chore: remove legacy gateway key compatibility (#5531 )

* removed aes128ctr key between client and gateway * removed deprecated code and all references to the legacy aes128ctr key * clippy * post rebase fixes
deprecated unpaginated /issued-ticketbooks-challenge request (#5555 )
2025-03-04 16:42:29 +00:00 · 2025-03-04 16:42:08 +00:00 · 2025-03-04 14:59:00 +00:00 · 2025-03-04 14:56:50 +00:00 · 2025-03-04 12:55:45 +00:00 · 2025-03-04 11:00:24 +00:00
299 changed files with 8011 additions and 11120 deletions
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ jobs:
    runs-on: ${{ matrix.platform }}
    env:
      CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
+      RUSTUP_PERMIT_COPY_RENAME: 1
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ jobs:
    runs-on: arc-ubuntu-22.04
    env:
      CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
+      RUSTUP_PERMIT_COPY_RENAME: 1
    steps:
      - name: Check out repository code
        uses: actions/checkout@v4
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ jobs:
    env:
      CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
      IPINFO_API_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.IPINFO_API_TOKEN }}
+      RUSTUP_PERMIT_COPY_RENAME: 1
    steps:
      - name: Install Dependencies (Linux)
        run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get -y install libwebkit2gtk-4.0-dev build-essential curl wget libssl-dev libgtk-3-dev libudev-dev squashfs-tools protobuf-compiler
@@ -4,6 +4,96 @@ Post 1.0.0 release, the changelog format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://

 ## [Unreleased]

+## [2025.4-dorina] (2025-03-04)
+
+- fixed sphinx version metrics registration ([#5546])
+- Feature/chain status api ([#5539])
+- Add SURBs soft threshold ([#5535])
+- Simplify IPR v8 ([#5532])
+- Shared instance for DNS AsyncResolver ([#5523])
+- merge #5512 again after reverting due to incorrect rebase ([#5520])
+- cherry-pick 17d3ff2d775f61aee381d90a304ed416c08f33fc onto dorina ([#5519])
+- cherry-pick 6e5d0dac1b75413c5f09122b0d953f8ec6ef48df onto dorina ([#5518])
+- chore: workspace global panic preventing lints ([#5512])
+- bugfix: dont query for ecash apis unless necessary when spending ticketbooks ([#5508])
+- bugfix: bound check when recovering a reply SURB ([#5502])
+- chore: removed all old coconut code ([#5500])
+- IPR request types v8 ([#5498])
+- Support static routes for HTTP requests ([#5487])
+- build(deps): bump the patch-updates group across 1 directory with 3 updates ([#5482])
+- added missing import to doctest ([#5480])
+- adjusted TestSetup::new_complex to ensure bonded node's existence ([#5478])
+- Trigger contracts CI on main workspace Cargo changes ([#5477])
+- build(deps): bump http from 1.1.0 to 1.2.0 ([#5472])
+- build(deps): bump utoipa-swagger-ui from 8.0.3 to 8.1.0 ([#5471])
+- build(deps): bump colored from 2.1.0 to 2.2.0 ([#5470])
+- build(deps): bump celes from 2.4.0 to 2.5.0 ([#5469])
+- build(deps): bump the patch-updates group with 2 updates ([#5467])
+- build(deps): bump elliptic from 6.5.4 to 6.6.1 in /docker/typescript_client/upload_contract ([#5463])
+- Run cargo autoinherit ([#5460])
+- Fix clippy::precedence ([#5457])
+- Provide Interval context with node descriptor endpoints ([#5456])
+- fix: update fx average rate calcs to ignore 0 values ([#5454])
+- Feature/add gbp currency ([#5453])
+- Add helper to extract a list of sqlite files with journal files wal/shm ([#5452])
+- Add a middleware layer to the nym api allowing for data compression ([#5451])
+- Condense core API functionalities and enable gzip decompression for reqwest payloads ([#5450])
+- build(deps): bump uniffi_build from 0.25.3 to 0.29.0 ([#5448])
+- Upgrade tower to 0.5.2 ([#5446])
+- build(deps): bump hickory-proto from 0.24.2 to 0.24.3 ([#5444])
+- Seedable clients ([#5440])
+- build(deps): bump the patch-updates group across 1 directory with 10 updates ([#5439])
+- Remove all recv_with_delay and add shutdown condition to loops in client-core ([#5435])
+- Disable the test for checking the remaining bandwidth in nym-node-status-api ([#5425])
+- Dz nym node stats ([#5418])
+- build(deps): bump hyper from 1.4.1 to 1.6.0 ([#5416])
+- build(deps): bump publicsuffix from 2.2.3 to 2.3.0 ([#5367])
+- Nymnode entrypoint docker ([#5300])
+
+[#5546]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5546
+[#5539]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5539
+[#5535]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5535
+[#5532]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5532
+[#5523]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5523
+[#5520]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5520
+[#5519]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5519
+[#5518]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5518
+[#5512]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5512
+[#5508]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5508
+[#5502]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5502
+[#5500]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5500
+[#5498]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5498
+[#5487]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5487
+[#5482]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5482
+[#5480]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5480
+[#5478]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5478
+[#5477]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5477
+[#5472]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5472
+[#5471]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5471
+[#5470]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5470
+[#5469]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5469
+[#5467]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5467
+[#5463]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5463
+[#5460]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5460
+[#5457]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5457
+[#5456]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5456
+[#5454]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5454
+[#5453]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5453
+[#5452]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5452
+[#5451]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5451
+[#5450]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5450
+[#5448]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5448
+[#5446]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5446
+[#5444]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5444
+[#5440]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5440
+[#5439]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5439
+[#5435]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5435
+[#5425]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5425
+[#5418]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5418
+[#5416]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5416
+[#5367]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5367
+[#5300]: https://github.com/nymtech/nym/pull/5300
+
 ## [2025.3-ruta] (2025-02-10)

 - Push down forget me to client configs ([#5431])
@@ -66,7 +66,6 @@ members = [
    "common/nym-id",
    "common/nym-metrics",
    "common/nym_offline_compact_ecash",
-    "common/nymcoconut",
    "common/nymsphinx",
    "common/nymsphinx/acknowledgements",
    "common/nymsphinx/addressing",
@@ -192,10 +191,10 @@ aes = "0.8.1"
 aes-gcm = "0.10.1"
 aes-gcm-siv = "0.11.1"
 ammonia = "4"
-anyhow = "1.0.95"
+anyhow = "1.0.97"
 arc-swap = "1.7.1"
 argon2 = "0.5.0"
-async-trait = "0.1.86"
+async-trait = "0.1.87"
 axum = "0.7.5"
 axum-client-ip = "0.6.1"
 axum-extra = "0.9.4"
@@ -206,7 +205,7 @@ bincode = "1.3.3"
 bip39 = { version = "2.0.0", features = ["zeroize"] }
 bit-vec = "0.7.0"                                     # can we unify those?
 bitvec = "1.0.0"
-blake3 = "1.5.5"
+blake3 = "1.6.1"
 bloomfilter = "1.0.14"
 bs58 = "0.5.1"
 bytecodec = "0.4.15"
@@ -216,14 +215,14 @@ celes = "2.5.0"
 cfg-if = "1.0.0"
 chacha20 = "0.9.0"
 chacha20poly1305 = "0.10.1"
-chrono = "0.4.39"
+chrono = "0.4.40"
 cipher = "0.4.3"
-clap = "4.5.30"
+clap = "4.5.31"
 clap_complete = "4.5"
 clap_complete_fig = "4.5"
 colored = "2.2"
 comfy-table = "7.1.4"
-console = "0.15.10"
+console = "0.15.11"
 console-subscriber = "0.1.1"
 console_error_panic_hook = "0.1"
 const-str = "0.5.6"
@@ -247,17 +246,17 @@ envy = "0.4"
 etherparse = "0.13.0"
 eyre = "0.6.9"
 fastrand = "2.1.1"
-flate2 = "1.0.35"
+flate2 = "1.1.0"
 futures = "0.3.31"
 futures-util = "0.3"
 generic-array = "0.14.7"
 getrandom = "0.2.10"
-getset = "0.1.4"
+getset = "0.1.5"
 handlebars = "3.5.5"
 headers = "0.4.0"
 hex = "0.4.3"
 hex-literal = "0.3.3"
-hickory-resolver = "0.24.3"
+hickory-resolver = "0.24.4"
 hkdf = "0.12.3"
 hmac = "0.12.1"
 http = "1"
@@ -273,7 +272,7 @@ inquire = "0.6.2"
 ip_network = "0.4.1"
 ipnetwork = "0.20"
 isocountry = "0.3.2"
-itertools = "0.13.0"
+itertools = "0.14.0"
 k256 = "0.13"
 lazy_static = "1.5.0"
 ledger-transport = "0.10.0"
@@ -310,19 +309,19 @@ rocket_cors = "0.6.0"
 rocket_okapi = "0.8.0"
 rs_merkle = "1.4.2"
 safer-ffi = "0.1.13"
-schemars = "0.8.21"
+schemars = "0.8.22"
 semver = "1.0.25"
 serde = "1.0.217"
-serde_bytes = "0.11.15"
+serde_bytes = "0.11.16"
 serde_derive = "1.0"
-serde_json = "1.0.138"
+serde_json = "1.0.140"
 serde_json_path = "0.7.2"
 serde_repr = "0.1"
 serde_with = "3.9.0"
 serde_yaml = "0.9.25"
 sha2 = "0.10.8"
 si-scale = "0.2.3"
-sphinx-packet = "0.1.1"
+sphinx-packet = "=0.4.0" # make sure to use version 0.4.0 (or higher) that has removed backwards compatibility
 sqlx = "0.7.4"
 strum = "0.26"
 strum_macros = "0.26"
@@ -330,7 +329,7 @@ subtle-encoding = "0.5"
 syn = "1"
 sysinfo = "0.33.0"
 tap = "1.0.1"
-tar = "0.4.43"
+tar = "0.4.44"
 tempfile = "3.15"
 thiserror = "2.0"
 time = "0.3.37"
@@ -438,3 +437,13 @@ opt-level = 'z'
 [profile.release.package.mix-fetch-wasm]
 # lto = true
 opt-level = 'z'
+
+[workspace.lints.clippy]
+unwrap_used = "deny"
+expect_used = "deny"
+todo = "deny"
+dbg_macro = "deny"
+exit = "deny"
+panic = "deny"
+unimplemented = "deny"
+unreachable = "deny"
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
 allow-unwrap-in-tests = true
 allow-expect-in-tests = true
+allow-panic-in-tests = true
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ const DEFAULT_COVER_TRAFFIC_PRIMARY_SIZE_RATIO: f64 = 0.70;
 // clients/client-core/src/client/replies/reply_storage/surb_storage.rs
 const DEFAULT_MINIMUM_REPLY_SURB_STORAGE_THRESHOLD: usize = 10;
 const DEFAULT_MAXIMUM_REPLY_SURB_STORAGE_THRESHOLD: usize = 200;
+const DEFAULT_MINIMUM_REPLY_SURB_THRESHOLD_BUFFER: usize = 0;

 // define how much to request at once
 // clients/client-core/src/client/replies/reply_controller.rs
@@ -621,6 +622,10 @@ pub struct ReplySurbs {
    /// Defines the maximum number of reply surbs the client wants to keep in its storage at any times.
    pub maximum_reply_surb_storage_threshold: usize,

+    /// Defines the soft threshold ontop of the minimum reply surb storage threshold for when the client
+    /// should proactively request additional reply surbs.
+    pub minimum_reply_surb_threshold_buffer: usize,
+
    /// Defines the minimum number of reply surbs the client would request.
    pub minimum_reply_surb_request_size: u32,

@@ -660,6 +665,7 @@ impl Default for ReplySurbs {
        ReplySurbs {
            minimum_reply_surb_storage_threshold: DEFAULT_MINIMUM_REPLY_SURB_STORAGE_THRESHOLD,
            maximum_reply_surb_storage_threshold: DEFAULT_MAXIMUM_REPLY_SURB_STORAGE_THRESHOLD,
+            minimum_reply_surb_threshold_buffer: DEFAULT_MINIMUM_REPLY_SURB_THRESHOLD_BUFFER,
            minimum_reply_surb_request_size: DEFAULT_MINIMUM_REPLY_SURB_REQUEST_SIZE,
            maximum_reply_surb_request_size: DEFAULT_MAXIMUM_REPLY_SURB_REQUEST_SIZE,
            maximum_allowed_reply_surb_request_size: DEFAULT_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED_SURB_REQUEST_SIZE,
@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ impl From<ConfigV5> for Config {
                    maximum_reply_surb_age: value.debug.reply_surbs.maximum_reply_surb_age,
                    maximum_reply_key_age: value.debug.reply_surbs.maximum_reply_key_age,
                    surb_mix_hops: value.debug.reply_surbs.surb_mix_hops,
+                    ..Default::default()
                },
                ..Default::default()
            },
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2025 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+-- make aes256gcm column non-nullable and drop any gateways that still use the legacy keys
+-- (since they'd be unusable after this change)
+CREATE TABLE remote_gateway_details_tmp
+(
+    gateway_id_bs58            TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES registered_gateway (gateway_id_bs58),
+    derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key BLOB NOT NULL,
+    gateway_owner_address      TEXT,
+    gateway_listener           TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+INSERT INTO remote_gateway_details_tmp (gateway_id_bs58, derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key, gateway_owner_address,
+                                        gateway_listener)
+SELECT gateway_id_bs58, derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key, gateway_owner_address, gateway_listener
+FROM remote_gateway_details
+WHERE derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key IS NOT NULL;
+
+DROP TABLE remote_gateway_details;
+ALTER TABLE remote_gateway_details_tmp
+    RENAME TO remote_gateway_details;
@@ -156,48 +156,26 @@ impl StorageManager {

    pub(crate) async fn set_remote_gateway_details(
        &self,
-        remote: &RawRemoteGatewayDetails,
+        gateway_id_bs58: String,
+        derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key: &[u8],
+        gateway_owner_address: Option<String>,
+        gateway_listener: String,
    ) -> Result<(), sqlx::Error> {
        sqlx::query!(
            r#"
-                INSERT INTO remote_gateway_details(gateway_id_bs58, derived_aes128_ctr_blake3_hmac_keys_bs58, derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key, gateway_owner_address, gateway_listener)
-                VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+                INSERT INTO remote_gateway_details(gateway_id_bs58, derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key, gateway_owner_address, gateway_listener)
+                VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)
            "#,
-            remote.gateway_id_bs58,
-            remote.derived_aes128_ctr_blake3_hmac_keys_bs58,
-            remote.derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key,
-            remote.gateway_owner_address,
-            remote.gateway_listener,
+            gateway_id_bs58,
+            derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key,
+            gateway_owner_address,
+            gateway_listener,
        )
            .execute(&self.connection_pool)
            .await?;
        Ok(())
    }

-    pub(crate) async fn update_remote_gateway_key(
-        &self,
-        gateway_id_bs58: &str,
-        derived_aes128_ctr_blake3_hmac_keys_bs58: Option<&str>,
-        derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key: Option<&[u8]>,
-    ) -> Result<(), sqlx::Error> {
-        sqlx::query!(
-            r#"
-                UPDATE remote_gateway_details
-                SET
-                    derived_aes128_ctr_blake3_hmac_keys_bs58 = ?,
-                    derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key = ?
-                WHERE gateway_id_bs58 = ?
-            "#,
-            derived_aes128_ctr_blake3_hmac_keys_bs58,
-            derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key,
-            gateway_id_bs58
-        )
-        .execute(&self.connection_pool)
-        .await?;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
    pub(crate) async fn remove_remote_gateway_details(
        &self,
        gateway_id: &str,
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ use crate::{
 use async_trait::async_trait;
 use manager::StorageManager;
 use nym_crypto::asymmetric::ed25519;
-use nym_gateway_requests::SharedSymmetricKey;
 use std::path::Path;

 pub mod error;
@@ -119,9 +118,16 @@ impl GatewaysDetailsStore for OnDiskGatewaysDetails {

        match &details.details {
            GatewayDetails::Remote(remote_details) => {
-                let raw_details = remote_details.into();
                self.manager
-                    .set_remote_gateway_details(&raw_details)
+                    .set_remote_gateway_details(
+                        remote_details.gateway_id.to_base58_string(),
+                        remote_details.shared_key.as_bytes(),
+                        remote_details
+                            .gateway_owner_address
+                            .as_ref()
+                            .map(|o| o.to_string()),
+                        remote_details.gateway_listener.to_string(),
+                    )
                    .await?;
            }
            GatewayDetails::Custom(custom_details) => {
@@ -134,21 +140,6 @@ impl GatewaysDetailsStore for OnDiskGatewaysDetails {
        Ok(())
    }

-    async fn upgrade_stored_remote_gateway_key(
-        &self,
-        gateway_id: ed25519::PublicKey,
-        updated_key: &SharedSymmetricKey,
-    ) -> Result<(), Self::StorageError> {
-        self.manager
-            .update_remote_gateway_key(
-                &gateway_id.to_base58_string(),
-                None,
-                Some(updated_key.as_bytes()),
-            )
-            .await?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
    // ideally all of those should be run under a storage tx to ensure storage consistency,
    // but at that point it's fine
    async fn remove_gateway_details(&self, gateway_id: &str) -> Result<(), Self::StorageError> {
@@ -2,10 +2,8 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

 use crate::types::{ActiveGateway, GatewayRegistration};
-use crate::{BadGateway, GatewayDetails, GatewaysDetailsStore};
+use crate::{BadGateway, GatewaysDetailsStore};
 use async_trait::async_trait;
-use nym_crypto::asymmetric::ed25519::PublicKey;
-use nym_gateway_requests::{SharedGatewayKey, SharedSymmetricKey};
 use std::collections::HashMap;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use thiserror::Error;
@@ -96,29 +94,6 @@ impl GatewaysDetailsStore for InMemGatewaysDetails {
        Ok(())
    }

-    async fn upgrade_stored_remote_gateway_key(
-        &self,
-        gateway_id: PublicKey,
-        updated_key: &SharedSymmetricKey,
-    ) -> Result<(), Self::StorageError> {
-        let mut guard = self.inner.write().await;
-
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        if let Some(target) = guard.gateways.get_mut(&gateway_id.to_string()) {
-            let GatewayDetails::Remote(details) = &mut target.details else {
-                return Ok(());
-            };
-            assert_eq!(Arc::strong_count(&details.shared_key), 1);
-
-            // eh. that's nasty, but it's only ever used for ephemeral clients so should be fine for now...
-            details.shared_key = Arc::new(SharedGatewayKey::Current(
-                SharedSymmetricKey::try_from_bytes(updated_key.as_bytes()).unwrap(),
-            ))
-        }
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
    async fn remove_gateway_details(&self, gateway_id: &str) -> Result<(), Self::StorageError> {
        let mut guard = self.inner.write().await;
        if let Some(active) = guard.active_gateway.as_ref() {
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@

 use async_trait::async_trait;
 use nym_crypto::asymmetric::identity;
-use nym_gateway_requests::SharedSymmetricKey;
 use std::error::Error;

 pub mod backend;
@@ -62,12 +61,6 @@ pub trait GatewaysDetailsStore {
        details: &GatewayRegistration,
    ) -> Result<(), Self::StorageError>;

-    async fn upgrade_stored_remote_gateway_key(
-        &self,
-        gateway_id: identity::PublicKey,
-        updated_key: &SharedSymmetricKey,
-    ) -> Result<(), Self::StorageError>;
-
    /// Remove given gateway details from the underlying store.
    async fn remove_gateway_details(&self, gateway_id: &str) -> Result<(), Self::StorageError>;
 }
@@ -4,10 +4,9 @@
 use crate::BadGateway;
 use cosmrs::AccountId;
 use nym_crypto::asymmetric::identity;
-use nym_gateway_requests::shared_key::{LegacySharedKeys, SharedGatewayKey, SharedSymmetricKey};
+use nym_gateway_requests::shared_key::SharedSymmetricKey;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use std::fmt::{Display, Formatter};
-use std::ops::Deref;
 use std::str::FromStr;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use time::OffsetDateTime;
@@ -65,7 +64,7 @@ impl From<GatewayDetails> for GatewayRegistration {
 impl GatewayDetails {
    pub fn new_remote(
        gateway_id: identity::PublicKey,
-        shared_key: Arc<SharedGatewayKey>,
+        shared_key: Arc<SharedSymmetricKey>,
        gateway_owner_address: Option<AccountId>,
        gateway_listener: Url,
    ) -> Self {
@@ -88,7 +87,7 @@ impl GatewayDetails {
        }
    }

-    pub fn shared_key(&self) -> Option<&SharedGatewayKey> {
+    pub fn shared_key(&self) -> Option<&SharedSymmetricKey> {
        match self {
            GatewayDetails::Remote(details) => Some(&details.shared_key),
            GatewayDetails::Custom(_) => None,
@@ -168,8 +167,7 @@ pub struct RegisteredGateway {
 #[cfg_attr(feature = "sqlx", derive(sqlx::FromRow))]
 pub struct RawRemoteGatewayDetails {
    pub gateway_id_bs58: String,
-    pub derived_aes128_ctr_blake3_hmac_keys_bs58: Option<String>,
-    pub derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    pub derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key: Vec<u8>,
    pub gateway_owner_address: Option<String>,
    pub gateway_listener: String,
 }
@@ -186,35 +184,11 @@ impl TryFrom<RawRemoteGatewayDetails> for RemoteGatewayDetails {
                }
            })?;

-        let shared_key =
-            match (
-                &value.derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key,
-                &value.derived_aes128_ctr_blake3_hmac_keys_bs58,
-            ) {
-                (None, None) => {
-                    return Err(BadGateway::MissingSharedKey {
-                        gateway_id: value.gateway_id_bs58.clone(),
-                    })
-                }
-                (Some(aes256gcm_siv), _) => {
-                    let current_key =
-                        SharedSymmetricKey::try_from_bytes(aes256gcm_siv).map_err(|source| {
-                            BadGateway::MalformedSharedKeys {
-                                gateway_id: value.gateway_id_bs58.clone(),
-                                source,
-                            }
-                        })?;
-                    SharedGatewayKey::Current(current_key)
-                }
-                (None, Some(aes128ctr_hmac)) => {
-                    let legacy_key = LegacySharedKeys::try_from_base58_string(aes128ctr_hmac)
-                        .map_err(|source| BadGateway::MalformedSharedKeys {
-                            gateway_id: value.gateway_id_bs58.clone(),
-                            source,
-                        })?;
-                    SharedGatewayKey::Legacy(legacy_key)
-                }
-            };
+        let shared_key = SharedSymmetricKey::try_from_bytes(&value.derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key)
+            .map_err(|source| BadGateway::MalformedSharedKeys {
+                gateway_id: value.gateway_id_bs58.clone(),
+                source,
+            })?;

        let gateway_owner_address = value
            .gateway_owner_address
@@ -247,29 +221,11 @@ impl TryFrom<RawRemoteGatewayDetails> for RemoteGatewayDetails {
    }
 }

-impl<'a> From<&'a RemoteGatewayDetails> for RawRemoteGatewayDetails {
-    fn from(value: &'a RemoteGatewayDetails) -> Self {
-        let (derived_aes128_ctr_blake3_hmac_keys_bs58, derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key) =
-            match value.shared_key.deref() {
-                SharedGatewayKey::Current(key) => (None, Some(key.to_bytes())),
-                SharedGatewayKey::Legacy(key) => (Some(key.to_base58_string()), None),
-            };
-
-        RawRemoteGatewayDetails {
-            gateway_id_bs58: value.gateway_id.to_base58_string(),
-            derived_aes128_ctr_blake3_hmac_keys_bs58,
-            derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key,
-            gateway_owner_address: value.gateway_owner_address.as_ref().map(|o| o.to_string()),
-            gateway_listener: value.gateway_listener.to_string(),
-        }
-    }
-}
-
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub struct RemoteGatewayDetails {
    pub gateway_id: identity::PublicKey,

-    pub shared_key: Arc<SharedGatewayKey>,
+    pub shared_key: Arc<SharedSymmetricKey>,

    pub gateway_owner_address: Option<AccountId>,

@@ -394,7 +394,6 @@ where
        config: &Config,
        initialisation_result: InitialisationResult,
        bandwidth_controller: Option<BandwidthController<C, S::CredentialStore>>,
-        details_store: &S::GatewaysDetailsStore,
        packet_router: PacketRouter,
        stats_reporter: ClientStatsSender,
        #[cfg(unix)] connection_fd_callback: Option<Arc<dyn Fn(RawFd) + Send + Sync>>,
@@ -403,7 +402,6 @@ where
    where
        <S::KeyStore as KeyStore>::StorageError: Send + Sync + 'static,
        <S::CredentialStore as CredentialStorage>::StorageError: Send + Sync + 'static,
-        <S::GatewaysDetailsStore as GatewaysDetailsStore>::StorageError: Sync + Send,
    {
        let managed_keys = initialisation_result.client_keys;
        let GatewayDetails::Remote(details) = initialisation_result.gateway_registration.details
@@ -458,31 +456,13 @@ where
        // we need to:
        // - perform handshake (reg or auth)
        // - check for key upgrade
-        // - maybe perform another upgrade handshake
        // - check for bandwidth
        // - start background tasks
-        let auth_res = gateway_client
+        let _auth_res = gateway_client
            .perform_initial_authentication()
            .await
            .map_err(gateway_failure)?;

-        if auth_res.requires_key_upgrade {
-            // drop the shared_key arc because we don't need it and we can't hold it for the purposes of upgrade
-            drop(auth_res);
-
-            let updated_key = gateway_client
-                .upgrade_key_authenticated()
-                .await
-                .map_err(gateway_failure)?;
-
-            details_store
-                .upgrade_stored_remote_gateway_key(gateway_client.gateway_identity(), &updated_key)
-                .await.map_err(|err| {
-                error!("failed to store upgraded gateway key! this connection might be forever broken now: {err}");
-                ClientCoreError::GatewaysDetailsStoreError { source: Box::new(err) }
-            })?
-        }
-
        gateway_client
            .claim_initial_bandwidth()
            .await
@@ -501,7 +481,6 @@ where
        config: &Config,
        initialisation_result: InitialisationResult,
        bandwidth_controller: Option<BandwidthController<C, S::CredentialStore>>,
-        details_store: &S::GatewaysDetailsStore,
        packet_router: PacketRouter,
        stats_reporter: ClientStatsSender,
        #[cfg(unix)] connection_fd_callback: Option<Arc<dyn Fn(RawFd) + Send + Sync>>,
@@ -510,7 +489,6 @@ where
    where
        <S::KeyStore as KeyStore>::StorageError: Send + Sync + 'static,
        <S::CredentialStore as CredentialStorage>::StorageError: Send + Sync + 'static,
-        <S::GatewaysDetailsStore as GatewaysDetailsStore>::StorageError: Sync + Send,
    {
        // if we have setup custom gateway sender and persisted details agree with it, return it
        if let Some(mut custom_gateway_transceiver) = custom_gateway_transceiver {
@@ -533,7 +511,6 @@ where
            config,
            initialisation_result,
            bandwidth_controller,
-            details_store,
            packet_router,
            stats_reporter,
            #[cfg(unix)]
@@ -744,8 +721,7 @@ where
        )
        .await?;

-        let (reply_storage_backend, credential_store, details_store) =
-            self.client_store.into_runtime_stores();
+        let (reply_storage_backend, credential_store, _) = self.client_store.into_runtime_stores();

        // channels for inter-component communication
        // TODO: make the channels be internally created by the relevant components
@@ -826,7 +802,6 @@ where
            &self.config,
            init_res,
            bandwidth_controller,
-            &details_store,
            gateway_packet_router,
            stats_reporter.clone(),
            #[cfg(unix)]
@@ -2,24 +2,11 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

 pub mod v1_1_33 {
-    use crate::client::base_client::{
-        non_wasm_helpers::setup_fs_gateways_storage,
-        storage::helpers::{set_active_gateway, store_gateway_details},
-    };
    use crate::config::disk_persistence::old_v1_1_33::CommonClientPathsV1_1_33;
    use crate::config::disk_persistence::CommonClientPaths;
    use crate::config::old_config_v1_1_33::OldGatewayEndpointConfigV1_1_33;
    use crate::error::ClientCoreError;
-    use nym_client_core_gateways_storage::{
-        CustomGatewayDetails, GatewayDetails, GatewayRegistration, RemoteGatewayDetails,
-    };
-    use nym_gateway_requests::shared_key::LegacySharedKeys;
    use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
-    use sha2::{digest::Digest, Sha256};
-    use std::ops::Deref;
-    use std::path::Path;
-    use std::sync::Arc;
-    use zeroize::Zeroizing;

    mod base64 {
        use base64::{engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, Engine as _};
@@ -57,155 +44,18 @@ pub mod v1_1_33 {
        details: OldGatewayEndpointConfigV1_1_33,
    }

-    impl PersistedGatewayConfig {
-        fn verify(&self, shared_key: &LegacySharedKeys) -> bool {
-            let key_bytes = Zeroizing::new(shared_key.to_bytes());
-
-            let mut key_hasher = Sha256::new();
-            key_hasher.update(&key_bytes);
-            let key_hash = key_hasher.finalize();
-
-            self.key_hash == key_hash.deref()
-        }
-    }
-
    #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
    struct PersistedCustomGatewayDetails {
        gateway_id: String,
    }

