blake3(Self::KDF_CONTEXT, psk, &[]);
+        let key = nym_crypto::hkdf::blake3::derive_key_blake3(Self::KDF_CONTEXT, psk, &[]);
        Self { key }
    }

@@ -70,6 +72,7 @@ impl std::fmt::Debug for OuterAeadKey {
    }
 }

+// noiserm
 /// Build 12-byte nonce from 8-byte counter (zero-padded).
 ///
 /// Format: counter (8 bytes LE) || 0x00000000 (4 bytes)
@@ -177,6 +180,7 @@ pub fn parse_lp_packet(src: &[u8], outer_key: Option<&OuterAeadKey>) -> Result<L
                trailer,
            })
        }
+        // noiserm (potentially)
        Some(key) => {
            // AEAD decryption mode
            // AAD is the outer header (12 bytes)
@@ -224,6 +228,7 @@ pub fn parse_lp_packet(src: &[u8], outer_key: Option<&OuterAeadKey>) -> Result<L
    }
 }

+// georgio: start with no outer_key
 /// Serializes an LpPacket into the provided BytesMut buffer.
 ///
 /// ## Unified Packet Format
@@ -318,7 +323,7 @@ mod tests {
    use super::{OuterAeadKey, parse_lp_packet, serialize_lp_packet};
    // Keep necessary imports
    use crate::LpError;
-    use crate::message::{EncryptedDataPayload, HandshakeData, LpMessage, MessageType};
+    use crate::message::{EncryptedDataPayload, LpMessage, MessageType, PSQRequestData};
    use crate::packet::{LpHeader, LpPacket, TRAILER_LEN};
    use bytes::BytesMut;
    use nym_crypto::asymmetric::{ed25519, x25519};
@@ -373,7 +378,7 @@ mod tests {
                receiver_idx: 42,
                counter: 123,
            },
-            message: LpMessage::Handshake(HandshakeData(payload.clone())),
+            message: LpMessage::PSQRequest(PSQRequestData(payload.clone())),
            trailer: [0; TRAILER_LEN],
        };

@@ -390,8 +395,8 @@ mod tests {

        // Verify message type and data
        match decoded.message {
-            LpMessage::Handshake(decoded_payload) => {
-                assert_eq!(decoded_payload, HandshakeData(payload));
+            LpMessage::PSQRequest(decoded_payload) => {
+                assert_eq!(decoded_payload, PSQRequestData(payload));
            }
            _ => panic!("Expected Handshake message"),
        }
@@ -555,7 +560,7 @@ mod tests {
        buf.extend_from_slice(&[1, 0, 0, 0]); // Version + reserved
        buf.extend_from_slice(&42u32.to_le_bytes()); // Sender index
        buf.extend_from_slice(&123u64.to_le_bytes()); // Counter
-        buf.extend_from_slice(&231u16.to_le_bytes()); // Invalid message type
+        buf.extend_from_slice(&255u16.to_le_bytes()); // Invalid message type
        // Need payload and trailer to meet min_size requirement
        let payload_size = 10; // Arbitrary
        buf.extend_from_slice(&vec![0u8; payload_size]); // Some data
@@ -565,7 +570,7 @@ mod tests {
        let result = parse_lp_packet(&buf, None);
        assert!(result.is_err());
        match result {
-            Err(LpError::InvalidMessageType(231)) => {} // Expected error
+            Err(LpError::InvalidMessageType(255)) => {} // Expected error
            Err(e) => panic!("Expected InvalidMessageType error, got {:?}", e),
            Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error, but got Ok"),
        }
@@ -628,7 +633,7 @@ mod tests {
                receiver_idx: 42,
                counter: 123,
            },
-            message: LpMessage::ClientHello(hello_data),
+            message: LpMessage::ClientHello(hello_data.clone()),
            trailer: [0; TRAILER_LEN],
        };

@@ -681,7 +686,7 @@ mod tests {
                receiver_idx: 100,
                counter: 200,
            },
-            message: LpMessage::ClientHello(hello_data),
+            message: LpMessage::ClientHello(hello_data.clone()),
            trailer: [55; TRAILER_LEN],
        };

@@ -757,12 +762,12 @@ mod tests {
    }

    #[test]
-    fn test_forward_packet_encode_decode_roundtrip_v4() {
+    fn test_forward_packet_encode_decode_roundtrip() {
        let mut dst = BytesMut::new();

        let forward_data = crate::message::ForwardPacketData {
            target_gateway_identity: [77u8; 32],
-            target_lp_address: "1.2.3.4:41264".parse().unwrap(),
+            target_lp_address: "1.2.3.4:41264".to_string(),
            inner_packet_bytes: vec![0xa, 0xb, 0xc, 0xd],
        };

@@ -789,50 +794,7 @@ mod tests {

        if let LpMessage::ForwardPacket(data) = decoded.message {
            assert_eq!(data.target_gateway_identity, [77u8; 32]);
-            assert_eq!(data.target_lp_address, "1.2.3.4:41264".parse().unwrap());
-            assert_eq!(data.inner_packet_bytes, vec![0xa, 0xb, 0xc, 0xd]);
-        } else {
-            panic!("Expected ForwardPacket message");
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_forward_packet_encode_decode_roundtrip_v6() {
-        let mut dst = BytesMut::new();
-
-        let forward_data = crate::message::ForwardPacketData {
-            target_gateway_identity: [77u8; 32],
-            target_lp_address: "[dead:beef:4242:c0ff:ee00::1111]:41264".parse().unwrap(),
-            inner_packet_bytes: vec![0xa, 0xb, 0xc, 0xd],
-        };
-
-        let packet = LpPacket {
-            header: LpHeader {
-                protocol_version: 1,
-                reserved: [0u8; 3],
-                receiver_idx: 999,
-                counter: 555,
-            },
-            message: LpMessage::ForwardPacket(forward_data),
-            trailer: [0xff; TRAILER_LEN],
-        };
-
-        // Serialize
-        serialize_lp_packet(&packet, &mut dst, None).unwrap();
-
-        // Parse back
-        let decoded = parse_lp_packet(&dst, None).unwrap();
-
-        // Verify LP protocol handling works correctly
-        assert_eq!(decoded.header.receiver_idx, 999);
-        assert!(matches!(decoded.message.typ(), MessageType::ForwardPacket));
-
-        if let LpMessage::ForwardPacket(data) = decoded.message {
-            assert_eq!(data.target_gateway_identity, [77u8; 32]);
-            assert_eq!(
-                data.target_lp_address,
-                "[dead:beef:4242:c0ff:ee00::1111]:41264".parse().unwrap()
-            );
+            assert_eq!(data.target_lp_address, "1.2.3.4:41264");
            assert_eq!(data.inner_packet_bytes, vec![0xa, 0xb, 0xc, 0xd]);
        } else {
            panic!("Expected ForwardPacket message");
@@ -1093,7 +1055,7 @@ mod tests {
                receiver_idx: 99999,
                counter: 2,
            },
-            message: LpMessage::Handshake(HandshakeData(handshake_data.clone())),
+            message: LpMessage::PSQRequest(PSQRequestData(handshake_data.clone())),
            trailer: [0; TRAILER_LEN],
        };

@@ -1103,7 +1065,7 @@ mod tests {
        let decoded = parse_lp_packet(&encrypted, Some(&outer_key)).unwrap();

        match decoded.message {
-            LpMessage::Handshake(data) => {
+            LpMessage::PSQResponse(data) => {
                assert_eq!(data.0, handshake_data);
            }
            _ => panic!("Expected Handshake message"),
@@ -1289,37 +1251,4 @@ mod tests {
            _ => panic!("Expected SubsessionKK1 message"),
        }
    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_serialize_parse_error() {
-        use crate::message::ErrorPacketData;
-
-        let mut dst = BytesMut::new();
-
-        let error_data = ErrorPacketData {
-            message: "this is an error".to_string(),
-        };
-
-        let packet = LpPacket {
-            header: LpHeader {
-                protocol_version: 1,
-                reserved: [0u8; 3],
-                receiver_idx: 42,
-                counter: 200,
-            },
-            message: LpMessage::Error(error_data.clone()),
-            trailer: [0; TRAILER_LEN],
-        };
-
-        serialize_lp_packet(&packet, &mut dst, None).unwrap();
-        let decoded = parse_lp_packet(&dst, None).unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(decoded.header.receiver_idx, 42);
-        match decoded.message {
-            LpMessage::Error(data) => {
-                assert_eq!(data.message, "this is an error");
-            }
-            _ => panic!("Expected Error message"),
-        }
-    }
 }
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ pub const DEFAULT_PSK_TTL_SECS: u64 = 3600;
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct LpConfig {
    /// KEM algorithm for PSQ key encapsulation.
-    /// X25519 = classical (testing), MlKem768 = PQ, XWing = hybrid.
+    /// Supported KEMs: MlKem768, McEliece
    #[serde(with = "kem_serde")]
    pub kem_algorithm: KEM,

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ pub struct LpConfig {
 impl Default for LpConfig {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self {
-            kem_algorithm: KEM::X25519,
+            kem_algorithm: KEM::MlKem768,
            psk_ttl_secs: DEFAULT_PSK_TTL_SECS,
            enable_kkt: true,
        }
@@ -55,10 +55,10 @@ mod kem_serde {
        S: Serializer,
    {
        match kem {
-            KEM::X25519 => "X25519",
            KEM::MlKem768 => "MlKem768",
-            KEM::XWing => "XWing",
            KEM::McEliece => "McEliece",
+            KEM::X25519 => return Err(serde::ser::Error::custom("Unsupported KEM: X25519")),
+            KEM::XWing => return Err(serde::ser::Error::custom("Unsupported KEM: XWing")),
        }
        .serialize(serializer)
    }
@@ -69,10 +69,10 @@ mod kem_serde {
    {
        let s = String::deserialize(deserializer)?;
        match s.as_str() {
-            "X25519" => Ok(KEM::X25519),
            "MlKem768" => Ok(KEM::MlKem768),
-            "XWing" => Ok(KEM::XWing),
            "McEliece" => Ok(KEM::McEliece),
+            "X25519" => Err(serde::de::Error::custom("Unsupported KEM: X25519")),
+            "XWing" => Err(serde::de::Error::custom("Unsupported KEM: XWing")),
            _ => Err(serde::de::Error::custom(format!("Unknown KEM: {}", s))),
        }
    }
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
 // Copyright 2025 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

-use crate::message::MessageType;
 use crate::{noise_protocol::NoiseError, replay::ReplayError};
+use libcrux_psq::handshake::builders::BuilderError;
 use nym_crypto::asymmetric::ed25519::Ed25519RecoveryError;
-use nym_kkt::ciphersuite::{HashFunction, KEM};
-use nym_kkt::error::KKTError;
+use nym_kkt::{
+    ciphersuite::{HashFunction, KEM},
+    error::KKTError,
+};
 use thiserror::Error;

 #[derive(Error, Debug)]
@@ -13,15 +15,21 @@ pub enum LpError {
    #[error("IO Error: {0}")]
    IoError(#[from] std::io::Error),

+    // noiserm
    #[error("Snow Error: {0}")]
    SnowKeyError(#[from] snow::Error),

+    // noiserm
    #[error("Snow Pattern Error: {0}")]
    SnowPatternError(String),

+    // noiserm
    #[error("Noise Protocol Error: {0}")]
    NoiseError(#[from] NoiseError),

+    #[error("PSQ Error: {0}")]
+    PSQError(String),
+
    #[error("Replay detected: {0}")]
    Replay(#[from] ReplayError),

@@ -94,8 +102,8 @@ pub enum LpError {
    #[error("incompatible LP packet version. got: {got}, lowest supported: {lowest_supported}")]
    IncompatibleLegacyPacketVersion { got: u8, lowest_supported: u8 },

-    #[error("attempted to create an LP responder without providing a valid KEM key")]
-    ResponderWithMissingKEMKey,
+    #[error("attempted to create an LP responder without providing a valid KEM key for {kem} ")]
+    ResponderWithMissingKEMKey { kem: KEM },

    #[error(
        "there are no known digests for remote's KEM key with {kem} KEM and {hash_function} hash function"
@@ -104,25 +112,10 @@ pub enum LpError {
        kem: KEM,
        hash_function: HashFunction,
    },
-
-    #[error("failed to complete KKT/PSQ handshake: {0}")]
-    KKTPSQHandshake(String),
-
-    #[error("failed to complete the KKT exchange: {source}")]
-    KKTFailure {
-        #[from]
-        source: KKTError,
-    },
 }