-    fn load_shared_key<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<LegacySharedKeys, ClientCoreError> {
-        // the shared key was a simple pem file
-        Ok(nym_pemstore::load_key(path)?)
-    }
-
-    fn gateway_details_from_raw(
-        gateway_id: String,
-        gateway_owner: String,
-        gateway_listener: String,
-        gateway_shared_key: LegacySharedKeys,
-    ) -> Result<GatewayDetails, ClientCoreError> {
-        Ok(GatewayDetails::Remote(RemoteGatewayDetails {
-            gateway_id: gateway_id
-                .parse()
-                .map_err(|err| ClientCoreError::UpgradeFailure {
-                    message: format!("the stored gateway id was malformed: {err}"),
-                })?,
-            shared_key: Arc::new(gateway_shared_key.into()),
-            gateway_owner_address: Some(gateway_owner.parse().map_err(|err| {
-                ClientCoreError::UpgradeFailure {
-                    message: format!("the stored gateway owner address was malformed: {err}"),
-                }
-            })?),
-            gateway_listener: gateway_listener.parse().map_err(|err| {
-                ClientCoreError::UpgradeFailure {
-                    message: format!("the stored gateway listener address was malformed: {err}"),
-                }
-            })?,
-        }))
-    }
-
-    // helper to extract shared key and gateway details into the new GatewayRegistration
-    fn extract_gateway_registration(
-        storage_paths: &CommonClientPathsV1_1_33,
-    ) -> Result<GatewayRegistration, ClientCoreError> {
-        let details_file = std::fs::File::open(&storage_paths.gateway_details).map_err(|err| {
-            ClientCoreError::UpgradeFailure {
-                message: format!(
-                    "failed to open gateway details file at {}: {err}",
-                    storage_paths.gateway_details.display()
-                ),
-            }
-        })?;
-
-        // in v1.1.33 of the clients, the gateway details struct was saved as json
-        let details: PersistedGatewayDetails =
-            serde_json::from_reader(details_file).map_err(|err| {
-                ClientCoreError::UpgradeFailure {
-                    message: format!(
-                        "failed to deserialize gateway details from {}: {err}",
-                        storage_paths.gateway_details.display()
-                    ),
-                }
-            })?;
-
-        let details = match details {
-            PersistedGatewayDetails::Default(config) => {
-                let gateway_shared_key =
-                    load_shared_key(&storage_paths.keys.gateway_shared_key_file)?;
-                if !config.verify(&gateway_shared_key) {
-                    return Err(ClientCoreError::UpgradeFailure {
-                        message: "failed to verify consistency of the existing gateway details"
-                            .to_string(),
-                    });
-                }
-                gateway_details_from_raw(
-                    config.details.gateway_id,
-                    config.details.gateway_owner,
-                    config.details.gateway_listener,
-                    gateway_shared_key,
-                )?
-            }
-            PersistedGatewayDetails::Custom(custom) => {
-                GatewayDetails::Custom(CustomGatewayDetails {
-                    gateway_id: custom.gateway_id.parse().map_err(|err| {
-                        ClientCoreError::UpgradeFailure {
-                            message: format!("the stored gateway id was malformed: {err}"),
-                        }
-                    })?,
-                    data: None,
-                })
-            }
-        };
-
-        Ok(details.into())
-    }
-
-    // it's responsibility of the caller to ensure this is called **after** new registration has already been saved
-    fn remove_old_gateway_details(storage_paths: &CommonClientPathsV1_1_33) -> std::io::Result<()> {
-        std::fs::remove_file(&storage_paths.gateway_details)?;
-
-        if storage_paths.keys.gateway_shared_key_file.exists() {
-            std::fs::remove_file(&storage_paths.keys.gateway_shared_key_file)?;
-        }
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
    pub async fn migrate_gateway_details(
-        old_storage_paths: &CommonClientPathsV1_1_33,
-        new_storage_paths: &CommonClientPaths,
-        preloaded_config: Option<OldGatewayEndpointConfigV1_1_33>,
+        _old_storage_paths: &CommonClientPathsV1_1_33,
+        _new_storage_paths: &CommonClientPaths,
+        _preloaded_config: Option<OldGatewayEndpointConfigV1_1_33>,
    ) -> Result<(), ClientCoreError> {
-        let gateway_registration = match preloaded_config {
-            Some(config) => {
-                let gateway_shared_key =
-                    load_shared_key(&old_storage_paths.keys.gateway_shared_key_file)?;
-                gateway_details_from_raw(
-                    config.gateway_id,
-                    config.gateway_owner,
-                    config.gateway_listener,
-                    gateway_shared_key,
-                )?
-                .into()
-            }
-            None => extract_gateway_registration(old_storage_paths)?,
-        };
-
-        // since we're migrating to a brand new store, the store should be empty
-        // and thus set the 'new' gateway as the active one
-        let details_store =
-            setup_fs_gateways_storage(&new_storage_paths.gateway_registrations).await?;
-        store_gateway_details(&details_store, &gateway_registration).await?;
-        set_active_gateway(
-            &details_store,
-            &gateway_registration.details.gateway_id().to_base58_string(),
-        )
-        .await?;
-
-        remove_old_gateway_details(old_storage_paths).map_err(|err| {
-            ClientCoreError::UpgradeFailure {
-                message: format!("failed to remove old data: {err}"),
-            }
-        })
+        Err(ClientCoreError::UnsupportedMigration(
+            "migration of legacy keys has been removed and is no longer supported".into(),
+        ))
    }
 }
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ use nym_crypto::{
    asymmetric::{encryption, identity},
    hkdf::{DerivationMaterial, InvalidLength},
 };
-use nym_gateway_requests::shared_key::{LegacySharedKeys, SharedGatewayKey, SharedSymmetricKey};
+use nym_gateway_requests::shared_key::SharedSymmetricKey;
 use nym_sphinx::acknowledgements::AckKey;
 use rand::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
 use std::sync::Arc;
@@ -106,7 +106,5 @@ fn _assert_keys_zeroize_on_drop() {
    _assert_zeroize_on_drop::<identity::KeyPair>();
    _assert_zeroize_on_drop::<encryption::KeyPair>();
    _assert_zeroize_on_drop::<AckKey>();
-    _assert_zeroize_on_drop::<LegacySharedKeys>();
    _assert_zeroize_on_drop::<SharedSymmetricKey>();
-    _assert_zeroize_on_drop::<SharedGatewayKey>();
 }
@@ -517,17 +517,25 @@ where
        use crate::error::ClientCoreStatusMessage;

        let packets = self.transmission_buffer.total_size();
-        let backlog = self.transmission_buffer.total_size_in_bytes() as f64 / 1024.0;
-        let lanes = self.transmission_buffer.num_lanes();
+        let lanes = self.transmission_buffer.lanes();
        let mult = self.sending_delay_controller.current_multiplier();
        let delay = self.current_average_message_sending_delay().as_millis();
+
+        let lane_status = lanes
+            .iter()
+            .map(|lane_name| {
+                let lane_length = self.transmission_buffer.lane_length(lane_name).unwrap_or(0);
+                format!("{lane_name:?}: {lane_length}")
+            })
+            .collect::<Vec<String>>()
+            .join(", ");
+
        let status_str = if self.config.traffic.disable_main_poisson_packet_distribution {
-            format!("Packet backlog: {backlog:.2} kiB ({packets}), {lanes} lanes, no delay")
+            format!("Packet backlog: {lane_status}, no delay")
        } else {
-            format!(
-                "Packet backlog: {backlog:.2} kiB ({packets}), {lanes} lanes, avg delay: {delay}ms ({mult})"
-            )
+            format!("Packet backlog: {lane_status}, avg delay: {delay}ms ({mult})")
        };
+
        if packets > 1000 {
            log::warn!("{status_str}");
        } else if packets > 0 {
@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ where
        fragments: I,
        lane: TransmissionLane,
    ) {
+        trace!("buffering pending replies for {recipient}");
        self.pending_replies
            .entry(*recipient)
            .or_insert_with(TransmissionBuffer::new)
@@ -113,6 +114,7 @@ where
        recipient: &AnonymousSenderTag,
        fragments: Vec<(TransmissionLane, Fragment)>,
    ) {
+        trace!("re-inserting pending replies for {recipient}");
        // the buffer should ALWAYS exist at this point, if it doesn't, it's a bug...
        self.pending_replies
            .entry(*recipient)
@@ -125,6 +127,7 @@ where
        recipient: &AnonymousSenderTag,
        data: Vec<Arc<PendingAcknowledgement>>,
    ) {
+        trace!("re-inserting pending retransmissions for {recipient}");
        // the underlying entry MUST exist as we've just got data from there
        let map_entry = self
            .pending_retransmissions
@@ -142,7 +145,7 @@ where
    }

    fn should_request_more_surbs(&self, target: &AnonymousSenderTag) -> bool {
-        trace!("checking if we should request more surbs from {:?}", target);
+        trace!("checking if we should request more surbs from {target}");

        let pending_queue_size = self
            .pending_replies
@@ -158,11 +161,6 @@ where

        let total_queue = pending_queue_size + retransmission_queue;

-        // simple as that - there's absolutely nothing to retransmit
-        if total_queue == 0 {
-            return false;
-        }
-
        let available_surbs = self
            .full_reply_storage
            .surbs_storage_ref()
@@ -179,11 +177,27 @@ where
            .full_reply_storage
            .surbs_storage_ref()
            .max_surb_threshold();
+        let min_surbs_threshold_buffer =
+            self.config.reply_surbs.minimum_reply_surb_threshold_buffer;

-        debug!("total queue size: {total_queue} = pending data {pending_queue_size} + pending retransmission {retransmission_queue}, available surbs: {available_surbs} pending surbs: {pending_surbs} threshold range: {min_surbs_threshold}..{max_surbs_threshold}");
+        // After clearing the queue, we want to have at least `min_surbs_threshold` surbs available
+        // and reserved for requesting additional surbs, and in addition to that we also want to
+        // have `min_surbs_threshold_buffer` surbs available proactively.
+        let target_surbs_after_clearing_queue = min_surbs_threshold + min_surbs_threshold_buffer;

-        (pending_surbs + available_surbs) < max_surbs_threshold
-            && (pending_surbs + available_surbs) < (total_queue + min_surbs_threshold)
+        // Check if we have enough surbs to handle the total queue and maintain minimum thresholds
+        let total_required_surbs = total_queue + target_surbs_after_clearing_queue;
+        let total_available_surbs = pending_surbs + available_surbs;
+
+        debug!("total queue size: {total_queue} = pending data {pending_queue_size} + pending retransmission {retransmission_queue}, available surbs: {available_surbs} pending surbs: {pending_surbs} threshold range: {min_surbs_threshold}..+{min_surbs_threshold_buffer}..{max_surbs_threshold}");
+
+        // We should request more surbs if:
+        // 1. We haven't hit the maximum surb threshold, and
+        // 2. We don't have enough surbs to handle the queue plus minimum thresholds
+        let is_below_max_threshold = total_available_surbs < max_surbs_threshold;
+        let is_below_required_surbs = total_available_surbs < total_required_surbs;
+
+        is_below_max_threshold && is_below_required_surbs
    }

    async fn handle_send_reply(
@@ -244,6 +258,10 @@ where
                        &recipient_tag,
                    );
                    warn!("failed to send reply to {recipient_tag}: {err}");
+                    info!(
+                        "buffering {no_fragments} fragments for {recipient_tag}",
+                        no_fragments = to_send.len()
+                    );
                    self.insert_pending_replies(&recipient_tag, to_send, lane);
                }
            }
@@ -251,6 +269,13 @@ where

        // if there's leftover data we didn't send because we didn't have enough (or any) surbs - buffer it
        if !fragments.is_empty() {
+            // Ideally we should have enough surbs above the minimum threshold to handle sending
+            // new replies without having to first request more surbs. That's why I'd like to log
+            // these cases as they might indicate a problem with the surb management.
+            debug!(
+                "buffering {no_fragments} fragments for {recipient_tag}",
+                no_fragments = fragments.len()
+            );
            self.insert_pending_replies(&recipient_tag, fragments, lane);
        }

@@ -265,6 +290,7 @@ where
        target: AnonymousSenderTag,
        amount: u32,
    ) -> Result<(), PreparationError> {
+        debug!("requesting {amount} additional reply surbs for {target}");
        let reply_surb = self
            .full_reply_storage
            .surbs_storage_ref()
@@ -686,7 +712,7 @@ where
    // it should take into consideration the average latency, sending rate and queue size.
    // it should request as many surbs as it takes to saturate its sending rate before next batch arrives
    async fn request_reply_surbs_for_queue_clearing(&mut self, target: AnonymousSenderTag) {
-        trace!("requesting surbs for queues clearing");
+        trace!("requesting surbs for queue clearing");

        let pending_queue_size = self
            .pending_replies
@@ -700,17 +726,18 @@ where
            .map(|pending_queue| pending_queue.len())
            .unwrap_or_default();

+        let min_surbs_buffer = self.config.reply_surbs.minimum_reply_surb_threshold_buffer as u32;
+
        let total_queue = (pending_queue_size + retransmission_queue) as u32;

-        if total_queue == 0 {
-            trace!("the pending queues for {:?} are already empty", target);
-            return;
-        }
+        // To proactively request additional surbs, we aim to have a buffer of extra surbs in our
+        // storage.
+        let total_queue_with_buffer = total_queue + min_surbs_buffer;

        let request_size = min(
            self.config.reply_surbs.maximum_reply_surb_request_size,
            max(
-                total_queue,
+                total_queue_with_buffer,
                self.config.reply_surbs.minimum_reply_surb_request_size,
            ),
        );
@@ -58,8 +58,8 @@ impl<T> TransmissionBuffer<T> {
    }

    #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
-    pub(crate) fn num_lanes(&self) -> usize {
-        self.buffer.keys().count()
+    pub(crate) fn lanes(&self) -> Vec<TransmissionLane> {
+        self.buffer.keys().cloned().collect()
    }

    pub(crate) fn lane_length(&self, lane: &TransmissionLane) -> Option<usize> {
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ impl<T> TransmissionBuffer<T> {
    }

    #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
+    #[allow(unused)]
    pub(crate) fn total_size_in_bytes(&self) -> usize
    where
        T: SizedData,
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ use std::path::PathBuf;

 #[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]
 pub enum ClientCoreError {
+    #[error("could not perform the state migration: {0}")]
+    UnsupportedMigration(String),
+
    #[error("I/O error: {0}")]
    IoError(#[from] std::io::Error),

@@ -335,14 +335,6 @@ pub(super) async fn register_with_gateway(
            }
        })?;

-    // this should NEVER happen, if it did, it means the function was misused,
-    // because for any fresh **registration**, the derived key is always up to date
-    if auth_response.requires_key_upgrade {
-        return Err(ClientCoreError::UnexpectedKeyUpgrade {
-            gateway_id: gateway_id.to_base58_string(),
-        });
-    }
-
    Ok(RegistrationResult {
        shared_keys: auth_response.initial_shared_key,
        authenticated_ephemeral_client: gateway_client,
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ use nym_client_core_gateways_storage::{
 };
 use nym_crypto::asymmetric::identity;
 use nym_gateway_client::client::InitGatewayClient;
-use nym_gateway_requests::shared_key::SharedGatewayKey;
+use nym_gateway_requests::shared_key::SharedSymmetricKey;
 use nym_sphinx::addressing::clients::Recipient;
 use nym_topology::node::RoutingNode;
 use nym_validator_client::client::IdentityKey;
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ impl SelectedGateway {
 /// - shared keys derived between ourselves and the node
 /// - an authenticated handle of an ephemeral handle created for the purposes of registration
 pub struct RegistrationResult {
-    pub shared_keys: Arc<SharedGatewayKey>,
+    pub shared_keys: Arc<SharedSymmetricKey>,
    pub authenticated_ephemeral_client: InitGatewayClient,
 }

@@ -20,9 +20,8 @@ use nym_credentials_interface::TicketType;
 use nym_crypto::asymmetric::identity;
 use nym_gateway_requests::registration::handshake::client_handshake;
 use nym_gateway_requests::{
-    BinaryRequest, ClientControlRequest, ClientRequest, SensitiveServerResponse, ServerResponse,
-    SharedGatewayKey, SharedSymmetricKey, AES_GCM_SIV_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
-    CREDENTIAL_UPDATE_V2_PROTOCOL_VERSION, CURRENT_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+    BinaryRequest, ClientControlRequest, ClientRequest, GatewayProtocolVersionExt, ServerResponse,
+    SharedSymmetricKey, CREDENTIAL_UPDATE_V2_PROTOCOL_VERSION, CURRENT_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
 };
 use nym_sphinx::forwarding::packet::MixPacket;
 use nym_statistics_common::clients::connection::ConnectionStatsEvent;
@@ -47,7 +46,6 @@ use std::os::raw::c_int as RawFd;
 use wasm_utils::websocket::JSWebsocket;
 #[cfg(target_arch = "wasm32")]
 use wasmtimer::tokio::sleep;
-use zeroize::Zeroizing;

 pub mod config;

@@ -82,8 +80,7 @@ impl GatewayConfig {
 #[must_use]
 #[derive(Debug)]
 pub struct AuthenticationResponse {
-    pub initial_shared_key: Arc<SharedGatewayKey>,
-    pub requires_key_upgrade: bool,
+    pub initial_shared_key: Arc<SharedSymmetricKey>,
 }

 // TODO: this should be refactored into a state machine that keeps track of its authentication state
@@ -95,7 +92,7 @@ pub struct GatewayClient<C, St = EphemeralCredentialStorage> {
    gateway_address: String,
    gateway_identity: identity::PublicKey,
    local_identity: Arc<identity::KeyPair>,
-    shared_key: Option<Arc<SharedGatewayKey>>,
+    shared_key: Option<Arc<SharedSymmetricKey>>,
    connection: SocketState,
    packet_router: PacketRouter,
    bandwidth_controller: Option<BandwidthController<C, St>>,
@@ -119,7 +116,7 @@ impl<C, St> GatewayClient<C, St> {
        gateway_config: GatewayConfig,
        local_identity: Arc<identity::KeyPair>,
        // TODO: make it mandatory. if you don't want to pass it, use `new_init`
-        shared_key: Option<Arc<SharedGatewayKey>>,
+        shared_key: Option<Arc<SharedSymmetricKey>>,
        packet_router: PacketRouter,
        bandwidth_controller: Option<BandwidthController<C, St>>,
        stats_reporter: ClientStatsSender,
@@ -149,7 +146,7 @@ impl<C, St> GatewayClient<C, St> {
        self.gateway_identity
    }

-    pub fn shared_key(&self) -> Option<Arc<SharedGatewayKey>> {
+    pub fn shared_key(&self) -> Option<Arc<SharedSymmetricKey>> {
        self.shared_key.clone()
    }

@@ -204,15 +201,15 @@ impl<C, St> GatewayClient<C, St> {
            "Attemting to establish connection to gateway at: {}",
            self.gateway_address
        );
-        let (ws_stream, _) = connect_async(&self.gateway_address).await?;
+        let (ws_stream, _) = connect_async(
+            &self.gateway_address,
+            #[cfg(unix)]
+            self.connection_fd_callback.clone(),
+        )
+        .await?;

        self.connection = SocketState::Available(Box::new(ws_stream));

-        #[cfg(unix)]
-        if let (Some(callback), Some(fd)) = (self.connection_fd_callback.as_ref(), self.ws_fd()) {
-            callback.as_ref()(fd);
-        }
-
        Ok(())
    }

@@ -271,7 +268,7 @@ impl<C, St> GatewayClient<C, St> {
        message: ClientRequest,
    ) -> Result<(), GatewayClientError> {
        if let Some(shared_key) = self.shared_key() {
-            let encrypted = message.encrypt(&*shared_key)?;
+            let encrypted = message.encrypt(&shared_key)?;
            Box::pin(self.send_websocket_message(encrypted)).await?;
            Ok(())
        } else {
@@ -410,49 +407,39 @@ impl<C, St> GatewayClient<C, St> {
        }
    }

-    fn check_gateway_protocol(
-        &self,
-        gateway_protocol: Option<u8>,
-    ) -> Result<(), GatewayClientError> {
+    fn check_gateway_protocol(&self, gateway_protocol: u8) -> Result<(), GatewayClientError> {
        debug!("gateway protocol: {gateway_protocol:?}, ours: {CURRENT_PROTOCOL_VERSION}");

-        // right now there are no failure cases here, but this might change in the future
-        match gateway_protocol {
-            None => {
-                warn!("the gateway we're connected to has not specified its protocol version. It's probably running version < 1.1.X, but that's still fine for now. It will become a hard error in 1.2.0");
-                // note: in +1.2.0 we will have to return a hard error here
-                Ok(())
-            }
-            Some(v) if v > CURRENT_PROTOCOL_VERSION => {
-                let err = GatewayClientError::IncompatibleProtocol {
-                    gateway: Some(v),
-                    current: CURRENT_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
-                };
-                error!("{err}");
-                Err(err)
-            }
+        // client should reject any gateways that do not indicate they support auth v2 or aes256gcm-siv
+        if !gateway_protocol.supports_authenticate_v2()
+            || !gateway_protocol.supports_aes256_gcm_siv()
+        {
+            return Err(GatewayClientError::IncompatibleProtocol {
+                gateway: gateway_protocol,
+                current: CURRENT_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+            });
+        }

-            Some(_) => {
-                debug!("the gateway is using exactly the same (or older) protocol version as we are. We're good to continue!");
-                Ok(())
-            }
+        // we can't handle gateways with higher protocol than ours
+        if gateway_protocol <= CURRENT_PROTOCOL_VERSION {
+            debug!("the gateway is using exactly the same (or older) protocol version as we are. We're good to continue!");
+            Ok(())
+        } else {
+            let err = GatewayClientError::IncompatibleProtocol {
+                gateway: gateway_protocol,
+                current: CURRENT_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+            };
+            error!("{err}");
+            Err(err)
        }
    }

-    async fn register(
-        &mut self,
-        derive_aes256_gcm_siv_key: bool,
-    ) -> Result<(), GatewayClientError> {
+    async fn register(&mut self) -> Result<(), GatewayClientError> {
        if !self.connection.is_established() {
            return Err(GatewayClientError::ConnectionNotEstablished);
        }

        debug_assert!(self.connection.is_available());
-        log::debug!(
-            "registering with gateway. using legacy key derivation: {}",
-            !derive_aes256_gcm_siv_key
-        );
-
        // it's fine to instantiate it here as it's only used once (during authentication or registration)
        // and putting it into the GatewayClient struct would be a hassle
        let mut rng = OsRng;
@@ -464,7 +451,6 @@ impl<C, St> GatewayClient<C, St> {
                self.local_identity.as_ref(),
                self.gateway_identity,
                self.cfg.bandwidth.require_tickets,
-                derive_aes256_gcm_siv_key,
                #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
                self.task_client.clone(),
            )
@@ -492,99 +478,15 @@ impl<C, St> GatewayClient<C, St> {
        }

        // populate the negotiated protocol for future uses
-        self.negotiated_protocol = gateway_protocol;
+        self.negotiated_protocol = Some(gateway_protocol);

        Ok(())
    }

-    pub async fn upgrade_key_authenticated(
+    async fn send_authenticate_request_and_handle_response(
        &mut self,
-    ) -> Result<Zeroizing<SharedSymmetricKey>, GatewayClientError> {
-        info!("*** STARTING AES128CTR-HMAC KEY UPGRADE INTO AES256GCM-SIV***");
-
-        if !self.connection.is_established() {
-            return Err(GatewayClientError::ConnectionNotEstablished);
-        }
-
-        if !self.authenticated {
-            return Err(GatewayClientError::NotAuthenticated);
-        }
-
-        let Some(shared_key) = self.shared_key.as_ref() else {
-            return Err(GatewayClientError::NoSharedKeyAvailable);
-        };
-
-        if !shared_key.is_legacy() {
-            return Err(GatewayClientError::KeyAlreadyUpgraded);
-        }
-
-        // make sure we have the only reference, so we could safely swap it
-        if Arc::strong_count(shared_key) != 1 {
-            return Err(GatewayClientError::KeyAlreadyInUse);
-        }
-
-        assert!(shared_key.is_legacy());
-        let legacy_key = shared_key.unwrap_legacy();
-        let (updated_key, hkdf_salt) = legacy_key.upgrade();
-        let derived_key_digest = updated_key.digest();
-
-        let upgrade_request = ClientRequest::UpgradeKey {
-            hkdf_salt,
-            derived_key_digest,
-        }
-        .encrypt(legacy_key)?;
-
-        info!("sending upgrade request and awaiting the acknowledgement back");
-        let (ciphertext, nonce) = match self.send_websocket_message(upgrade_request).await? {
-            ServerResponse::EncryptedResponse { ciphertext, nonce } => (ciphertext, nonce),
-            ServerResponse::Error { message } => {
-                return Err(GatewayClientError::GatewayError(message))
-            }
-            other => return Err(GatewayClientError::UnexpectedResponse { name: other.name() }),
-        };
-
-        // attempt to decrypt it using NEW key
-        let Ok(response) = SensitiveServerResponse::decrypt(&ciphertext, &nonce, &updated_key)
-        else {
-            return Err(GatewayClientError::FatalKeyUpgradeFailure);
-        };
-
-        match response {
-            SensitiveServerResponse::KeyUpgradeAck { .. } => {
-                info!("received key upgrade acknowledgement")
-            }
-            _ => return Err(GatewayClientError::FatalKeyUpgradeFailure),
-        }
-
-        // perform in memory swap and make a copy for updating storage
-        let zeroizing_updated_key = updated_key.zeroizing_clone();
-        self.shared_key = Some(Arc::new(updated_key.into()));
-
-        Ok(zeroizing_updated_key)
-    }
-
-    async fn authenticate(&mut self) -> Result<(), GatewayClientError> {
-        let Some(shared_key) = self.shared_key.as_ref() else {
-            return Err(GatewayClientError::NoSharedKeyAvailable);
-        };
-
-        if !self.connection.is_established() {
-            return Err(GatewayClientError::ConnectionNotEstablished);
-        }
-        debug!("authenticating with gateway");
-
-        let self_address = self
-            .local_identity
-            .as_ref()
-            .public_key()
-            .derive_destination_address();
-
-        let msg = ClientControlRequest::new_authenticate(
-            self_address,
-            shared_key,
-            self.cfg.bandwidth.require_tickets,
-        )?;
-
+        msg: ClientControlRequest,
+    ) -> Result<(), GatewayClientError> {
        match self.send_websocket_message(msg).await? {
            ServerResponse::Authenticate {
                protocol_version,
@@ -595,7 +497,7 @@ impl<C, St> GatewayClient<C, St> {
                self.authenticated = status;
                self.bandwidth.update_and_maybe_log(bandwidth_remaining);

-                self.negotiated_protocol = protocol_version;
+                self.negotiated_protocol = Some(protocol_version);
                log::debug!("authenticated: {status}, bandwidth remaining: {bandwidth_remaining}");

                self.task_client.send_status_msg(Box::new(
@@ -608,6 +510,26 @@ impl<C, St> GatewayClient<C, St> {
        }
    }

+    async fn authenticate_v2(&mut self) -> Result<(), GatewayClientError> {
+        debug!("using v2 authentication");
+        let Some(shared_key) = self.shared_key.as_ref() else {
+            return Err(GatewayClientError::NoSharedKeyAvailable);
+        };
+
+        let msg = ClientControlRequest::new_authenticate_v2(shared_key, &self.local_identity)?;
+        self.send_authenticate_request_and_handle_response(msg)
+            .await
+    }
+
+    async fn authenticate(&mut self) -> Result<(), GatewayClientError> {
+        if !self.connection.is_established() {
+            return Err(GatewayClientError::ConnectionNotEstablished);
+        }
+        debug!("authenticating with gateway");
+
+        self.authenticate_v2().await
+    }
+
    /// Helper method to either call register or authenticate based on self.shared_key value
    #[instrument(skip_all,
        fields(
@@ -623,18 +545,26 @@ impl<C, St> GatewayClient<C, St> {
        }

        // 1. check gateway's protocol version
-        let supports_aes_gcm_siv = match self.get_gateway_protocol().await {
-            Ok(protocol) => protocol >= AES_GCM_SIV_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
-            Err(_) => {
-                // if we failed to send the request, it means the gateway is running the old binary,
-                // so it has reset our connection - we have to reconnect
-                self.establish_connection().await?;
-                false
-            }
-        };
+        // if we failed to get this request resolved, it means the gateway is on an old version
+        // that definitely does not support auth v2 or aes256gcm, so we bail
+        let gw_protocol = self.get_gateway_protocol().await?;
+
+        let supports_aes_gcm_siv = gw_protocol.supports_aes256_gcm_siv();
+        let supports_auth_v2 = gw_protocol.supports_authenticate_v2();

        if !supports_aes_gcm_siv {
-            warn!("this gateway is on an old version that doesn't support AES256-GCM-SIV");
+            error!("this gateway is on an old version that doesn't support AES256-GCM-SIV");
+        }
+        if !supports_aes_gcm_siv {
+            error!("this gateway is on an old version that doesn't support authentication v2");
+        }
+
+        if !supports_auth_v2 || !supports_aes_gcm_siv {
+            // we can't continue
+            return Err(GatewayClientError::IncompatibleProtocol {
+                gateway: gw_protocol,
+                current: CURRENT_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+            });
        }

        if self.authenticated {
@@ -642,7 +572,6 @@ impl<C, St> GatewayClient<C, St> {
            return if let Some(shared_key) = &self.shared_key {
                Ok(AuthenticationResponse {
                    initial_shared_key: Arc::clone(shared_key),
-                    requires_key_upgrade: shared_key.is_legacy() && supports_aes_gcm_siv,
                })
            } else {
                Err(GatewayClientError::AuthenticationFailureWithPreexistingSharedKey)
@@ -656,17 +585,14 @@ impl<C, St> GatewayClient<C, St> {
                // if we are authenticated it means we MUST have an associated shared_key
                let shared_key = self.shared_key.as_ref().unwrap();

-                let requires_key_upgrade = shared_key.is_legacy() && supports_aes_gcm_siv;
-
                Ok(AuthenticationResponse {
                    initial_shared_key: Arc::clone(shared_key),
-                    requires_key_upgrade,
                })
            } else {
                Err(GatewayClientError::AuthenticationFailure)
            }
        } else {
-            self.register(supports_aes_gcm_siv).await?;
+            self.register().await?;

            // if registration didn't return an error, we MUST have an associated shared key
            let shared_key = self.shared_key.as_ref().unwrap();
@@ -675,7 +601,6 @@ impl<C, St> GatewayClient<C, St> {
            // so no upgrades are required
            Ok(AuthenticationResponse {
                initial_shared_key: Arc::clone(shared_key),
-                requires_key_upgrade: false,
            })
        }
    }
@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
 use crate::error::GatewayClientError;

 use nym_http_api_client::HickoryDnsResolver;
+#[cfg(unix)]
+use std::{
+    os::fd::{AsRawFd, RawFd},
+    sync::Arc,
+};
 use tokio::net::TcpStream;
 use tokio_tungstenite::{MaybeTlsStream, WebSocketStream};
 use tungstenite::handshake::client::Response;
@@ -11,7 +16,10 @@ use std::net::SocketAddr;
 #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
 pub(crate) async fn connect_async(
    endpoint: &str,
+    #[cfg(unix)] connection_fd_callback: Option<Arc<dyn Fn(RawFd) + Send + Sync>>,
 ) -> Result<(WebSocketStream<MaybeTlsStream<TcpStream>>, Response), GatewayClientError> {
+    use tokio::net::TcpSocket;
+
    let resolver = HickoryDnsResolver::default();
    let uri =
        Url::parse(endpoint).map_err(|_| GatewayClientError::InvalidUrl(endpoint.to_owned()))?;
@@ -37,14 +45,41 @@ pub(crate) async fn connect_async(
        }
    };

-    let stream = TcpStream::connect(&sock_addrs[..]).await.map_err(|error| {
-        GatewayClientError::NetworkConnectionFailed {
-            address: endpoint.to_owned(),
-            source: error.into(),
+    let mut stream = Err(GatewayClientError::NoEndpointForConnection {
+        address: endpoint.to_owned(),
+    });
+    for sock_addr in sock_addrs {
+        let socket = if sock_addr.is_ipv4() {
+            TcpSocket::new_v4()
+        } else {
+            TcpSocket::new_v6()
        }
-    })?;
+        .map_err(|err| GatewayClientError::NetworkConnectionFailed {
+            address: endpoint.to_owned(),
+            source: err.into(),
+        })?;

-    tokio_tungstenite::client_async_tls(endpoint, stream)
+        #[cfg(unix)]
+        if let Some(callback) = connection_fd_callback.as_ref() {
+            callback.as_ref()(socket.as_raw_fd());
+        }
+
+        match socket.connect(sock_addr).await {
+            Ok(s) => {
+                stream = Ok(s);
+                break;
+            }
+            Err(err) => {
+                stream = Err(GatewayClientError::NetworkConnectionFailed {
+                    address: endpoint.to_owned(),
+                    source: err.into(),
+                });
+                continue;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    tokio_tungstenite::client_async_tls(endpoint, stream?)
        .await
        .map_err(|error| GatewayClientError::NetworkConnectionFailed {
            address: endpoint.to_owned(),
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ pub enum GatewayClientError {
    #[error("connection failed: {address}: {source}")]
    NetworkConnectionFailed { address: String, source: WsError },

+    #[error("no socket address for endpoint: {address}")]
+    NoEndpointForConnection { address: String },
+
    #[error("Invalid URL: {0}")]
    InvalidUrl(String),

@@ -111,7 +114,7 @@ pub enum GatewayClientError {
    MixnetMsgSenderFailedToSend,

    #[error("Attempted to negotiate connection with gateway using incompatible protocol version. Ours is {current} and the gateway reports {gateway:?}")]
-    IncompatibleProtocol { gateway: Option<u8>, current: u8 },
+    IncompatibleProtocol { gateway: u8, current: u8 },

    #[error(
        "The packet router hasn't been set - are you sure you started up the client correctly?"
@@ -7,9 +7,7 @@ use tracing::{error, warn};
 use tungstenite::{protocol::Message, Error as WsError};

 pub use client::{config::GatewayClientConfig, GatewayClient, GatewayConfig};
-pub use nym_gateway_requests::shared_key::{
-    LegacySharedKeys, SharedGatewayKey, SharedSymmetricKey,
-};
+pub use nym_gateway_requests::shared_key::SharedSymmetricKey;
 pub use packet_router::{
    AcknowledgementReceiver, AcknowledgementSender, MixnetMessageReceiver, MixnetMessageSender,
    PacketRouter,
@@ -47,7 +45,7 @@ pub(crate) fn cleanup_socket_messages(

 pub(crate) fn try_decrypt_binary_message(
    bin_msg: Vec<u8>,
-    shared_keys: &SharedGatewayKey,
+    shared_keys: &SharedSymmetricKey,
 ) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
    match BinaryResponse::try_from_encrypted_tagged_bytes(bin_msg, shared_keys) {
        Ok(bin_response) => match bin_response {
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ use crate::{cleanup_socket_messages, try_decrypt_binary_message};
 use futures::channel::oneshot;
 use futures::stream::{SplitSink, SplitStream};
 use futures::{SinkExt, StreamExt};
-use nym_gateway_requests::shared_key::SharedGatewayKey;
+use nym_gateway_requests::shared_key::SharedSymmetricKey;
 use nym_gateway_requests::{ServerResponse, SimpleGatewayRequestsError};
 use nym_task::TaskClient;
 use si_scale::helpers::bibytes2;
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ pub(crate) struct PartiallyDelegatedHandle {

 struct PartiallyDelegatedRouter {
    packet_router: PacketRouter,
-    shared_key: Arc<SharedGatewayKey>,
+    shared_key: Arc<SharedSymmetricKey>,
    client_bandwidth: ClientBandwidth,

    stream_return: SplitStreamSender,
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ struct PartiallyDelegatedRouter {
 impl PartiallyDelegatedRouter {
    fn new(
        packet_router: PacketRouter,
-        shared_key: Arc<SharedGatewayKey>,
+        shared_key: Arc<SharedSymmetricKey>,
        client_bandwidth: ClientBandwidth,
        stream_return: SplitStreamSender,
        stream_return_requester: oneshot::Receiver<()>,
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ impl PartiallyDelegatedHandle {
    pub(crate) fn split_and_listen_for_mixnet_messages(
        conn: WsConn,
        packet_router: PacketRouter,
-        shared_key: Arc<SharedGatewayKey>,
+        shared_key: Arc<SharedSymmetricKey>,
        client_bandwidth: ClientBandwidth,
        shutdown: TaskClient,
    ) -> Self {
@@ -23,11 +23,12 @@ use nym_api_requests::models::{
    NymNodeDescription, RewardEstimationResponse, StakeSaturationResponse,
 };
 use nym_api_requests::models::{LegacyDescribedGateway, MixNodeBondAnnotated};
-use nym_api_requests::nym_nodes::SkimmedNode;
+use nym_api_requests::nym_nodes::{NodesByAddressesResponse, SkimmedNode};
 use nym_coconut_dkg_common::types::EpochId;
 use nym_ecash_contract_common::deposit::DepositId;
 use nym_http_api_client::UserAgent;
 use nym_network_defaults::NymNetworkDetails;
+use std::net::IpAddr;
 use time::Date;
 use url::Url;

@@ -710,4 +711,11 @@ impl NymApiClient {
            .issued_ticketbooks_challenge(expiration_date, deposits)
            .await?)
    }
+
+    pub async fn nodes_by_addresses(
+        &self,
+        addresses: Vec<IpAddr>,
+    ) -> Result<NodesByAddressesResponse, ValidatorClientError> {
+        Ok(self.nym_api.nodes_by_addresses(addresses).await?)
+    }
 }
@@ -15,7 +15,9 @@ use nym_api_requests::models::{
    AnnotationResponse, ApiHealthResponse, LegacyDescribedMixNode, NodePerformanceResponse,
    NodeRefreshBody, NymNodeDescription, PerformanceHistoryResponse, RewardedSetResponse,
 };
-use nym_api_requests::nym_nodes::PaginatedCachedNodesResponse;
+use nym_api_requests::nym_nodes::{
+    NodesByAddressesRequestBody, NodesByAddressesResponse, PaginatedCachedNodesResponse,
+};
 use nym_api_requests::pagination::PaginatedResponse;
 pub use nym_api_requests::{
    ecash::{
@@ -40,6 +42,7 @@ pub use nym_http_api_client::Client;
 use nym_http_api_client::{ApiClient, NO_PARAMS};
 use nym_mixnet_contract_common::mixnode::MixNodeDetails;
 use nym_mixnet_contract_common::{GatewayBond, IdentityKeyRef, NodeId, NymNodeDetails};
+use std::net::IpAddr;
 use time::format_description::BorrowedFormatItem;
 use time::Date;
 use tracing::instrument;
@@ -1015,6 +1018,23 @@ pub trait NymApiClientExt: ApiClient {
        .await
    }

+    async fn nodes_by_addresses(
+        &self,
+        addresses: Vec<IpAddr>,
+    ) -> Result<NodesByAddressesResponse, NymAPIError> {
+        self.post_json(
+            &[
+                routes::API_VERSION,
+                "unstable",
+                routes::NYM_NODES_ROUTES,
+                routes::nym_nodes::BY_ADDRESSES,
+            ],
+            NO_PARAMS,
+            &NodesByAddressesRequestBody { addresses },
+        )
+        .await
+    }
+
    #[instrument(level = "debug", skip(self))]
    async fn get_network_details(&self) -> Result<NymNetworkDetailsResponse, NymAPIError> {
        self.get_json(
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ pub mod nym_nodes {
    pub const NYM_NODES_BONDED: &str = "bonded";
    pub const NYM_NODES_REWARDED_SET: &str = "rewarded-set";
    pub const NYM_NODES_REFRESH_DESCRIBED: &str = "refresh-described";
+    pub const BY_ADDRESSES: &str = "by-addresses";
 }

 pub const STATUS_ROUTES: &str = "status";
@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ use nym_network_defaults::{ChainDetails, NymNetworkDetails};
 use serde::{de::DeserializeOwned, Serialize};
 use std::fmt::Debug;
 use std::time::SystemTime;
-use tendermint_rpc::endpoint::block::Response as BlockResponse;
 use tendermint_rpc::endpoint::*;
 use tendermint_rpc::{Error as TendermintRpcError, Order};
 use url::Url;
@@ -63,6 +62,7 @@ pub use cw3;
 pub use cw4;
 pub use cw_controllers;
 pub use fee::{gas_price::GasPrice, GasAdjustable, GasAdjustment};
+pub use tendermint_rpc::endpoint::block::Response as BlockResponse;
 pub use tendermint_rpc::{
    endpoint::{tx::Response as TxResponse, validators::Response as ValidatorResponse},
    query::Query,
@@ -25,15 +25,6 @@ pub fn in6addr_any_init() -> IpAddr {
    IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::UNSPECIFIED)
 }

-/// Helper for providing binding warnings if node tries to bind to any of those
-pub const SPECIAL_ADDRESSES: &[IpAddr] = &[
-    IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST),
-    IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED),
-    IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST),
-    IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::LOCALHOST),
-    IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::UNSPECIFIED),
-];
-
 // TODO: is it really part of 'Config'?
 pub trait OptionalSet {
    /// If the value is available (i.e. `Some`), the provided closure is applied.
@@ -37,11 +37,13 @@ nym-pemstore = { path = "../../common/pemstore", version = "0.3.0" }
 rand_chacha = { workspace = true }

 [features]
-default = ["sphinx"]
+default = []
 aead = ["dep:aead", "aead/std", "aes-gcm-siv", "generic-array"]
 serde = ["dep:serde", "serde_bytes", "ed25519-dalek/serde", "x25519-dalek/serde"]
 asymmetric = ["x25519-dalek", "ed25519-dalek", "zeroize"]
 hashing = ["blake3", "digest", "hkdf", "hmac", "generic-array", "sha2"]
 stream_cipher = ["aes", "ctr", "cipher", "generic-array"]
 sphinx = ["nym-sphinx-types/sphinx"]
-outfox = ["nym-sphinx-types/outfox"]
+
+[lints]
+workspace = true
@@ -202,6 +202,18 @@ impl PemStorableKey for PublicKey {
    }
 }

+impl From<x25519_dalek::PublicKey> for PublicKey {
+    fn from(public_key: x25519_dalek::PublicKey) -> Self {
+        PublicKey(public_key)
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<PublicKey> for x25519_dalek::PublicKey {
+    fn from(public_key: PublicKey) -> Self {
+        public_key.0
+    }
+}
+
 #[derive(Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
 pub struct PrivateKey(x25519_dalek::StaticSecret);

@@ -308,109 +320,15 @@ impl PemStorableKey for PrivateKey {
    }
 }

-// compatibility with sphinx keys:
-#[cfg(feature = "sphinx")]
-impl From<PublicKey> for nym_sphinx_types::PublicKey {
-    fn from(key: PublicKey) -> Self {
-        nym_sphinx_types::PublicKey::from(key.to_bytes())
+impl From<x25519_dalek::StaticSecret> for PrivateKey {
+    fn from(secret: x25519_dalek::StaticSecret) -> Self {
+        PrivateKey(secret)
    }
 }

-#[cfg(feature = "sphinx")]
-impl<'a> From<&'a PublicKey> for nym_sphinx_types::PublicKey {
-    fn from(key: &'a PublicKey) -> Self {
-        nym_sphinx_types::PublicKey::from((*key).to_bytes())
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "sphinx")]
-impl From<nym_sphinx_types::PublicKey> for PublicKey {
-    fn from(pub_key: nym_sphinx_types::PublicKey) -> Self {
-        Self(x25519_dalek::PublicKey::from(*pub_key.as_bytes()))
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "sphinx")]
-impl From<PrivateKey> for nym_sphinx_types::PrivateKey {
-    fn from(key: PrivateKey) -> Self {
-        nym_sphinx_types::PrivateKey::from(key.to_bytes())
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "sphinx")]
-impl<'a> From<&'a PrivateKey> for nym_sphinx_types::PrivateKey {
-    fn from(key: &'a PrivateKey) -> Self {
-        nym_sphinx_types::PrivateKey::from(key.to_bytes())
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "sphinx")]
-impl From<nym_sphinx_types::PrivateKey> for PrivateKey {
-    fn from(private_key: nym_sphinx_types::PrivateKey) -> Self {
-        let private_key_bytes = private_key.to_bytes();
-        assert_eq!(private_key_bytes.len(), PRIVATE_KEY_SIZE);
-        Self::from_bytes(&private_key_bytes).unwrap()
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod sphinx_key_conversion {
-    use super::*;
-    use rand_chacha::rand_core::SeedableRng;
-    use rand_chacha::ChaCha20Rng;
-
-    pub(super) fn test_rng() -> ChaCha20Rng {
-        let dummy_seed = [42u8; 32];
-        ChaCha20Rng::from_seed(dummy_seed)
-    }
-
-    const NUM_ITERATIONS: usize = 100;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn works_for_forward_conversion() {
-        let mut rng = test_rng();
-
-        for _ in 0..NUM_ITERATIONS {
-            let keys = KeyPair::new(&mut rng);
-            let private = &keys.private_key;
-            let public = &keys.public_key;
-
-            let dummy_remote = KeyPair::new(&mut rng);
-            let dh1 = private.diffie_hellman(&dummy_remote.public_key);
-
-            let public_bytes = public.to_bytes();
-
-            let sphinx_private: nym_sphinx_types::PrivateKey = private.into();
-            let recovered_private = PrivateKey::from(sphinx_private);
-
-            let dh2 = recovered_private.diffie_hellman(&dummy_remote.public_key);
-
-            let sphinx_public: nym_sphinx_types::PublicKey = public.into();
-            let recovered_public = PublicKey::from(sphinx_public);
-            assert_eq!(public_bytes, recovered_public.to_bytes());
-
-            // even though the byte representation of the private key changed, the resultant DH is the same
-            // which is what matters
-            assert_eq!(dh1, dh2);
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn works_for_backward_conversion() {
-        for _ in 0..NUM_ITERATIONS {
-            let (sphinx_private, sphinx_public) = nym_sphinx_types::crypto::keygen();
-
-            let private_bytes = sphinx_private.to_bytes();
-            let public_bytes = sphinx_public.as_bytes();
-
-            let private: PrivateKey = sphinx_private.into();
-            let recovered_sphinx_private: nym_sphinx_types::PrivateKey = private.into();
-
-            let public: PublicKey = sphinx_public.into();
-            let recovered_sphinx_public: nym_sphinx_types::PublicKey = public.into();
-            assert_eq!(private_bytes, recovered_sphinx_private.to_bytes());
-            assert_eq!(public_bytes, recovered_sphinx_public.as_bytes());
-        }
+impl AsRef<x25519_dalek::StaticSecret> for PrivateKey {
+    fn as_ref(&self) -> &x25519_dalek::StaticSecret {
+        &self.0
    }
 }

@@ -16,8 +16,11 @@ pub fn compute_keyed_hmac<D>(key: &[u8], data: &[u8]) -> HmacOutput<D>
 where
    D: Digest + BlockSizeUser,
 {
-    let mut hmac = SimpleHmac::<D>::new_from_slice(key)
-        .expect("HMAC was instantiated with a key of an invalid size!");
+    // SAFETY: hmac is fine with keys of any size; if they're smaller than the block size of the underlying
+    // digest, they're padded with 0. if they're larger they're hashed and padded
+    // the reason for `Result` return type is due to the trait definition
+    #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
+    let mut hmac = SimpleHmac::<D>::new_from_slice(key).unwrap();
    hmac.update(data);
    hmac.finalize()
 }
@@ -27,8 +30,11 @@ pub fn recompute_keyed_hmac_and_verify_tag<D>(key: &[u8], data: &[u8], tag: &[u8
 where
    D: Digest + BlockSizeUser,
 {
-    let mut hmac = SimpleHmac::<D>::new_from_slice(key)
-        .expect("HMAC was instantiated with a key of an invalid size!");
+    // SAFETY: hmac is fine with keys of any size; if they're smaller than the block size of the underlying
+    // digest, they're padded with 0. if they're larger they're hashed and padded
+    // the reason for `Result` return type is due to the trait definition
+    #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
+    let mut hmac = SimpleHmac::<D>::new_from_slice(key).unwrap();
    hmac.update(data);

    let tag_arr = Output::<D>::from_slice(tag);
@@ -27,12 +27,16 @@ where
    // after performing diffie-hellman we don't care about the private component anymore
    let dh_result = ephemeral_keypair.private_key().diffie_hellman(remote_key);

-    // there is no reason for this to fail as our okm is expected to be only C::KeySize bytes
+    // SAFETY: while this is a relatively weak assumption, it's unlikely that any stream cipher has `C::key_size()`
+    // larger than 255 * chunk_size of the digest (so for example keys larger than 8160 bytes if sh256 is used)
+    #[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
    let okm = hkdf::extract_then_expand::<D>(None, &dh_result, None, C::key_size())
        .expect("somehow too long okm was provided");

-    let derived_shared_key =
-        Key::<C>::from_exact_iter(okm).expect("okm was expanded to incorrect length!");
+    // SAFETY: the generated okm has exactly `C::key_size()` elements,
+    // so this call is safe
+    #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
+    let derived_shared_key = Key::<C>::from_exact_iter(okm).unwrap();

    (ephemeral_keypair, derived_shared_key)
 }
@@ -48,9 +52,14 @@ where
 {
    let dh_result = local_key.diffie_hellman(remote_key);

-    // there is no reason for this to fail as our okm is expected to be only C::KeySize bytes
+    // SAFETY: while this is a relatively weak assumption, it's unlikely that any stream cipher has `C::key_size()`
+    // larger than 255 * chunk_size of the digest (so for example keys larger than 8160 bytes if sh256 is used)
+    #[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
    let okm = hkdf::extract_then_expand::<D>(None, &dh_result, None, C::key_size())
        .expect("somehow too long okm was provided");

-    Key::<C>::from_exact_iter(okm).expect("okm was expanded to incorrect length!")
+    // SAFETY: the generated okm has exactly `C::key_size()` elements,
+    // so this call is safe
+    #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
+    Key::<C>::from_exact_iter(okm).unwrap()
 }
@@ -60,20 +60,15 @@ where
    Iv::<C>::default()
 }

-pub fn iv_from_slice<C>(b: &[u8]) -> &IV<C>
+pub fn try_iv_from_slice<C>(b: &[u8]) -> Option<&IV<C>>
 where
    C: IvSizeUser,
 {
    if b.len() != C::iv_size() {
-        // `from_slice` would have caused a panic about this issue anyway.
-        // Now we at least have slightly more information
-        panic!(
-            "Tried to convert {} bytes to IV. Expected {}",
-            b.len(),
-            C::iv_size()
-        )
+        None
+    } else {
+        Some(IV::<C>::from_slice(b))
    }
-    IV::<C>::from_slice(b)
 }

 // TODO: there's really no way to use more parts of the keystream if it was required at some point.
@@ -20,11 +20,14 @@ serde_json = { workspace = true }
 strum = { workspace = true }
 thiserror = { workspace = true }
 tracing = { workspace = true, features = ["log"] }
+time = { workspace = true }
+subtle = { workspace = true }
 zeroize = { workspace = true }

 nym-crypto = { path = "../crypto", features = ["aead", "hashing"] }
 nym-pemstore = { path = "../pemstore" }
 nym-sphinx = { path = "../nymsphinx" }
+nym-serde-helpers = { path = "../serde-helpers", features = ["base64"] }
 nym-task = { path = "../task" }

 nym-credentials = { path = "../credentials" }
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2020-2024 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-use crate::shared_key::{SharedGatewayKey, SharedKeyUsageError};
-use nym_sphinx::DestinationAddressBytes;
-use thiserror::Error;
-
-/// Replacement for what used to be an `AuthToken`.
-///
-/// Replacement for what used to be an `AuthToken`. We used to be generating an `AuthToken` based on
-/// local secret and remote address in order to allow for authentication. Due to changes in registration
-/// and the fact we are deriving a shared key, we are encrypting remote's address with the previously
-/// derived shared key. If the value is as expected, then authentication is successful.
-#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Clone)]
-// this is no longer constant size due to the differences in ciphertext between aes128ctr and aes256gcm-siv (inclusion of tag)
-pub struct EncryptedAddressBytes(Vec<u8>);
-
-#[derive(Debug, Error)]
-pub enum EncryptedAddressConversionError {
-    #[error("Failed to decode the encrypted address - {0}")]
-    DecodeError(#[from] bs58::decode::Error),
-}
-
-impl EncryptedAddressBytes {
-    pub fn new(
-        address: &DestinationAddressBytes,
-        key: &SharedGatewayKey,
-        nonce: &[u8],
-    ) -> Result<Self, SharedKeyUsageError> {
-        let ciphertext = key.encrypt_naive(address.as_bytes_ref(), Some(nonce))?;
-
-        Ok(EncryptedAddressBytes(ciphertext))
-    }
-
-    pub fn verify(
-        &self,
-        address: &DestinationAddressBytes,
-        key: &SharedGatewayKey,
-        nonce: &[u8],
-    ) -> bool {
-        let Ok(reconstructed) = Self::new(address, key, nonce) else {
-            return false;
-        };
-        self == &reconstructed
-    }
-
-    pub fn as_bytes(&self) -> &[u8] {
-        &self.0
-    }
-
-    pub fn try_from_base58_string<S: Into<String>>(
-        val: S,
-    ) -> Result<Self, EncryptedAddressConversionError> {
-        let decoded = bs58::decode(val.into()).into_vec()?;
-        Ok(EncryptedAddressBytes(decoded))
-    }
-
-    pub fn to_base58_string(self) -> String {
-        bs58::encode(self.0).into_string()
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<EncryptedAddressBytes> for String {
-    fn from(val: EncryptedAddressBytes) -> Self {
-        val.to_base58_string()
-    }
-}
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2020 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-pub mod encrypted_address;
@@ -2,24 +2,17 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

 pub use nym_crypto::generic_array;
-use nym_crypto::OutputSizeUser;
-use nym_sphinx::params::GatewayIntegrityHmacAlgorithm;

 pub use types::*;

-pub mod authentication;
 pub mod models;
 pub mod registration;
 pub mod shared_key;
 pub mod types;

-pub use shared_key::helpers::SymmetricKey;
-pub use shared_key::legacy::{LegacySharedKeySize, LegacySharedKeys};
-pub use shared_key::{
-    SharedGatewayKey, SharedKeyConversionError, SharedKeyUsageError, SharedSymmetricKey,
-};
+pub use shared_key::{SharedKeyConversionError, SharedKeyUsageError, SharedSymmetricKey};

-pub const CURRENT_PROTOCOL_VERSION: u8 = AES_GCM_SIV_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+pub const CURRENT_PROTOCOL_VERSION: u8 = AUTHENTICATE_V2_PROTOCOL_VERSION;

 /// Defines the current version of the communication protocol between gateway and clients.
 /// It has to be incremented for any breaking change.
@@ -27,10 +20,23 @@ pub const CURRENT_PROTOCOL_VERSION: u8 = AES_GCM_SIV_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
 // 1 - initial release
 // 2 - changes to client credentials structure
 // 3 - change to AES-GCM-SIV and non-zero IVs
+// 4 - introduction of v2 authentication protocol to prevent reply attacks
 pub const INITIAL_PROTOCOL_VERSION: u8 = 1;
 pub const CREDENTIAL_UPDATE_V2_PROTOCOL_VERSION: u8 = 2;
 pub const AES_GCM_SIV_PROTOCOL_VERSION: u8 = 3;
+pub const AUTHENTICATE_V2_PROTOCOL_VERSION: u8 = 4;

-// TODO: could using `Mac` trait here for OutputSize backfire?
-// Should hmac itself be exposed, imported and used instead?
-pub type LegacyGatewayMacSize = <GatewayIntegrityHmacAlgorithm as OutputSizeUser>::OutputSize;
+pub trait GatewayProtocolVersionExt {
+    fn supports_aes256_gcm_siv(&self) -> bool;
+    fn supports_authenticate_v2(&self) -> bool;
+}
+
+impl GatewayProtocolVersionExt for u8 {
+    fn supports_aes256_gcm_siv(&self) -> bool {
+        *self >= AES_GCM_SIV_PROTOCOL_VERSION
+    }
+
+    fn supports_authenticate_v2(&self) -> bool {
+        *self >= AUTHENTICATE_V2_PROTOCOL_VERSION
+    }
+}
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@

 use crate::registration::handshake::messages::{Finalization, GatewayMaterialExchange};
 use crate::registration::handshake::state::State;
-use crate::registration::handshake::SharedGatewayKey;
+use crate::registration::handshake::SharedSymmetricKey;
 use crate::registration::handshake::{error::HandshakeError, WsItem};
 use futures::{Sink, Stream};
 use rand::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
@@ -15,12 +15,12 @@ impl<S, R> State<'_, S, R> {
        S: Stream<Item = WsItem> + Sink<WsMessage> + Unpin,
        R: CryptoRng + RngCore,
    {
-        // 1. if we're using non-legacy, i.e. aes256gcm-siv derivation, generate initiator salt for kdf
-        let maybe_hkdf_salt = self.maybe_generate_initiator_salt();
+        // 1. generate initiator salt for kdf
+        let hkdf_salt = self.generate_initiator_salt();

-        // 1. send ed25519 pubkey alongside ephemeral x25519 pubkey and a hkdf salt if we're using non-legacy client
+        // 1. send ed25519 pubkey alongside ephemeral x25519 pubkey and a hkdf salt
        // LOCAL_ID_PUBKEY || EPHEMERAL_KEY || MAYBE_SALT
-        let init_message = self.init_message(maybe_hkdf_salt.clone());
+        let init_message = self.init_message(hkdf_salt.clone());
        self.send_handshake_data(init_message).await?;

        // 2. wait for response with remote x25519 pubkey as well as encrypted signature
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ impl<S, R> State<'_, S, R> {

        // 3. derive shared keys locally
        // hkdf::<blake3>::(g^xy)
-        self.derive_shared_key(&mid_res.ephemeral_dh, maybe_hkdf_salt.as_deref());
+        self.derive_shared_key(&mid_res.ephemeral_dh, &hkdf_salt);

        // 4. verify the received signature using the locally derived keys
        self.verify_remote_key_material(&mid_res.materials, &mid_res.ephemeral_dh)?;
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ impl<S, R> State<'_, S, R> {

    pub(crate) async fn perform_client_handshake(
        mut self,
-    ) -> Result<SharedGatewayKey, HandshakeError>
+    ) -> Result<SharedSymmetricKey, HandshakeError>
    where
        S: Stream<Item = WsItem> + Sink<WsMessage> + Unpin,
        R: CryptoRng + RngCore,
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ use crate::registration::handshake::messages::{
    HandshakeMessage, Initialisation, MaterialExchange,
 };
 use crate::registration::handshake::state::State;
-use crate::registration::handshake::SharedGatewayKey;
+use crate::registration::handshake::SharedSymmetricKey;
 use crate::registration::handshake::{error::HandshakeError, WsItem};
 use futures::{Sink, Stream};
 use tungstenite::Message as WsMessage;
@@ -18,18 +18,14 @@ impl<S, R> State<'_, S, R> {
    where
        S: Stream<Item = WsItem> + Sink<WsMessage> + Unpin,
    {
-        // 1. receive remote ed25519 pubkey alongside ephemeral x25519 pubkey and maybe a flag indicating non-legacy client
-        // LOCAL_ID_PUBKEY || EPHEMERAL_KEY || MAYBE_NON_LEGACY
+        // 1. receive remote ed25519 pubkey alongside ephemeral x25519 pubkey and initiator salt
+        // LOCAL_ID_PUBKEY || EPHEMERAL_KEY || INITIATOR_SALT
        let init_message = Initialisation::try_from_bytes(&raw_init_message)?;
        self.update_remote_identity(init_message.identity);
-        self.set_aes256_gcm_siv_key_derivation(!init_message.is_legacy());

        // 2. derive shared keys locally
        // hkdf::<blake3>::(g^xy)
-        self.derive_shared_key(
-            &init_message.ephemeral_dh,
-            init_message.initiator_salt.as_deref(),
-        );
+        self.derive_shared_key(&init_message.ephemeral_dh, &init_message.initiator_salt);

        // 3. send ephemeral x25519 pubkey alongside the encrypted signature
        // g^y || AES(k, sig(gate_priv, (g^y || g^x))
@@ -54,7 +50,7 @@ impl<S, R> State<'_, S, R> {
    pub(crate) async fn perform_gateway_handshake(
        mut self,
        raw_init_message: Vec<u8>,
-    ) -> Result<SharedGatewayKey, HandshakeError>
+    ) -> Result<SharedSymmetricKey, HandshakeError>
    where
        S: Stream<Item = WsItem> + Sink<WsMessage> + Unpin,
    {
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 use crate::registration::handshake::error::HandshakeError;
 use crate::registration::handshake::KDF_SALT_LENGTH;
 use nym_crypto::asymmetric::{ed25519, x25519};
-use nym_crypto::symmetric::aead::{nonce_size, tag_size};
+use nym_crypto::symmetric::aead::{nonce_size, tag_size, Nonce};
 use nym_sphinx::params::GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm;

 // it is vital nobody changes the serialisation implementation unless you have an EXTREMELY good reason,
@@ -21,20 +21,13 @@ pub trait HandshakeMessage {
 pub struct Initialisation {
    pub identity: ed25519::PublicKey,
    pub ephemeral_dh: x25519::PublicKey,
-    pub initiator_salt: Option<Vec<u8>>,
-}
-
-impl Initialisation {
-    #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
-    pub fn is_legacy(&self) -> bool {
-        self.initiator_salt.is_none()
-    }
+    pub initiator_salt: Vec<u8>,
 }

 #[derive(Debug)]
 pub struct MaterialExchange {
    pub signature_ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
-    pub nonce: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    pub nonce: Nonce<GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>,
 }

 impl MaterialExchange {
@@ -72,17 +65,12 @@ impl HandshakeMessage for Initialisation {
    // Eventually the ID_PUBKEY prefix will get removed and recipient will know
    // initializer's identity from another source.
    fn into_bytes(self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        let bytes = self
-            .identity
+        self.identity
            .to_bytes()
            .into_iter()
-            .chain(self.ephemeral_dh.to_bytes());
-
-        if let Some(salt) = self.initiator_salt {
-            bytes.chain(salt).collect()
-        } else {
-            bytes.collect()
-        }
+            .chain(self.ephemeral_dh.to_bytes())
+            .chain(self.initiator_salt)
+            .collect()
    }

    // this will need to be adjusted when REMOTE_ID_PUBKEY is removed
@@ -90,9 +78,8 @@ impl HandshakeMessage for Initialisation {
    where
        Self: Sized,
    {
-        let legacy_len = ed25519::PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH + x25519::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
-        let current_len = legacy_len + KDF_SALT_LENGTH;
-        if bytes.len() != legacy_len && bytes.len() != current_len {
+        let current_len = ed25519::PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH + x25519::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE + KDF_SALT_LENGTH;
+        if bytes.len() != current_len {
            return Err(HandshakeError::MalformedRequest);
        }

@@ -101,14 +88,13 @@ impl HandshakeMessage for Initialisation {

        // this can only fail if the provided bytes have len different from encryption::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE
        // which is impossible
-        let ephemeral_dh =
-            x25519::PublicKey::from_bytes(&bytes[ed25519::PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH..legacy_len]).unwrap();
+        let ephemeral_dh = x25519::PublicKey::from_bytes(
+            &bytes
+                [ed25519::PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH..ed25519::PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH + x25519::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE],
+        )
+        .unwrap();

-        let initiator_salt = if bytes.len() == legacy_len {
-            None
-        } else {
-            Some(bytes[legacy_len..].to_vec())
-        };
+        let initiator_salt = bytes[ed25519::PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH + x25519::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE..].to_vec();

        Ok(Initialisation {
            identity,
@@ -121,43 +107,31 @@ impl HandshakeMessage for Initialisation {
 impl HandshakeMessage for MaterialExchange {
    // AES(k, SIG(PRIV_GATE, G^y || G^x))
    fn into_bytes(self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        if let Some(nonce) = self.nonce {
-            self.signature_ciphertext
-                .iter()
-                .cloned()
-                .chain(nonce)
-                .collect()
-        } else {
-            self.signature_ciphertext.to_vec()
-        }
+        self.signature_ciphertext
+            .iter()
+            .cloned()
+            .chain(self.nonce)
+            .collect()
    }

    fn try_from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, HandshakeError>
    where
        Self: Sized,
    {
-        // we expect to receive either:
-        // LEGACY: ed25519 signature ciphertext (64 bytes)
        // CURRENT: ed25519 signature ciphertext (+ tag) + AES256-GCM-SIV nonce (76 bytes)
-        let legacy_len = ed25519::SIGNATURE_LENGTH;
-        let current_len = legacy_len
+        let current_len = ed25519::SIGNATURE_LENGTH
            + tag_size::<GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>()
            + nonce_size::<GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>();

-        if bytes.len() != legacy_len && bytes.len() != current_len {
+        if bytes.len() != current_len {
            return Err(HandshakeError::MalformedResponse);
        }

-        let (signature_ciphertext, nonce) = if bytes.len() == current_len {
-            let ciphertext_len =
-                ed25519::SIGNATURE_LENGTH + tag_size::<GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>();
-            (
-                bytes[..ciphertext_len].to_vec(),
-                Some(bytes[ciphertext_len..].to_vec()),
-            )
-        } else {
-            (bytes.to_vec(), None)
-        };
+        let ciphertext_len = ed25519::SIGNATURE_LENGTH + tag_size::<GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>();
+        let signature_ciphertext = bytes[..ciphertext_len].to_vec();
+
+        // SAFETY: we know the bytes have correct length
+        let nonce = Nonce::<GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>::clone_from_slice(&bytes[ciphertext_len..]);