-impl LpError {
-    pub fn kkt_psq_handshake(msg: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
-        Self::KKTPSQHandshake(msg.into())
-    }
-
-    pub fn unexpected_handshake_response(got: MessageType, expected: MessageType) -> LpError {
-        Self::KKTPSQHandshake(format!(
-            "received unexpected response, got: {got:?}, expected: {expected:?}"
-        ))
+impl From<KKTError> for LpError {
+    fn from(err: KKTError) -> Self {
+        LpError::KKTError(format!("KKT Error: {:?}", err))
    }
 }
@@ -2,22 +2,25 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

 pub mod codec;
-pub mod config;
+// georgio: config does not seem to be used anywhere
+// pub mod config;
+// pub use config::LpConfig;
+
 pub mod error;
+// georgio: no use for this
 // pub mod kkt_orchestrator;
 pub mod message;
 pub mod noise_protocol;
 pub mod packet;
 pub mod peer;
 pub mod psk;
-mod psq;
+pub mod psq;
 pub mod replay;
 pub mod session;
 mod session_integration;
 pub mod session_manager;
 pub mod state_machine;

-pub use config::LpConfig;
 pub use error::LpError;
 pub use message::{ClientHelloData, LpMessage};
 pub use packet::{BOOTSTRAP_RECEIVER_IDX, LpPacket, OuterHeader};
@@ -26,135 +29,30 @@ pub use session::LpSession;
 pub use session_manager::SessionManager;
 pub use state_machine::LpStateMachine;

+// noiserm
 pub const NOISE_PATTERN: &str = "Noise_XKpsk3_25519_ChaChaPoly_SHA256";
 pub const NOISE_PSK_INDEX: u8 = 3;

-#[cfg(any(feature = "mock", test))]
-pub struct SessionsMock {
-    pub initiator: LpSession,
-    pub responder: LpSession,
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub fn kem_list() -> Vec<nym_kkt::ciphersuite::KEM> {
+    use nym_kkt::ciphersuite::KEM;
+    vec![KEM::MlKem768, KEM::McEliece, KEM::X25519]
 }
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub fn sessions_for_tests<'a>(kem: nym_kkt::ciphersuite::KEM) -> (LpSession<'a>, LpSession<'a>) {
+    let (init, resp) = crate::peer::mock_peers(kem);

-#[cfg(any(feature = "mock", test))]
-impl SessionsMock {
-    pub fn mock_post_handshake(session_id: u32) -> SessionsMock {
-        use crate::peer::mock_peers;
-        use nym_kkt::ciphersuite::{DecapsulationKey, EncapsulationKey};
+    // Use a fixed receiver_index for deterministic tests
+    let receiver_index: u32 = 12345;

-        let (init, resp) = mock_peers();
-        let resp_remote = resp.as_remote();
-        let init_remote = init.as_remote();
-        let salt = [42u8; 32];
-        let session_id_bytes = session_id.to_le_bytes();
+    let initiator_session =
+        LpSession::new(receiver_index, true, init.clone(), resp.as_remote(), &salt)
+            .expect("Test session creation failed");

-        // skip KKT by just deriving the kem key locally
-        let kem_keys = resp.kem_psq.as_ref().unwrap();
+    let responder_session = LpSession::new(receiver_index, false, resp, init.as_remote(), &salt)
+        .expect("Test session creation failed");

-        let libcrux_private_key = libcrux_kem::PrivateKey::decode(
-            libcrux_kem::Algorithm::X25519,
-            kem_keys.private_key().as_bytes(),
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-        let decapsulation_key = DecapsulationKey::X25519(libcrux_private_key);
-
-        let libcrux_public_key = libcrux_kem::PublicKey::decode(
-            libcrux_kem::Algorithm::X25519,
-            kem_keys.public_key().as_bytes(),
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-        let encapsulation_key = EncapsulationKey::X25519(libcrux_public_key);
-
-        // INIT -> RESP: PSQ MSG1
-        let psq_initiator = crate::psk::psq_initiator_create_message(
-            init.x25519.private_key(),
-            &resp_remote.x25519_public,
-            &encapsulation_key,
-            init.ed25519.private_key(),
-            init.ed25519.public_key(),
-            &salt,
-            &session_id_bytes,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        let psk = psq_initiator.psk;
-        let psq_payload = psq_initiator.payload;
-        let outer_aead_key = crate::codec::OuterAeadKey::from_psk(&psk);
-
-        let noise_state_init = snow::Builder::new(crate::noise_protocol::NoiseProtocol::params())
-            .local_private_key(init.x25519().private_key().as_bytes())
-            .remote_public_key(resp_remote.x25519_public.as_bytes())
-            .psk(crate::NOISE_PSK_INDEX, &psk)
-            .build_initiator()
-            .unwrap();
-        let mut noise_protocol_init = crate::noise_protocol::NoiseProtocol::new(noise_state_init);
-        let noise_msg1 = noise_protocol_init.get_bytes_to_send().unwrap().unwrap();
-
-        let psq_responder = crate::psk::psq_responder_process_message(
-            resp.x25519.private_key(),
-            &init_remote.x25519_public,
-            (&decapsulation_key, &encapsulation_key),
-            &init_remote.ed25519_public,
-            &psq_payload,
-            &salt,
-            &session_id_bytes,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        let noise_state_resp = snow::Builder::new(crate::noise_protocol::NoiseProtocol::params())
-            .local_private_key(resp.x25519().private_key().as_bytes())
-            .remote_public_key(init_remote.x25519_public.as_bytes())
-            .psk(crate::NOISE_PSK_INDEX, &psk)
-            .build_responder()
-            .unwrap();
-        let mut noise_protocol_resp = crate::noise_protocol::NoiseProtocol::new(noise_state_resp);
-        noise_protocol_resp.read_message(&noise_msg1).unwrap();
-
-        let noise_msg2 = noise_protocol_resp.get_bytes_to_send().unwrap().unwrap();
-        noise_protocol_init.read_message(&noise_msg2).unwrap();
-        let noise_msg3 = noise_protocol_init.get_bytes_to_send().unwrap().unwrap();
-
-        assert!(noise_protocol_init.is_handshake_finished());
-
-        noise_protocol_resp.read_message(&noise_msg3).unwrap();
-        assert!(noise_protocol_resp.is_handshake_finished());
-
-        SessionsMock {
-            initiator: LpSession::new(
-                session_id,
-                1,
-                outer_aead_key.clone(),
-                init,
-                resp_remote,
-                crate::session::PqSharedSecret::new(psq_initiator.pq_shared_secret),
-                noise_protocol_init,
-            ),
-            responder: LpSession::new(
-                session_id,
-                1,
-                outer_aead_key,
-                resp,
-                init_remote,
-                crate::session::PqSharedSecret::new(psq_responder.pq_shared_secret),
-                noise_protocol_resp,
-            ),
-        }
-    }
-
-    // we just need a dummy 'valid' session for simpler tests
-    pub fn mock_initiator() -> LpSession {
-        Self::mock_post_handshake(1234).initiator
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(any(feature = "mock", test))]
-pub fn sessions_for_tests() -> (LpSession, LpSession) {
-    let sessions = SessionsMock::mock_post_handshake(69);
-    (sessions.initiator, sessions.responder)
-}
-
-#[cfg(any(feature = "mock", test))]
-pub fn mock_session_for_test() -> LpSession {
-    SessionsMock::mock_initiator()
+    (initiator_session, responder_session)
 }

 #[cfg(test)]
@@ -162,218 +60,243 @@ mod tests {
    use crate::message::LpMessage;
    use crate::packet::{LpHeader, LpPacket, TRAILER_LEN};
    use crate::session_manager::SessionManager;
-    use crate::{LpError, SessionsMock, mock_session_for_test};
+    use crate::{LpError, kem_list, sessions_for_tests};
    use bytes::BytesMut;
+    use nym_kkt::ciphersuite::{Ciphersuite, HashFunction, SignatureScheme};

    // Import the new standalone functions
    use crate::codec::{parse_lp_packet, serialize_lp_packet};
+    use crate::peer::mock_peers;

    #[test]
    fn test_replay_protection_integration() {
-        // Create session
-        let mut session = mock_session_for_test();
+        for kem in kem_list() {
+            // Create session
+            let session = sessions_for_tests(kem).0;

-        // === Packet 1 (Counter 0 - Should succeed) ===
-        let packet1 = LpPacket {
-            header: LpHeader {
-                protocol_version: 1,
-                reserved: [0u8; 3],
-                receiver_idx: 42, // Matches session's sending_index assumption for this test
-                counter: 0,
-            },
-            message: LpMessage::Busy,
-            trailer: [0u8; TRAILER_LEN],
-        };
+            // === Packet 1 (Counter 0 - Should succeed) ===
+            let packet1 = LpPacket {
+                header: LpHeader {
+                    protocol_version: 1,
+                    reserved: [0u8; 3],
+                    receiver_idx: 42, // Matches session's sending_index assumption for this test
+                    counter: 0,
+                },
+                message: LpMessage::Busy,
+                trailer: [0u8; TRAILER_LEN],
+            };

-        // Serialize packet
-        let mut buf1 = BytesMut::new();
-        serialize_lp_packet(&packet1, &mut buf1, None).unwrap();
+            // Serialize packet
+            let mut buf1 = BytesMut::new();
+            serialize_lp_packet(&packet1, &mut buf1, None).unwrap();

-        // Parse packet
-        let parsed_packet1 = parse_lp_packet(&buf1, None).unwrap();
+            // Parse packet
+            let parsed_packet1 = parse_lp_packet(&buf1, None).unwrap();

-        // Perform replay check (should pass)
-        session
-            .receiving_counter_quick_check(parsed_packet1.header.counter)
-            .expect("Initial packet failed replay check");
+            // Perform replay check (should pass)
+            session
+                .receiving_counter_quick_check(parsed_packet1.header.counter)
+                .expect("Initial packet failed replay check");

-        // Mark received (simulating successful processing)
-        session
-            .receiving_counter_mark(parsed_packet1.header.counter)
-            .expect("Failed to mark initial packet received");
+            // Mark received (simulating successful processing)
+            session
+                .receiving_counter_mark(parsed_packet1.header.counter)
+                .expect("Failed to mark initial packet received");

-        // === Packet 2 (Counter 0 - Replay, should fail check) ===
-        let packet2 = LpPacket {
-            header: LpHeader {
-                protocol_version: 1,
-                reserved: [0u8; 3],
-                receiver_idx: 42,
-                counter: 0, // Same counter as before (replay)
-            },
-            message: LpMessage::Busy,
-            trailer: [0u8; TRAILER_LEN],
-        };
+            // === Packet 2 (Counter 0 - Replay, should fail check) ===
+            let packet2 = LpPacket {
+                header: LpHeader {
+                    protocol_version: 1,
+                    reserved: [0u8; 3],
+                    receiver_idx: 42,
+                    counter: 0, // Same counter as before (replay)
+                },
+                message: LpMessage::Busy,
+                trailer: [0u8; TRAILER_LEN],
+            };

-        // Serialize packet
-        let mut buf2 = BytesMut::new();
-        serialize_lp_packet(&packet2, &mut buf2, None).unwrap();
+            // Serialize packet
+            let mut buf2 = BytesMut::new();
+            serialize_lp_packet(&packet2, &mut buf2, None).unwrap();

-        // Parse packet
-        let parsed_packet2 = parse_lp_packet(&buf2, None).unwrap();
+            // Parse packet
+            let parsed_packet2 = parse_lp_packet(&buf2, None).unwrap();