        Ok(MaterialExchange {
            signature_ciphertext,
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@

 use self::error::HandshakeError;
 use crate::registration::handshake::state::State;
-use crate::SharedGatewayKey;
+use crate::SharedSymmetricKey;
 use futures::future::BoxFuture;
 use futures::{Sink, Stream};
 use nym_crypto::asymmetric::identity;
@@ -34,11 +34,11 @@ pub const KDF_SALT_LENGTH: usize = 16;
 // we do not need to worry about that.

 pub struct GatewayHandshake<'a> {
-    handshake_future: BoxFuture<'a, Result<SharedGatewayKey, HandshakeError>>,
+    handshake_future: BoxFuture<'a, Result<SharedSymmetricKey, HandshakeError>>,
 }

 impl Future for GatewayHandshake<'_> {
-    type Output = Result<SharedGatewayKey, HandshakeError>;
+    type Output = Result<SharedSymmetricKey, HandshakeError>;

    fn poll(mut self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<Self::Output> {
        Pin::new(&mut self.handshake_future).poll(cx)
@@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ pub fn client_handshake<'a, S, R>(
    identity: &'a identity::KeyPair,
    gateway_pubkey: identity::PublicKey,
    expects_credential_usage: bool,
-    derive_aes256_gcm_siv_key: bool,
    #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))] shutdown: TaskClient,
 ) -> GatewayHandshake<'a>
 where
@@ -66,8 +65,7 @@ where
        #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
        shutdown,
    )
-    .with_credential_usage(expects_credential_usage)
-    .with_aes256_gcm_siv_key(derive_aes256_gcm_siv_key);
+    .with_credential_usage(expects_credential_usage);

    GatewayHandshake {
        handshake_future: Box::pin(state.perform_client_handshake()),
@@ -5,12 +5,9 @@ use crate::registration::handshake::error::HandshakeError;
 use crate::registration::handshake::messages::{
    HandshakeMessage, Initialisation, MaterialExchange,
 };
-use crate::registration::handshake::{SharedGatewayKey, WsItem, KDF_SALT_LENGTH};
+use crate::registration::handshake::{WsItem, KDF_SALT_LENGTH};
 use crate::shared_key::SharedKeySize;
-use crate::{
-    types, LegacySharedKeySize, LegacySharedKeys, SharedSymmetricKey, AES_GCM_SIV_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
-    CREDENTIAL_UPDATE_V2_PROTOCOL_VERSION, INITIAL_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
-};
+use crate::{types, SharedSymmetricKey, AES_GCM_SIV_PROTOCOL_VERSION};
 use futures::{Sink, SinkExt, Stream, StreamExt};
 use nym_crypto::asymmetric::{ed25519, x25519};
 use nym_crypto::symmetric::aead::random_nonce;
@@ -52,7 +49,7 @@ pub(crate) struct State<'a, S, R> {
    ephemeral_keypair: x25519::KeyPair,

    /// The derived shared key using the ephemeral keys of both parties.
-    derived_shared_keys: Option<SharedGatewayKey>,
+    derived_shared_keys: Option<SharedSymmetricKey>,

    /// The known or received public identity key of the remote.
    /// Ideally it would always be known before the handshake was initiated.
@@ -62,9 +59,6 @@ pub(crate) struct State<'a, S, R> {
    // in order to establish correct protocol for backwards compatibility reasons
    expects_credential_usage: bool,

-    /// Specifies whether the end product should be an AES128Ctr + blake3 HMAC keys (legacy) or AES256-GCM-SIV (current)
-    derive_aes256_gcm_siv_key: bool,
-
    // channel to receive shutdown signal
    #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
    shutdown: TaskClient,
@@ -91,7 +85,6 @@ impl<'a, S, R> State<'a, S, R> {
            derived_shared_keys: None,
            // later on this should become the default
            expects_credential_usage: false,
-            derive_aes256_gcm_siv_key: false,
            #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
            shutdown,
        }
@@ -102,38 +95,24 @@ impl<'a, S, R> State<'a, S, R> {
        self
    }

-    pub(crate) fn with_aes256_gcm_siv_key(mut self, derive_aes256_gcm_siv_key: bool) -> Self {
-        self.derive_aes256_gcm_siv_key = derive_aes256_gcm_siv_key;
-        self
-    }
-
-    #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
-    pub(crate) fn set_aes256_gcm_siv_key_derivation(&mut self, derive_aes256_gcm_siv_key: bool) {
-        self.derive_aes256_gcm_siv_key = derive_aes256_gcm_siv_key;
-    }
-
    #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]
    pub(crate) fn local_ephemeral_key(&self) -> &encryption::PublicKey {
        self.ephemeral_keypair.public_key()
    }

-    pub(crate) fn maybe_generate_initiator_salt(&mut self) -> Option<Vec<u8>>
+    pub(crate) fn generate_initiator_salt(&mut self) -> Vec<u8>
    where
        R: CryptoRng + RngCore,
    {
-        if self.derive_aes256_gcm_siv_key {
-            let mut salt = vec![0u8; KDF_SALT_LENGTH];
-            self.rng.fill_bytes(&mut salt);
-            Some(salt)
-        } else {
-            None
-        }
+        let mut salt = vec![0u8; KDF_SALT_LENGTH];
+        self.rng.fill_bytes(&mut salt);
+        salt
    }

    // LOCAL_ID_PUBKEY || EPHEMERAL_KEY || MAYBE_SALT
    // Eventually the ID_PUBKEY prefix will get removed and recipient will know
    // initializer's identity from another source.
-    pub(crate) fn init_message(&self, initiator_salt: Option<Vec<u8>>) -> Initialisation {
+    pub(crate) fn init_message(&self, initiator_salt: Vec<u8>) -> Initialisation {
        Initialisation {
            identity: *self.identity.public_key(),
            ephemeral_dh: *self.ephemeral_keypair.public_key(),
@@ -151,37 +130,27 @@ impl<'a, S, R> State<'a, S, R> {
    pub(crate) fn derive_shared_key(
        &mut self,
        remote_ephemeral_key: &encryption::PublicKey,
-        initiator_salt: Option<&[u8]>,
+        initiator_salt: &[u8],
    ) {
        let dh_result = self
            .ephemeral_keypair
            .private_key()
            .diffie_hellman(remote_ephemeral_key);

-        let key_size = if self.derive_aes256_gcm_siv_key {
-            SharedKeySize::to_usize()
-        } else {
-            LegacySharedKeySize::to_usize()
-        };
+        let key_size = SharedKeySize::to_usize();

        // there is no reason for this to fail as our okm is expected to be only 16 bytes
        let okm = hkdf::extract_then_expand::<GatewaySharedKeyHkdfAlgorithm>(
-            initiator_salt,
+            Some(initiator_salt),
            &dh_result,
            None,
            key_size,
        )
        .expect("somehow too long okm was provided");

-        let shared_key = if self.derive_aes256_gcm_siv_key {
-            let current_key = SharedSymmetricKey::try_from_bytes(&okm)
-                .expect("okm was expanded to incorrect length!");
-            SharedGatewayKey::Current(current_key)
-        } else {
-            let legacy_key = LegacySharedKeys::try_from_bytes(&okm)
-                .expect("okm was expanded to incorrect length!");
-            SharedGatewayKey::Legacy(legacy_key)
-        };
+        let shared_key = SharedSymmetricKey::try_from_bytes(&okm)
+            .expect("okm was expanded to incorrect length!");
+
        self.derived_shared_keys = Some(shared_key)
    }

@@ -200,19 +169,15 @@ impl<'a, S, R> State<'a, S, R> {
            .collect();
        let signature = self.identity.private_key().sign(plaintext);

-        let nonce = if self.derive_aes256_gcm_siv_key {
-            let mut rng = thread_rng();
-            Some(random_nonce::<GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm, _>(&mut rng).to_vec())
-        } else {
-            None
-        };
+        let mut rng = thread_rng();
+        let nonce = random_nonce::<GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm, _>(&mut rng);

        // SAFETY: this function is only called after the local key has already been derived
        let signature_ciphertext = self
            .derived_shared_keys
            .as_ref()
            .expect("shared key was not derived!")
-            .encrypt_naive(&signature.to_bytes(), nonce.as_deref())?;
+            .encrypt(&signature.to_bytes(), &nonce)?;

        Ok(MaterialExchange {
            signature_ciphertext,
@@ -231,15 +196,10 @@ impl<'a, S, R> State<'a, S, R> {
            .as_ref()
            .expect("shared key was not derived!");

-        // if the [client] init message contained non-legacy flag, the associated nonce MUST be present
-        if self.derive_aes256_gcm_siv_key && remote_response.nonce.is_none() {
-            return Err(HandshakeError::MissingNonceForCurrentKey);
-        }
-
        // first decrypt received data
-        let decrypted_signature = derived_shared_key.decrypt_naive(
+        let decrypted_signature = derived_shared_key.decrypt(
            &remote_response.signature_ciphertext,
-            remote_response.nonce.as_deref(),
+            &remote_response.nonce,
        )?;

        // now verify signature itself
@@ -367,13 +327,7 @@ impl<'a, S, R> State<'a, S, R> {
    }

    fn request_protocol_version(&self) -> u8 {
-        if self.derive_aes256_gcm_siv_key {
-            AES_GCM_SIV_PROTOCOL_VERSION
-        } else if self.expects_credential_usage {
-            CREDENTIAL_UPDATE_V2_PROTOCOL_VERSION
-        } else {
-            INITIAL_PROTOCOL_VERSION
-        }
+        AES_GCM_SIV_PROTOCOL_VERSION
    }

    pub(crate) async fn send_handshake_data<M>(
@@ -398,7 +352,7 @@ impl<'a, S, R> State<'a, S, R> {

    /// Finish the handshake, yielding the derived shared key and implicitly dropping all borrowed
    /// values.
-    pub(crate) fn finalize_handshake(self) -> SharedGatewayKey {
+    pub(crate) fn finalize_handshake(self) -> SharedSymmetricKey {
        self.derived_shared_keys.unwrap()
    }

@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2024 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-use crate::{LegacySharedKeys, SharedGatewayKey, SharedKeyUsageError, SharedSymmetricKey};
-use nym_crypto::symmetric::aead::random_nonce;
-use nym_crypto::symmetric::stream_cipher::random_iv;
-use nym_sphinx::params::{GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm, LegacyGatewayEncryptionAlgorithm};
-use rand::thread_rng;
-
-pub trait SymmetricKey {
-    fn random_nonce_or_iv(&self) -> Vec<u8>;
-
-    fn encrypt(
-        &self,
-        plaintext: &[u8],
-        nonce: Option<&[u8]>,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SharedKeyUsageError>;
-
-    fn decrypt(
-        &self,
-        ciphertext: &[u8],
-        nonce: Option<&[u8]>,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SharedKeyUsageError>;
-}
-
-impl SymmetricKey for SharedGatewayKey {
-    fn random_nonce_or_iv(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.random_nonce_or_iv()
-    }
-
-    fn encrypt(
-        &self,
-        plaintext: &[u8],
-        nonce: Option<&[u8]>,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SharedKeyUsageError> {
-        self.encrypt(plaintext, nonce)
-    }
-
-    fn decrypt(
-        &self,
-        ciphertext: &[u8],
-        nonce: Option<&[u8]>,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SharedKeyUsageError> {
-        self.decrypt(ciphertext, nonce)
-    }
-}
-
-impl SymmetricKey for SharedSymmetricKey {
-    fn random_nonce_or_iv(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        let mut rng = thread_rng();
-
-        random_nonce::<GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm, _>(&mut rng).to_vec()
-    }
-
-    fn encrypt(
-        &self,
-        plaintext: &[u8],
-        nonce: Option<&[u8]>,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SharedKeyUsageError> {
-        let nonce = SharedGatewayKey::validate_aead_nonce(nonce)?;
-        self.encrypt(plaintext, &nonce)
-    }
-
-    fn decrypt(
-        &self,
-        ciphertext: &[u8],
-        nonce: Option<&[u8]>,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SharedKeyUsageError> {
-        let nonce = SharedGatewayKey::validate_aead_nonce(nonce)?;
-        self.decrypt(ciphertext, &nonce)
-    }
-}
-
-impl SymmetricKey for LegacySharedKeys {
-    fn random_nonce_or_iv(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        let mut rng = thread_rng();
-
-        random_iv::<LegacyGatewayEncryptionAlgorithm, _>(&mut rng).to_vec()
-    }
-
-    fn encrypt(
-        &self,
-        plaintext: &[u8],
-        nonce: Option<&[u8]>,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SharedKeyUsageError> {
-        let iv = SharedGatewayKey::validate_cipher_iv(nonce)?;
-        Ok(self.encrypt_and_tag(plaintext, iv))
-    }
-
-    fn decrypt(
-        &self,
-        ciphertext: &[u8],
-        nonce: Option<&[u8]>,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SharedKeyUsageError> {
-        let iv = SharedGatewayKey::validate_cipher_iv(nonce)?;
-        self.decrypt_tagged(ciphertext, iv)
-    }
-}
@@ -1,241 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2020-2023 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-use crate::registration::handshake::KDF_SALT_LENGTH;
-use crate::shared_key::SharedSymmetricKey;
-use crate::shared_key::{SharedKeyConversionError, SharedKeySize, SharedKeyUsageError};
-use crate::LegacyGatewayMacSize;
-use nym_crypto::generic_array::{
-    typenum::{Sum, Unsigned, U16},
-    GenericArray,
-};
-use nym_crypto::hkdf;
-use nym_crypto::hmac::{compute_keyed_hmac, recompute_keyed_hmac_and_verify_tag};
-use nym_crypto::symmetric::stream_cipher::{self, CipherKey, KeySizeUser, IV};
-use nym_pemstore::traits::PemStorableKey;
-use nym_sphinx::params::{
-    GatewayIntegrityHmacAlgorithm, GatewaySharedKeyHkdfAlgorithm, LegacyGatewayEncryptionAlgorithm,
-};
-use rand::{thread_rng, RngCore};
-use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
-use zeroize::{Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop, Zeroizing};
-
-// shared key is as long as the encryption key and the MAC key combined.
-pub type LegacySharedKeySize = Sum<EncryptionKeySize, MacKeySize>;
-
-// we're using 16 byte long key in sphinx, so let's use the same one here
-type MacKeySize = U16;
-type EncryptionKeySize = <LegacyGatewayEncryptionAlgorithm as KeySizeUser>::KeySize;
-
-/// Shared key used when computing MAC for messages exchanged between client and its gateway.
-pub type MacKey = GenericArray<u8, MacKeySize>;
-
-#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize, Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
-pub struct LegacySharedKeys {
-    encryption_key: CipherKey<LegacyGatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>,
-    mac_key: MacKey,
-}
-
-impl LegacySharedKeys {
-    pub fn upgrade(&self) -> (SharedSymmetricKey, Vec<u8>) {
-        let mut rng = thread_rng();
-        let mut salt = vec![0u8; KDF_SALT_LENGTH];
-        rng.fill_bytes(&mut salt);
-
-        let legacy_bytes = Zeroizing::new(self.to_bytes());
-        let okm = hkdf::extract_then_expand::<GatewaySharedKeyHkdfAlgorithm>(
-            Some(&salt),
-            &legacy_bytes,
-            None,
-            SharedKeySize::to_usize(),
-        )
-        .expect("somehow too long okm was provided");
-
-        let key = SharedSymmetricKey::try_from_bytes(&okm)
-            .expect("okm was expanded to incorrect length!");
-        (key, salt)
-    }
-
-    pub fn upgrade_verify(
-        &self,
-        salt: &[u8],
-        expected_digest: &[u8],
-    ) -> Option<SharedSymmetricKey> {
-        let legacy_bytes = Zeroizing::new(self.to_bytes());
-        let okm = hkdf::extract_then_expand::<GatewaySharedKeyHkdfAlgorithm>(
-            Some(salt),
-            &legacy_bytes,
-            None,
-            SharedKeySize::to_usize(),
-        )
-        .expect("somehow too long okm was provided");
-        let key = SharedSymmetricKey::try_from_bytes(&okm)
-            .expect("okm was expanded to incorrect length!");
-        if key.digest() != expected_digest {
-            // no need to zeroize  that key since it's malformed and we won't be using it anyway
-            None
-        } else {
-            Some(key)
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn try_from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, SharedKeyConversionError> {
-        if bytes.len() != LegacySharedKeySize::to_usize() {
-            return Err(SharedKeyConversionError::InvalidSharedKeysSize {
-                received: bytes.len(),
-                expected: LegacySharedKeySize::to_usize(),
-            });
-        }
-
-        let encryption_key =
-            GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&bytes[..EncryptionKeySize::to_usize()]);
-        let mac_key = GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&bytes[EncryptionKeySize::to_usize()..]);
-
-        Ok(LegacySharedKeys {
-            encryption_key,
-            mac_key,
-        })
-    }
-
-    /// Encrypts the provided data using the optionally provided initialisation vector,
-    /// or a 0 value if nothing was given.
-    /// It does **NOT** attach any integrity macs on the produced ciphertext
-    pub fn encrypt_without_tagging(
-        &self,
-        data: &[u8],
-        iv: Option<&IV<LegacyGatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>>,
-    ) -> Vec<u8> {
-        match iv {
-            Some(iv) => stream_cipher::encrypt::<LegacyGatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>(
-                self.encryption_key(),
-                iv,
-                data,
-            ),
-            None => {
-                let zero_iv = stream_cipher::zero_iv::<LegacyGatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>();
-                stream_cipher::encrypt::<LegacyGatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>(
-                    self.encryption_key(),
-                    &zero_iv,
-                    data,
-                )
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Encrypts the provided data using the optionally provided initialisation vector,
-    /// or a 0 value if nothing was given. Then it computes an integrity mac and concatenates it
-    /// with the previously produced ciphertext.
-    pub fn encrypt_and_tag(
-        &self,
-        data: &[u8],
-        iv: Option<&IV<LegacyGatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>>,
-    ) -> Vec<u8> {
-        let ciphertext = self.encrypt_without_tagging(data, iv);
-        let mac = compute_keyed_hmac::<GatewayIntegrityHmacAlgorithm>(
-            self.mac_key().as_slice(),
-            &ciphertext,
-        );
-
-        mac.into_bytes().into_iter().chain(ciphertext).collect()
-    }
-
-    pub fn decrypt_without_tag(
-        &self,
-        ciphertext: &[u8],
-        iv: Option<&IV<LegacyGatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>>,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SharedKeyUsageError> {
-        let zero_iv = stream_cipher::zero_iv::<LegacyGatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>();
-        let iv = iv.unwrap_or(&zero_iv);
-        Ok(stream_cipher::decrypt::<LegacyGatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>(
-            self.encryption_key(),
-            iv,
-            ciphertext,
-        ))
-    }
-
-    pub fn decrypt_tagged(
-        &self,
-        enc_data: &[u8],
-        iv: Option<&IV<LegacyGatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>>,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SharedKeyUsageError> {
-        let mac_size = LegacyGatewayMacSize::to_usize();
-        if enc_data.len() < mac_size {
-            return Err(SharedKeyUsageError::TooShortRequest);
-        }
-
-        let mac_tag = &enc_data[..mac_size];
-        let message_bytes = &enc_data[mac_size..];
-
-        if !recompute_keyed_hmac_and_verify_tag::<GatewayIntegrityHmacAlgorithm>(
-            self.mac_key().as_slice(),
-            message_bytes,
-            mac_tag,
-        ) {
-            return Err(SharedKeyUsageError::InvalidMac);
-        }
-
-        // couldn't have made the first borrow mutable as you can't have an immutable borrow
-        // together with a mutable one
-        let mut message_bytes_mut = message_bytes.to_vec();
-
-        let zero_iv = stream_cipher::zero_iv::<LegacyGatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>();
-        let iv = iv.unwrap_or(&zero_iv);
-        stream_cipher::decrypt_in_place::<LegacyGatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>(
-            self.encryption_key(),
-            iv,
-            &mut message_bytes_mut,
-        );
-        Ok(message_bytes_mut)
-    }
-
-    pub fn encryption_key(&self) -> &CipherKey<LegacyGatewayEncryptionAlgorithm> {
-        &self.encryption_key
-    }
-
-    pub fn mac_key(&self) -> &MacKey {
-        &self.mac_key
-    }
-
-    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.encryption_key
-            .iter()
-            .copied()
-            .chain(self.mac_key.iter().copied())
-            .collect()
-    }
-
-    pub fn try_from_base58_string<S: Into<String>>(
-        val: S,
-    ) -> Result<Self, SharedKeyConversionError> {
-        let decoded = bs58::decode(val.into()).into_vec()?;
-        LegacySharedKeys::try_from_bytes(&decoded)
-    }
-
-    pub fn to_base58_string(&self) -> String {
-        bs58::encode(self.to_bytes()).into_string()
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<LegacySharedKeys> for String {
-    fn from(keys: LegacySharedKeys) -> Self {
-        keys.to_base58_string()
-    }
-}
-
-impl PemStorableKey for LegacySharedKeys {
-    type Error = SharedKeyConversionError;
-
-    fn pem_type() -> &'static str {
-        // TODO: If common\nymsphinx\params\src\lib::GatewayIntegrityHmacAlgorithm changes
-        // the pem type needs updating!
-        "AES-128-CTR + HMAC-BLAKE3 GATEWAY SHARED KEYS"
-    }
-
-    fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.to_bytes()
-    }
-
-    fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        Self::try_from_bytes(bytes)
-    }
-}
@@ -7,213 +7,27 @@ use nym_crypto::generic_array::{typenum::Unsigned, GenericArray};
 use nym_crypto::symmetric::aead::{
    self, nonce_size, random_nonce, AeadError, AeadKey, KeySizeUser, Nonce,
 };
-use nym_crypto::symmetric::stream_cipher::{iv_size, random_iv, IV};
 use nym_pemstore::traits::PemStorableKey;
-use nym_sphinx::params::{GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm, LegacyGatewayEncryptionAlgorithm};
+use nym_sphinx::params::GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm;
 use rand::thread_rng;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use thiserror::Error;
 use zeroize::{Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop, Zeroizing};

-pub use legacy::LegacySharedKeys;
-
-pub mod helpers;
-pub mod legacy;
-
 pub type SharedKeySize = <GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm as KeySizeUser>::KeySize;

-#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
-pub enum SharedGatewayKey {
-    Current(SharedSymmetricKey),
-    Legacy(LegacySharedKeys),
-}
-
-impl SharedGatewayKey {
-    pub fn is_legacy(&self) -> bool {
-        matches!(self, SharedGatewayKey::Legacy(..))
-    }
-
-    pub fn aes128_ctr_hmac_bs58(&self) -> Option<Zeroizing<String>> {
-        match self {
-            SharedGatewayKey::Current(_) => None,
-            SharedGatewayKey::Legacy(key) => Some(Zeroizing::new(key.to_base58_string())),
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn aes256_gcm_siv(&self) -> Option<Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>> {
-        match self {
-            SharedGatewayKey::Current(key) => Some(Zeroizing::new(key.to_bytes())),
-            SharedGatewayKey::Legacy(_) => None,
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn unwrap_legacy(&self) -> &LegacySharedKeys {
-        match self {
-            SharedGatewayKey::Current(_) => panic!("expected legacy key"),
-            SharedGatewayKey::Legacy(key) => key,
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn random_nonce_or_iv(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        let mut rng = thread_rng();
-
-        if self.is_legacy() {
-            random_iv::<LegacyGatewayEncryptionAlgorithm, _>(&mut rng).to_vec()
-        } else {
-            random_nonce::<GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm, _>(&mut rng).to_vec()
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn random_nonce_or_zero_iv(&self) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
-        if self.is_legacy() {
-            None
-        } else {
-            let mut rng = thread_rng();
-            Some(random_nonce::<GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm, _>(&mut rng).to_vec())
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn nonce_size(&self) -> usize {
-        match self {
-            SharedGatewayKey::Current(_) => nonce_size::<GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>(),
-            SharedGatewayKey::Legacy(_) => iv_size::<LegacyGatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>(),
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<LegacySharedKeys> for SharedGatewayKey {
-    fn from(keys: LegacySharedKeys) -> Self {
-        SharedGatewayKey::Legacy(keys)
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<SharedSymmetricKey> for SharedGatewayKey {
-    fn from(keys: SharedSymmetricKey) -> Self {
-        SharedGatewayKey::Current(keys)
-    }
-}
-
 #[derive(Debug, Error)]
 pub enum SharedKeyUsageError {
    #[error("the request is too short")]
    TooShortRequest,

-    #[error("provided MAC is invalid")]
-    InvalidMac,
-
-    #[error("the provided nonce (or legacy IV) did not have the expected length")]
+    #[error("the provided nonce did not have the expected length or was malformed")]
    MalformedNonce,

-    #[error("did not provide a valid nonce for aead encryption")]
-    MissingAeadNonce,
-
    #[error("failed to either encrypt or decrypt provided message")]
    AeadFailure(#[from] AeadError),
 }

-impl SharedGatewayKey {
-    fn validate_aead_nonce(
-        raw: Option<&[u8]>,
-    ) -> Result<Nonce<GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>, SharedKeyUsageError> {
-        let Some(raw) = raw else {
-            return Err(SharedKeyUsageError::MissingAeadNonce);
-        };
-        if raw.len() != nonce_size::<GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>() {
-            return Err(SharedKeyUsageError::MalformedNonce);
-        }
-        Ok(Nonce::<GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>::clone_from_slice(raw))
-    }
-
-    fn validate_cipher_iv(
-        raw: Option<&[u8]>,
-    ) -> Result<Option<&IV<LegacyGatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>>, SharedKeyUsageError> {
-        let Some(raw) = raw else { return Ok(None) };
-        let iv = if raw.is_empty() {
-            None
-        } else {
-            if raw.len() != iv_size::<LegacyGatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>() {
-                return Err(SharedKeyUsageError::MalformedNonce);
-            }
-            Some(IV::<LegacyGatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>::from_slice(raw))
-        };
-        Ok(iv)
-    }
-
-    pub fn encrypt(
-        &self,
-        plaintext: &[u8],
-        // the best common denominator for converting into 'IV' and 'Nonce' types
-        raw_nonce: Option<&[u8]>,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SharedKeyUsageError> {
-        match self {
-            SharedGatewayKey::Current(aes_gcm_siv) => {
-                let nonce = Self::validate_aead_nonce(raw_nonce)?;
-                aes_gcm_siv.encrypt(plaintext, &nonce)
-            }
-            SharedGatewayKey::Legacy(aes_ctr) => {
-                let iv = Self::validate_cipher_iv(raw_nonce)?;
-                Ok(aes_ctr.encrypt_and_tag(plaintext, iv))
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn decrypt(
-        &self,
-        ciphertext: &[u8],
-        // the best common denominator for converting into 'IV' and 'Nonce' types
-        raw_nonce: Option<&[u8]>,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SharedKeyUsageError> {
-        match self {
-            SharedGatewayKey::Current(aes_gcm_siv) => {
-                let nonce = Self::validate_aead_nonce(raw_nonce)?;
-                aes_gcm_siv.decrypt(ciphertext, &nonce)
-            }
-            SharedGatewayKey::Legacy(aes_ctr) => {
-                let iv = Self::validate_cipher_iv(raw_nonce)?;
-                aes_ctr.decrypt_tagged(ciphertext, iv)
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    // for the legacy keys do not use integrity MAC
-    pub fn encrypt_naive(
-        &self,
-        plaintext: &[u8],
-        // the best common denominator for converting into 'IV' and 'Nonce' types
-        raw_nonce: Option<&[u8]>,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SharedKeyUsageError> {
-        match self {
-            SharedGatewayKey::Current(aes_gcm_siv) => {
-                let nonce = Self::validate_aead_nonce(raw_nonce)?;
-                aes_gcm_siv.encrypt(plaintext, &nonce)
-            }
-            SharedGatewayKey::Legacy(aes_ctr) => {
-                let iv = Self::validate_cipher_iv(raw_nonce)?;
-                Ok(aes_ctr.encrypt_without_tagging(plaintext, iv))
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    // for the legacy keys do not use integrity MAC
-    pub fn decrypt_naive(
-        &self,
-        ciphertext: &[u8],
-        // the best common denominator for converting into 'IV' and 'Nonce' types
-        raw_nonce: Option<&[u8]>,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SharedKeyUsageError> {
-        match self {
-            SharedGatewayKey::Current(aes_gcm_siv) => {
-                let nonce = Self::validate_aead_nonce(raw_nonce)?;
-                aes_gcm_siv.decrypt(ciphertext, &nonce)
-            }
-            SharedGatewayKey::Legacy(aes_ctr) => {
-                let iv = Self::validate_cipher_iv(raw_nonce)?;
-                aes_ctr.decrypt_without_tag(ciphertext, iv)
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}
-
 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize, Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
 pub struct SharedSymmetricKey(AeadKey<GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>);

@@ -230,6 +44,36 @@ pub enum SharedKeyConversionError {
 }

 impl SharedSymmetricKey {
+    pub fn random_nonce(&self) -> Nonce<GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm> {
+        let mut rng = thread_rng();
+        random_nonce::<GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm, _>(&mut rng)
+    }
+
+    pub fn nonce_size(&self) -> usize {
+        nonce_size::<GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>()
+    }
+
+    pub fn decode_bs58_nonce<I: AsRef<[u8]>>(
+        raw: I,
+    ) -> Result<Nonce<GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>, SharedKeyUsageError> {
+        // 1. decode bytes from encoding
+        let decoded = bs58::decode(raw)
+            .into_vec()
+            .map_err(|_| SharedKeyUsageError::MalformedNonce)?;
+
+        // 2. validate length and convert into the proper type
+        Self::validate_aead_nonce(&decoded)
+    }
+
+    pub fn validate_aead_nonce(
+        raw: &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<Nonce<GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>, SharedKeyUsageError> {
+        if raw.len() != nonce_size::<GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>() {
+            return Err(SharedKeyUsageError::MalformedNonce);
+        }
+        Ok(Nonce::<GatewayEncryptionAlgorithm>::clone_from_slice(raw))
+    }
+
    pub fn try_from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, SharedKeyConversionError> {
        if bytes.len() != KeySize::to_usize() {
            return Err(SharedKeyConversionError::InvalidSharedKeysSize {
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

 use crate::types::helpers::BinaryData;
-use crate::{GatewayRequestsError, SharedGatewayKey};
+use crate::{GatewayRequestsError, SharedSymmetricKey};
 use nym_sphinx::forwarding::packet::MixPacket;
 use strum::FromRepr;
 use tungstenite::Message;
@@ -46,14 +46,14 @@ impl BinaryRequest {

    pub fn try_from_encrypted_tagged_bytes(
        bytes: Vec<u8>,
-        shared_key: &SharedGatewayKey,
+        shared_key: &SharedSymmetricKey,
    ) -> Result<Self, GatewayRequestsError> {
        BinaryData::from_raw(&bytes, shared_key)?.into_request(shared_key)
    }

    pub fn into_encrypted_tagged_bytes(
        self,
-        shared_key: &SharedGatewayKey,
+        shared_key: &SharedSymmetricKey,
    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, GatewayRequestsError> {
        let kind = self.kind();

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ impl BinaryRequest {

    pub fn into_ws_message(
        self,
-        shared_key: &SharedGatewayKey,
+        shared_key: &SharedSymmetricKey,
    ) -> Result<Message, GatewayRequestsError> {
        // all variants are currently encrypted
        let blob = match self {
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

 use crate::types::helpers::BinaryData;
-use crate::{GatewayRequestsError, SharedGatewayKey};
+use crate::{GatewayRequestsError, SharedSymmetricKey};
 use strum::FromRepr;
 use tungstenite::Message;

@@ -38,14 +38,14 @@ impl BinaryResponse {

    pub fn try_from_encrypted_tagged_bytes(
        bytes: Vec<u8>,
-        shared_key: &SharedGatewayKey,
+        shared_key: &SharedSymmetricKey,
    ) -> Result<Self, GatewayRequestsError> {
        BinaryData::from_raw(&bytes, shared_key)?.into_response(shared_key)
    }

    pub fn into_encrypted_tagged_bytes(
        self,
-        shared_key: &SharedGatewayKey,
+        shared_key: &SharedSymmetricKey,
    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, GatewayRequestsError> {
        let kind = self.kind();

@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ impl BinaryResponse {

    pub fn into_ws_message(
        self,
-        shared_key: &SharedGatewayKey,
+        shared_key: &SharedSymmetricKey,
    ) -> Result<Message, GatewayRequestsError> {
        // all variants are currently encrypted
        let blob = match self {
@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@

 use crate::SharedKeyUsageError;
 use nym_credentials_interface::CompactEcashError;
+use nym_crypto::asymmetric::ed25519::SignatureError;
 use nym_sphinx::addressing::nodes::NymNodeRoutingAddressError;
 use nym_sphinx::forwarding::packet::MixPacketFormattingError;
 use nym_sphinx::params::packet_sizes::PacketSize;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
-use std::string::FromUtf8Error;
 use thiserror::Error;

 // specific errors (that should not be nested!!) for clients to match on
@@ -50,9 +50,6 @@ pub enum GatewayRequestsError {
    #[error("the request is too short")]
    TooShortRequest,

-    #[error("provided MAC is invalid")]
-    InvalidMac,
-
    #[error("address field was incorrectly encoded: {source}")]
    IncorrectlyEncodedAddress {
        #[from]
@@ -68,31 +65,43 @@ pub enum GatewayRequestsError {
    ]
    RequestOfInvalidSize(usize),

-    #[error("received sphinx packet was malformed")]
-    MalformedSphinxPacket,
-
    #[error("failed to serialise created sphinx packet: {0}")]
    SphinxSerialisationFailure(#[from] MixPacketFormattingError),

    #[error("the received encrypted data was malformed")]
    MalformedEncryption,

-    #[error("provided packet mode is invalid")]
-    InvalidPacketMode,
-
    #[error("failed to deserialize provided credential: {0}")]
    EcashCredentialDeserializationFailure(#[from] CompactEcashError),

-    #[error("failed to deserialize provided credential: EOF")]
-    CredentialDeserializationFailureEOF,
-
-    #[error("failed to deserialize provided credential: malformed string: {0}")]
-    CredentialDeserializationFailureMalformedString(#[from] FromUtf8Error),
-
-    #[error("the provided [v1] credential has invalid number of parameters - {0}")]
-    InvalidNumberOfEmbededParameters(u32),
+    #[error("failed to authenticate the client: {0}")]
+    Authentication(#[from] AuthenticationFailure),

    // variant to catch legacy errors
    #[error("{0}")]
    Other(String),
 }
+
+#[derive(Debug, Error)]
+pub enum AuthenticationFailure {
+    #[error(transparent)]
+    KeyUsageFailure(#[from] SharedKeyUsageError),
+
+    #[error("failed to verify provided address ciphertext")]
+    MalformedCiphertext,
+
+    #[error("failed to verify request signature")]
+    InvalidSignature(#[from] SignatureError),
+
+    #[error("provided request timestamp is in the future")]
+    RequestTimestampInFuture,
+
+    #[error("the client is not registered")]
+    NotRegistered,
+
+    #[error("the provided request is too stale to process")]
+    StaleRequest,
+
+    #[error("the provided request timestamp is smaller or equal to a one previously used")]
+    RequestReuse,
+}
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@

 use crate::{
    BinaryRequest, BinaryRequestKind, BinaryResponse, BinaryResponseKind, GatewayRequestsError,
-    SharedGatewayKey,
+    SharedSymmetricKey,
 };
 use std::iter::once;

@@ -22,11 +22,7 @@ pub struct BinaryData<'a> {

 impl<'a> BinaryData<'a> {
    // serialises possibly encrypted data into bytes to be put on the wire
-    pub fn into_raw(self, legacy: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
-        if legacy {
-            return self.data.to_vec();
-        }
-
+    pub fn into_raw(self) -> Vec<u8> {
        let i = once(self.kind).chain(once(if self.encrypted { 1 } else { 0 }));
        if let Some(nonce) = self.maybe_nonce {
            i.chain(nonce.iter().copied())
@@ -40,19 +36,8 @@ impl<'a> BinaryData<'a> {
    // attempts to perform basic parsing on bytes received from the wire
    pub fn from_raw(
        raw: &'a [u8],
-        available_key: &SharedGatewayKey,
+        available_key: &SharedSymmetricKey,
    ) -> Result<Self, GatewayRequestsError> {
-        // if we're using legacy key, it's quite simple:
-        // it's always encrypted with no nonce and the request/response kind is always 1
-        if available_key.is_legacy() {
-            return Ok(BinaryData {
-                kind: 1,
-                encrypted: true,
-                maybe_nonce: None,
-                data: raw,
-            });
-        }
-
        if raw.len() < 2 {
            return Err(GatewayRequestsError::TooShortRequest);
        }
@@ -83,30 +68,33 @@ impl<'a> BinaryData<'a> {
    pub fn make_encrypted_blob(
        kind: u8,
        plaintext: &[u8],
-        key: &SharedGatewayKey,
+        key: &SharedSymmetricKey,
    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, GatewayRequestsError> {
-        let maybe_nonce = key.random_nonce_or_zero_iv();
+        let nonce = key.random_nonce();

-        let ciphertext = key.encrypt(plaintext, maybe_nonce.as_deref())?;
+        let ciphertext = key.encrypt(plaintext, &nonce)?;
        Ok(BinaryData {
            kind,
            encrypted: true,
-            maybe_nonce: maybe_nonce.as_deref(),
+            maybe_nonce: Some(&nonce),
            data: &ciphertext,
        }
-        .into_raw(key.is_legacy()))
+        .into_raw())
    }

    // attempts to parse previously recovered bytes into a [`BinaryRequest`]
    pub fn into_request(
        self,
-        key: &SharedGatewayKey,
+        key: &SharedSymmetricKey,
    ) -> Result<BinaryRequest, GatewayRequestsError> {
        let kind = BinaryRequestKind::from_repr(self.kind)
            .ok_or(GatewayRequestsError::UnknownRequestKind { kind: self.kind })?;

        let plaintext = if self.encrypted {
-            &*key.decrypt(self.data, self.maybe_nonce)?
+            let raw_nonce = self.maybe_nonce.unwrap_or(&[]);
+            let nonce = SharedSymmetricKey::validate_aead_nonce(raw_nonce)?;
+
+            &*key.decrypt(self.data, &nonce)?
        } else {
            self.data
        };
@@ -117,13 +105,16 @@ impl<'a> BinaryData<'a> {
    // attempts to parse previously recovered bytes into a [`BinaryResponse`]
    pub fn into_response(
        self,
-        key: &SharedGatewayKey,
+        key: &SharedSymmetricKey,
    ) -> Result<BinaryResponse, GatewayRequestsError> {
        let kind = BinaryResponseKind::from_repr(self.kind)
            .ok_or(GatewayRequestsError::UnknownResponseKind { kind: self.kind })?;

        let plaintext = if self.encrypted {
-            &*key.decrypt(self.data, self.maybe_nonce)?
+            let raw_nonce = self.maybe_nonce.unwrap_or(&[]);
+            let nonce = SharedSymmetricKey::validate_aead_nonce(raw_nonce)?;
+
+            &*key.decrypt(self.data, &nonce)?
        } else {
            self.data
        };
@@ -76,25 +76,7 @@ mod tests {
                protocol_version,
                data,
            } => {
-                assert_eq!(protocol_version, Some(42));
-                assert_eq!(data, handshake_data)
-            }
-            _ => unreachable!("this branch shouldn't have been reached!"),
-        }
-
-        let handshake_payload_without_protocol = RegistrationHandshake::HandshakePayload {
-            protocol_version: None,
-            data: handshake_data.clone(),
-        };
-        let serialized = serde_json::to_string(&handshake_payload_without_protocol).unwrap();
-        let deserialized = ClientControlRequest::try_from(serialized).unwrap();
-
-        match deserialized {
-            ClientControlRequest::RegisterHandshakeInitRequest {
-                protocol_version,
-                data,
-            } => {
-                assert!(protocol_version.is_none());
+                assert_eq!(protocol_version, 42);
                assert_eq!(data, handshake_data)
            }
            _ => unreachable!("this branch shouldn't have been reached!"),
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+// Copyright 2025 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
+
+use crate::{AuthenticationFailure, GatewayRequestsError, SharedSymmetricKey};
+use nym_crypto::asymmetric::ed25519;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use std::iter;
+use std::time::Duration;
+use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
+use time::OffsetDateTime;
+
+#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+pub struct AuthenticateRequest {
+    #[serde(flatten)]
+    pub content: AuthenticateRequestContent,
+
+    pub request_signature: ed25519::Signature,
+}
+
+impl AuthenticateRequest {
+    pub fn new(
+        protocol_version: u8,
+        shared_key: &SharedSymmetricKey,
+        identity_keys: &ed25519::KeyPair,
+    ) -> Result<AuthenticateRequest, GatewayRequestsError> {
+        let content = AuthenticateRequestContent::new(
+            protocol_version,
+            shared_key,
+            *identity_keys.public_key(),
+        )?;
+        let plaintext = content.plaintext();
+        let request_signature = identity_keys.private_key().sign(&plaintext);
+
+        Ok(AuthenticateRequest {
+            content,
+            request_signature,
+        })
+    }
+
+    pub fn verify_timestamp(&self, max_request_age: Duration) -> Result<(), AuthenticationFailure> {
+        let now = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
+        if self.content.request_timestamp() + max_request_age < now {
+            return Err(AuthenticationFailure::StaleRequest);
+        }
+        if self.content.request_timestamp() > now {
+            return Err(AuthenticationFailure::RequestTimestampInFuture);
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    pub fn ensure_timestamp_not_reused(
+        &self,
+        previous: OffsetDateTime,
+    ) -> Result<(), AuthenticationFailure> {
+        if self.content.request_timestamp() <= previous {
+            return Err(AuthenticationFailure::RequestReuse);
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    pub fn verify_ciphertext(
+        &self,
+        shared_key: &SharedSymmetricKey,
+    ) -> Result<(), AuthenticationFailure> {
+        let expected = shared_key.encrypt(
+            self.content
+                .client_identity
+                .derive_destination_address()
+                .as_bytes_ref(),
+            &SharedSymmetricKey::validate_aead_nonce(&self.content.nonce)?,
+        )?;
+
+        if !bool::from(expected.ct_eq(&self.content.address_ciphertext)) {
+            return Err(AuthenticationFailure::MalformedCiphertext);
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    pub fn verify_signature(&self) -> Result<(), AuthenticationFailure> {
+        let plaintext = self.content.plaintext();
+        self.content
+            .client_identity
+            .verify(plaintext, &self.request_signature)
+            .map_err(Into::into)
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+pub struct AuthenticateRequestContent {
+    pub protocol_version: u8,
+
+    // this is identical to the client's address
+    pub client_identity: ed25519::PublicKey,
+
+    #[serde(with = "nym_serde_helpers::base64")]
+    pub address_ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
+
+    #[serde(with = "nym_serde_helpers::base64")]
+    pub nonce: Vec<u8>,
+
+    pub request_unix_timestamp: u64,
+}
+
+impl AuthenticateRequestContent {
+    fn new(
+        protocol_version: u8,
+        shared_key: &SharedSymmetricKey,
+        client_identity: ed25519::PublicKey,
+    ) -> Result<AuthenticateRequestContent, GatewayRequestsError> {
+        let nonce = shared_key.random_nonce();
+        let destination_address = client_identity.derive_destination_address();
+
+        let address_ciphertext = shared_key.encrypt(destination_address.as_bytes_ref(), &nonce)?;
+        let now = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
+        Ok(AuthenticateRequestContent {
+            protocol_version,
+            client_identity,
+            address_ciphertext,
+            nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
+            request_unix_timestamp: now.unix_timestamp() as u64, // SAFETY: we're running this in post 1970...
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+impl AuthenticateRequestContent {
+    pub fn plaintext(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+        iter::once(self.protocol_version)
+            .chain(self.client_identity.to_bytes())
+            .chain(self.address_ciphertext.iter().copied())
+            .chain(self.nonce.iter().copied())
+            .chain(self.request_unix_timestamp.to_be_bytes())
+            .collect()
+    }
+
+    pub fn request_timestamp(&self) -> OffsetDateTime {
+        OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(self.request_unix_timestamp as i64)
+            .unwrap_or(OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
+    }
+}
@@ -2,34 +2,27 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

 use crate::models::CredentialSpendingRequest;
-use crate::{
-    GatewayRequestsError, SharedGatewayKey, SymmetricKey, AES_GCM_SIV_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
-    CREDENTIAL_UPDATE_V2_PROTOCOL_VERSION, INITIAL_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
-};
+use crate::text_request::authenticate::AuthenticateRequest;
+use crate::{GatewayRequestsError, SharedSymmetricKey, AUTHENTICATE_V2_PROTOCOL_VERSION};
 use nym_credentials_interface::CredentialSpendingData;
-use nym_sphinx::DestinationAddressBytes;
+use nym_crypto::asymmetric::ed25519;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use std::str::FromStr;
 use tungstenite::Message;

+pub mod authenticate;
+
 // wrapper for all encrypted requests for ease of use
 #[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone)]
 #[non_exhaustive]
 pub enum ClientRequest {
-    UpgradeKey {
-        hkdf_salt: Vec<u8>,
-        derived_key_digest: Vec<u8>,
-    },
-    ForgetMe {
-        client: bool,
-        stats: bool,
-    },
+    ForgetMe { client: bool, stats: bool },
 }

 impl ClientRequest {
-    pub fn encrypt<S: SymmetricKey>(
+    pub fn encrypt(
        &self,
-        key: &S,
+        key: &SharedSymmetricKey,
    ) -> Result<ClientControlRequest, GatewayRequestsError> {
        // we're using json representation for few reasons:
        // - ease of re-implementation in other languages (compared to for example bincode)
@@ -38,17 +31,21 @@ impl ClientRequest {

        // SAFETY: the trait has been derived correctly with no weird variants
        let plaintext = serde_json::to_vec(self).unwrap();
-        let nonce = key.random_nonce_or_iv();
-        let ciphertext = key.encrypt(&plaintext, Some(&nonce))?;
-        Ok(ClientControlRequest::EncryptedRequest { ciphertext, nonce })
+        let nonce = key.random_nonce();
+        let ciphertext = key.encrypt(&plaintext, &nonce)?;
+        Ok(ClientControlRequest::EncryptedRequest {
+            ciphertext,
+            nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
+        })
    }

-    pub fn decrypt<S: SymmetricKey>(
+    pub fn decrypt(
        ciphertext: &[u8],
        nonce: &[u8],
-        key: &S,
+        key: &SharedSymmetricKey,
    ) -> Result<Self, GatewayRequestsError> {
-        let plaintext = key.decrypt(ciphertext, Some(nonce))?;
+        let nonce = SharedSymmetricKey::validate_aead_nonce(nonce)?;
+        let plaintext = key.decrypt(ciphertext, &nonce)?;
        serde_json::from_slice(&plaintext)
            .map_err(|source| GatewayRequestsError::MalformedRequest { source })
    }
@@ -59,32 +56,18 @@ impl ClientRequest {
 #[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "camelCase")]
 #[non_exhaustive]
 pub enum ClientControlRequest {
-    // TODO: should this also contain a MAC considering that at this point we already
-    // have the shared key derived?
-    Authenticate {
-        #[serde(default)]
-        protocol_version: Option<u8>,
-        address: String,
-        enc_address: String,
-        iv: String,
-    },
+    AuthenticateV2(Box<AuthenticateRequest>),
+
    #[serde(alias = "handshakePayload")]
    RegisterHandshakeInitRequest {
-        #[serde(default)]
-        protocol_version: Option<u8>,
+        protocol_version: u8,
        data: Vec<u8>,
    },
-    BandwidthCredential {
-        enc_credential: Vec<u8>,
-        iv: Vec<u8>,
-    },
-    BandwidthCredentialV2 {
-        enc_credential: Vec<u8>,
-        iv: Vec<u8>,
-    },
+
    EcashCredential {
        enc_credential: Vec<u8>,
-        iv: Vec<u8>,
+        #[serde(alias = "iv")]
+        nonce: Vec<u8>,
    },
    ClaimFreeTestnetBandwidth,
    EncryptedRequest {
@@ -93,39 +76,44 @@ pub enum ClientControlRequest {
    },
    SupportedProtocol {},
    // if you're adding new variants here, consider putting them inside `ClientRequest` instead
+
+    // NO LONGER SUPPORTED:
+    Authenticate {
+        #[serde(default)]
+        protocol_version: Option<u8>,
+        address: String,
+        enc_address: String,
+        iv: String,
+    },
+
+    BandwidthCredential {
+        enc_credential: Vec<u8>,
+        iv: Vec<u8>,
+    },
+    BandwidthCredentialV2 {
+        enc_credential: Vec<u8>,
+        iv: Vec<u8>,
+    },
 }

 impl ClientControlRequest {
-    pub fn new_authenticate(
-        address: DestinationAddressBytes,
-        shared_key: &SharedGatewayKey,
-        uses_credentials: bool,
+    pub fn new_authenticate_v2(
+        shared_key: &SharedSymmetricKey,
+        identity_keys: &ed25519::KeyPair,
    ) -> Result<Self, GatewayRequestsError> {
-        // if we're encrypting with non-legacy key, the remote must support AES256-GCM-SIV
-        let protocol_version = if !shared_key.is_legacy() {
-            Some(AES_GCM_SIV_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
-        } else if uses_credentials {
-            Some(CREDENTIAL_UPDATE_V2_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
-        } else {
-            // if we're not going to be using credentials, advertise lower protocol version to allow connection
-            // to wider range of gateways
-            Some(INITIAL_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
-        };
+        // if we're using v2 authentication, we must announce at least that protocol version
+        // (which also implicitly implies usage of AES256-GCM-SIV
+        let protocol_version = AUTHENTICATE_V2_PROTOCOL_VERSION;

-        let nonce = shared_key.random_nonce_or_iv();
-        let ciphertext = shared_key.encrypt_naive(address.as_bytes_ref(), Some(&nonce))?;
-
-        Ok(ClientControlRequest::Authenticate {
-            protocol_version,
-            address: address.as_base58_string(),
-            enc_address: bs58::encode(&ciphertext).into_string(),
-            iv: bs58::encode(&nonce).into_string(),
-        })
+        Ok(ClientControlRequest::AuthenticateV2(Box::new(
+            AuthenticateRequest::new(protocol_version, shared_key, identity_keys)?,
+        )))
    }

    pub fn name(&self) -> String {
        match self {
            ClientControlRequest::Authenticate { .. } => "Authenticate".to_string(),
+            ClientControlRequest::AuthenticateV2(..) => "AuthenticateV2".to_string(),
            ClientControlRequest::RegisterHandshakeInitRequest { .. } => {
                "RegisterHandshakeInitRequest".to_string()
            }
@@ -144,26 +132,27 @@ impl ClientControlRequest {

    pub fn new_enc_ecash_credential(
        credential: CredentialSpendingData,
-        shared_key: &SharedGatewayKey,
+        shared_key: &SharedSymmetricKey,
    ) -> Result<Self, GatewayRequestsError> {
        let cred = CredentialSpendingRequest::new(credential);
        let serialized_credential = cred.to_bytes();

-        let nonce = shared_key.random_nonce_or_iv();
-        let enc_credential = shared_key.encrypt(&serialized_credential, Some(&nonce))?;
+        let nonce = shared_key.random_nonce();
+        let enc_credential = shared_key.encrypt(&serialized_credential, &nonce)?;

        Ok(ClientControlRequest::EcashCredential {
            enc_credential,
-            iv: nonce,
+            nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
        })
    }

    pub fn try_from_enc_ecash_credential(
        enc_credential: Vec<u8>,
-        shared_key: &SharedGatewayKey,
-        iv: Vec<u8>,
+        shared_key: &SharedSymmetricKey,
+        nonce: Vec<u8>,
    ) -> Result<CredentialSpendingRequest, GatewayRequestsError> {
-        let credential_bytes = shared_key.decrypt(&enc_credential, Some(&iv))?;
+        let nonce = SharedSymmetricKey::validate_aead_nonce(&nonce)?;
+        let credential_bytes = shared_key.decrypt(&enc_credential, &nonce)?;
        CredentialSpendingRequest::try_from_bytes(credential_bytes.as_slice())
            .map_err(|_| GatewayRequestsError::MalformedEncryption)
    }
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 // Copyright 2024 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

-use crate::{GatewayRequestsError, SimpleGatewayRequestsError, SymmetricKey};
+use crate::{GatewayRequestsError, SharedSymmetricKey, SimpleGatewayRequestsError};
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use tungstenite::Message;

@@ -15,9 +15,9 @@ pub enum SensitiveServerResponse {
 }

 impl SensitiveServerResponse {
-    pub fn encrypt<S: SymmetricKey>(
+    pub fn encrypt(
        &self,
-        key: &S,
+        key: &SharedSymmetricKey,
    ) -> Result<ServerResponse, GatewayRequestsError> {
        // we're using json representation for few reasons:
        // - ease of re-implementation in other languages (compared to for example bincode)
@@ -26,17 +26,21 @@ impl SensitiveServerResponse {

        // SAFETY: the trait has been derived correctly with no weird variants
        let plaintext = serde_json::to_vec(self).unwrap();
-        let nonce = key.random_nonce_or_iv();
-        let ciphertext = key.encrypt(&plaintext, Some(&nonce))?;
-        Ok(ServerResponse::EncryptedResponse { ciphertext, nonce })
+        let nonce = key.random_nonce();
+        let ciphertext = key.encrypt(&plaintext, &nonce)?;
+        Ok(ServerResponse::EncryptedResponse {
+            ciphertext,
+            nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
+        })
    }

-    pub fn decrypt<S: SymmetricKey>(
+    pub fn decrypt(
        ciphertext: &[u8],
        nonce: &[u8],
-        key: &S,
+        key: &SharedSymmetricKey,
    ) -> Result<Self, GatewayRequestsError> {
-        let plaintext = key.decrypt(ciphertext, Some(nonce))?;
+        let nonce = SharedSymmetricKey::validate_aead_nonce(nonce)?;
+        let plaintext = key.decrypt(ciphertext, &nonce)?;
        serde_json::from_slice(&plaintext)
            .map_err(|source| GatewayRequestsError::MalformedRequest { source })
    }
@@ -47,14 +51,12 @@ impl SensitiveServerResponse {
 #[non_exhaustive]
 pub enum ServerResponse {
    Authenticate {
-        #[serde(default)]
-        protocol_version: Option<u8>,
+        protocol_version: u8,
        status: bool,
        bandwidth_remaining: i64,
    },
    Register {
-        #[serde(default)]
-        protocol_version: Option<u8>,
+        protocol_version: u8,
        status: bool,
    },
    EncryptedResponse {
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2025 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+
+-- make aes256gcm column non-nullable and drop any clients that still use the legacy keys
+CREATE TABLE shared_keys_tmp
+(
+    client_id                  INTEGER NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES clients (id),
+    client_address_bs58        TEXT    NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+    derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key BLOB    NOT NULL
+);
+
+INSERT INTO shared_keys_tmp (client_id, client_address_bs58, derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key)
+SELECT client_id, client_address_bs58, derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key
+FROM shared_keys
+WHERE derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key IS NOT NULL;
+
+DROP TABLE shared_keys;
+ALTER TABLE shared_keys_tmp
+    RENAME TO shared_keys;
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2025 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+ALTER TABLE shared_keys
+    ADD COLUMN last_used_authentication TIMESTAMP WITHOUT TIME ZONE;
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use models::{
    VerifiedTicket, WireguardPeer,
 };
 use nym_credentials_interface::ClientTicket;
-use nym_gateway_requests::shared_key::SharedGatewayKey;
+use nym_gateway_requests::shared_key::SharedSymmetricKey;
 use nym_sphinx::DestinationAddressBytes;
 use shared_keys::SharedKeysManager;
 use sqlx::{
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ impl GatewayStorage {
    pub async fn insert_shared_keys(
        &self,
        client_address: DestinationAddressBytes,
-        shared_keys: &SharedGatewayKey,
+        shared_keys: &SharedSymmetricKey,
    ) -> Result<i64, GatewayStorageError> {
        let client_address_bs58 = client_address.as_base58_string();
        let client_id = match self
@@ -171,8 +171,7 @@ impl GatewayStorage {
            .insert_shared_keys(
                client_id,
                client_address_bs58,
-                shared_keys.aes128_ctr_hmac_bs58().as_deref(),
-                shared_keys.aes256_gcm_siv().as_deref(),
+                shared_keys.to_bytes().as_ref(),
            )
            .await?;
        Ok(client_id)
@@ -200,6 +199,20 @@ impl GatewayStorage {
        Ok(())
    }

+    pub async fn update_last_used_authentication_timestamp(
+        &self,
+        client_id: i64,
+        last_used_authentication_timestamp: OffsetDateTime,
+    ) -> Result<(), GatewayStorageError> {
+        self.shared_key_manager
+            .update_last_used_authentication_timestamp(
+                client_id,
+                last_used_authentication_timestamp,
+            )
+            .await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
    pub async fn get_client(&self, client_id: i64) -> Result<Option<Client>, GatewayStorageError> {
        let client = self.client_manager.get_client(client_id).await?;
        Ok(client)
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@

 use crate::error::GatewayStorageError;
 use nym_credentials_interface::{AvailableBandwidth, ClientTicket, CredentialSpendingData};
-use nym_gateway_requests::shared_key::{LegacySharedKeys, SharedGatewayKey, SharedSymmetricKey};
+use nym_gateway_requests::shared_key::SharedSymmetricKey;
 use sqlx::FromRow;
 use time::OffsetDateTime;

@@ -14,37 +14,20 @@ pub struct Client {

 #[derive(FromRow)]
 pub struct PersistedSharedKeys {
-    #[allow(dead_code)]
    pub client_id: i64,

    #[allow(dead_code)]
    pub client_address_bs58: String,
-    pub derived_aes128_ctr_blake3_hmac_keys_bs58: Option<String>,
-    pub derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    pub derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key: Vec<u8>,
+    pub last_used_authentication: Option<OffsetDateTime>,
 }

-impl TryFrom<PersistedSharedKeys> for SharedGatewayKey {
+impl TryFrom<PersistedSharedKeys> for SharedSymmetricKey {
    type Error = GatewayStorageError;

    fn try_from(value: PersistedSharedKeys) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        match (
-            &value.derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key,
-            &value.derived_aes128_ctr_blake3_hmac_keys_bs58,
-        ) {
-            (None, None) => Err(GatewayStorageError::MissingSharedKey {
-                id: value.client_id,
-            }),
-            (Some(aes256gcm_siv), _) => {
-                let current_key = SharedSymmetricKey::try_from_bytes(aes256gcm_siv)
-                    .map_err(|source| GatewayStorageError::DataCorruption(source.to_string()))?;
-                Ok(SharedGatewayKey::Current(current_key))
-            }
-            (None, Some(aes128ctr_hmac)) => {
-                let legacy_key = LegacySharedKeys::try_from_base58_string(aes128ctr_hmac)
-                    .map_err(|source| GatewayStorageError::DataCorruption(source.to_string()))?;
-                Ok(SharedGatewayKey::Legacy(legacy_key))
-            }
-        }
+        SharedSymmetricKey::try_from_bytes(&value.derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key)
+            .map_err(|source| GatewayStorageError::DataCorruption(source.to_string()))
    }
 }

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only

 use crate::models::PersistedSharedKeys;
+use time::OffsetDateTime;

 #[derive(Clone)]
 pub(crate) struct SharedKeysManager {
@@ -36,31 +37,27 @@ impl SharedKeysManager {
    ///
    /// * `client_id`: The client id for which the shared keys are stored
    /// * `client_address_bs58`: base58-encoded address of the client
-    /// * `derived_aes128_ctr_blake3_hmac_keys_bs58`: shared encryption (AES128CTR) and mac (hmac-blake3) derived shared keys to store.
+    /// * `derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key`: shared encryption (AES256GCM_SIV) derived shared keys to store.
    pub(crate) async fn insert_shared_keys(
        &self,
        client_id: i64,
        client_address_bs58: String,
-        derived_aes128_ctr_blake3_hmac_keys_bs58: Option<&String>,
-        derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key: Option<&Vec<u8>>,
+        derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key: &Vec<u8>,
    ) -> Result<(), sqlx::Error> {
        // https://stackoverflow.com/a/20310838
        // we don't want to be using `INSERT OR REPLACE INTO` due to the foreign key on `available_bandwidth` if the entry already exists
        sqlx::query!(
            r#"
-                INSERT OR IGNORE INTO shared_keys(client_id, client_address_bs58, derived_aes128_ctr_blake3_hmac_keys_bs58, derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?);
+                INSERT OR IGNORE INTO shared_keys(client_id, client_address_bs58, derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key) VALUES (?, ?, ?);

                UPDATE shared_keys
                SET
-                    derived_aes128_ctr_blake3_hmac_keys_bs58 = ?,
                    derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key = ?
                WHERE client_address_bs58 = ?
            "#,
            client_id,
            client_address_bs58,
-            derived_aes128_ctr_blake3_hmac_keys_bs58,
            derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key,
-            derived_aes128_ctr_blake3_hmac_keys_bs58,
            derived_aes256_gcm_siv_key,
            client_address_bs58,
        ).execute(&self.connection_pool).await?;
@@ -68,6 +65,22 @@ impl SharedKeysManager {
        Ok(())
    }

+    pub(crate) async fn update_last_used_authentication_timestamp(
+        &self,
+        client_id: i64,
+        last_used: OffsetDateTime,
+    ) -> Result<(), sqlx::Error> {
+        sqlx::query!(
+            "UPDATE shared_keys SET last_used_authentication = ? WHERE client_id = ?;",
+            last_used,
+            client_id
+        )
+        .execute(&self.connection_pool)
+        .await?;
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
    /// Tries to retrieve shared keys stored for the particular client.
    ///
    /// # Arguments
@@ -77,13 +90,10 @@ impl SharedKeysManager {
        &self,
        client_address_bs58: &str,
    ) -> Result<Option<PersistedSharedKeys>, sqlx::Error> {
-        sqlx::query_as!(
-            PersistedSharedKeys,
-            "SELECT * FROM shared_keys WHERE client_address_bs58 = ?",
-            client_address_bs58
-        )
-        .fetch_optional(&self.connection_pool)
-        .await
+        sqlx::query_as("SELECT * FROM shared_keys WHERE client_address_bs58 = ?")
+            .bind(client_address_bs58)
+            .fetch_optional(&self.connection_pool)
+            .await
    }

    /// Removes from the database shared keys derived with the particular client.
@@ -13,15 +13,18 @@

 use crate::ClientBuilder;

-use std::{net::SocketAddr, sync::Arc};
+use std::{
+    net::SocketAddr,
+    sync::{Arc, LazyLock},
+};

-use hickory_resolver::lookup_ip::LookupIp;
 use hickory_resolver::{
    config::{LookupIpStrategy, NameServerConfigGroup, ResolverConfig, ResolverOpts},
    error::ResolveError,
    lookup_ip::LookupIpIntoIter,
    TokioAsyncResolver,
 };
+use hickory_resolver::{error::ResolveErrorKind, lookup_ip::LookupIp};
 use once_cell::sync::OnceCell;
 use reqwest::dns::{Addrs, Name, Resolve, Resolving};
 use tracing::warn;
@@ -38,6 +41,14 @@ struct SocketAddrs {
    iter: LookupIpIntoIter,
 }