-        // Perform replay check (should fail)
-        let replay_result = session.receiving_counter_quick_check(parsed_packet2.header.counter);
-        assert!(replay_result.is_err());
-        match replay_result.unwrap_err() {
-            LpError::Replay(e) => {
-                assert!(matches!(e, crate::replay::ReplayError::DuplicateCounter));
+            // Perform replay check (should fail)
+            let replay_result =
+                session.receiving_counter_quick_check(parsed_packet2.header.counter);
+            assert!(replay_result.is_err());
+            match replay_result.unwrap_err() {
+                LpError::Replay(e) => {
+                    assert!(matches!(e, crate::replay::ReplayError::DuplicateCounter));
+                }
+                e => panic!("Expected replay error, got {:?}", e),
            }
-            e => panic!("Expected replay error, got {:?}", e),
+            // Do not mark received as it failed validation
+
+            // === Packet 3 (Counter 1 - Should succeed) ===
+            let packet3 = LpPacket {
+                header: LpHeader {
+                    protocol_version: 1,
+                    reserved: [0u8; 3],
+                    receiver_idx: 42,
+                    counter: 1, // Incremented counter
+                },
+                message: LpMessage::Busy,
+                trailer: [0u8; TRAILER_LEN],
+            };
+
+            // Serialize packet
+            let mut buf3 = BytesMut::new();
+            serialize_lp_packet(&packet3, &mut buf3, None).unwrap();
+
+            // Parse packet
+            let parsed_packet3 = parse_lp_packet(&buf3, None).unwrap();
+
+            // Perform replay check (should pass)
+            session
+                .receiving_counter_quick_check(parsed_packet3.header.counter)
+                .expect("Packet 3 failed replay check");
+
+            // Mark received
+            session
+                .receiving_counter_mark(parsed_packet3.header.counter)
+                .expect("Failed to mark packet 3 received");
+
+            // Verify validator state directly on the session
+            let state = session.current_packet_cnt();
+            assert_eq!(state.0, 2); // Next expected counter (correct - was 1, now expects 2)
+            assert_eq!(state.1, 2); // Total marked received (correct - packets 1 and 3)
        }
-        // Do not mark received as it failed validation
-
-        // === Packet 3 (Counter 1 - Should succeed) ===
-        let packet3 = LpPacket {
-            header: LpHeader {
-                protocol_version: 1,
-                reserved: [0u8; 3],
-                receiver_idx: 42,
-                counter: 1, // Incremented counter
-            },
-            message: LpMessage::Busy,
-            trailer: [0u8; TRAILER_LEN],
-        };
-
-        // Serialize packet
-        let mut buf3 = BytesMut::new();
-        serialize_lp_packet(&packet3, &mut buf3, None).unwrap();
-
-        // Parse packet
-        let parsed_packet3 = parse_lp_packet(&buf3, None).unwrap();
-
-        // Perform replay check (should pass)
-        session
-            .receiving_counter_quick_check(parsed_packet3.header.counter)
-            .expect("Packet 3 failed replay check");
-
-        // Mark received
-        session
-            .receiving_counter_mark(parsed_packet3.header.counter)
-            .expect("Failed to mark packet 3 received");
-
-        // Verify validator state directly on the session
-        let state = session.current_packet_cnt();
-        assert_eq!(state.0, 2); // Next expected counter (correct - was 1, now expects 2)
-        assert_eq!(state.1, 2); // Total marked received (correct - packets 1 and 3)
    }
-
    #[test]
    fn test_session_manager_integration() {
        // Create session manager
        let mut local_manager = SessionManager::new();
        let mut remote_manager = SessionManager::new();

-        // Use fixed receiver_index for deterministic test
-        let receiver_index: u32 = 54321;
+        for kem in kem_list() {
+            // Generate Ed25519 keypairs for PSQ authentication
+            let (init, resp) = mock_peers(kem);

-        let sessions = SessionsMock::mock_post_handshake(receiver_index);
-        let local_session = sessions.initiator;
-        let remote_session = sessions.responder;
+            let mut ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::resolve_ciphersuite(
+                kem,
+                HashFunction::Blake3,
+                SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
+                None,
+            );

-        // Create a session via manager
-        let _ = local_manager.create_session_state_machine(local_session);
-        let _ = remote_manager.create_session_state_machine(remote_session);
+            // Use fixed receiver_index for deterministic test
+            let receiver_index: u32 = 54321;

-        // === Packet 1 (Counter 0 - Should succeed) ===
-        let packet1 = LpPacket {
-            header: LpHeader {
-                protocol_version: 1,
-                reserved: [0u8; 3],
-                receiver_idx: receiver_index,
-                counter: 0,
-            },
-            message: LpMessage::Busy,
-            trailer: [0u8; TRAILER_LEN],
-        };
+            // Test salt
+            let salt = [46u8; 32];

-        // Serialize
-        let mut buf1 = BytesMut::new();
-        serialize_lp_packet(&packet1, &mut buf1, None).unwrap();
+            // Create a session via manager
+            let _ = local_manager
+                .create_session_state_machine(
+                    receiver_index,
+                    true,
+                    init.clone(),
+                    resp.as_remote(),
+                    &salt,
+                )
+                .unwrap();

-        // Parse
-        let parsed_packet1 = parse_lp_packet(&buf1, None).unwrap();
+            let _ = remote_manager
+                .create_session_state_machine(receiver_index, false, resp, init.as_remote(), &salt)
+                .unwrap();
+            // === Packet 1 (Counter 0 - Should succeed) ===
+            let packet1 = LpPacket {
+                header: LpHeader {
+                    protocol_version: 1,
+                    reserved: [0u8; 3],
+                    receiver_idx: receiver_index,
+                    counter: 0,
+                },
+                message: LpMessage::Busy,
+                trailer: [0u8; TRAILER_LEN],
+            };

-        // Process via SessionManager method (which should handle checks + marking)
-        // NOTE: We might need a method on SessionManager/LpSession like `process_incoming_packet`
-        //       that encapsulates parse -> check -> process_noise -> mark.
-        //       For now, we simulate the steps using the retrieved session.
+            // Serialize
+            let mut buf1 = BytesMut::new();
+            serialize_lp_packet(&packet1, &mut buf1, None).unwrap();

-        // Perform replay check
-        local_manager
-            .receiving_counter_quick_check(receiver_index, parsed_packet1.header.counter)
-            .expect("Packet 1 check failed");
-        // Mark received
-        local_manager
-            .receiving_counter_mark(receiver_index, parsed_packet1.header.counter)
-            .expect("Packet 1 mark failed");
+            // Parse
+            let parsed_packet1 = parse_lp_packet(&buf1, None).unwrap();

-        // === Packet 2 (Counter 1 - Should succeed on same session) ===
-        let packet2 = LpPacket {
-            header: LpHeader {
-                protocol_version: 1,
-                reserved: [0u8; 3],
-                receiver_idx: receiver_index,
-                counter: 1,
-            },
-            message: LpMessage::Busy,
-            trailer: [0u8; TRAILER_LEN],
-        };
+            // Process via SessionManager method (which should handle checks + marking)
+            // NOTE: We might need a method on SessionManager/LpSession like `process_incoming_packet`
+            //       that encapsulates parse -> check -> process_noise -> mark.
+            //       For now, we simulate the steps using the retrieved session.

-        // Serialize
-        let mut buf2 = BytesMut::new();
-        serialize_lp_packet(&packet2, &mut buf2, None).unwrap();
+            // Perform replay check
+            local_manager
+                .receiving_counter_quick_check(receiver_index, parsed_packet1.header.counter)
+                .expect("Packet 1 check failed");
+            // Mark received
+            local_manager
+                .receiving_counter_mark(receiver_index, parsed_packet1.header.counter)
+                .expect("Packet 1 mark failed");

-        // Parse
-        let parsed_packet2 = parse_lp_packet(&buf2, None).unwrap();
+            // === Packet 2 (Counter 1 - Should succeed on same session) ===
+            let packet2 = LpPacket {
+                header: LpHeader {
+                    protocol_version: 1,
+                    reserved: [0u8; 3],
+                    receiver_idx: receiver_index,
+                    counter: 1,
+                },
+                message: LpMessage::Busy,
+                trailer: [0u8; TRAILER_LEN],
+            };

-        // Perform replay check
-        local_manager
-            .receiving_counter_quick_check(receiver_index, parsed_packet2.header.counter)
-            .expect("Packet 2 check failed");
-        // Mark received
-        local_manager
-            .receiving_counter_mark(receiver_index, parsed_packet2.header.counter)
-            .expect("Packet 2 mark failed");
+            // Serialize
+            let mut buf2 = BytesMut::new();
+            serialize_lp_packet(&packet2, &mut buf2, None).unwrap();

-        // === Packet 3 (Counter 0 - Replay, should fail check) ===
-        let packet3 = LpPacket {
-            header: LpHeader {
-                protocol_version: 1,
-                reserved: [0u8; 3],
-                receiver_idx: receiver_index,
-                counter: 0, // Replay of first packet
-            },
-            message: LpMessage::Busy,
-            trailer: [0u8; TRAILER_LEN],
-        };
+            // Parse
+            let parsed_packet2 = parse_lp_packet(&buf2, None).unwrap();

-        // Serialize
-        let mut buf3 = BytesMut::new();
-        serialize_lp_packet(&packet3, &mut buf3, None).unwrap();
+            // Perform replay check
+            local_manager
+                .receiving_counter_quick_check(receiver_index, parsed_packet2.header.counter)
+                .expect("Packet 2 check failed");
+            // Mark received
+            local_manager
+                .receiving_counter_mark(receiver_index, parsed_packet2.header.counter)
+                .expect("Packet 2 mark failed");

-        // Parse
-        let parsed_packet3 = parse_lp_packet(&buf3, None).unwrap();
+            // === Packet 3 (Counter 0 - Replay, should fail check) ===
+            let packet3 = LpPacket {
+                header: LpHeader {
+                    protocol_version: 1,
+                    reserved: [0u8; 3],
+                    receiver_idx: receiver_index,
+                    counter: 0, // Replay of first packet
+                },
+                message: LpMessage::Busy,
+                trailer: [0u8; TRAILER_LEN],
+            };

-        // Perform replay check (should fail)
-        let replay_result = local_manager
-            .receiving_counter_quick_check(receiver_index, parsed_packet3.header.counter);
-        assert!(replay_result.is_err());
-        match replay_result.unwrap_err() {
-            LpError::Replay(e) => {
-                assert!(matches!(e, crate::replay::ReplayError::DuplicateCounter));
+            // Serialize
+            let mut buf3 = BytesMut::new();
+            serialize_lp_packet(&packet3, &mut buf3, None).unwrap();
+
+            // Parse
+            let parsed_packet3 = parse_lp_packet(&buf3, None).unwrap();
+
+            // Perform replay check (should fail)
+            let replay_result = local_manager
+                .receiving_counter_quick_check(receiver_index, parsed_packet3.header.counter);
+            assert!(replay_result.is_err());
+            match replay_result.unwrap_err() {
+                LpError::Replay(e) => {
+                    assert!(matches!(e, crate::replay::ReplayError::DuplicateCounter));
+                }
+                e => panic!("Expected replay error for packet 3, got {:?}", e),
            }
-            e => panic!("Expected replay error for packet 3, got {:?}", e),
+            // Do not mark received
        }
-        // Do not mark received
    }
 }
@@ -1,19 +1,17 @@
 // Copyright 2025 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

-use crate::packet::LpHeader;
 use crate::peer::LpRemotePeer;
-use crate::{BOOTSTRAP_RECEIVER_IDX, LpError, LpPacket};
+use crate::{BOOTSTRAP_RECEIVER_IDX, LpError};
 use bytes::{BufMut, BytesMut};
 use num_enum::{IntoPrimitive, TryFromPrimitive};
 use nym_crypto::asymmetric::{ed25519, x25519};
 use rand::RngCore;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
-use std::fmt::{self, Display};
-use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr, SocketAddr};
+use std::fmt::{self, Display, write};

 /// Data structure for the ClientHello message
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct ClientHelloData {
    /// Client-proposed receiver index for session identification (4 bytes)
    /// Auto-generated randomly by the client
@@ -22,25 +20,16 @@ pub struct ClientHelloData {
    pub client_lp_public_key: x25519::PublicKey,
    /// Client's Ed25519 public key (32 bytes) - for PSQ authentication
    pub client_ed25519_public_key: ed25519::PublicKey,
+    // noiserm
    /// Salt for PSK derivation (32 bytes: 8-byte timestamp + 24-byte nonce)
    pub salt: [u8; 32],
 }

 impl ClientHelloData {
+    // noiserm (remove 32 bytes for salt)
    // 4 bytes for receiver index + 32 bytes for client lp key, 32 bytes for client ed25519 key + 32 bytes for salt
    pub const LEN: usize = 100;