+// n.b. static items do not call [`Drop`] on program termination, so this won't be deallocated.
+// this is fine, as the OS can deallocate the terminated program faster than we can free memory
+// but tools like valgrind might report "memory leaks" as it isn't obvious this is intentional.
+static SHARED_RESOLVER: LazyLock<HickoryDnsResolver> = LazyLock::new(|| {
+    tracing::debug!("Initializing shared DNS resolver");
+    HickoryDnsResolver::default()
+});
+
 #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
 #[error("hickory-dns resolver error: {hickory_error}")]
 /// Error occurring while resolving a hostname into an IP address.
@@ -47,29 +58,62 @@ pub struct HickoryDnsError {
 }

 /// Wrapper around an `AsyncResolver`, which implements the `Resolve` trait.
+///
+/// Typical use involves instantiating using the `Default` implementation and then resolving using
+/// methods or trait implementations.
+///
+/// The default initialization uses a shared underlying `AsyncResolver`. If a thread local resolver
+/// is required use `thread_resolver()` to build a resolver with an independently instantiated
+/// internal `AsyncResolver`.
 #[derive(Debug, Default, Clone)]
 pub struct HickoryDnsResolver {
-    /// Since we might not have been called in the context of a
-    /// Tokio Runtime in initialization, so we must delay the actual
-    /// construction of the resolver.
+    // Since we might not have been called in the context of a
+    // Tokio Runtime in initialization, so we must delay the actual
+    // construction of the resolver.
    state: Arc<OnceCell<TokioAsyncResolver>>,
    fallback: Arc<OnceCell<TokioAsyncResolver>>,
+    dont_use_shared: bool,
 }

 impl Resolve for HickoryDnsResolver {
    fn resolve(&self, name: Name) -> Resolving {
        let resolver = self.state.clone();
        let fallback = self.fallback.clone();
+        let independent = self.dont_use_shared;
        Box::pin(async move {
-            let resolver = resolver.get_or_try_init(new_resolver)?;
+            let resolver = resolver.get_or_try_init(|| {
+                // using a closure here is slightly gross, but this makes sure that if the
+                // lazy-init returns an error it can be handled by the client
+                if independent {
+                    new_resolver()
+                } else {
+                    Ok(SHARED_RESOLVER.state.get_or_try_init(new_resolver)?.clone())
+                }
+            })?;

            // try the primary DNS resolver that we set up (DoH or DoT or whatever)
            let lookup = match resolver.lookup_ip(name.as_str()).await {
                Ok(res) => res,
                Err(e) => {
                    // on failure use the fall back system configured DNS resolver
-                    warn!("primary DNS failed w/ error {e}: using system fallback");
-                    let resolver = fallback.get_or_try_init(new_resolver_system)?;
+                    match e.kind() {
+                        ResolveErrorKind::NoRecordsFound { .. } => {}
+                        _ => {
+                            warn!("primary DNS failed w/ error {e}: using system fallback");
+                        }
+                    }
+                    let resolver = fallback.get_or_try_init(|| {
+                        // using a closure here is slightly gross, but this makes sure that if the
+                        // lazy-init returns an error it can be handled by the client
+                        if independent {
+                            new_resolver_system()
+                        } else {
+                            Ok(SHARED_RESOLVER
+                                .fallback
+                                .get_or_try_init(new_resolver_system)?
+                                .clone())
+                        }
+                    })?;
                    resolver.lookup_ip(name.as_str()).await?
                }
            };
@@ -93,21 +137,55 @@ impl Iterator for SocketAddrs {
 impl HickoryDnsResolver {
    /// Attempt to resolve a domain name to a set of ['IpAddr']s
    pub async fn resolve_str(&self, name: &str) -> Result<LookupIp, HickoryDnsError> {
-        let resolver = self.state.get_or_try_init(new_resolver)?;
+        let resolver = self.state.get_or_try_init(|| self.new_resolver())?;

        // try the primary DNS resolver that we set up (DoH or DoT or whatever)
        let lookup = match resolver.lookup_ip(name).await {
            Ok(res) => res,
            Err(e) => {
                // on failure use the fall back system configured DNS resolver
-                warn!("primary DNS failed w/ error {e}: using system fallback");
-                let resolver = self.fallback.get_or_try_init(new_resolver_system)?;
+                match e.kind() {
+                    ResolveErrorKind::NoRecordsFound { .. } => {}
+                    _ => {
+                        warn!("primary DNS failed w/ error {e}: using system fallback");
+                    }
+                }
+                let resolver = self
+                    .fallback
+                    .get_or_try_init(|| self.new_resolver_system())?;
                resolver.lookup_ip(name).await?
            }
        };

        Ok(lookup)
    }
+
+    /// Create a (lazy-initialized) resolver that is not shared across threads.
+    pub fn thread_resolver() -> Self {
+        Self {
+            dont_use_shared: true,
+            ..Default::default()
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn new_resolver(&self) -> Result<TokioAsyncResolver, HickoryDnsError> {
+        if self.dont_use_shared {
+            new_resolver()
+        } else {
+            Ok(SHARED_RESOLVER.state.get_or_try_init(new_resolver)?.clone())
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn new_resolver_system(&self) -> Result<TokioAsyncResolver, HickoryDnsError> {
+        if self.dont_use_shared {
+            new_resolver_system()
+        } else {
+            Ok(SHARED_RESOLVER
+                .fallback
+                .get_or_try_init(new_resolver_system)?
+                .clone())
+        }
+    }
 }

 /// Create a new resolver with a custom DoT based configuration. The options are overridden to look
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ mime = { workspace = true }
 serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
 serde_json.workspace = true
 serde_yaml = { workspace = true }
+subtle.workspace = true
 tower = { workspace = true }
 tracing.workspace = true
 utoipa = { workspace = true, optional = true }
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ use axum::{extract::Request, response::Response};
 use futures::future::BoxFuture;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use std::task::{Context, Poll};
+use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
 use tower::{Layer, Service};
 use tracing::{debug, instrument, trace};
 use zeroize::Zeroizing;
@@ -76,7 +77,7 @@ impl<S> RequireAuth<S> {
            return Err("`Authorization` header must contain non-empty `Bearer` token");
        }

-        if self.bearer_token.as_str() != bearer_token {
+        if bool::from(self.bearer_token.as_bytes().ct_ne(bearer_token.as_bytes())) {
            return Err("`Authorization` header does not contain the correct `Bearer` token");
        }

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ bincode = { workspace = true }
 bytes = { workspace = true }
 nym-bin-common = { path = "../bin-common" }
 nym-crypto = { path = "../crypto" }
+nym-service-provider-requests-common = { path = "../service-provider-requests-common" }
 nym-sphinx = { path = "../nymsphinx" }
 rand = { workspace = true }
 serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
@@ -2,24 +2,18 @@ use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use std::fmt::{Display, Formatter};
 use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};

-// The current version of the protocol.
-// The idea here is that we add new request response types at least one version before we start
-// using them.
-// Also, depending on the version in the client connect message the IPR could respond with a
-// matching older version.
-pub use v6::request;
-pub use v6::response;
-
 pub mod codec;
+pub mod sign;
 pub mod v6;
 pub mod v7;
+pub mod v8;

 // version 3: initial version
 // version 4: IPv6 support
 // version 5: Add severity level to info response
 // version 6: Increase the available IPs
 // version 7: Add signature support (for the future)
-pub const CURRENT_VERSION: u8 = 6;
+// version 8: Anonymous sends

 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct IpPair {
@@ -45,3 +39,9 @@ fn make_bincode_serializer() -> impl bincode::Options {
        .with_big_endian()
        .with_varint_encoding()
 }
+
+fn generate_random() -> u64 {
+    use rand::RngCore;
+    let mut rng = rand::rngs::OsRng;
+    rng.next_u64()
+}
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 use std::time::Duration;

-use nym_crypto::asymmetric::identity;
+use nym_crypto::asymmetric::ed25519;
+use time::OffsetDateTime;

 // For reply protection, if a request is older than this, it will be rejected
 const MAX_REQUEST_AGE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(10);
@@ -22,29 +23,37 @@ pub enum SignatureError {
    #[error("signature verification failed")]
    VerificationFailed {
        message: String,
-        error: identity::SignatureError,
+        error: ed25519::SignatureError,
    },
 }

 pub trait SignedRequest {
-    fn identity(&self) -> &identity::PublicKey;
+    fn identity(&self) -> Option<&ed25519::PublicKey>;

-    fn request(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SignatureError>;
+    fn request_as_bytes(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SignatureError>;

-    fn signature(&self) -> Option<&identity::Signature>;
+    fn signature(&self) -> Option<&ed25519::Signature>;

-    fn timestamp(&self) -> time::OffsetDateTime;
+    fn timestamp(&self) -> OffsetDateTime;

    fn verify(&self) -> Result<(), SignatureError> {
+        let identity = match self.identity() {
+            Some(identity) => identity,
+            None => {
+                // If we are not revealing our identity, we don't need to verify anything
+                return Ok(());
+            }
+        };
+
        if let Some(signature) = self.signature() {
            // First check that the request is recent enough
-            if time::OffsetDateTime::now_utc() - self.timestamp() > MAX_REQUEST_AGE {
+            if OffsetDateTime::now_utc() - self.timestamp() > MAX_REQUEST_AGE {
                return Err(SignatureError::RequestOutOfDate);
            }

-            let request_as_bytes = self.request()?;
+            let request_as_bytes = self.request_as_bytes()?;

-            self.identity()
+            identity
                .verify(request_as_bytes, signature)
                .map_err(|error| SignatureError::VerificationFailed {
                    message: "signature verification failed".to_string(),
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2024 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-use crate::{v6, v7};
-
-impl From<v7::response::StaticConnectFailureReason> for v6::response::StaticConnectFailureReason {
-    fn from(failure: v7::response::StaticConnectFailureReason) -> Self {
-        match failure {
-            v7::response::StaticConnectFailureReason::RequestedIpAlreadyInUse => {
-                v6::response::StaticConnectFailureReason::RequestedIpAlreadyInUse
-            }
-            v7::response::StaticConnectFailureReason::RequestedNymAddressAlreadyInUse => {
-                v6::response::StaticConnectFailureReason::RequestedNymAddressAlreadyInUse
-            }
-            v7::response::StaticConnectFailureReason::OutOfDateTimestamp => {
-                v6::response::StaticConnectFailureReason::Other("out of date timestamp".to_string())
-            }
-            v7::response::StaticConnectFailureReason::Other(reason) => {
-                v6::response::StaticConnectFailureReason::Other(reason)
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<v7::response::DynamicConnectFailureReason> for v6::response::DynamicConnectFailureReason {
-    fn from(failure: v7::response::DynamicConnectFailureReason) -> Self {
-        match failure {
-            v7::response::DynamicConnectFailureReason::RequestedNymAddressAlreadyInUse => {
-                v6::response::DynamicConnectFailureReason::RequestedNymAddressAlreadyInUse
-            }
-            v7::response::DynamicConnectFailureReason::NoAvailableIp => {
-                v6::response::DynamicConnectFailureReason::NoAvailableIp
-            }
-            v7::response::DynamicConnectFailureReason::Other(err) => {
-                v6::response::DynamicConnectFailureReason::Other(err)
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<v7::response::InfoResponseReply> for v6::response::InfoResponseReply {
-    fn from(reply: v7::response::InfoResponseReply) -> Self {
-        match reply {
-            v7::response::InfoResponseReply::Generic { msg } => {
-                v6::response::InfoResponseReply::Generic { msg }
-            }
-            v7::response::InfoResponseReply::VersionMismatch {
-                request_version,
-                response_version,
-            } => v6::response::InfoResponseReply::VersionMismatch {
-                request_version,
-                response_version,
-            },
-            v7::response::InfoResponseReply::ExitPolicyFilterCheckFailed { dst } => {
-                v6::response::InfoResponseReply::ExitPolicyFilterCheckFailed { dst }
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<v7::response::InfoLevel> for v6::response::InfoLevel {
-    fn from(level: v7::response::InfoLevel) -> Self {
-        match level {
-            v7::response::InfoLevel::Info => v6::response::InfoLevel::Info,
-            v7::response::InfoLevel::Warn => v6::response::InfoLevel::Warn,
-            v7::response::InfoLevel::Error => v6::response::InfoLevel::Error,
-        }
-    }
-}
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-pub mod conversion;
 pub mod request;
 pub mod response;

@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
-use time::OffsetDateTime;
-
-use crate::{v6, v7};
-
-impl From<v6::request::IpPacketRequest> for v7::request::IpPacketRequest {
-    fn from(ip_packet_request: v6::request::IpPacketRequest) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            version: 7,
-            data: ip_packet_request.data.into(),
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<v6::request::IpPacketRequestData> for v7::request::IpPacketRequestData {
-    fn from(ip_packet_request_data: v6::request::IpPacketRequestData) -> Self {
-        match ip_packet_request_data {
-            v6::request::IpPacketRequestData::StaticConnect(r) => {
-                v7::request::IpPacketRequestData::StaticConnect(
-                    v7::request::SignedStaticConnectRequest {
-                        request: r.into(),
-                        signature: None,
-                    },
-                )
-            }
-            v6::request::IpPacketRequestData::DynamicConnect(r) => {
-                v7::request::IpPacketRequestData::DynamicConnect(
-                    v7::request::SignedDynamicConnectRequest {
-                        request: r.into(),
-                        signature: None,
-                    },
-                )
-            }
-            v6::request::IpPacketRequestData::Disconnect(r) => {
-                v7::request::IpPacketRequestData::Disconnect(v7::request::SignedDisconnectRequest {
-                    request: r.into(),
-                    signature: None,
-                })
-            }
-            v6::request::IpPacketRequestData::Data(r) => {
-                v7::request::IpPacketRequestData::Data(r.into())
-            }
-            v6::request::IpPacketRequestData::Ping(r) => {
-                v7::request::IpPacketRequestData::Ping(r.into())
-            }
-            v6::request::IpPacketRequestData::Health(r) => {
-                v7::request::IpPacketRequestData::Health(r.into())
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<v6::request::StaticConnectRequest> for v7::request::StaticConnectRequest {
-    fn from(static_connect_request: v6::request::StaticConnectRequest) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            request_id: static_connect_request.request_id,
-            ips: static_connect_request.ips,
-            reply_to: static_connect_request.reply_to,
-            reply_to_hops: static_connect_request.reply_to_hops,
-            reply_to_avg_mix_delays: static_connect_request.reply_to_avg_mix_delays,
-            buffer_timeout: static_connect_request.buffer_timeout,
-            timestamp: OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-#[allow(deprecated)]
-impl From<v6::request::DynamicConnectRequest> for v7::request::DynamicConnectRequest {
-    fn from(dynamic_connect_request: v6::request::DynamicConnectRequest) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            request_id: dynamic_connect_request.request_id,
-            reply_to: dynamic_connect_request.reply_to,
-            reply_to_hops: dynamic_connect_request.reply_to_hops,
-            reply_to_avg_mix_delays: dynamic_connect_request.reply_to_avg_mix_delays,
-            buffer_timeout: dynamic_connect_request.buffer_timeout,
-            timestamp: OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<v6::request::DisconnectRequest> for v7::request::SignedDisconnectRequest {
-    fn from(disconnect_request: v6::request::DisconnectRequest) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            request: disconnect_request.into(),
-            signature: None,
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<v6::request::DisconnectRequest> for v7::request::DisconnectRequest {
-    fn from(disconnect_request: v6::request::DisconnectRequest) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            request_id: disconnect_request.request_id,
-            reply_to: disconnect_request.reply_to,
-            timestamp: OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<v6::request::DataRequest> for v7::request::DataRequest {
-    fn from(data_request: v6::request::DataRequest) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            ip_packets: data_request.ip_packets,
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<v6::request::PingRequest> for v7::request::PingRequest {
-    fn from(ping_request: v6::request::PingRequest) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            request_id: ping_request.request_id,
-            reply_to: ping_request.reply_to,
-            timestamp: OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<v6::request::HealthRequest> for v7::request::HealthRequest {
-    fn from(health_request: v6::request::HealthRequest) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            request_id: health_request.request_id,
-            reply_to: health_request.reply_to,
-            timestamp: OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
-        }
-    }
-}
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
-pub mod conversion;
 pub mod request;
 pub mod response;
-pub mod signature;

 pub const VERSION: u8 = 7;
@@ -1,22 +1,18 @@
+use std::fmt;
+
 use nym_crypto::asymmetric::identity;
 use nym_sphinx::addressing::clients::Recipient;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use time::OffsetDateTime;

-use crate::{make_bincode_serializer, IpPair};
-
-use super::{
-    signature::{SignatureError, SignedRequest},
-    VERSION,
+use crate::{
+    sign::{SignatureError, SignedRequest},
+    IpPair,
 };

-fn generate_random() -> u64 {
-    use rand::RngCore;
-    let mut rng = rand::rngs::OsRng;
-    rng.next_u64()
-}
+use super::VERSION;

-#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
 pub struct IpPacketRequest {
    pub version: u8,
    pub data: IpPacketRequestData,
@@ -30,7 +26,7 @@ impl IpPacketRequest {
        reply_to_avg_mix_delays: Option<f64>,
        buffer_timeout: Option<u64>,
    ) -> (Self, u64) {
-        let request_id = generate_random();
+        let request_id = crate::generate_random();
        (
            Self {
                version: VERSION,
@@ -58,7 +54,7 @@ impl IpPacketRequest {
        reply_to_avg_mix_delays: Option<f64>,
        buffer_timeout: Option<u64>,
    ) -> (Self, u64) {
-        let request_id = generate_random();
+        let request_id = crate::generate_random();
        (
            Self {
                version: VERSION,
@@ -79,7 +75,7 @@ impl IpPacketRequest {
    }

    pub fn new_disconnect_request(reply_to: Recipient) -> (Self, u64) {
-        let request_id = generate_random();
+        let request_id = crate::generate_random();
        (
            Self {
                version: VERSION,
@@ -104,7 +100,7 @@ impl IpPacketRequest {
    }

    pub fn new_ping(reply_to: Recipient) -> (Self, u64) {
-        let request_id = generate_random();
+        let request_id = crate::generate_random();
        (
            Self {
                version: VERSION,
@@ -119,7 +115,7 @@ impl IpPacketRequest {
    }

    pub fn new_health_request(reply_to: Recipient) -> (Self, u64) {
-        let request_id = generate_random();
+        let request_id = crate::generate_random();
        (
            Self {
                version: VERSION,
@@ -155,16 +151,27 @@ impl IpPacketRequest {
        }
    }

+    pub fn verify(&self) -> Result<(), SignatureError> {
+        match &self.data {
+            IpPacketRequestData::StaticConnect(request) => request.verify(),
+            IpPacketRequestData::DynamicConnect(request) => request.verify(),
+            IpPacketRequestData::Disconnect(request) => request.verify(),
+            IpPacketRequestData::Data(_) => Ok(()),
+            IpPacketRequestData::Ping(_) => Ok(()),
+            IpPacketRequestData::Health(_) => Ok(()),
+        }
+    }
+
    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, bincode::Error> {
        use bincode::Options;
-        make_bincode_serializer().serialize(self)
+        crate::make_bincode_serializer().serialize(self)
    }

    pub fn from_reconstructed_message(
        message: &nym_sphinx::receiver::ReconstructedMessage,
    ) -> Result<Self, bincode::Error> {
        use bincode::Options;
-        make_bincode_serializer().deserialize(&message.message)
+        crate::make_bincode_serializer().deserialize(&message.message)
    }
 }

@@ -179,6 +186,19 @@ pub enum IpPacketRequestData {
    Health(HealthRequest),
 }

+impl fmt::Display for IpPacketRequestData {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        match self {
+            IpPacketRequestData::StaticConnect(_) => write!(f, "StaticConnect"),
+            IpPacketRequestData::DynamicConnect(_) => write!(f, "DynamicConnect"),
+            IpPacketRequestData::Disconnect(_) => write!(f, "Disconnect"),
+            IpPacketRequestData::Data(_) => write!(f, "Data"),
+            IpPacketRequestData::Ping(_) => write!(f, "Ping"),
+            IpPacketRequestData::Health(_) => write!(f, "Health"),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 impl IpPacketRequestData {
    pub fn add_signature(&mut self, signature: identity::Signature) -> Option<identity::Signature> {
        match self {
@@ -202,9 +222,9 @@ impl IpPacketRequestData {

    pub fn signable_request(&self) -> Option<Result<Vec<u8>, SignatureError>> {
        match self {
-            IpPacketRequestData::StaticConnect(request) => Some(request.request()),
-            IpPacketRequestData::DynamicConnect(request) => Some(request.request()),
-            IpPacketRequestData::Disconnect(request) => Some(request.request()),
+            IpPacketRequestData::StaticConnect(request) => Some(request.request_as_bytes()),
+            IpPacketRequestData::DynamicConnect(request) => Some(request.request_as_bytes()),
+            IpPacketRequestData::Disconnect(request) => Some(request.request_as_bytes()),
            IpPacketRequestData::Data(_) => None,
            IpPacketRequestData::Ping(_) => None,
            IpPacketRequestData::Health(_) => None,
@@ -242,7 +262,7 @@ pub struct StaticConnectRequest {
 impl StaticConnectRequest {
    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, bincode::Error> {
        use bincode::Options;
-        make_bincode_serializer().serialize(self)
+        crate::make_bincode_serializer().serialize(self)
    }
 }

@@ -253,11 +273,11 @@ pub struct SignedStaticConnectRequest {
 }

 impl SignedRequest for SignedStaticConnectRequest {
-    fn identity(&self) -> &identity::PublicKey {
-        self.request.reply_to.identity()
+    fn identity(&self) -> Option<&identity::PublicKey> {
+        Some(self.request.reply_to.identity())
    }

-    fn request(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SignatureError> {
+    fn request_as_bytes(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SignatureError> {
        self.request
            .to_bytes()
            .map_err(|error| SignatureError::RequestSerializationError {
@@ -306,7 +326,7 @@ pub struct DynamicConnectRequest {
 impl DynamicConnectRequest {
    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, bincode::Error> {
        use bincode::Options;
-        make_bincode_serializer().serialize(self)
+        crate::make_bincode_serializer().serialize(self)
    }
 }

@@ -317,11 +337,11 @@ pub struct SignedDynamicConnectRequest {
 }

 impl SignedRequest for SignedDynamicConnectRequest {
-    fn identity(&self) -> &identity::PublicKey {
-        self.request.reply_to.identity()
+    fn identity(&self) -> Option<&identity::PublicKey> {
+        Some(self.request.reply_to.identity())
    }

-    fn request(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SignatureError> {
+    fn request_as_bytes(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SignatureError> {
        self.request
            .to_bytes()
            .map_err(|error| SignatureError::RequestSerializationError {
@@ -355,7 +375,7 @@ pub struct DisconnectRequest {
 impl DisconnectRequest {
    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, bincode::Error> {
        use bincode::Options;
-        make_bincode_serializer().serialize(self)
+        crate::make_bincode_serializer().serialize(self)
    }
 }

@@ -366,11 +386,11 @@ pub struct SignedDisconnectRequest {
 }

 impl SignedRequest for SignedDisconnectRequest {
-    fn identity(&self) -> &identity::PublicKey {
-        self.request.reply_to.identity()
+    fn identity(&self) -> Option<&identity::PublicKey> {
+        Some(self.request.reply_to.identity())
    }

-    fn request(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SignatureError> {
+    fn request_as_bytes(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SignatureError> {
        self.request
            .to_bytes()
            .map_err(|error| SignatureError::RequestSerializationError {
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+pub mod request;
+pub mod response;
+
+pub const VERSION: u8 = 8;
@@ -0,0 +1,304 @@
+use std::fmt;
+
+use nym_service_provider_requests_common::{Protocol, ServiceProviderType};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use time::OffsetDateTime;
+
+use super::VERSION;
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
+pub struct IpPacketRequest {
+    pub protocol: Protocol,
+    pub data: IpPacketRequestData,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
+pub enum IpPacketRequestData {
+    Data(DataRequest),
+    Control(Box<ControlRequest>),
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
+pub enum ControlRequest {
+    Connect(ConnectRequest),
+    Disconnect(DisconnectRequest),
+    Ping(PingRequest),
+    Health(HealthRequest),
+}
+
+// A data request is when the client wants to send an IP packet to a destination.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
+pub struct DataRequest {
+    pub ip_packets: bytes::Bytes,
+}
+
+// A dynamic connect request is when the client does not provide the internal IP address it will use
+// on the ip packet router, and instead requests one to be assigned to it.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
+pub struct ConnectRequest {
+    pub request_id: u64,
+
+    // The maximum time in milliseconds the IPR should wait when filling up a mix packet
+    // with ip packets.
+    pub buffer_timeout: Option<u64>,
+
+    // Timestamp of when the request was sent by the client.
+    pub timestamp: OffsetDateTime,
+}
+
+// A disconnect request is when the client wants to disconnect from the ip packet router and free
+// up the allocated IP address.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
+pub struct DisconnectRequest {
+    pub request_id: u64,
+
+    // Timestamp of when the request was sent by the client.
+    pub timestamp: OffsetDateTime,
+}
+
+// A ping request is when the client wants to check if the ip packet router is still alive.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
+pub struct PingRequest {
+    pub request_id: u64,
+
+    // Timestamp of when the request was sent by the client.
+    pub timestamp: OffsetDateTime,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
+pub struct HealthRequest {
+    pub request_id: u64,
+
+    // Timestamp of when the request was sent by the client.
+    pub timestamp: OffsetDateTime,
+}
+
+impl IpPacketRequest {
+    pub fn new_connect_request(buffer_timeout: Option<u64>) -> (Self, u64) {
+        let protocol = Protocol {
+            version: VERSION,
+            service_provider_type: ServiceProviderType::IpPacketRouter,
+        };
+        let request_id = rand::random();
+        let timestamp = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
+        let connect = ConnectRequest {
+            request_id,
+            buffer_timeout,
+            timestamp,
+        };
+        let request = Self {
+            protocol,
+            data: IpPacketRequestData::Control(Box::new(ControlRequest::Connect(connect))),
+        };
+        (request, request_id)
+    }
+
+    pub fn new_disconnect_request() -> (Self, u64) {
+        let protocol = Protocol {
+            version: VERSION,
+            service_provider_type: ServiceProviderType::IpPacketRouter,
+        };
+        let request_id = rand::random();
+        let timestamp = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
+        let disconnect = DisconnectRequest {
+            request_id,
+            timestamp,
+        };
+        let request = Self {
+            protocol,
+            data: IpPacketRequestData::Control(Box::new(ControlRequest::Disconnect(disconnect))),
+        };
+        (request, request_id)
+    }
+
+    pub fn new_data_request(ip_packets: bytes::Bytes) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            protocol: Protocol {
+                version: VERSION,
+                service_provider_type: ServiceProviderType::IpPacketRouter,
+            },
+            data: IpPacketRequestData::Data(DataRequest { ip_packets }),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn new_ping() -> (Self, u64) {
+        let protocol = Protocol {
+            version: VERSION,
+            service_provider_type: ServiceProviderType::IpPacketRouter,
+        };
+        let request_id = rand::random();
+        let timestamp = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
+        let ping_request = PingRequest {
+            request_id,
+            timestamp,
+        };
+        let request = Self {
+            protocol,
+            data: IpPacketRequestData::Control(Box::new(ControlRequest::Ping(ping_request))),
+        };
+        (request, request_id)
+    }
+
+    pub fn new_health_request() -> (Self, u64) {
+        let protocol = Protocol {
+            version: VERSION,
+            service_provider_type: ServiceProviderType::IpPacketRouter,
+        };
+        let request_id = rand::random();
+        let timestamp = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
+        let health_request = HealthRequest {
+            request_id,
+            timestamp,
+        };
+        let request = Self {
+            protocol,
+            data: IpPacketRequestData::Control(Box::new(ControlRequest::Health(health_request))),
+        };
+        (request, request_id)
+    }
+
+    pub fn id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
+        match self.data {
+            IpPacketRequestData::Control(ref c) => Some(c.id()),
+            IpPacketRequestData::Data(_) => None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, bincode::Error> {
+        use bincode::Options;
+        crate::make_bincode_serializer().serialize(self)
+    }
+
+    pub fn from_reconstructed_message(
+        message: &nym_sphinx::receiver::ReconstructedMessage,
+    ) -> Result<Self, bincode::Error> {
+        use bincode::Options;
+        crate::make_bincode_serializer().deserialize(&message.message)
+    }
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for IpPacketRequest {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        write!(
+            f,
+            "IpPacketRequest {{ version: {}, data: {} }}",
+            self.protocol.version, self.data
+        )
+    }
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for IpPacketRequestData {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        match self {
+            IpPacketRequestData::Data(_) => write!(f, "Data"),
+            IpPacketRequestData::Control(c) => write!(f, "Control({})", c),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl ControlRequest {
+    fn id(&self) -> u64 {
+        match self {
+            ControlRequest::Connect(request) => request.request_id,
+            ControlRequest::Disconnect(request) => request.request_id,
+            ControlRequest::Ping(request) => request.request_id,
+            ControlRequest::Health(request) => request.request_id,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for ControlRequest {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        match self {
+            ControlRequest::Connect(_) => write!(f, "Connect"),
+            ControlRequest::Disconnect(_) => write!(f, "Disconnect"),
+            ControlRequest::Ping(_) => write!(f, "Ping"),
+            ControlRequest::Health(_) => write!(f, "Health"),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl ConnectRequest {
+    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, bincode::Error> {
+        use bincode::Options;
+        crate::make_bincode_serializer().serialize(self)
+    }
+}
+
+impl DisconnectRequest {
+    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, bincode::Error> {
+        use bincode::Options;
+        crate::make_bincode_serializer().serialize(self)
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use time::macros::datetime;
+
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn check_size_of_request() {
+        let connect = IpPacketRequest {
+            protocol: Protocol {
+                version: 4,
+                service_provider_type: ServiceProviderType::IpPacketRouter,
+            },
+            data: IpPacketRequestData::Control(Box::new(ControlRequest::Connect(ConnectRequest {
+                request_id: 123,
+                buffer_timeout: None,
+                timestamp: datetime!(2024-01-01 12:59:59.5 UTC),
+            }))),
+        };
+        assert_eq!(connect.to_bytes().unwrap().len(), 21);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn check_size_of_data() {
+        let data = IpPacketRequest {
+            protocol: Protocol {
+                version: 4,
+                service_provider_type: ServiceProviderType::IpPacketRouter,
+            },
+            data: IpPacketRequestData::Data(DataRequest {
+                ip_packets: bytes::Bytes::from(vec![1u8; 32]),
+            }),
+        };
+        assert_eq!(data.to_bytes().unwrap().len(), 36);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn serialize_and_deserialize_data_request() {
+        let data = IpPacketRequest {
+            protocol: Protocol {
+                version: 4,
+                service_provider_type: ServiceProviderType::IpPacketRouter,
+            },
+            data: IpPacketRequestData::Data(DataRequest {
+                ip_packets: bytes::Bytes::from(vec![1, 2, 4, 2, 5]),
+            }),
+        };
+
+        let serialized = data.to_bytes().unwrap();
+        let deserialized = IpPacketRequest::from_reconstructed_message(
+            &nym_sphinx::receiver::ReconstructedMessage {
+                message: serialized,
+                sender_tag: None,
+            },
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(deserialized.protocol.version, 4);
+        assert_eq!(
+            deserialized.protocol.service_provider_type,
+            ServiceProviderType::IpPacketRouter
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            deserialized.data,
+            IpPacketRequestData::Data(DataRequest {
+                ip_packets: bytes::Bytes::from(vec![1, 2, 4, 2, 5]),
+            })
+        );
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+use nym_bin_common::build_information::BinaryBuildInformationOwned;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+
+use crate::{make_bincode_serializer, IpPair};
+
+use super::VERSION;
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct IpPacketResponse {
+    pub version: u8,
+    pub data: IpPacketResponseData,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub enum IpPacketResponseData {
+    Data(DataResponse),
+    Control(Box<ControlResponse>),
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct DataResponse {
+    pub ip_packet: bytes::Bytes,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub enum ControlResponse {
+    // Response for a connect request
+    Connect(ConnectResponse),
+
+    // Response for a disconnect initiqated by the client
+    Disconnect(DisconnectResponse),
+
+    // Message from the server that the client got disconnected without the client initiating it
+    UnrequestedDisconnect(UnrequestedDisconnect),
+
+    // Response to ping request
+    Pong(PongResponse),
+
+    // Response for a health request
+    Health(Box<HealthResponse>),
+
+    // Info response. This can be anything from informative messages to errors
+    Info(InfoResponse),
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct ConnectResponse {
+    pub request_id: u64,
+    pub reply: ConnectResponseReply,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub enum ConnectResponseReply {
+    Success(ConnectSuccess),
+    Failure(ConnectFailureReason),
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct ConnectSuccess {
+    pub ips: IpPair,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum ConnectFailureReason {
+    #[error("client is already connected")]
+    ClientAlreadyConnected,
+
+    #[error("no available ip address")]
+    NoAvailableIp,
+
+    #[error("{0}")]
+    Other(String),
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct DisconnectResponse {
+    pub request_id: u64,
+    pub reply: DisconnectResponseReply,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub enum DisconnectResponseReply {
+    Success,
+    Failure(DisconnectFailureReason),
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum DisconnectFailureReason {
+    #[error("client is not connected")]
+    ClientNotConnected,
+
+    #[error("{0}")]
+    Other(String),
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct UnrequestedDisconnect {
+    pub reason: UnrequestedDisconnectReason,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum UnrequestedDisconnectReason {
+    #[error("client mixnet traffic timeout")]
+    ClientMixnetTrafficTimeout,
+
+    #[error("client tun traffic timeout")]
+    ClientTunTrafficTimeout,
+
+    #[error("{0}")]
+    Other(String),
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct PongResponse {
+    pub request_id: u64,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct HealthResponse {
+    pub request_id: u64,
+    pub reply: HealthResponseReply,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct HealthResponseReply {
+    // Return the binary build information of the IPR
+    pub build_info: BinaryBuildInformationOwned,
+
+    // Return if the IPR has performed a successful routing test.
+    pub routable: Option<bool>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct InfoResponse {
+    pub request_id: u64,
+    pub reply: InfoResponseReply,
+    pub level: InfoLevel,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum InfoResponseReply {
+    #[error("{msg}")]
+    Generic { msg: String },
+
+    #[error(
+        "version mismatch: response is v{request_version} and response is v{response_version}"
+    )]
+    VersionMismatch {
+        request_version: u8,
+        response_version: u8,
+    },
+
+    #[error("destination failed exit policy filter check: {dst}")]
+    ExitPolicyFilterCheckFailed { dst: String },
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub enum InfoLevel {
+    Info,
+    Warn,
+    Error,
+}
+
+impl IpPacketResponse {
+    pub fn new_ip_packet(ip_packet: bytes::Bytes) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            version: VERSION,
+            data: IpPacketResponseData::Data(DataResponse { ip_packet }),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
+        match &self.data {
+            IpPacketResponseData::Data(_) => None,
+            IpPacketResponseData::Control(response) => response.id(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, bincode::Error> {
+        use bincode::Options;
+        make_bincode_serializer().serialize(self)
+    }
+
+    pub fn from_reconstructed_message(
+        message: &nym_sphinx::receiver::ReconstructedMessage,
+    ) -> Result<Self, bincode::Error> {
+        use bincode::Options;
+        make_bincode_serializer().deserialize(&message.message)
+    }
+}
+
+impl IpPacketResponseData {
+    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, bincode::Error> {
+        use bincode::Options;
+        make_bincode_serializer().serialize(self)
+    }
+}
+
+impl ControlResponse {
+    fn id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
+        match self {
+            ControlResponse::Connect(response) => Some(response.request_id),
+            ControlResponse::Disconnect(response) => Some(response.request_id),
+            ControlResponse::UnrequestedDisconnect(_) => None,
+            ControlResponse::Pong(response) => Some(response.request_id),
+            ControlResponse::Health(response) => Some(response.request_id),
+            ControlResponse::Info(response) => Some(response.request_id),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl ConnectResponseReply {
+    pub fn is_success(&self) -> bool {
+        match self {
+            ConnectResponseReply::Success(_) => true,
+            ConnectResponseReply::Failure(_) => false,
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-[package]
-name = "nym-coconut"
-version = "0.5.0"
-authors = ["Jedrzej Stuczynski <andrew@nymtech.net>", "Ania Piotrowska <ania@nymtech.net>"]
-edition = "2021"
-license.workspace = true
-
-# See more keys and their definitions at https://doc.rust-lang.org/cargo/reference/manifest.html
-
-[dependencies]
-bls12_381 = { workspace = true, default-features = false, features = ["pairings", "alloc", "experimental"] }
-itertools = { workspace = true }
-digest = "0.9"
-rand = { workspace = true }
-thiserror = { workspace = true }
-serde = { workspace = true }
-serde_derive = { workspace = true }
-bs58 = { workspace = true }
-sha2 = "0.9"
-zeroize = { workspace = true, optional = true }
-
-nym-dkg = { path = "../dkg" }
-nym-pemstore = { path = "../pemstore" }
-
-[dependencies.ff]
-workspace = true
-default-features = false
-
-[dependencies.group]
-workspace = true
-default-features = false
-
-[dev-dependencies]
-criterion = { workspace = true, features = ["html_reports"] }
-doc-comment = { workspace = true }
-rand_chacha = { workspace = true }
-
-[[bench]]
-name = "benchmarks"
-harness = false
-
-[features]
-key-zeroize = ["zeroize", "bls12_381/zeroize"]
-default = []
-
-
-[target.'cfg(target_env = "wasm32-unknown-unknown")'.dependencies]
-getrandom = { version="0.2", features=["js"] }
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-This project was partially funded through the NGI0 PET Fund, a fund established by NL.net with financial support from the European Commission's NGI programme, under the aegis of DG Communications Networks, Content and Technology under grant agreement No 825310.
@@ -1,360 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2021 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-use bls12_381::{multi_miller_loop, G1Affine, G1Projective, G2Affine, G2Prepared, Scalar};
-use criterion::{criterion_group, criterion_main, Criterion};
-use ff::Field;
-use group::{Curve, Group};
-use nym_coconut::{
-    aggregate_signature_shares_and_verify, aggregate_verification_keys, blind_sign,
-    prepare_blind_sign, prove_bandwidth_credential, random_scalars_refs, setup, ttp_keygen,
-    verify_credential, verify_partial_blind_signature, Attribute, BlindedSignature, Parameters,
-    Signature, SignatureShare, VerificationKey,
-};
-use rand::seq::SliceRandom;
-use std::ops::Neg;
-use std::time::Duration;
-
-#[allow(unused)]
-fn double_pairing(g11: &G1Affine, g21: &G2Affine, g12: &G1Affine, g22: &G2Affine) {
-    let gt1 = bls12_381::pairing(g11, g21);
-    let gt2 = bls12_381::pairing(g12, g22);
-    assert_eq!(gt1, gt2)
-}
-
-#[allow(unused)]
-fn multi_miller_pairing_affine(g11: &G1Affine, g21: &G2Affine, g12: &G1Affine, g22: &G2Affine) {
-    let miller_loop_result = multi_miller_loop(&[
-        (g11, &G2Prepared::from(*g21)),
-        (&g12.neg(), &G2Prepared::from(*g22)),
-    ]);
-    assert!(bool::from(
-        miller_loop_result.final_exponentiation().is_identity()
-    ))
-}
-
-#[allow(unused)]
-fn bench_pairings(c: &mut Criterion) {
-    let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
-
-    let g1 = G1Affine::generator();
-    let g2 = G2Affine::generator();
-    let r = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
-    let s = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
-
-    let g11 = (g1 * r).to_affine();
-    let g21 = (g2 * s).to_affine();
-    let g21_prep = G2Prepared::from(g21);
-
-    let g12 = (g1 * s).to_affine();
-    let g22 = (g2 * r).to_affine();
-    let g22_prep = G2Prepared::from(g22);
-
-    c.bench_function("double pairing", |b| {
-        b.iter(|| double_pairing(&g11, &g21, &g12, &g22))
-    });
-
-    c.bench_function("multi miller in affine", |b| {
-        b.iter(|| multi_miller_pairing_affine(&g11, &g21, &g12, &g22))
-    });
-
-    c.bench_function("multi miller with prepared g2", |b| {
-        b.iter(|| multi_miller_pairing_with_prepared(&g11, &g21_prep, &g12, &g22_prep))
-    });
-
-    c.bench_function("multi miller with semi-prepared g2", |b| {
-        b.iter(|| multi_miller_pairing_with_semi_prepared(&g11, &g21, &g12, &g22_prep))
-    });
-}
-
-#[allow(unused)]
-fn multi_miller_pairing_with_prepared(
-    g11: &G1Affine,
-    g21: &G2Prepared,
-    g12: &G1Affine,
-    g22: &G2Prepared,
-) {
-    let miller_loop_result = multi_miller_loop(&[(g11, g21), (&g12.neg(), g22)]);
-    assert!(bool::from(
-        miller_loop_result.final_exponentiation().is_identity()
-    ))
-}
-
-// the case of being able to prepare G2 generator
-#[allow(unused)]
-fn multi_miller_pairing_with_semi_prepared(
-    g11: &G1Affine,
-    g21: &G2Affine,
-    g12: &G1Affine,
-    g22: &G2Prepared,
-) {
-    let miller_loop_result =
-        multi_miller_loop(&[(g11, &G2Prepared::from(*g21)), (&g12.neg(), g22)]);
-    assert!(bool::from(
-        miller_loop_result.final_exponentiation().is_identity()
-    ))
-}
-
-#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
-fn unblind_and_aggregate(
-    params: &Parameters,
-    blinded_signatures: &[BlindedSignature],
-    partial_verification_keys: &[VerificationKey],
-    private_attributes: &[&Attribute],
-    public_attributes: &[&Attribute],
-    commitment_hash: &G1Projective,
-    pedersen_commitments_openings: &[Scalar],
-    verification_key: &VerificationKey,
-) -> Signature {
-    // Unblind all partial signatures
-    let unblinded_signatures: Vec<Signature> = blinded_signatures
-        .iter()
-        .zip(partial_verification_keys.iter())
-        .map(|(signature, partial_verification_key)| {
-            signature
-                .unblind_and_verify(
-                    params,
-                    partial_verification_key,
-                    private_attributes,
-                    public_attributes,
-                    commitment_hash,
-                    pedersen_commitments_openings,
-                )
-                .unwrap()
-        })
-        .collect();
-
-    let unblinded_signature_shares: Vec<SignatureShare> = unblinded_signatures
-        .iter()
-        .enumerate()
-        .map(|(idx, signature)| SignatureShare::new(*signature, (idx + 1) as u64))
-        .collect();
-
-    let mut attributes = vec![];
-    attributes.extend_from_slice(private_attributes);
-    attributes.extend_from_slice(public_attributes);
-    aggregate_signature_shares_and_verify(
-        params,
-        verification_key,
-        &attributes,
-        &unblinded_signature_shares,
-    )
-    .unwrap()
-}
-
-struct BenchCase {
-    num_authorities: u64,
-    threshold_p: f32,
-    num_public_attrs: u32,
-    num_private_attrs: u32,
-}
-
-impl BenchCase {
-    fn threshold(&self) -> u64 {
-        (self.num_authorities as f32 * self.threshold_p).round() as u64
-    }
-
-    fn num_attrs(&self) -> u32 {
-        self.num_public_attrs + self.num_private_attrs
-    }
-}
-
-fn bench_coconut(c: &mut Criterion) {
-    let mut group = c.benchmark_group("benchmark-coconut");
-    group.measurement_time(Duration::from_secs(1000));
-    let case = BenchCase {
-        num_authorities: 100,
-        threshold_p: 0.7,
-        num_public_attrs: 2,
-        num_private_attrs: 2,
-    };
-
-    let params = setup(case.num_public_attrs + case.num_private_attrs).unwrap();
-
-    random_scalars_refs!(public_attributes, params, case.num_public_attrs as usize);
-    let serial_number = params.random_scalar();
-    let binding_number = params.random_scalar();
-    let private_attributes = vec![&serial_number, &binding_number];
-
-    // The prepare blind sign is performed by the user
-    let (pedersen_commitments_openings, blind_sign_request) =
-        prepare_blind_sign(&params, &private_attributes, &public_attributes).unwrap();
-
-    // CLIENT BENCHMARK: Data needed to ask for a credential
-    // Let's benchmark the operations the client has to perform
-    // to ask for a credential
-    group.bench_function(
-        format!(
-            "[Client] prepare_blind_sign_{}_authorities_{}_attributes_{}_threshold",
-            case.num_authorities,
-            case.num_attrs(),
-            case.threshold_p,
-        ),
-        |b| {
-            b.iter(|| prepare_blind_sign(&params, &private_attributes, &public_attributes).unwrap())
-        },
-    );
-
-    // keys for the validators
-    let coconut_keypairs = ttp_keygen(&params, case.threshold(), case.num_authorities).unwrap();
-
-    // VALIDATOR BENCHMARK: Issue partial credential
-    // we pick only one key pair, as we want to validate how much does it
-    // take for a single validator to issue a partial credential
-    let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
-    let keypair = coconut_keypairs.choose(&mut rng).unwrap();
-
-    group.bench_function(
-        format!(
-            "[Validator] compute_single_blind_sign_for_credential_with_{}_attributes",
-            case.num_attrs(),
-        ),
-        |b| {
-            b.iter(|| {
-                blind_sign(
-                    &params,
-                    keypair.secret_key(),
-                    &blind_sign_request,
-                    &public_attributes,
-                )
-                .unwrap()
-            })
-        },
-    );
-
-    // computing all partial credentials
-    // NOTE: in reality, each validator computes only single signature
-    let mut blinded_signatures = Vec::new();
-    for keypair in coconut_keypairs.iter() {
-        let blinded_signature = blind_sign(
-            &params,
-            keypair.secret_key(),
-            &blind_sign_request,
-            &public_attributes,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-        blinded_signatures.push(blinded_signature)
-    }
-
-    let verification_keys: Vec<VerificationKey> = coconut_keypairs
-        .iter()
-        .map(|keypair| keypair.verification_key().clone())
-        .collect();
-
-    // verify a random partial blind signature
-    let rand_idx = 1;
-    let random_blind_signature = blinded_signatures.get(rand_idx).unwrap();
-    let partial_verification_key = verification_keys.get(rand_idx).unwrap();
-
-    group.bench_function(
-        format!(
-            "verify_partial_blind_signature_{}_private_attributes_{}_public_attributes",
-            case.num_private_attrs, case.num_public_attrs
-        ),
-        |b| {
-            b.iter(|| {
-                verify_partial_blind_signature(
-                    &params,
-                    blind_sign_request.get_private_attributes_pedersen_commitments(),
-                    &public_attributes,
-                    random_blind_signature,
-                    partial_verification_key,
-                )
-            })
-        },
-    );
-
-    // Lets bench worse case, ie aggregating all
-    let indices: Vec<u64> = (1..=case.num_authorities).collect();
-    // aggregate verification keys
-    let aggr_verification_key =
-        aggregate_verification_keys(&verification_keys, Some(&indices)).unwrap();
-
-    // CLIENT OPERATION: Unblind partial singatures and aggregate into single signature
-    let aggregated_signature = unblind_and_aggregate(
-        &params,
-        &blinded_signatures,
-        &verification_keys,
-        &private_attributes,
-        &public_attributes,
-        &blind_sign_request.get_commitment_hash(),
-        &pedersen_commitments_openings,
-        &aggr_verification_key,
-    );
-
-    // CLIENT BENCHMARK: aggregate all partial credentials
-    group.bench_function(
-        format!(
-            "[Client] unblind_and_aggregate_partial_credentials_{}_authorities_{}_attributes_{}_threshold",
-            case.num_authorities,
-            case.num_attrs(),
-            case.threshold_p,
-        ),
-        |b| {
-            b.iter(|| {
-                unblind_and_aggregate(
-                    &params,
-                    &blinded_signatures,
-                    &verification_keys,
-                    &private_attributes,
-                    &public_attributes,
-                    &blind_sign_request.get_commitment_hash(),
-                    &pedersen_commitments_openings,
-                    &aggr_verification_key)
-            })
-        },
-    );
-
-    // CLIENT OPERATION: Randomize credentials and generate any cryptographic material to verify them
-    let theta = prove_bandwidth_credential(
-        &params,
-        &aggr_verification_key,
-        &aggregated_signature,
-        &serial_number,
-        &binding_number,
-    )
-    .unwrap();
-
-    // CLIENT BENCHMARK
-    group.bench_function(
-        format!(
-            "[Client] randomize_and_prove_credential_{}_authorities_{}_attributes_{}_threshold",
-            case.num_authorities,
-            case.num_attrs(),
-            case.threshold_p,
-        ),
-        |b| {
-            b.iter(|| {
-                prove_bandwidth_credential(
-                    &params,
-                    &aggr_verification_key,
-                    &aggregated_signature,
-                    &serial_number,
-                    &binding_number,
-                )
-                .unwrap()
-            })
-        },
-    );
-
-    // VERIFIER OPERATION
-    // Verify credentials
-    verify_credential(&params, &aggr_verification_key, &theta, &public_attributes);
-
-    // VERIFICATION BENCHMARK
-    group.bench_function(
-        format!(
-            "[Verifier] verify_credentials_{}_authorities_{}_attributes_{}_threshold",
-            case.num_authorities,
-            case.num_attrs(),
-            case.threshold_p,
-        ),
-        |b| {
-            b.iter(|| {
-                verify_credential(&params, &aggr_verification_key, &theta, &public_attributes)
-            })
-        },
-    );
-}
-criterion_group!(benches, bench_coconut);
-criterion_main!(benches);
@@ -1,354 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2021 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-use core::ops::{Deref, Mul};
-
-use bls12_381::{G1Projective, Scalar};
-use group::Curve;
-use serde_derive::{Deserialize, Serialize};
-
-use crate::error::{CoconutError, Result};
-use crate::scheme::setup::Parameters;
-use crate::traits::{Base58, Bytable};
-use crate::utils::{try_deserialize_g1_projective, try_deserialize_scalar};
-use crate::Attribute;
-
-/// Type alias for the ephemeral key generated during ElGamal encryption
-pub type EphemeralKey = Scalar;
-
-/// Two G1 points representing ElGamal ciphertext
-#[derive(Debug)]
-#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq, Eq))]
-pub struct Ciphertext(pub(crate) G1Projective, pub(crate) G1Projective);
-
-impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for Ciphertext {
-    type Error = CoconutError;
-
-    fn try_from(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Ciphertext> {
-        if bytes.len() != 96 {
-            return Err(CoconutError::Deserialization(format!(
-                "Ciphertext must be exactly 96 bytes, got {}",
-                bytes.len()
-            )));
-        }
-
-        // safety: we just checked for the length so the unwraps are fine
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        let c1_bytes: &[u8; 48] = &bytes[..48].try_into().unwrap();
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        let c2_bytes: &[u8; 48] = &bytes[48..].try_into().unwrap();
-
-        let c1 = try_deserialize_g1_projective(
-            c1_bytes,
-            CoconutError::Deserialization("Failed to deserialize compressed c1".to_string()),
-        )?;
-        let c2 = try_deserialize_g1_projective(
-            c2_bytes,
-            CoconutError::Deserialization("Failed to deserialize compressed c2".to_string()),
-        )?;
-
-        Ok(Ciphertext(c1, c2))
-    }
-}
-
-impl Ciphertext {
-    pub fn c1(&self) -> &G1Projective {
-        &self.0
-    }
-
-    pub fn c2(&self) -> &G1Projective {
-        &self.1
-    }
-
-    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 96] {
-        let mut bytes = [0u8; 96];
-        bytes[..48].copy_from_slice(&self.0.to_affine().to_compressed());
-        bytes[48..].copy_from_slice(&self.1.to_affine().to_compressed());
-        bytes
-    }
-
-    pub fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Ciphertext> {
-        Ciphertext::try_from(bytes)
-    }
-}
-
-/// PrivateKey used in the ElGamal encryption scheme to recover the plaintext
-#[derive(Debug)]
-#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq, Eq))]
-pub struct PrivateKey(pub(crate) Scalar);
-
-impl PrivateKey {
-    /// Decrypt takes the ElGamal encryption of a message and returns a point on the G1 curve
-    /// that represents original h^m.
-    pub fn decrypt(&self, ciphertext: &Ciphertext) -> G1Projective {
-        let (c1, c2) = &(ciphertext.0, ciphertext.1);
-
-        // (gamma^k * h^m) / (g1^{d * k})   |   note: gamma = g1^d
-        c2 - c1 * self.0
-    }
-
-    pub fn public_key(&self, params: &Parameters) -> PublicKey {
-        PublicKey(params.gen1() * self.0)
-    }
-
-    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
-        self.0.to_bytes()
-    }
-
-    pub fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<PrivateKey> {
-        try_deserialize_scalar(
-            bytes,
-            CoconutError::Deserialization(
-                "Failed to deserialize ElGamal private key - it was not in the canonical form"
-                    .to_string(),
-            ),
-        )
-        .map(PrivateKey)
-    }
-}
-
-impl Bytable for PrivateKey {
-    fn to_byte_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.to_bytes().to_vec()
-    }
-
-    fn try_from_byte_slice(slice: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> {
-        let received = slice.len();
-        let Ok(arr) = slice.try_into() else {
-            return Err(CoconutError::UnexpectedArrayLength {
-                typ: "elgamal::PrivateKey".to_string(),
-                received,
-                expected: 32,
-            });
-        };
-
-        PrivateKey::from_bytes(arr)
-    }
-}
-
-impl Base58 for PrivateKey {}
-
-// TODO: perhaps be more explicit and apart from gamma also store generator and group order?
-/// PublicKey used in the ElGamal encryption scheme to produce the ciphertext
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
-#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq, Eq))]
-pub struct PublicKey(G1Projective);
-
-impl PublicKey {
-    /// Encrypt encrypts the given message in the form of h^m,
-    /// where h is a point on the G1 curve using the given public key.
-    /// The random k is returned alongside the encryption
-    /// as it is required by the Coconut Scheme to create proofs of knowledge.
-    pub fn encrypt(
-        &self,
-        params: &Parameters,
-        h: &G1Projective,
-        msg: &Scalar,
-    ) -> (Ciphertext, EphemeralKey) {
-        let k = params.random_scalar();
-        // c1 = g1^k
-        let c1 = params.gen1() * k;
-        // c2 = gamma^k * h^m
-        let c2 = self.0 * k + h * msg;
-
-        (Ciphertext(c1, c2), k)
-    }
-
-    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 48] {
-        self.0.to_affine().to_compressed()
-    }
-
-    pub fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8; 48]) -> Result<PublicKey> {
-        try_deserialize_g1_projective(
-            bytes,
-            CoconutError::Deserialization(
-                "Failed to deserialize compressed ElGamal public key".to_string(),
-            ),
-        )
-        .map(PublicKey)
-    }
-}
-
-impl Bytable for PublicKey {
-    fn to_byte_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.to_bytes().into()
-    }
-
-    fn try_from_byte_slice(slice: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> {
-        let received = slice.len();
-        let Ok(arr) = slice.try_into() else {
-            return Err(CoconutError::UnexpectedArrayLength {
-                typ: "elgamal::PublicKey".to_string(),
-                received,
-                expected: 48,
-            });
-        };
-
-        PublicKey::from_bytes(arr)
-    }
-}
-
-impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for PublicKey {
-    type Error = CoconutError;
-
-    fn try_from(slice: &[u8]) -> Result<PublicKey> {
-        PublicKey::try_from_byte_slice(slice)
-    }
-}
-
-impl Base58 for PublicKey {}
-
-impl Deref for PublicKey {
-    type Target = G1Projective;
-
-    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
-        &self.0
-    }
-}
-
-impl<'a> Mul<&'a Scalar> for &PublicKey {
-    type Output = G1Projective;
-
-    fn mul(self, rhs: &'a Scalar) -> Self::Output {
-        self.0 * rhs
-    }
-}
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-/// A convenient wrapper for both keys of the ElGamal keypair
-pub struct ElGamalKeyPair {
-    private_key: PrivateKey,
-    public_key: PublicKey,
-}
-
-impl ElGamalKeyPair {
-    pub fn public_key(&self) -> &PublicKey {
-        &self.public_key
-    }
-
-    pub fn private_key(&self) -> &PrivateKey {
-        &self.private_key
-    }
-}
-
-/// Generate a fresh ElGamal keypair using the group generator specified by the provided [Parameters]
-pub fn elgamal_keygen(params: &Parameters) -> ElGamalKeyPair {
-    let private_key = params.random_scalar();
-    let gamma = params.gen1() * private_key;
-
-    ElGamalKeyPair {
-        private_key: PrivateKey(private_key),
-        public_key: PublicKey(gamma),
-    }
-}
-
-pub fn compute_attribute_encryption(
-    params: &Parameters,
-    private_attributes: &[&Attribute],
-    pub_key: &PublicKey,
-    commitment_hash: G1Projective,
-) -> (Vec<Ciphertext>, Vec<EphemeralKey>) {
-    private_attributes
-        .iter()
-        .map(|m| pub_key.encrypt(params, &commitment_hash, m))
-        .unzip()
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn keygen() {
-        let params = Parameters::default();
-        let keypair = super::elgamal_keygen(&params);
-
-        let expected = params.gen1() * keypair.private_key.0;
-        let gamma = keypair.public_key.0;
-        assert_eq!(
-            expected, gamma,
-            "Public key, gamma, should be equal to g1^d, where d is the private key"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn encryption() {
-        let params = Parameters::default();
-        let keypair = super::elgamal_keygen(&params);
-
-        let r = params.random_scalar();
-        let h = params.gen1() * r;
-        let m = params.random_scalar();
-
-        let (ciphertext, ephemeral_key) = keypair.public_key.encrypt(&params, &h, &m);
-
-        let expected_c1 = params.gen1() * ephemeral_key;
-        assert_eq!(expected_c1, ciphertext.0, "c1 should be equal to g1^k");
-
-        let expected_c2 = keypair.public_key.0 * ephemeral_key + h * m;
-        assert_eq!(
-            expected_c2, ciphertext.1,
-            "c2 should be equal to gamma^k * h^m"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn decryption() {
-        let params = Parameters::default();
-        let keypair = super::elgamal_keygen(&params);
-