-    pub fn into_lp_packet(self, protocol_version: u8) -> LpPacket {
-        LpPacket::new(
-            LpHeader::new(
-                BOOTSTRAP_RECEIVER_IDX, // session_id not yet established
-                0,                      // counter starts at 0
-                protocol_version,
-            ),
-            LpMessage::ClientHello(self),
-        )
-    }
-
    fn len(&self) -> usize {
        Self::LEN
    }
@@ -54,6 +43,7 @@ impl ClientHelloData {
        }
    }

+    // noiserm
    /// Generates a new ClientHelloData with fresh salt.
    ///
    /// Salt format: 8 bytes timestamp (u64 LE) + 24 bytes random nonce
@@ -82,7 +72,7 @@ impl ClientHelloData {
            salt,
        }
    }
-
+    // noiserm
    /// Extracts the timestamp from the salt.
    ///
    /// # Returns
@@ -97,6 +87,7 @@ impl ClientHelloData {
        dst.put_u32_le(self.receiver_index);
        dst.put_slice(self.client_lp_public_key.as_bytes());
        dst.put_slice(self.client_ed25519_public_key.as_bytes());
+        // noiserm
        dst.put_slice(&self.salt);
    }

@@ -120,6 +111,7 @@ impl ClientHelloData {
            client_ed25519_public_key: ed25519::PublicKey::from_byte_array(
                client_ed25519_public_key_bytes,
            )?,
+            // noiserm
            salt: b[68..].try_into().unwrap(),
        })
    }
@@ -146,6 +138,8 @@ pub enum MessageType {
    Ack = 0x0008,
    /// Subsession request - client initiates subsession creation
    SubsessionRequest = 0x0009,
+
+    // georgio: this should be the psq msg
    /// Subsession KK1 - first message of Noise KK handshake
    SubsessionKK1 = 0x000A,
    /// Subsession KK2 - second message of Noise KK handshake
@@ -154,8 +148,6 @@ pub enum MessageType {
    SubsessionReady = 0x000C,
    /// Subsession abort - race winner tells loser to become responder
    SubsessionAbort = 0x000D,
-    /// General error
-    Error = 0x00FF,
 }

 impl MessageType {
@@ -172,9 +164,6 @@ impl MessageType {
 pub struct HandshakeData(pub Vec<u8>);

 impl HandshakeData {
-    pub(crate) fn new(bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
-        Self(bytes)
-    }
    fn len(&self) -> usize {
        self.0.len()
    }
@@ -192,11 +181,6 @@ impl HandshakeData {
 pub struct EncryptedDataPayload(pub Vec<u8>);

 impl EncryptedDataPayload {
-    #[allow(dead_code)]
-    pub(crate) fn new(bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
-        Self(bytes)
-    }
-
    fn len(&self) -> usize {
        self.0.len()
    }
@@ -215,10 +199,6 @@ impl EncryptedDataPayload {
 pub struct KKTRequestData(pub Vec<u8>);

 impl KKTRequestData {
-    pub(crate) fn new(bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
-        Self(bytes)
-    }
-
    fn len(&self) -> usize {
        self.0.len()
    }
@@ -237,10 +217,6 @@ impl KKTRequestData {
 pub struct KKTResponseData(pub Vec<u8>);

 impl KKTResponseData {
-    pub(crate) fn new(bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
-        Self(bytes)
-    }
-
    fn len(&self) -> usize {
        self.0.len()
    }
@@ -254,49 +230,39 @@ impl KKTResponseData {
    }
 }

-/// General human-readable error message
+/// PSQ request frame data (serialized bytes)
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub struct ErrorPacketData {
-    pub message: String,
-}
-
-impl ErrorPacketData {
-    pub(crate) fn new(message: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
-        ErrorPacketData {
-            message: message.into(),
-        }
-    }
+pub struct PSQRequestData(pub Vec<u8>);

+impl PSQRequestData {
    fn len(&self) -> usize {
-        // length-encoding + message
-        4 + self.message.len()
+        self.0.len()
    }

    fn encode(&self, dst: &mut BytesMut) {
-        dst.put_u32_le(self.message.len() as u32);
-        dst.put_slice(self.message.as_bytes());
+        dst.put_slice(&self.0);
    }

    fn decode(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, LpError> {
-        if bytes.len() < 4 {
-            return Err(LpError::DeserializationError(format!(
-                "Too few bytes to deserialise ErrorPacketData. got {}",
-                bytes.len()
-            )));
-        }
+        Ok(PSQRequestData(bytes.to_vec()))
+    }
+}

-        let message_len = u32::from_le_bytes([bytes[0], bytes[1], bytes[2], bytes[3]]) as usize;
-        if bytes[4..].len() != message_len {
-            return Err(LpError::DeserializationError(format!(
-                "Wrong number of bytes to deserialise ErrorPacketData. got {}. Expected {}",
-                bytes.len(),
-                4 + message_len
-            )));
-        }
+/// PSQ response frame data (serialized bytes)
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct PSQResponseData(pub Vec<u8>);

-        let message = String::from_utf8_lossy(&bytes[4..]).to_string();
+impl PSQResponseData {
+    fn len(&self) -> usize {
+        self.0.len()
+    }

-        Ok(ErrorPacketData { message })
+    fn encode(&self, dst: &mut BytesMut) {
+        dst.put_slice(&self.0);
+    }
+
+    fn decode(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, LpError> {
+        Ok(PSQResponseData(bytes.to_vec()))
    }
 }

@@ -306,8 +272,9 @@ pub struct ForwardPacketData {
    /// Target gateway's Ed25519 identity (32 bytes)
    pub target_gateway_identity: [u8; 32],

+    // TODO: replace it with `SocketAddr`
    /// Target gateway's LP address (IP:port string)
-    pub target_lp_address: SocketAddr,
+    pub target_lp_address: String,

    /// Complete inner LP packet bytes (serialized LpPacket)
    /// This is the CLIENT→EXIT gateway packet, encrypted for exit
@@ -315,46 +282,23 @@ pub struct ForwardPacketData {
 }

 impl ForwardPacketData {
-    pub fn new(
-        target_gateway_identity: ed25519::PublicKey,
-        target_lp_address: SocketAddr,
-        inner_packet_bytes: Vec<u8>,
-    ) -> Self {
-        ForwardPacketData {
-            target_gateway_identity: target_gateway_identity.to_bytes(),
-            target_lp_address,
-            inner_packet_bytes,
-        }
-    }
-
    fn len(&self) -> usize {
        // 32 bytes target gateway identity
        // +
-        // 1 byte length of target lp address type
+        // 4 bytes length of target lp address
        // +
-        // {4,16} target_lp_address IPv{4,6}
-        // +
-        // 2 bytes target_lp_address port
+        // target_lp_address.len()
        // +
        // 4 bytes of length of inner packet bytes
        // +
        // inner_packet_bytes.len()
-        match self.target_lp_address {
-            SocketAddr::V4(_) => 32 + 1 + 4 + 2 + 4 + self.inner_packet_bytes.len(),
-            SocketAddr::V6(_) => 32 + 1 + 16 + 2 + 4 + self.inner_packet_bytes.len(),
-        }
+        32 + 4 + self.target_lp_address.len() + 4 + self.inner_packet_bytes.len()
    }

    fn encode(&self, dst: &mut BytesMut) {
-        let (is_ipv6, ip_bytes) = match &self.target_lp_address {
-            SocketAddr::V4(address) => (false, address.ip().octets().to_vec()),
-            SocketAddr::V6(address) => (true, address.ip().octets().to_vec()),
-        };
-
        dst.put_slice(&self.target_gateway_identity);
-        dst.put_u8(is_ipv6 as u8); // IP type , 0 for ipv4
-        dst.put_slice(&ip_bytes); // IP bytes
-        dst.put_u16_le(self.target_lp_address.port()); // Port
+        dst.put_u16_le(self.target_lp_address.len() as u16);
+        dst.put_slice(self.target_lp_address.as_bytes());
        dst.put_u32_le(self.inner_packet_bytes.len() as u32);
        dst.put_slice(&self.inner_packet_bytes);
    }
@@ -366,56 +310,42 @@ impl ForwardPacketData {
    }

    pub fn decode(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, LpError> {
-        // smallest possible packet with ipv4 and empty data
-        if bytes.len() < 43 {
-            // 32 + 1 + 4 + 2 + 4 + 0
+        // smallest possible packet with empty address and empty data
+        if bytes.len() < 38 {
            return Err(LpError::DeserializationError(format!(
-                "Too few bytes to deserialise ForwardPacketData. got {}",
+                "Too few bytes to deserialise ForwardPacketData[1]. got {}",
                bytes.len()
            )));
        }
        // SAFETY: we ensured we have sufficient data
        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
        let target_gateway_identity = bytes[0..32].try_into().unwrap();
-        let target_lp_address_is_ipv6 = bytes[32] != 0;
+        let target_lp_address_len = u16::from_le_bytes([bytes[32], bytes[33]]);

-        let (target_lp_address, next_index) = if target_lp_address_is_ipv6 {
-            // IPv6, first check we have actually enough bytes
-            // smallest possible packet with ipv6 and empty data
-            if bytes.len() < 55 {
-                // 32 + 1 + 16 + 2 + 4 + 0
-                return Err(LpError::DeserializationError(format!(
-                    "Too few bytes to deserialise ipv6 ForwardPacketData. got {}",
-                    bytes.len()
-                )));
-            }
-            // SAFETY: we ensured we have sufficient data, and the length is correct for casting
-            #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-            let ipv6 = IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::from_octets(bytes[33..49].try_into().unwrap()));
-            let port = u16::from_le_bytes([bytes[49], bytes[50]]);
-            (SocketAddr::new(ipv6, port), 51)
-        } else {
-            // IPv4. Length check done at the start
-            // SAFETY: we ensured we have sufficient data, and the length is correct for casting
-            #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-            let ipv4 = IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::from_octets(bytes[33..37].try_into().unwrap()));
-            let port = u16::from_le_bytes([bytes[37], bytes[38]]);
-            (SocketAddr::new(ipv4, port), 39)
-        };
-
-        let inner_packet_bytes_len = u32::from_le_bytes([
-            bytes[next_index],
-            bytes[next_index + 1],
-            bytes[next_index + 2],
-            bytes[next_index + 3],
-        ]);
-        if bytes[next_index + 4..].len() != inner_packet_bytes_len as usize {
+        // smallest possible packet with empty data
+        if bytes[34..].len() < 4 + target_lp_address_len as usize {
            return Err(LpError::DeserializationError(format!(
-                "Expected {inner_packet_bytes_len} bytes to deserialise inner packet bytes of ForwardPacketData. got {}",
-                bytes[next_index + 4..].len()
+                "Too few bytes to deserialise ForwardPacketData[2]. got {}",
+                bytes.len()
            )));
        }
-        let inner_packet_bytes = bytes[next_index + 4..].to_vec();
+
+        let target_lp_address =
+            String::from_utf8_lossy(&bytes[34..34 + target_lp_address_len as usize]).to_string();
+        let inner_packet_bytes_len = u32::from_le_bytes([
+            bytes[34 + target_lp_address_len as usize],
+            bytes[34 + target_lp_address_len as usize + 1],
+            bytes[34 + target_lp_address_len as usize + 2],
+            bytes[34 + target_lp_address_len as usize + 3],
+        ]);
+        if bytes[34 + target_lp_address_len as usize + 4..].len() != inner_packet_bytes_len as usize
+        {
+            return Err(LpError::DeserializationError(format!(
+                "Expected {inner_packet_bytes_len} bytes to deserialise inner packet bytes of ForwardPacketData. got {}",
+                bytes[34 + target_lp_address_len as usize + 4..].len()
+            )));
+        }
+        let inner_packet_bytes = bytes[34 + target_lp_address_len as usize + 4..].to_vec();

        Ok(ForwardPacketData {
            target_gateway_identity,
@@ -425,6 +355,7 @@ impl ForwardPacketData {
    }
 }

+// georgio: swap with psq
 /// Subsession KK1 message - first message of Noise KK handshake
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub struct SubsessionKK1Data {
@@ -505,7 +436,8 @@ impl SubsessionReadyData {
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub enum LpMessage {
    Busy,
-    Handshake(HandshakeData),
+    PSQRequest(PSQRequestData),
+    PSQResponse(PSQResponseData),
    EncryptedData(EncryptedDataPayload),
    ClientHello(ClientHelloData),
    KKTRequest(KKTRequestData),
@@ -515,6 +447,7 @@ pub enum LpMessage {
    Collision,
    /// Acknowledgment - gateway confirms receipt of message
    Ack,
+    // georgio: this should become psq stuff
    /// Subsession request - client initiates subsession creation (empty, signal only)
    SubsessionRequest,
    /// Subsession KK1 - first message of Noise KK handshake
@@ -525,69 +458,12 @@ pub enum LpMessage {
    SubsessionReady(SubsessionReadyData),
    /// Subsession abort - race winner tells loser to become responder (empty, signal only)
    SubsessionAbort,
-    /// An error has occurred
-    Error(ErrorPacketData),
-}
-
-impl From<HandshakeData> for LpMessage {
-    fn from(value: HandshakeData) -> Self {
-        LpMessage::Handshake(value)
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<EncryptedDataPayload> for LpMessage {
-    fn from(value: EncryptedDataPayload) -> Self {
-        LpMessage::EncryptedData(value)
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<ClientHelloData> for LpMessage {
-    fn from(value: ClientHelloData) -> Self {
-        LpMessage::ClientHello(value)
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<KKTRequestData> for LpMessage {
-    fn from(value: KKTRequestData) -> Self {
-        LpMessage::KKTRequest(value)
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<KKTResponseData> for LpMessage {
-    fn from(value: KKTResponseData) -> Self {
-        LpMessage::KKTResponse(value)
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<ForwardPacketData> for LpMessage {
-    fn from(value: ForwardPacketData) -> Self {
-        LpMessage::ForwardPacket(value)
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<SubsessionKK1Data> for LpMessage {
-    fn from(value: SubsessionKK1Data) -> Self {
-        LpMessage::SubsessionKK1(value)
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<SubsessionKK2Data> for LpMessage {
-    fn from(value: SubsessionKK2Data) -> Self {
-        LpMessage::SubsessionKK2(value)
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<SubsessionReadyData> for LpMessage {
-    fn from(value: SubsessionReadyData) -> Self {
-        LpMessage::SubsessionReady(value)
-    }
 }

 impl Display for LpMessage {
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
        match self {
            LpMessage::Busy => write!(f, "Busy"),
-            LpMessage::Handshake(_) => write!(f, "Handshake"),
            LpMessage::EncryptedData(_) => write!(f, "EncryptedData"),
            LpMessage::ClientHello(_) => write!(f, "ClientHello"),
            LpMessage::KKTRequest(_) => write!(f, "KKTRequest"),
@@ -600,36 +476,16 @@ impl Display for LpMessage {
            LpMessage::SubsessionKK2(_) => write!(f, "SubsessionKK2"),
            LpMessage::SubsessionReady(_) => write!(f, "SubsessionReady"),
            LpMessage::SubsessionAbort => write!(f, "SubsessionAbort"),
-            LpMessage::Error(_) => write!(f, "Error"),
+            LpMessage::PSQRequest(_) => write!(f, "PSQRequest"),
+            LpMessage::PSQResponse(_) => write!(f, "PSQResponse"),
        }
    }
 }

 impl LpMessage {
-    pub fn payload(&self) -> &[u8] {
-        match self {
-            LpMessage::Busy => &[],
-            LpMessage::Handshake(payload) => payload.0.as_slice(),
-            LpMessage::EncryptedData(payload) => payload.0.as_slice(),
-            LpMessage::ClientHello(_) => &[], // Structured data, serialized in encode_content
-            LpMessage::KKTRequest(payload) => payload.0.as_slice(),
-            LpMessage::KKTResponse(payload) => payload.0.as_slice(),
-            LpMessage::ForwardPacket(_) => &[], // Structured data, serialized in encode_content
-            LpMessage::Collision => &[],
-            LpMessage::Ack => &[],
-            LpMessage::SubsessionRequest => &[],
-            LpMessage::SubsessionKK1(_) => &[], // Structured data, serialized in encode_content
-            LpMessage::SubsessionKK2(_) => &[], // Structured data, serialized in encode_content
-            LpMessage::SubsessionReady(_) => &[], // Structured data, serialized in encode_content
-            LpMessage::SubsessionAbort => &[],
-            LpMessage::Error(_) => &[], // Structured data, serialized in encode_content (?)
-        }
-    }
-
    pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
        match self {
            LpMessage::Busy => true,
-            LpMessage::Handshake(payload) => payload.0.is_empty(),
            LpMessage::EncryptedData(payload) => payload.0.is_empty(),
            LpMessage::ClientHello(_) => false, // Always has data
            LpMessage::KKTRequest(payload) => payload.0.is_empty(),
@@ -642,14 +498,16 @@ impl LpMessage {
            LpMessage::SubsessionKK2(_) => false, // Always has payload
            LpMessage::SubsessionReady(_) => false, // Always has receiver_index
            LpMessage::SubsessionAbort => true,   // Empty signal
-            LpMessage::Error(_) => false,
+            LpMessage::PSQRequest(payload) => true, // Always had data (?)
+            LpMessage::PSQResponse(payload) => true, // Always had data (?)
        }
    }

    pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
        match self {
            LpMessage::Busy => 0,
-            LpMessage::Handshake(payload) => payload.len(),
+            LpMessage::PSQRequest(payload) => payload.len(),
+            LpMessage::PSQResponse(payload) => payload.len(),
            LpMessage::EncryptedData(payload) => payload.len(),
            LpMessage::ClientHello(payload) => payload.len(),
            LpMessage::KKTRequest(payload) => payload.len(),
@@ -662,14 +520,14 @@ impl LpMessage {
            LpMessage::SubsessionKK2(payload) => payload.len(),
            LpMessage::SubsessionReady(payload) => payload.len(),
            LpMessage::SubsessionAbort => 0,
-            LpMessage::Error(payload) => payload.len(),
        }
    }

    pub fn typ(&self) -> MessageType {
        match self {
            LpMessage::Busy => MessageType::Busy,
-            LpMessage::Handshake(_) => MessageType::Handshake,
+            LpMessage::PSQRequest(_) => todo!(),
+            LpMessage::PSQResponse(_) => todo!(),
            LpMessage::EncryptedData(_) => MessageType::EncryptedData,
            LpMessage::ClientHello(_) => MessageType::ClientHello,
            LpMessage::KKTRequest(_) => MessageType::KKTRequest,
@@ -682,14 +540,14 @@ impl LpMessage {
            LpMessage::SubsessionKK2(_) => MessageType::SubsessionKK2,
            LpMessage::SubsessionReady(_) => MessageType::SubsessionReady,
            LpMessage::SubsessionAbort => MessageType::SubsessionAbort,
-            LpMessage::Error(_) => MessageType::Error,
        }
    }

    pub fn encode_content(&self, dst: &mut BytesMut) {
        match self {
            LpMessage::Busy => { /* No content */ }
-            LpMessage::Handshake(payload) => payload.encode(dst),
+            LpMessage::PSQRequest(payload) => payload.encode(dst),
+            LpMessage::PSQResponse(payload) => payload.encode(dst),
            LpMessage::EncryptedData(payload) => payload.encode(dst),
            LpMessage::ClientHello(data) => data.encode(dst),
            LpMessage::KKTRequest(payload) => payload.encode(dst),
@@ -702,7 +560,6 @@ impl LpMessage {
            LpMessage::SubsessionKK2(data) => data.encode(dst),
            LpMessage::SubsessionReady(data) => data.encode(dst),
            LpMessage::SubsessionAbort => { /* No content - signal only */ }
-            LpMessage::Error(data) => data.encode(dst),
        }
    }

@@ -716,7 +573,7 @@ impl LpMessage {
                content.ensure_empty()?;
                Ok(LpMessage::Busy)
            }
-            MessageType::Handshake => Ok(LpMessage::Handshake(HandshakeData::decode(content)?)),
+            MessageType::Handshake => todo!(),
            MessageType::EncryptedData => Ok(LpMessage::EncryptedData(
                EncryptedDataPayload::decode(content)?,
            )),
@@ -755,7 +612,6 @@ impl LpMessage {
                content.ensure_empty()?;
                Ok(LpMessage::SubsessionAbort)
            }
-            MessageType::Error => Ok(LpMessage::Error(ErrorPacketData::decode(content)?)),
        }
    }
 }
@@ -82,13 +82,6 @@ pub enum ReadResult {
 // --- Implementation ---

 impl NoiseProtocol {
-    pub fn params() -> NoiseParams {
-        // SAFETY: the hardcoded pattern must be valid
-        // and if for some reason it was not, we MUST fail non-gracefully for there is no possible recovery
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        crate::NOISE_PATTERN.parse().unwrap()
-    }
-
    /// Creates a new `NoiseProtocol` instance in the Handshaking state.
    ///
    /// Takes an initialized `snow::HandshakeState` (e.g., from `snow::Builder`).
@@ -98,46 +91,6 @@ impl NoiseProtocol {
        }
    }

-    fn prepare_handshake_state<'a>(
-        local_private_key: &'a [u8],
-        remote_public_key: &'a [u8],
-        psk: &'a [u8],
-    ) -> snow::Builder<'a> {
-        let psk_index = crate::NOISE_PSK_INDEX;
-        let noise_params = NoiseProtocol::params();
-
-        snow::Builder::new(noise_params)
-            .local_private_key(local_private_key)
-            .remote_public_key(remote_public_key)
-            .psk(psk_index, psk)
-    }
-
-    /// Builds a new `NoiseProtocol` initiator instance with the provided local private key,
-    /// remote public key and psk
-    pub fn build_new_initiator(
-        local_private_key: &[u8],
-        remote_public_key: &[u8],
-        psk: &[u8],
-    ) -> Result<Self, NoiseError> {
-        let handshake_state =
-            Self::prepare_handshake_state(local_private_key, remote_public_key, psk)
-                .build_initiator()?;
-        Ok(Self::new(handshake_state))
-    }
-
-    /// Builds a new `NoiseProtocol` responder instance with the provided local private key,
-    /// remote public key and psk
-    pub fn build_new_responder(
-        local_private_key: &[u8],
-        remote_public_key: &[u8],
-        psk: &[u8],
-    ) -> Result<Self, NoiseError> {
-        let handshake_state =
-            Self::prepare_handshake_state(local_private_key, remote_public_key, psk)
-                .build_responder()?;
-        Ok(Self::new(handshake_state))
-    }
-
    /// Processes a single, complete incoming Noise message frame.
    ///
    /// Assumes the caller handles buffering and framing to provide one full message.
@@ -335,3 +288,43 @@ impl NoiseProtocol {
        }
    }
 }
+
+pub fn create_noise_state(
+    local_private_key: &[u8],
+    remote_public_key: &[u8],
+    psk: &[u8],
+) -> Result<NoiseProtocol, NoiseError> {
+    let pattern_name = crate::NOISE_PATTERN;
+    let psk_index = crate::NOISE_PSK_INDEX;
+    let noise_params: NoiseParams = pattern_name.parse().unwrap();
+
+    let builder = snow::Builder::new(noise_params.clone());
+    // Using dummy remote key as it's not needed for state creation itself
+    // In a real scenario, the key would depend on initiator/responder role
+    let handshake_state = builder
+        .local_private_key(local_private_key)
+        .remote_public_key(remote_public_key) // Use own public as dummy remote
+        .psk(psk_index, psk)
+        .build_initiator()?;
+    Ok(NoiseProtocol::new(handshake_state))
+}
+
+pub fn create_noise_state_responder(
+    local_private_key: &[u8],
+    remote_public_key: &[u8],
+    psk: &[u8],
+) -> Result<NoiseProtocol, NoiseError> {
+    let pattern_name = crate::NOISE_PATTERN;
+    let psk_index = crate::NOISE_PSK_INDEX;
+    let noise_params: NoiseParams = pattern_name.parse().unwrap();
+
+    let builder = snow::Builder::new(noise_params.clone());
+    // Using dummy remote key as it's not needed for state creation itself
+    // In a real scenario, the key would depend on initiator/responder role
+    let handshake_state = builder
+        .local_private_key(local_private_key)
+        .remote_public_key(remote_public_key) // Use own public as dummy remote
+        .psk(psk_index, psk)
+        .build_responder()?;
+    Ok(NoiseProtocol::new(handshake_state))
+}
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

 use crate::LpError;
-use crate::message::{LpMessage, MessageType};
+use crate::message::LpMessage;
 use crate::replay::ReceivingKeyCounterValidator;
 use bytes::{BufMut, BytesMut};
 use nym_lp_common::format_debug_bytes;
@@ -53,10 +53,6 @@ impl LpPacket {
        }
    }

-    pub fn typ(&self) -> MessageType {
-        self.message.typ()
-    }
-
    /// Compute a hash of the message payload
    ///
    /// This can be used for message integrity verification or deduplication
@@ -207,9 +203,9 @@ impl LpHeader {
 }

 impl LpHeader {
-    pub fn new(receiver_idx: u32, counter: u64, protocol_version: u8) -> Self {
+    pub fn new(receiver_idx: u32, counter: u64) -> Self {
        Self {
-            protocol_version,
+            protocol_version: version::CURRENT,
            reserved: [0u8; 3],
            receiver_idx,
            counter,
@@ -269,7 +265,7 @@ impl LpHeader {

        Ok(LpHeader {
            protocol_version,
-            reserved,
+            reserved: [0u8; 3],
            receiver_idx,
            counter,
        })
@@ -1,46 +1,59 @@
 // Copyright 2026 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

-use crate::{ClientHelloData, LpError};
+use libcrux_kem::{MlKem768PrivateKey, MlKem768PublicKey};
+use libcrux_psq::handshake::Responder;
+use libcrux_psq::handshake::types::{DHKeyPair, DHPrivateKey, DHPublicKey};
 use nym_crypto::asymmetric::{ed25519, x25519};
-use nym_kkt::ciphersuite::{Ciphersuite, KEM, KEMKeyDigests, SignatureScheme, SigningKeyDigests};
+use nym_kkt::ciphersuite::{
+    Ciphersuite, DecapsulationKey, EncapsulationKey, KEM, KEMKeyDigests, KemKeyPair,
+    SignatureScheme, SigningKeyDigests,
+};
+use rand::rngs::ThreadRng;
 use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::fmt::Debug;
 use std::sync::Arc;

+use crate::psq::build_responder;
+
 /// Representation of a local Lewes Protocol peer
 /// encapsulating all the known information and keys.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone)]
 pub struct LpLocalPeer {
+    pub(crate) ciphersuite: Ciphersuite,
+
    /// Local Ed25519 keys for PSQ authentication
    pub(crate) ed25519: Arc<ed25519::KeyPair>,

    /// Local x25519 keys (Noise static key)
-    pub(crate) x25519: Arc<x25519::KeyPair>,
+    pub(crate) x25519: Arc<DHKeyPair>,

-    /// Local KEM key used for PSQ
-    pub(crate) kem_psq: Option<Arc<x25519::KeyPair>>,
+    /// Local KEM keys used for PSQ
+    pub(crate) kem_keypairs: HashMap<KEM, Arc<KemKeyPair>>,
 }

 impl LpLocalPeer {
-    pub fn new(ed25519: Arc<ed25519::KeyPair>, x25519: Arc<x25519::KeyPair>) -> Self {
+    pub fn new(
+        ciphersuite: Ciphersuite,
+        ed25519: Arc<ed25519::KeyPair>,
+        x25519: Arc<x25519::KeyPair>,
+    ) -> Self {
+        // TODO: make nicer conversion (without cloning) + error handling
+        let initiator_libcrux_x25519_private_key =
+            DHPrivateKey::from_bytes(x25519.private_key().as_bytes()).unwrap();
+        let initiator_x25519_keypair = DHKeyPair::from(initiator_libcrux_x25519_private_key);
+
        LpLocalPeer {
+            ciphersuite,
            ed25519,
-            x25519,
-            kem_psq: None,
+            x25519: Arc::new(initiator_x25519_keypair),
+            kem_keypairs: Default::default(),
        }
    }

-    pub fn build_client_hello_data(&self, timestamp: u64) -> ClientHelloData {
-        ClientHelloData::new_with_fresh_salt(
-            *self.x25519().public_key(),
-            *self.ed25519().public_key(),
-            timestamp,
-        )
-    }
-
-    #[must_use]
-    pub fn with_kem_psq_key(mut self, key: Arc<x25519::KeyPair>) -> Self {
-        self.kem_psq = Some(key);
+    pub fn with_kem_keypair(mut self, keypair: Arc<KemKeyPair>) -> Self {
+        let kem = keypair.kem();
+        self.kem_keypairs.insert(kem, keypair);
        self
    }

@@ -48,55 +61,48 @@ impl LpLocalPeer {
        &self.ed25519
    }

-    pub fn x25519(&self) -> &Arc<x25519::KeyPair> {
+    pub fn x25519(&self) -> &Arc<DHKeyPair> {
        &self.x25519
    }

-    /// Returns the reference to the KEM Public key of the peer (if available).
-    pub fn get_kem_key_handle(&self) -> Result<&x25519::PublicKey, LpError> {
-        self.kem_psq
-            .as_ref()
-            .map(|kp| kp.public_key())
-            .ok_or(LpError::ResponderWithMissingKEMKey)
+    pub fn kem_key(&self, kem: KEM) -> Option<&Arc<KemKeyPair>> {
+        self.kem_keypairs.get(&kem)
    }

    /// Convert this `LpLocalPeer` into a valid `LpRemotePeer` that can be used within tests
    #[doc(hidden)]
    pub fn as_remote(&self) -> LpRemotePeer {
-        let expected_kem_key_digests = match &self.kem_psq {
-            None => HashMap::new(),
-            Some(kem_keys) => {
-                let mut digests = HashMap::new();
-                digests.insert(
-                    KEM::X25519,
-                    nym_kkt::key_utils::produce_key_digests(kem_keys.public_key().as_bytes()),
-                );
-                digests
-            }
-        };
-
        let mut expected_signing_key_digests = HashMap::new();
        expected_signing_key_digests.insert(
            SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
            nym_kkt::key_utils::produce_key_digests(self.ed25519.public_key().as_bytes()),
        );

+        let mut expected_kem_key_digests = HashMap::new();
+        for (kem, kem_key) in &self.kem_keypairs {
+            expected_kem_key_digests.insert(
+                *kem,
+                nym_kkt::key_utils::produce_key_digests(&kem_key.encoded_encapsulation_key()),
+            );
+        }
+
        LpRemotePeer {
            ed25519_public: *self.ed25519.public_key(),
-            x25519_public: *self.x25519.public_key(),
+            x25519_public: self.x25519.pk,
            expected_kem_key_digests,
            expected_signing_key_digests,
        }
    }
+}

-    // this is only exposed in tests as ideally we should be storing the proper types to begin with
-    #[cfg(test)]
-    pub fn encapsulate_kem_key(&self) -> Option<nym_kkt::ciphersuite::EncapsulationKey<'_>> {
-        let pk_bytes = self.kem_psq.as_ref()?.public_key().to_bytes();
-        let libcrux_pk =
-            libcrux_kem::PublicKey::decode(libcrux_kem::Algorithm::X25519, &pk_bytes).ok()?;
-
-        Some(nym_kkt::ciphersuite::EncapsulationKey::X25519(libcrux_pk))
+impl Debug for LpLocalPeer {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        f.debug_struct("LpLocalPeer")
+            .field("ciphersuite", &self.ciphersuite)
+            .field("ed25519", &self.ed25519)
+            .field("x25519", &self.x25519.pk)
+            .field("kem_keypairs", &self.kem_keypairs)
+            .finish()
    }
 }

@@ -108,7 +114,7 @@ pub struct LpRemotePeer {
    pub(crate) ed25519_public: ed25519::PublicKey,

    /// Remote X25519 public key (Noise static key)
-    pub(crate) x25519_public: x25519::PublicKey,
+    pub(crate) x25519_public: DHPublicKey,

    /// Expected digests of the remote's KEM key
    pub(crate) expected_kem_key_digests: HashMap<KEM, KEMKeyDigests>,
@@ -119,9 +125,11 @@ pub struct LpRemotePeer {

 impl LpRemotePeer {
    pub fn new(ed25519_public: ed25519::PublicKey, x25519_public: x25519::PublicKey) -> Self {
+        // TODO: make nicer conversion (without cloning) + error handling
+        let responder_x25519_public_key = DHPublicKey::from_bytes(x25519_public.as_bytes());
        LpRemotePeer {
            ed25519_public,
-            x25519_public,
+            x25519_public: responder_x25519_public_key,
            expected_kem_key_digests: Default::default(),
            expected_signing_key_digests: Default::default(),
        }
@@ -131,8 +139,8 @@ impl LpRemotePeer {
        self.ed25519_public
    }

-    pub fn x25519(&self) -> x25519::PublicKey {
-        self.x25519_public
+    pub fn x25519(&self) -> &DHPublicKey {
+        &self.x25519_public
    }

    #[must_use]
@@ -145,53 +153,65 @@ impl LpRemotePeer {
        self.expected_signing_key_digests = expected_signing_key_digests;
        self
    }
-
-    /// Attempt to retrieve expected KEM key hash of the remote
-    /// for [`nym_kkt::ciphersuite::KEM`] key type and [`nym_kkt::ciphersuite::HashFunction`]
-    /// specified by own [`nym_kkt::ciphersuite::Ciphersuite`]
-    pub(crate) fn expected_kem_key_hash(
-        &self,
-        ciphersuite: Ciphersuite,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, LpError> {
-        let kem = ciphersuite.kem();
-        let hash_function = ciphersuite.hash_function();
-
-        let digests = self
-            .expected_kem_key_digests
-            .get(&kem)
-            .ok_or(LpError::NoKnownKEMKeyDigests { kem, hash_function })?;
-
-        digests
-            .get(&hash_function)
-            .ok_or(LpError::NoKnownKEMKeyDigests { kem, hash_function })
-            .cloned()
-    }
 }

-#[cfg(any(feature = "mock", test))]
-pub fn mock_peer() -> LpLocalPeer {
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub fn mock_peer(kem: KEM) -> LpLocalPeer {
    // use deterministic rng
    let mut rng = nym_test_utils::helpers::deterministic_rng();
-    random_peer(&mut rng)
+
+    let ciphersuite = Ciphersuite::new(
+        kem,
+        nym_kkt::ciphersuite::HashFunction::Blake3,
+        SignatureScheme::Ed25519,
+        nym_kkt::ciphersuite::HashLength::Default,
+    );
+
+    random_peer(&mut rng, ciphersuite)
 }

-#[cfg(any(feature = "mock", test))]
-pub fn random_peer<R: rand::CryptoRng + rand::RngCore>(rng: &mut R) -> LpLocalPeer {
-    let ed25519 = Arc::new(ed25519::KeyPair::new(rng));
-    let x25519 = Arc::new(ed25519.to_x25519());
-    let kem_psq = Some(x25519.clone());
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub fn random_peer<'a, R: rand::CryptoRng + rand::RngCore>(
+    rng: &mut R,
+    ciphersuite: Ciphersuite,
+) -> LpLocalPeer {
+    use nym_kkt::key_utils::{generate_keypair_mceliece, generate_keypair_mlkem};

-    LpLocalPeer {
+    let ed25519 = Arc::new(ed25519::KeyPair::new(rng));
+
+    let mut sk = [0u8; 32];
+    rng.fill_bytes(&mut sk);
+
+    // clamp
+    sk[0] &= 248u8;
+    sk[31] &= 127u8;
+    sk[31] |= 64u8;
+
+    let x25519 = Arc::new(DHKeyPair::from(DHPrivateKey::from_bytes(&sk).unwrap()));
+
+    let default_peer = LpLocalPeer {
+        ciphersuite: Arc::new(ciphersuite),
        ed25519,
        x25519,
-        kem_psq,
+        mlkem: None,
+        mceliece: None,
+    };
+
+    match ciphersuite.kem() {
+        KEM::MlKem768 => {
+            let mlkem_keypair = generate_keypair_mlkem(&mut rand09::rng());
+            default_peer.with_mlkem_keypair(&mlkem_keypair.0, &mlkem_keypair.1)
+        }
+        KEM::McEliece => {
+            let mceliece_keypair = generate_keypair_mceliece(&mut rand09::rng());
+            default_peer.with_mceliece_keypair(mceliece_keypair.0, mceliece_keypair.1)
+        }
+        _ => unreachable!(),
    }
 }

-#[cfg(any(feature = "mock", test))]
-pub fn mock_peers() -> (LpLocalPeer, LpLocalPeer) {
-    // use deterministic rng
-    let mut rng = nym_test_utils::helpers::deterministic_rng();
-
-    (random_peer(&mut rng), random_peer(&mut rng))
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub fn mock_peers(kem: KEM) -> (LpLocalPeer, LpLocalPeer) {
+    println!("KEM: {:?}", kem);
+    (mock_peer(kem), mock_peer(kem))
 }
@@ -47,11 +47,12 @@
 //! - **No cleanup needed**: No state was mutated

 use crate::LpError;
+use libcrux_psq::handshake::types::{DHPrivateKey, DHPublicKey};
 use libcrux_psq::v1::cred::{Authenticator, Ed25519};
 use libcrux_psq::v1::impls::X25519 as PsqX25519;
 use libcrux_psq::v1::psk_registration::{Initiator, InitiatorMsg, Responder};
 use libcrux_psq::v1::traits::{Ciphertext as PsqCiphertext, PSQ};
-use nym_crypto::asymmetric::{ed25519, x25519};
+use nym_crypto::asymmetric::ed25519;
 use nym_kkt::ciphersuite::{DecapsulationKey, EncapsulationKey};
 use std::time::Duration;
 use tls_codec::{Deserialize as TlsDeserializeTrait, Serialize as TlsSerializeTrait};
@@ -136,13 +137,15 @@ pub struct PsqResponderResult {
 /// // Send ciphertext to gateway
 /// ```
 pub fn derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
-    local_x25519_private: &x25519::PrivateKey,
-    remote_x25519_public: &x25519::PublicKey,
+    local_x25519_private: &DHPrivateKey,
+    remote_x25519_public: &DHPublicKey,
    remote_kem_public: &EncapsulationKey,
    salt: &[u8; 32],
 ) -> Result<([u8; 32], Vec<u8>), LpError> {
    // Step 1: Classical ECDH for baseline security
-    let ecdh_secret = local_x25519_private.diffie_hellman(remote_x25519_public);
+    // let ecdh_secret = local_x25519_private.diffie_hellman(remote_x25519_public);
+
+    let ecdh_secret: [u8; 32] = unimplemented!("unexposed by libcrux");

    // Step 2: PSQ encapsulation for post-quantum security
    // KEM algorithm migration path:
@@ -171,7 +174,7 @@ pub fn derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
    combined.extend_from_slice(&psq_psk); // psq_psk is [u8; 32], need &
    combined.extend_from_slice(salt);

-    let final_psk = nym_crypto::kdf::derive_key_blake3(PSK_PSQ_CONTEXT, &combined, &[]);
+    let final_psk = nym_crypto::hkdf::blake3::derive_key_blake3(PSK_PSQ_CONTEXT, &combined, &[]);

    // Serialize ciphertext using TLS encoding for transport
    let ct_bytes = ciphertext
@@ -219,14 +222,16 @@ pub fn derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
 /// )?;
 /// ```
 pub fn derive_psk_with_psq_responder(
-    local_x25519_private: &x25519::PrivateKey,
-    remote_x25519_public: &x25519::PublicKey,
+    local_x25519_private: &DHPrivateKey,
+    remote_x25519_public: &DHPublicKey,
    local_kem_keypair: (&DecapsulationKey, &EncapsulationKey),
    ciphertext: &[u8],
    salt: &[u8; 32],
 ) -> Result<[u8; 32], LpError> {
    // Step 1: Classical ECDH for baseline security
-    let ecdh_secret = local_x25519_private.diffie_hellman(remote_x25519_public);
+    // let ecdh_secret = local_x25519_private.diffie_hellman(remote_x25519_public);
+
+    let ecdh_secret: [u8; 32] = unimplemented!("unexposed by libcrux");

    // Step 2: Extract X25519 keypair from DecapsulationKey/EncapsulationKey
    let (kem_sk, kem_pk) = match (local_kem_keypair.0, local_kem_keypair.1) {
@@ -252,7 +257,7 @@ pub fn derive_psk_with_psq_responder(
    combined.extend_from_slice(&psq_psk); // psq_psk is [u8; 32], need &
    combined.extend_from_slice(salt);

-    let final_psk = nym_crypto::kdf::derive_key_blake3(PSK_PSQ_CONTEXT, &combined, &[]);
+    let final_psk = nym_crypto::hkdf::blake3::derive_key_blake3(PSK_PSQ_CONTEXT, &combined, &[]);

    Ok(final_psk)
 }
@@ -279,8 +284,8 @@ pub fn derive_psk_with_psq_responder(
 /// # Returns
 /// `PsqInitiatorResult` containing PSK, payload, and raw PQ shared secret
 pub fn psq_initiator_create_message(
-    local_x25519_private: &x25519::PrivateKey,
-    remote_x25519_public: &x25519::PublicKey,
+    local_x25519_private: &DHPrivateKey,
+    remote_x25519_public: &DHPublicKey,
    remote_kem_public: &EncapsulationKey,
    client_ed25519_sk: &ed25519::PrivateKey,
    client_ed25519_pk: &ed25519::PublicKey,
@@ -288,7 +293,9 @@ pub fn psq_initiator_create_message(
    session_context: &[u8],
 ) -> Result<PsqInitiatorResult, LpError> {
    // Step 1: Classical ECDH for baseline security
-    let ecdh_secret = local_x25519_private.diffie_hellman(remote_x25519_public);
+    // let ecdh_secret = local_x25519_private.diffie_hellman(remote_x25519_public);
+
+    let ecdh_secret: [u8; 32] = unimplemented!("unexposed by libcrux");

    // Step 2: PSQ v1 with Ed25519 authentication
    // Extract X25519 KEM key from EncapsulationKey
@@ -338,7 +345,7 @@ pub fn psq_initiator_create_message(
    combined.extend_from_slice(psq_psk); // psq_psk is already a &[u8; 32]
    combined.extend_from_slice(salt);

-    let final_psk = nym_crypto::kdf::derive_key_blake3(PSK_PSQ_CONTEXT, &combined, &[]);
+    let final_psk = nym_crypto::hkdf::blake3::derive_key_blake3(PSK_PSQ_CONTEXT, &combined, &[]);

    // Serialize InitiatorMsg with TLS encoding for transport
    let msg_bytes = initiator_msg
@@ -374,8 +381,8 @@ pub fn psq_initiator_create_message(
 /// # Returns
 /// `PsqResponderResult` containing PSK, PSK handle, and raw PQ shared secret
 pub fn psq_responder_process_message(
-    local_x25519_private: &x25519::PrivateKey,
-    remote_x25519_public: &x25519::PublicKey,
+    local_x25519_private: &DHPrivateKey,
+    remote_x25519_public: &DHPublicKey,
    local_kem_keypair: (&DecapsulationKey, &EncapsulationKey),
    initiator_ed25519_pk: &ed25519::PublicKey,
    psq_payload: &[u8],
@@ -383,7 +390,8 @@ pub fn psq_responder_process_message(
    session_context: &[u8],
 ) -> Result<PsqResponderResult, LpError> {
    // Step 1: Classical ECDH for baseline security
-    let ecdh_secret = local_x25519_private.diffie_hellman(remote_x25519_public);
+    // let ecdh_secret = local_x25519_private.diffie_hellman(remote_x25519_public);
+    let ecdh_secret: [u8; 32] = unimplemented!("unexposed by libcrux");

    // Step 2: Extract X25519 keypair from DecapsulationKey/EncapsulationKey
    let (kem_sk, kem_pk) = match (local_kem_keypair.0, local_kem_keypair.1) {
@@ -447,7 +455,7 @@ pub fn psq_responder_process_message(
    combined.extend_from_slice(&psq_psk); // psq_psk is [u8; 32], need &
    combined.extend_from_slice(salt);

-    let final_psk = nym_crypto::kdf::derive_key_blake3(PSK_PSQ_CONTEXT, &combined, &[]);
+    let final_psk = nym_crypto::hkdf::blake3::derive_key_blake3(PSK_PSQ_CONTEXT, &combined, &[]);

    // Step 7: Serialize ResponderMsg (contains ctxt_B - encrypted PSK handle)
    use tls_codec::Serialize;
@@ -482,7 +490,7 @@ pub fn psq_responder_process_message(
 /// # Returns
 /// 32-byte PSK for Noise KKpsk0 handshake
 pub fn derive_subsession_psk(pq_shared_secret: &[u8; 32], subsession_index: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
-    nym_crypto::kdf::derive_key_blake3(
+    nym_crypto::hkdf::blake3::derive_key_blake3(
        SUBSESSION_PSK_CONTEXT,
        pq_shared_secret,
        &subsession_index.to_le_bytes(),
@@ -492,10 +500,10 @@ pub fn derive_subsession_psk(pq_shared_secret: &[u8; 32], subsession_index: u64)
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
    use super::*;
-    use rand::thread_rng;
+    use libcrux_psq::handshake::types::DHKeyPair;

-    fn generate_x25519_keypair() -> x25519::KeyPair {
-        x25519::KeyPair::new(&mut thread_rng())
+    fn generate_x25519_keypair() -> DHKeyPair {
+        DHKeyPair::new(&mut rand09::rng())
    }

    #[test]
@@ -510,18 +518,13 @@ mod tests {
        let dec_key = DecapsulationKey::X25519(_kem_sk);

        // Client derives PSK
-        let (client_psk, ciphertext) = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
-            keypair_1.private_key(),
-            keypair_2.public_key(),
-            &enc_key,
-            &salt,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
+        let (client_psk, ciphertext) =
+            derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(keypair_1.sk(), &keypair_2.pk, &enc_key, &salt).unwrap();

        // Gateway derives PSK from their perspective
        let gateway_psk = derive_psk_with_psq_responder(
-            keypair_2.private_key(),
-            keypair_1.public_key(),
+            keypair_2.sk(),
+            &keypair_1.pk,
            (&dec_key, &enc_key),
            &ciphertext,
            &salt,
@@ -545,20 +548,10 @@ mod tests {
        let (_kem_sk, kem_pk) = generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, KEM::X25519).unwrap();
        let enc_key = EncapsulationKey::X25519(kem_pk);

-        let psk1 = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
-            keypair_1.private_key(),
-            keypair_2.public_key(),
-            &enc_key,
-            &salt1,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-        let psk2 = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
-            keypair_1.private_key(),
-            keypair_2.public_key(),
-            &enc_key,
-            &salt2,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
+        let psk1 =
+            derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(keypair_1.sk(), &keypair_2.pk, &enc_key, &salt1).unwrap();
+        let psk2 =
+            derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(keypair_1.sk(), &keypair_2.pk, &enc_key, &salt2).unwrap();

        assert_ne!(psk1, psk2, "Different salts should produce different PSKs");
    }
@@ -574,20 +567,10 @@ mod tests {
        let (_kem_sk, kem_pk) = generate_keypair_libcrux(&mut rng, KEM::X25519).unwrap();
        let enc_key = EncapsulationKey::X25519(kem_pk);

-        let psk1 = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
-            keypair_1.private_key(),
-            keypair_2.public_key(),
-            &enc_key,
-            &salt,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-        let psk2 = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
-            keypair_1.private_key(),
-            keypair_3.public_key(),
-            &enc_key,
-            &salt,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
+        let psk1 =
+            derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(keypair_1.sk(), &keypair_2.pk, &enc_key, &salt).unwrap();
+        let psk2 =
+            derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(keypair_1.sk(), &keypair_3.pk, &enc_key, &salt).unwrap();

        assert_ne!(
            psk1, psk2,
@@ -616,16 +599,16 @@ mod tests {

        // Derive PSK twice with same inputs (initiator side)
        let (_psk1, ct1) = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
-            client_keypair.private_key(),
-            gateway_keypair.public_key(),
+            client_keypair.sk(),
+            &gateway_keypair.pk,
            &enc_key,
            &salt,
        )
        .unwrap();

        let (_psk2, _ct2) = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
-            client_keypair.private_key(),
-            gateway_keypair.public_key(),
+            client_keypair.sk(),
+            &gateway_keypair.pk,
            &enc_key,
            &salt,
        )
@@ -634,8 +617,8 @@ mod tests {
        // PSKs will be different due to randomness in PSQ, but ciphertexts too
        // This test verifies the function is deterministic given the SAME ciphertext
        let psk_responder1 = derive_psk_with_psq_responder(
-            gateway_keypair.private_key(),
-            client_keypair.public_key(),
+            gateway_keypair.sk(),
+            &client_keypair.pk,
            (&dec_key, &enc_key),
            &ct1,
            &salt,
@@ -643,8 +626,8 @@ mod tests {
        .unwrap();

        let psk_responder2 = derive_psk_with_psq_responder(
-            gateway_keypair.private_key(),
-            client_keypair.public_key(),
+            gateway_keypair.sk(),
+            &client_keypair.pk,
            (&dec_key, &enc_key),
            &ct1, // Same ciphertext
            &salt,
@@ -674,8 +657,8 @@ mod tests {

        // Client derives PSK (initiator)
        let (client_psk, ciphertext) = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
-            client_keypair.private_key(),
-            gateway_keypair.public_key(),
+            client_keypair.sk(),
+            &gateway_keypair.pk,
            &enc_key,
            &salt,
        )
@@ -683,8 +666,8 @@ mod tests {

        // Gateway derives PSK from ciphertext (responder)
        let gateway_psk = derive_psk_with_psq_responder(
-            gateway_keypair.private_key(),
-            client_keypair.public_key(),
+            gateway_keypair.sk(),
+            &client_keypair.pk,
            (&dec_key, &enc_key),
            &ciphertext,
            &salt,
@@ -714,16 +697,16 @@ mod tests {
        let salt = [3u8; 32];

        let (psk1, _) = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
-            client_keypair.private_key(),
-            gateway_keypair.public_key(),
+            client_keypair.sk(),
+            &gateway_keypair.pk,
            &enc_key1,
            &salt,
        )
        .unwrap();

        let (psk2, _) = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
-            client_keypair.private_key(),
-            gateway_keypair.public_key(),
+            client_keypair.sk(),
+            &gateway_keypair.pk,
            &enc_key2,
            &salt,
        )
@@ -748,8 +731,8 @@ mod tests {
        let salt = [4u8; 32];

        let (psk, _) = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
-            client_keypair.private_key(),
-            gateway_keypair.public_key(),
+            client_keypair.sk(),
+            &gateway_keypair.pk,
            &enc_key,
            &salt,
        )
@@ -772,16 +755,16 @@ mod tests {
        let salt2 = [2u8; 32];

        let (psk1, _) = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
-            client_keypair.private_key(),
-            gateway_keypair.public_key(),
+            client_keypair.sk(),
+            &gateway_keypair.pk,
            &enc_key,
            &salt1,
        )
        .unwrap();

        let (psk2, _) = derive_psk_with_psq_initiator(
-            client_keypair.private_key(),
-            gateway_keypair.public_key(),
+            client_keypair.sk(),
+            &gateway_keypair.pk,
            &enc_key,
            &salt2,
        )
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+use libcrux_psq::{
+    Channel,
+    handshake::{
+        RegistrationInitiator, Responder,
+        builders::{CiphersuiteBuilder, PrincipalBuilder},
+        ciphersuites::CiphersuiteName,
+        types::{DHKeyPair, DHPublicKey},
+    },
+};
+use nym_kkt::ciphersuite::{Ciphersuite, DecapsulationKey, EncapsulationKey, KEM, KemKeyPair};
+use rand09::rngs::ThreadRng;
+
+use std::fmt::Debug;
+
+const AAD_INITIATOR_OUTER: &[u8] = b"Test Data I Outer";
+const AAD_INITIATOR_INNER: &[u8] = b"Test Data I Inner";
+const AAD_RESPONDER: &[u8] = b"Test Data R";
+const SESSION_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"Test Context";
+
+pub enum PSQState<'a> {
+    Initiator(RegistrationInitiator<'a, ThreadRng>),
+    Responder(Responder<'a, ThreadRng>),
+}
+impl Debug for PSQState<'_> {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        match self {
+            Self::Initiator(_) => f.debug_tuple("PSQ Initiator").finish(),
+            Self::Responder(_) => f.debug_tuple("PSQ Responder").finish(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn initiator_process(initiator: &mut RegistrationInitiator<ThreadRng>) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut buffer = vec![0u8; 4096];
+    let msg_len = initiator.write_message(b"", &mut buffer).unwrap();
+    buffer.resize(msg_len, 0);
+    buffer
+}
+
+pub fn build_initiator<'a>(
+    ciphersuite: &'a Ciphersuite,
+    session_context: &'a [u8],
+    local_x25519_keys: &'a DHKeyPair,
+    remote_x25519_public: &'a DHPublicKey,
+    remote_kem_public: &'a EncapsulationKey,
+) -> RegistrationInitiator<'a, rand09::rngs::ThreadRng> {
+    //georgio: handle errors
+
+    let initiator_cbuilder = match ciphersuite.kem() {
+        nym_kkt::ciphersuite::KEM::MlKem768 => match remote_kem_public {
+            EncapsulationKey::MlKem768(ml_kem_public_key) => CiphersuiteBuilder::new(
+                CiphersuiteName::X25519_MLKEM768_X25519_CHACHA20POLY1305_HKDFSHA256,
+            )
+            .peer_longterm_mlkem_pk(ml_kem_public_key),
+            _ => panic!(
+                "wrong key type passed (remote_kem_public should be EncapsulationKey::MlKem768)"
+            ),
+        },
+        nym_kkt::ciphersuite::KEM::McEliece => match remote_kem_public {
+            EncapsulationKey::McEliece(mceliece_public_key) => CiphersuiteBuilder::new(
+                CiphersuiteName::X25519_CLASSICMCELIECE_X25519_CHACHA20POLY1305_HKDFSHA256,
+            )
+            .peer_longterm_cmc_pk(mceliece_public_key),
+            _ => panic!(
+                "wrong key type passed (remote_kem_public should be EncapsulationKey::McEliece)"
+            ),
+        },
+        _ => panic!("undefined"),
+    };
+    let initiator_ciphersuite = initiator_cbuilder
+        .longterm_x25519_keys(local_x25519_keys)
+        .peer_longterm_x25519_pk(remote_x25519_public)
+        .build_initiator_ciphersuite()
+        .unwrap();
+
+    PrincipalBuilder::new(rand09::rng())
+        .outer_aad(AAD_INITIATOR_OUTER)
+        .inner_aad(AAD_INITIATOR_INNER)
+        .context(session_context)
+        .build_registration_initiator(initiator_ciphersuite)
+        .unwrap()
+}
+
+// JS: I have removed the `ciphersuite` argument as it was only matching on the key types,
+// which we already obtained matching on the ciphersuite kem type in `LpSession::new`
+pub fn build_responder<'a>(
+    local_x25519_keys: &'a DHKeyPair,
+    local_kem_keys: &'a KemKeyPair,
+) -> Responder<'a, rand09::rngs::ThreadRng> {
+    let responder_ciphersuite = match local_kem_keys {
+        KemKeyPair::MlKem768 {
+            encapsulation_key,
+            decapsulation_key,
+        } => CiphersuiteBuilder::new(
+            CiphersuiteName::X25519_MLKEM768_X25519_CHACHA20POLY1305_HKDFSHA256,
+        )
+        .longterm_mlkem_encapsulation_key(encapsulation_key)
+        .longterm_mlkem_decapsulation_key(decapsulation_key),
+        KemKeyPair::McEliece {
+            encapsulation_key,
+            decapsulation_key,
+        } => CiphersuiteBuilder::new(
+            CiphersuiteName::X25519_CLASSICMCELIECE_X25519_CHACHA20POLY1305_HKDFSHA256,
+        )
+        .longterm_cmc_encapsulation_key(encapsulation_key)
+        .longterm_cmc_decapsulation_key(decapsulation_key),
+        KemKeyPair::XWing { .. } => panic!("unsupported"),
+        KemKeyPair::X25519 { .. } => panic!("unsupported"),
+    }
+    .longterm_x25519_keys(local_x25519_keys)
+    .build_responder_ciphersuite()
+    .unwrap();
+
+    PrincipalBuilder::new(rand09::rng())
+        .outer_aad(AAD_RESPONDER)
+        .context(SESSION_CONTEXT)
+        .build_responder(responder_ciphersuite)
+        .unwrap()
+}
+
+pub fn psq_responder_process<'a>(
+    responder: &'a mut Responder<ThreadRng>,
+    initiator_message: &[u8],
+) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut payload = vec![0u8; 4096];
+    responder
+        .read_message(initiator_message, &mut payload)
+        .unwrap();
+
+    let mut buffer = vec![0u8; 4096];
+    let msg_len = responder.write_message(b"", &mut buffer).unwrap();
+    buffer.resize(msg_len, 0);
+    buffer
+}
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Georgio Nicolas	dc13fa2c27	use authenicator on the responder's side	2026-02-13 10:52:22 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	f35818e75a	fix typo	2026-02-13 06:43:58 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	aea48bd30a	Add test	2026-02-13 06:33:30 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	72a81449be	remove encapsulation key abstraction	2026-02-13 06:10:12 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	d5c4097dff	upgrade kkt	2026-02-13 05:02:19 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	65df76efea	upgrade kkt	2026-02-13 05:00:22 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	6489ed5dd5	remove stuff	2026-02-12 20:06:12 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	66ecccbfe5	replace encryption layer and add masked byte	2026-02-12 20:05:03 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	854ab369a6	wip: sigless kkt	2026-02-11 15:43:36 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	e24eff6945	clippy stuff	2026-02-07 00:25:06 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	38f2d8eca2	restore kkt	2026-02-07 00:15:03 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	064718a75a	this will become stale	2026-02-06 22:39:45 +01:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	c385d14342	most digusting code ever written	2026-01-29 15:43:42 +00:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	3ef986d6ce	more wip: might have to revert	2026-01-29 13:29:32 +00:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	261a36e792	wip	2026-01-29 12:05:04 +00:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	d1acd5b591	attempting to resolve lifetime issues	2026-01-29 09:39:00 +00:00
Georgio Nicolas	d8ca227a5f	purge wip	2026-01-29 09:32:57 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	41fae0cb03	Add Carrier	2026-01-29 05:57:21 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	5146ca92f5	Blake3 hkdf + integration	2026-01-29 02:43:27 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	6256b04cef	Blake3 hkdf	2026-01-29 02:42:23 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	511e8a4649	impl Default for Ciphersuite	2026-01-28 23:57:53 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	defbdc8a40	update rekey docs	2026-01-28 23:40:03 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	1d4977e536	Add docs for rekey algorithm and cleanup kkt crate	2026-01-28 23:34:45 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	a01bb3d9bd	add rekey algorithm	2026-01-28 23:03:01 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	dc98a2aed0	update manifests	2026-01-28 17:54:06 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	06a6df1365	merge with develop	2026-01-28 17:53:15 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	31df6b55b0	kkt type fixes	2026-01-28 17:46:05 +01:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	cef9534dce	temp: use jstuczyn's libcrux fork	2026-01-27 10:16:31 +00:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	0629e37c1b	moved libcrux imports into workspace cargo.toml	2026-01-27 10:11:43 +00:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	ac9166a401	use libcrux' DH key types	2026-01-27 09:43:40 +00:00
Georgio Nicolas	8e1a776b7d	wip: psqv2	2026-01-27 03:46:12 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	9a88018cf2	Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin' into georgio/lp-psqv2-integration	2026-01-27 01:52:33 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	fe45b856b7	make clippy happy	2026-01-26 15:16:29 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	5c50b760a8	enable kkt with mceliece (kkt tests pass)	2026-01-26 15:11:08 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	aafa99ea47	kkt should work with different keys now	2026-01-26 15:01:43 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	4767a719f7	impl hashing of different key types	2026-01-26 14:38:25 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	89d167de08	add key input helper functions	2026-01-26 14:25:12 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	05d5f4ae83	Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin' into georgio/lp-psqv2-integration	2026-01-26 13:28:40 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	2109beeef6	Update keytypes and remove lifetime specifier for mceliece keys	2026-01-26 13:20:18 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	d1a5342625	Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin' into georgio/lp-psqv2-integration	2026-01-25 01:20:43 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	f0645bad57	Merge develop	2026-01-23 13:56:37 +01:00
Georgio Nicolas	60f8fe09a7	Introduce newer mlkem key types	2026-01-23 13:48:55 +01:00