-        let r = params.random_scalar();
-        let h = params.gen1() * r;
-        let m = params.random_scalar();
-
-        let (ciphertext, _) = keypair.public_key.encrypt(&params, &h, &m);
-        let dec = keypair.private_key.decrypt(&ciphertext);
-
-        let expected = h * m;
-        assert_eq!(
-            expected, dec,
-            "after ElGamal decryption, original h^m should be obtained"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn private_key_bytes_roundtrip() {
-        let params = Parameters::default();
-        let private_key = PrivateKey(params.random_scalar());
-        let bytes = private_key.to_bytes();
-
-        // also make sure it is equivalent to the internal scalar's bytes
-        assert_eq!(private_key.0.to_bytes(), bytes);
-        assert_eq!(private_key, PrivateKey::from_bytes(&bytes).unwrap())
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn public_key_bytes_roundtrip() {
-        let params = Parameters::default();
-        let r = params.random_scalar();
-        let public_key = PublicKey(params.gen1() * r);
-        let bytes = public_key.to_bytes();
-
-        // also make sure it is equivalent to the internal g1 compressed bytes
-        assert_eq!(public_key.0.to_affine().to_compressed(), bytes);
-        assert_eq!(public_key, PublicKey::from_bytes(&bytes).unwrap())
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ciphertext_bytes_roundtrip() {
-        let params = Parameters::default();
-        let r = params.random_scalar();
-        let s = params.random_scalar();
-        let ciphertext = Ciphertext(params.gen1() * r, params.gen1() * s);
-        let bytes = ciphertext.to_bytes();
-
-        // also make sure it is equivalent to the internal g1 compressed bytes concatenated
-        let expected_bytes = [
-            ciphertext.0.to_affine().to_compressed(),
-            ciphertext.1.to_affine().to_compressed(),
-        ]
-        .concat();
-        assert_eq!(expected_bytes, bytes);
-        assert_eq!(ciphertext, Ciphertext::try_from(&bytes[..]).unwrap())
-    }
-}
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2021 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-use thiserror::Error;
-
-/// A `Result` alias where the `Err` case is `coconut_rs::Error`.
-pub type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, CoconutError>;
-
-#[derive(Error, Debug)]
-pub enum CoconutError {
-    #[error("Setup error: {0}")]
-    Setup(String),
-
-    #[error("encountered error during keygen")]
-    Keygen,
-
-    #[error("Issuance related error: {0}")]
-    Issuance(String),
-
-    #[error("Tried to prepare blind sign request for higher than specified number of attributes (max: {}, requested: {})", max, requested)]
-    IssuanceMaxAttributes { max: usize, requested: usize },
-
-    #[error("Interpolation error: {0}")]
-    Interpolation(String),
-
-    #[error("Aggregation error: {0}")]
-    Aggregation(String),
-
-    #[error("Unblind error: {0}")]
-    Unblind(String),
-
-    #[error("Verification error: {0}")]
-    Verification(String),
-
-    #[error("Deserialization error: {0}")]
-    Deserialization(String),
-
-    #[error(
-        "Deserailization error, expected at least {} bytes, got {}",
-        min,
-        actual
-    )]
-    DeserializationMinLength { min: usize, actual: usize },
-
-    #[error("Tried to deserialize {object} with bytes of invalid length. Expected {actual} < {object} or {modulus_target} % {modulus} == 0")]
-    DeserializationInvalidLength {
-        actual: usize,
-        target: usize,
-        modulus_target: usize,
-        modulus: usize,
-        object: String,
-    },
-
-    #[error("received an array of unexpected size for deserialization of {typ}. got {received} but expected {expected}")]
-    UnexpectedArrayLength {
-        typ: String,
-        received: usize,
-        expected: usize,
-    },
-
-    #[error("failed to decode the base58 representation: {0}")]
-    Base58DecodingFailure(#[from] bs58::decode::Error),
-
-    #[error("failed to deserialize scalar from the received bytes - it might not have been canonically encoded")]
-    ScalarDeserializationFailure,
-
-    #[error("failed to deserialize G1Projective point from the received bytes - it might not have been canonically encoded")]
-    G1ProjectiveDeserializationFailure,
-}
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-use crate::{BlindSignRequest, BlindedSignature, Bytable, VerifyCredentialRequest};
-
-macro_rules! impl_clone {
-    ($struct:ident) => {
-        impl Clone for $struct {
-            fn clone(&self) -> Self {
-                Self::try_from_byte_slice(&self.to_byte_vec()).unwrap()
-            }
-        }
-    };
-}
-
-impl_clone!(BlindSignRequest);
-impl_clone!(BlindedSignature);
-impl_clone!(VerifyCredentialRequest);
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-mod clone;
-mod serde;
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-use crate::elgamal::PrivateKey;
-use crate::scheme::SecretKey;
-use crate::{
-    Base58, BlindSignRequest, BlindedSignature, PublicKey, Signature, VerificationKey,
-    VerifyCredentialRequest,
-};
-use serde::de::Unexpected;
-use serde::{de::Error, de::Visitor, Deserialize, Deserializer, Serialize, Serializer};
-use std::fmt;
-
-macro_rules! impl_serde {
-    ($struct:ident, $visitor:ident) => {
-        pub struct $visitor {}
-
-        impl Serialize for $struct {
-            fn serialize<S>(&self, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
-            where
-                S: Serializer,
-            {
-                serializer.serialize_str(&self.to_bs58())
-            }
-        }
-
-        impl<'de> Visitor<'de> for $visitor {
-            type Value = $struct;
-
-            fn expecting(&self, formatter: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
-                write!(formatter, "A base58 encoded struct")
-            }
-
-            fn visit_str<E: Error>(self, s: &str) -> Result<Self::Value, E> {
-                match $struct::try_from_bs58(s) {
-                    Ok(x) => Ok(x),
-                    Err(_) => Err(Error::invalid_value(Unexpected::Str(s), &self)),
-                }
-            }
-        }
-
-        impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for $struct {
-            fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<$struct, D::Error>
-            where
-                D: Deserializer<'de>,
-            {
-                deserializer.deserialize_str($visitor {})
-            }
-        }
-    };
-}
-
-impl_serde!(SecretKey, V1);
-impl_serde!(VerificationKey, V2);
-impl_serde!(PublicKey, V3);
-impl_serde!(PrivateKey, V4);
-impl_serde!(BlindSignRequest, V5);
-impl_serde!(BlindedSignature, V6);
-impl_serde!(Signature, V7);
-impl_serde!(VerifyCredentialRequest, V8);
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2021 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-#![warn(clippy::expect_used)]
-#![warn(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-
-pub use bls12_381::Scalar;
-pub use elgamal::elgamal_keygen;
-pub use elgamal::ElGamalKeyPair;
-pub use elgamal::PublicKey;
-pub use error::CoconutError;
-pub use scheme::aggregation::aggregate_key_shares;
-pub use scheme::aggregation::aggregate_signature_shares;
-pub use scheme::aggregation::aggregate_signature_shares_and_verify;
-pub use scheme::aggregation::aggregate_verification_keys;
-pub use scheme::issuance::blind_sign;
-pub use scheme::issuance::prepare_blind_sign;
-pub use scheme::issuance::sign;
-pub use scheme::issuance::verify_partial_blind_signature;
-pub use scheme::issuance::BlindSignRequest;
-pub use scheme::keygen::keygen;
-pub use scheme::keygen::ttp_keygen;
-pub use scheme::keygen::KeyPair;
-pub use scheme::keygen::SecretKey;
-pub use scheme::keygen::VerificationKey;
-pub use scheme::keygen::VerificationKeyShare;
-pub use scheme::setup::setup;
-pub use scheme::setup::Parameters;
-pub use scheme::verification::check_vk_pairing;
-pub use scheme::verification::prove_bandwidth_credential;
-pub use scheme::verification::verify;
-pub use scheme::verification::verify_credential;
-pub use scheme::verification::BlindedSerialNumber;
-pub use scheme::verification::VerifyCredentialRequest;
-pub use scheme::BlindedSignature;
-pub use scheme::Signature;
-pub use scheme::SignatureShare;
-pub use scheme::SignerIndex;
-pub use traits::Base58;
-pub use traits::Bytable;
-pub use utils::hash_to_scalar;
-
-pub mod elgamal;
-mod error;
-mod impls;
-mod proofs;
-mod scheme;
-pub mod tests;
-mod traits;
-pub mod utils;
-
-pub type Attribute = bls12_381::Scalar;
-pub type PrivateAttribute = Attribute;
-pub type PublicAttribute = Attribute;
-
-pub use bls12_381::G1Projective;
@@ -1,619 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2021 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-// TODO: look at https://crates.io/crates/merlin to perhaps use it instead?
-
-use std::borrow::Borrow;
-
-use bls12_381::{G1Projective, G2Projective, Scalar};
-use digest::generic_array::typenum::Unsigned;
-use digest::Digest;
-use group::GroupEncoding;
-use itertools::izip;
-use sha2::Sha256;
-
-use crate::error::{CoconutError, Result};
-use crate::scheme::issuance::compute_hash;
-use crate::scheme::setup::Parameters;
-use crate::scheme::VerificationKey;
-use crate::utils::{try_deserialize_scalar, try_deserialize_scalar_vec};
-use crate::Attribute;
-
-// as per the reference python implementation
-type ChallengeDigest = Sha256;
-
-#[derive(Debug)]
-#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq, Eq))]
-pub struct ProofCmCs {
-    challenge: Scalar,
-    response_opening: Scalar,
-    response_openings: Vec<Scalar>,
-    response_attributes: Vec<Scalar>,
-}
-
-// note: this is slightly different from the reference python implementation
-// as we omit the unnecessary string conversion. Instead we concatenate byte
-// representations together and hash that.
-// note2: G1 and G2 elements are using their compressed representations
-// and as per the bls12-381 library all elements are using big-endian form
-/// Generates a Scalar [or Fp] challenge by hashing a number of elliptic curve points.  
-fn compute_challenge<D, I, B>(iter: I) -> Scalar
-where
-    D: Digest,
-    I: Iterator<Item = B>,
-    B: AsRef<[u8]>,
-{
-    let mut h = D::new();
-    for point_representation in iter {
-        h.update(point_representation);
-    }
-    let digest = h.finalize();
-
-    // TODO: I don't like the 0 padding here (though it's what we've been using before,
-    // but we never had a security audit anyway...)
-    // instead we could maybe use the `from_bytes` variant and adding some suffix
-    // when computing the digest until we produce a valid scalar.
-    let mut bytes = [0u8; 64];
-    let pad_size = 64usize
-        .checked_sub(D::OutputSize::to_usize())
-        .unwrap_or_default();
-
-    bytes[pad_size..].copy_from_slice(&digest);
-
-    Scalar::from_bytes_wide(&bytes)
-}
-
-fn produce_response(witness: &Scalar, challenge: &Scalar, secret: &Scalar) -> Scalar {
-    witness - challenge * secret
-}
-
-// note: it's caller's responsibility to ensure witnesses.len() = secrets.len()
-fn produce_responses<S>(witnesses: &[Scalar], challenge: &Scalar, secrets: &[S]) -> Vec<Scalar>
-where
-    S: Borrow<Scalar>,
-{
-    debug_assert_eq!(witnesses.len(), secrets.len());
-
-    witnesses
-        .iter()
-        .zip(secrets.iter())
-        .map(|(w, x)| produce_response(w, challenge, x.borrow()))
-        .collect()
-}
-
-impl ProofCmCs {
-    /// Construct non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of correctness of the ciphertexts and the commitment
-    /// using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic.
-    pub(crate) fn construct(
-        params: &Parameters,
-        commitment: &G1Projective,
-        commitment_opening: &Scalar,
-        commitments: &[G1Projective],
-        pedersen_commitments_openings: &[Scalar],
-        private_attributes: &[&Attribute],
-        public_attributes: &[&Attribute],
-    ) -> Self {
-        // note: this is only called from `prepare_blind_sign` that already checks
-        // whether private attributes are non-empty and whether we don't have too many
-        // attributes in total to sign.
-        // we also know, due to the single call place, that ephemeral_keys.len() == private_attributes.len()
-
-        // witness creation
-        let witness_commitment_opening = params.random_scalar();
-        let witness_pedersen_commitments_openings =
-            params.n_random_scalars(pedersen_commitments_openings.len());
-        let witness_attributes = params.n_random_scalars(private_attributes.len());
-
-        // recompute h
-        let h = compute_hash(*commitment, public_attributes);
-        let hs_bytes = params
-            .gen_hs()
-            .iter()
-            .map(|h| h.to_bytes())
-            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
-
-        let g1 = params.gen1();
-
-        // compute commitments
-
-        // zkp commitment for the attributes commitment cm
-        // Ccm = (wr * g1) + (wm[0] * hs[0]) + ... + (wm[i] * hs[i])
-        let commitment_attributes = g1 * witness_commitment_opening
-            + witness_attributes
-                .iter()
-                .zip(params.gen_hs().iter())
-                .map(|(wm_i, hs_i)| hs_i * wm_i)
-                .sum::<G1Projective>();
-
-        // zkp commitments for the individual attributes
-        let commitments_attributes = witness_pedersen_commitments_openings
-            .iter()
-            .zip(witness_attributes.iter())
-            .map(|(o_j, m_j)| g1 * o_j + h * m_j)
-            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
-
-        let commitments_bytes = commitments
-            .iter()
-            .map(|cm| cm.to_bytes())
-            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
-
-        let commitments_attributes_bytes = commitments_attributes
-            .iter()
-            .map(|cm| cm.to_bytes())
-            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
-
-        // compute challenge
-        let challenge = compute_challenge::<ChallengeDigest, _, _>(
-            std::iter::once(params.gen1().to_bytes().as_ref())
-                .chain(hs_bytes.iter().map(|hs| hs.as_ref()))
-                .chain(std::iter::once(h.to_bytes().as_ref()))
-                .chain(std::iter::once(commitment.to_bytes().as_ref()))
-                .chain(commitments_bytes.iter().map(|cm| cm.as_ref()))
-                .chain(std::iter::once(commitment_attributes.to_bytes().as_ref()))
-                .chain(commitments_attributes_bytes.iter().map(|cm| cm.as_ref())),
-        );
-
-        // Responses
-        let response_opening =
-            produce_response(&witness_commitment_opening, &challenge, commitment_opening);
-        let response_openings = produce_responses(
-            &witness_pedersen_commitments_openings,
-            &challenge,
-            &pedersen_commitments_openings.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(),
-        );
-        let response_attributes =
-            produce_responses(&witness_attributes, &challenge, private_attributes);
-
-        ProofCmCs {
-            challenge,
-            response_opening,
-            response_openings,
-            response_attributes,
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub(crate) fn verify(
-        &self,
-        params: &Parameters,
-        commitment: &G1Projective,
-        commitments: &[G1Projective],
-        public_attributes: &[&Attribute],
-    ) -> bool {
-        if self.response_attributes.len() != commitments.len() {
-            return false;
-        }
-
-        // recompute h
-        let h = compute_hash(*commitment, public_attributes);
-        let g1 = params.gen1();
-
-        let hs_bytes = params
-            .gen_hs()
-            .iter()
-            .map(|h| h.to_bytes())
-            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
-
-        // recompute witnesses commitments
-        // Cw = (cm * c) + (rr * g1) + (rm[0] * hs[0]) + ... + (rm[n] * hs[n])
-        let commitment_attributes = (commitment
-            - public_attributes
-                .iter()
-                .zip(params.gen_hs().iter().skip(self.response_attributes.len()))
-                .map(|(&pub_attr, hs)| hs * pub_attr)
-                .sum::<G1Projective>())
-            * self.challenge
-            + g1 * self.response_opening
-            + self
-                .response_attributes
-                .iter()
-                .zip(params.gen_hs().iter())
-                .map(|(res_attr, hs)| hs * res_attr)
-                .sum::<G1Projective>();
-
-        let commitments_attributes = izip!(
-            commitments.iter(),
-            self.response_openings.iter(),
-            self.response_attributes.iter()
-        )
-        .map(|(cm_j, r_o_j, r_m_j)| cm_j * self.challenge + g1 * r_o_j + h * r_m_j)
-        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
-
-        let commitments_bytes = commitments
-            .iter()
-            .map(|cm| cm.to_bytes())
-            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
-
-        let commitments_attributes_bytes = commitments_attributes
-            .iter()
-            .map(|cm| cm.to_bytes())
-            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
-
-        // re-compute the challenge
-        let challenge = compute_challenge::<ChallengeDigest, _, _>(
-            std::iter::once(params.gen1().to_bytes().as_ref())
-                .chain(hs_bytes.iter().map(|hs| hs.as_ref()))
-                .chain(std::iter::once(h.to_bytes().as_ref()))
-                .chain(std::iter::once(commitment.to_bytes().as_ref()))
-                .chain(commitments_bytes.iter().map(|cm| cm.as_ref()))
-                .chain(std::iter::once(commitment_attributes.to_bytes().as_ref()))
-                .chain(commitments_attributes_bytes.iter().map(|cm| cm.as_ref())),
-        );
-
-        challenge == self.challenge
-    }
-
-    // challenge || response opening || openings len || response openings || attributes len ||
-    // response attributes
-    pub(crate) fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        let openings_len = self.response_openings.len() as u64;
-        let attributes_len = self.response_attributes.len() as u64;
-
-        let mut bytes = Vec::with_capacity(16 + (2 + openings_len + attributes_len) as usize * 32);
-
-        bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.challenge.to_bytes());
-        bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.response_opening.to_bytes());
-
-        bytes.extend_from_slice(&openings_len.to_le_bytes());
-        for ro in &self.response_openings {
-            bytes.extend_from_slice(&ro.to_bytes());
-        }
-
-        bytes.extend_from_slice(&attributes_len.to_le_bytes());
-        for rm in &self.response_attributes {
-            bytes.extend_from_slice(&rm.to_bytes());
-        }
-
-        bytes
-    }
-
-    pub(crate) fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> {
-        // at the very minimum there must be a single attribute being proven
-        if bytes.len() < 32 * 4 + 16 || (bytes.len() - 16) % 32 != 0 {
-            return Err(CoconutError::Deserialization(
-                "tried to deserialize proof of commitments with bytes of invalid length"
-                    .to_string(),
-            ));
-        }
-
-        let mut idx = 0;
-        // safety: bound checked + constant offset
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        let challenge_bytes = bytes[idx..idx + 32].try_into().unwrap();
-        idx += 32;
-        // safety: bound checked + constant offset
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        let response_opening_bytes = bytes[idx..idx + 32].try_into().unwrap();
-        idx += 32;
-
-        let challenge = try_deserialize_scalar(
-            &challenge_bytes,
-            CoconutError::Deserialization("Failed to deserialize challenge".to_string()),
-        )?;
-
-        let response_opening = try_deserialize_scalar(
-            &response_opening_bytes,
-            CoconutError::Deserialization(
-                "Failed to deserialize the response to the random".to_string(),
-            ),
-        )?;
-
-        // safety: bound checked + constant offset
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        let ro_len = u64::from_le_bytes(bytes[idx..idx + 8].try_into().unwrap());
-        idx += 8;
-        if bytes[idx..].len() < ro_len as usize * 32 + 8 {
-            return Err(
-                CoconutError::Deserialization(
-                    "tried to deserialize proof of ciphertexts and commitment with insufficient number of bytes provided".to_string()),
-            );
-        }
-
-        let ro_end = idx + ro_len as usize * 32;
-        let response_openings = try_deserialize_scalar_vec(
-            ro_len,
-            &bytes[idx..ro_end],
-            CoconutError::Deserialization("Failed to deserialize openings response".to_string()),
-        )?;
-
-        // safety: bound checked + constant offset
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        let rm_len = u64::from_le_bytes(bytes[ro_end..ro_end + 8].try_into().unwrap());
-        let response_attributes = try_deserialize_scalar_vec(
-            rm_len,
-            &bytes[ro_end + 8..],
-            CoconutError::Deserialization("Failed to deserialize attributes response".to_string()),
-        )?;
-
-        Ok(ProofCmCs {
-            challenge,
-            response_opening,
-            response_openings,
-            response_attributes,
-        })
-    }
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub struct ProofKappaZeta {
-    // c
-    challenge: Scalar,
-
-    // responses
-    response_serial_number: Scalar,
-    response_binding_number: Scalar,
-    response_blinder: Scalar,
-}
-
-impl ProofKappaZeta {
-    pub(crate) fn construct(
-        params: &Parameters,
-        verification_key: &VerificationKey,
-        serial_number: &Attribute,
-        binding_number: &Attribute,
-        blinding_factor: &Scalar,
-        blinded_message: &G2Projective,
-        blinded_serial_number: &G2Projective,
-    ) -> Self {
-        // create the witnesses
-        let witness_blinder = params.random_scalar();
-        let witness_serial_number = params.random_scalar();
-        let witness_binding_number = params.random_scalar();
-        let witness_attributes = [witness_serial_number, witness_binding_number];
-
-        let beta_bytes = verification_key
-            .beta_g2
-            .iter()
-            .map(|beta_i| beta_i.to_bytes())
-            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
-
-        // witnesses commitments
-        // Aw = g2 * wt + alpha + beta[0] * wm[0] + ... + beta[i] * wm[i]
-        let commitment_kappa = params.gen2() * witness_blinder
-            + verification_key.alpha
-            + witness_attributes
-                .iter()
-                .zip(verification_key.beta_g2.iter())
-                .map(|(wm_i, beta_i)| beta_i * wm_i)
-                .sum::<G2Projective>();
-
-        // zeta is the public value associated with the serial number
-        let commitment_zeta = params.gen2() * witness_serial_number;
-
-        let challenge = compute_challenge::<ChallengeDigest, _, _>(
-            std::iter::once(params.gen2().to_bytes().as_ref())
-                .chain(std::iter::once(blinded_message.to_bytes().as_ref()))
-                .chain(std::iter::once(blinded_serial_number.to_bytes().as_ref()))
-                .chain(std::iter::once(verification_key.alpha.to_bytes().as_ref()))
-                .chain(beta_bytes.iter().map(|b| b.as_ref()))
-                .chain(std::iter::once(commitment_kappa.to_bytes().as_ref()))
-                .chain(std::iter::once(commitment_zeta.to_bytes().as_ref())),
-        );
-
-        // responses
-        let response_blinder = produce_response(&witness_blinder, &challenge, blinding_factor);
-        let response_serial_number =
-            produce_response(&witness_serial_number, &challenge, serial_number);
-        let response_binding_number =
-            produce_response(&witness_binding_number, &challenge, binding_number);
-
-        ProofKappaZeta {
-            challenge,
-            response_serial_number,
-            response_binding_number,
-            response_blinder,
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub(crate) fn private_attributes_len(&self) -> usize {
-        2
-    }
-
-    pub(crate) fn verify(
-        &self,
-        params: &Parameters,
-        verification_key: &VerificationKey,
-        kappa: &G2Projective,
-        zeta: &G2Projective,
-    ) -> bool {
-        let beta_bytes = verification_key
-            .beta_g2
-            .iter()
-            .map(|beta_i| beta_i.to_bytes())
-            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
-
-        let response_attributes = [self.response_serial_number, self.response_binding_number];
-        // re-compute witnesses commitments
-        // Aw = (c * kappa) + (rt * g2) + ((1 - c) * alpha) + (rm[0] * beta[0]) + ... + (rm[i] * beta[i])
-        let commitment_kappa = kappa * self.challenge
-            + params.gen2() * self.response_blinder
-            + verification_key.alpha * (Scalar::one() - self.challenge)
-            + response_attributes
-                .iter()
-                .zip(verification_key.beta_g2.iter())
-                .map(|(priv_attr, beta_i)| beta_i * priv_attr)
-                .sum::<G2Projective>();
-
-        // zeta is the public value associated with the serial number
-        let commitment_zeta = zeta * self.challenge + params.gen2() * self.response_serial_number;
-
-        // compute the challenge
-        let challenge = compute_challenge::<ChallengeDigest, _, _>(
-            std::iter::once(params.gen2().to_bytes().as_ref())
-                .chain(std::iter::once(kappa.to_bytes().as_ref()))
-                .chain(std::iter::once(zeta.to_bytes().as_ref()))
-                .chain(std::iter::once(verification_key.alpha.to_bytes().as_ref()))
-                .chain(beta_bytes.iter().map(|b| b.as_ref()))
-                .chain(std::iter::once(commitment_kappa.to_bytes().as_ref()))
-                .chain(std::iter::once(commitment_zeta.to_bytes().as_ref())),
-        );
-
-        challenge == self.challenge
-    }
-
-    // challenge || response serial number || response binding number || repose blinder
-    pub(crate) fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        let attributes_len = 2; // because we have serial number and the binding number
-        let mut bytes = Vec::with_capacity((1 + attributes_len + 1) as usize * 32);
-
-        bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.challenge.to_bytes());
-        bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.response_serial_number.to_bytes());
-        bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.response_binding_number.to_bytes());
-
-        bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.response_blinder.to_bytes());
-
-        bytes
-    }
-
-    pub(crate) fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> {
-        // at the very minimum there must be a single attribute being proven
-        if bytes.len() != 128 {
-            return Err(CoconutError::DeserializationInvalidLength {
-                actual: bytes.len(),
-                modulus_target: bytes.len(),
-                modulus: 32,
-                object: "kappa and zeta".to_string(),
-                target: 32 * 4,
-            });
-        }
-
-        // safety: bound checked + constant offset
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        let challenge_bytes = bytes[..32].try_into().unwrap();
-        let challenge = try_deserialize_scalar(
-            &challenge_bytes,
-            CoconutError::Deserialization("Failed to deserialize challenge".to_string()),
-        )?;
-
-        // safety: bound checked + constant offset
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        let serial_number_bytes = &bytes[32..64].try_into().unwrap();
-        let response_serial_number = try_deserialize_scalar(
-            serial_number_bytes,
-            CoconutError::Deserialization("failed to deserialize the serial number".to_string()),
-        )?;
-
-        // safety: bound checked + constant offset
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        let binding_number_bytes = &bytes[64..96].try_into().unwrap();
-        let response_binding_number = try_deserialize_scalar(
-            binding_number_bytes,
-            CoconutError::Deserialization("failed to deserialize the binding number".to_string()),
-        )?;
-
-        // safety: bound checked + constant offset
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        let blinder_bytes = bytes[96..].try_into().unwrap();
-        let response_blinder = try_deserialize_scalar(
-            &blinder_bytes,
-            CoconutError::Deserialization("failed to deserialize the blinder".to_string()),
-        )?;
-
-        Ok(ProofKappaZeta {
-            challenge,
-            response_serial_number,
-            response_binding_number,
-            response_blinder,
-        })
-    }
-}
-
-// proof builder:
-// - commitment
-// - challenge
-// - responses
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use crate::scheme::keygen::keygen;
-    use crate::scheme::setup::setup;
-    use crate::scheme::verification::{compute_kappa, compute_zeta};
-    use crate::tests::helpers::random_scalars_refs;
-    use group::Group;
-    use rand::thread_rng;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn proof_cm_cs_bytes_roundtrip() {
-        let mut rng = thread_rng();
-
-        let params = setup(1).unwrap();
-        let cm = G1Projective::random(&mut rng);
-        let r = params.random_scalar();
-        let cms: [G1Projective; 1] = [G1Projective::random(&mut rng)];
-        let rs = params.n_random_scalars(1);
-        random_scalars_refs!(private_attributes, params, 1);
-
-        // 0 public 1 private
-        let pi_s = ProofCmCs::construct(&params, &cm, &r, &cms, &rs, &private_attributes, &[]);
-
-        let bytes = pi_s.to_bytes();
-        assert_eq!(ProofCmCs::from_bytes(&bytes).unwrap(), pi_s);
-
-        let params = setup(2).unwrap();
-        let cm = G1Projective::random(&mut rng);
-        let r = params.random_scalar();
-        let cms: [G1Projective; 2] = [
-            G1Projective::random(&mut rng),
-            G1Projective::random(&mut rng),
-        ];
-        let rs = params.n_random_scalars(2);
-        random_scalars_refs!(private_attributes, params, 2);
-
-        // 0 public 2 privates
-        let pi_s = ProofCmCs::construct(&params, &cm, &r, &cms, &rs, &private_attributes, &[]);
-
-        let bytes = pi_s.to_bytes();
-        assert_eq!(ProofCmCs::from_bytes(&bytes).unwrap(), pi_s);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn proof_kappa_zeta_bytes_roundtrip() {
-        let params = setup(4).unwrap();
-
-        let keypair = keygen(&params);
-
-        // we don't care about 'correctness' of the proof. only whether we can correctly recover it from bytes
-        let serial_number = &params.random_scalar();
-        let binding_number = &params.random_scalar();
-        let private_attributes = vec![serial_number, binding_number];
-
-        let r = params.random_scalar();
-        let kappa = compute_kappa(&params, keypair.verification_key(), &private_attributes, r);
-        let zeta = compute_zeta(&params, serial_number);
-
-        // 0 public 2 private
-        let pi_v = ProofKappaZeta::construct(
-            &params,
-            keypair.verification_key(),
-            serial_number,
-            binding_number,
-            &r,
-            &kappa,
-            &zeta,
-        );
-
-        let proof_bytes = pi_v.to_bytes();
-
-        let proof_from_bytes = ProofKappaZeta::from_bytes(&proof_bytes).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(proof_from_bytes, pi_v);
-
-        // 2 public 2 private
-        let params = setup(4).unwrap();
-        let keypair = keygen(&params);
-
-        let pi_v = ProofKappaZeta::construct(
-            &params,
-            keypair.verification_key(),
-            serial_number,
-            binding_number,
-            &r,
-            &kappa,
-            &zeta,
-        );
-
-        let proof_bytes = pi_v.to_bytes();
-
-        let proof_from_bytes = ProofKappaZeta::from_bytes(&proof_bytes).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(proof_from_bytes, pi_v);
-    }
-}
@@ -1,432 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2021 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-use core::iter::Sum;
-use core::ops::Mul;
-
-use bls12_381::{G2Prepared, G2Projective, Scalar};
-use group::Curve;
-use itertools::Itertools;
-
-use crate::error::{CoconutError, Result};
-use crate::scheme::verification::check_bilinear_pairing;
-use crate::scheme::{PartialSignature, Signature, SignatureShare, SignerIndex, VerificationKey};
-use crate::utils::perform_lagrangian_interpolation_at_origin;
-use crate::{Attribute, Parameters, VerificationKeyShare};
-
-pub(crate) trait Aggregatable: Sized {
-    fn aggregate(aggregatable: &[Self], indices: Option<&[SignerIndex]>) -> Result<Self>;
-
-    fn check_unique_indices(indices: &[SignerIndex]) -> bool {
-        // if aggregation is a threshold one, all indices should be unique
-        indices.iter().unique_by(|&index| index).count() == indices.len()
-    }
-}
-
-// includes `VerificationKey`
-impl<T> Aggregatable for T
-where
-    T: Sum,
-    for<'a> T: Sum<&'a T>,
-    for<'a> &'a T: Mul<Scalar, Output = T>,
-{
-    fn aggregate(aggregatable: &[T], indices: Option<&[u64]>) -> Result<T> {
-        if aggregatable.is_empty() {
-            return Err(CoconutError::Aggregation("Empty set of values".to_string()));
-        }
-
-        if let Some(indices) = indices {
-            if !Self::check_unique_indices(indices) {
-                return Err(CoconutError::Aggregation("Non-unique indices".to_string()));
-            }
-            perform_lagrangian_interpolation_at_origin(indices, aggregatable)
-        } else {
-            // non-threshold
-            Ok(aggregatable.iter().sum())
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl Aggregatable for PartialSignature {
-    fn aggregate(sigs: &[PartialSignature], indices: Option<&[u64]>) -> Result<Signature> {
-        let h = sigs
-            .first()
-            .ok_or_else(|| CoconutError::Aggregation("Empty set of signatures".to_string()))?
-            .sig1();
-
-        // TODO: is it possible to avoid this allocation?
-        let sigmas = sigs.iter().map(|sig| *sig.sig2()).collect::<Vec<_>>();
-        let aggr_sigma = Aggregatable::aggregate(&sigmas, indices)?;
-
-        Ok(Signature(*h, aggr_sigma))
-    }
-}
-
-/// Ensures all provided verification keys were generated to verify the same number of attributes.
-fn check_same_key_size(keys: &[VerificationKey]) -> bool {
-    keys.iter().map(|vk| vk.beta_g1.len()).all_equal()
-        && keys.iter().map(|vk| vk.beta_g2.len()).all_equal()
-}
-
-pub fn aggregate_verification_keys(
-    keys: &[VerificationKey],
-    indices: Option<&[SignerIndex]>,
-) -> Result<VerificationKey> {
-    if !check_same_key_size(keys) {
-        return Err(CoconutError::Aggregation(
-            "Verification keys are of different sizes".to_string(),
-        ));
-    }
-    Aggregatable::aggregate(keys, indices)
-}
-
-pub fn aggregate_key_shares(shares: &[VerificationKeyShare]) -> Result<VerificationKey> {
-    let (keys, indices): (Vec<_>, Vec<_>) = shares
-        .iter()
-        .map(|share| (share.key.clone(), share.index))
-        .unzip();
-
-    aggregate_verification_keys(&keys, Some(&indices))
-}
-
-pub fn aggregate_signatures(
-    signatures: &[PartialSignature],
-    indices: Option<&[SignerIndex]>,
-) -> Result<Signature> {
-    Aggregatable::aggregate(signatures, indices)
-}
-
-pub fn aggregate_signatures_and_verify(
-    params: &Parameters,
-    verification_key: &VerificationKey,
-    attributes: &[&Attribute],
-    signatures: &[PartialSignature],
-    indices: Option<&[SignerIndex]>,
-) -> Result<Signature> {
-    // aggregate the signature
-    let signature = aggregate_signatures(signatures, indices)?;
-
-    // Verify the signature
-    let alpha = verification_key.alpha;
-
-    let tmp = attributes
-        .iter()
-        .zip(verification_key.beta_g2.iter())
-        .map(|(&attr, beta_i)| beta_i * attr)
-        .sum::<G2Projective>();
-
-    if bool::from(signature.0.is_identity()) {
-        return Err(CoconutError::Aggregation(
-            "Verification of the aggregated signature failed - h is an identity point".to_string(),
-        ));
-    }
-    if !check_bilinear_pairing(
-        &signature.0.to_affine(),
-        &G2Prepared::from((alpha + tmp).to_affine()),
-        &signature.1.to_affine(),
-        params.prepared_miller_g2(),
-    ) {
-        return Err(CoconutError::Aggregation(
-            "Verification of the aggregated signature failed".to_string(),
-        ));
-    }
-    Ok(signature)
-}
-
-pub fn aggregate_signature_shares(shares: &[SignatureShare]) -> Result<Signature> {
-    let (signatures, indices): (Vec<_>, Vec<_>) = shares
-        .iter()
-        .map(|share| (*share.signature(), share.index()))
-        .unzip();
-
-    aggregate_signatures(&signatures, Some(&indices))
-}
-
-pub fn aggregate_signature_shares_and_verify(
-    params: &Parameters,
-    verification_key: &VerificationKey,
-    attributes: &[&Attribute],
-    shares: &[SignatureShare],
-) -> Result<Signature> {
-    let (signatures, indices): (Vec<_>, Vec<_>) = shares
-        .iter()
-        .map(|share| (*share.signature(), share.index()))
-        .unzip();
-
-    aggregate_signatures_and_verify(
-        params,
-        verification_key,
-        attributes,
-        &signatures,
-        Some(&indices),
-    )
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use crate::scheme::issuance::sign;
-    use crate::scheme::keygen::ttp_keygen;
-    use crate::scheme::verification::verify;
-    use crate::tests::helpers::random_scalars_refs;
-    use bls12_381::G1Projective;
-    use group::Group;
-
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn key_aggregation_works_for_any_subset_of_keys() {
-        let params = Parameters::new(2).unwrap();
-        let keypairs = ttp_keygen(&params, 3, 5).unwrap();
-
-        let vks = keypairs
-            .into_iter()
-            .map(|keypair| keypair.verification_key().clone())
-            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
-
-        let aggr_vk1 = aggregate_verification_keys(&vks[..3], Some(&[1, 2, 3])).unwrap();
-        let aggr_vk2 = aggregate_verification_keys(&vks[2..], Some(&[3, 4, 5])).unwrap();
-
-        assert_eq!(aggr_vk1, aggr_vk2);
-
-        // TODO: should those two actually work or not?
-        // aggregating threshold+1
-        let aggr_more = aggregate_verification_keys(&vks[1..], Some(&[2, 3, 4, 5])).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(aggr_vk1, aggr_more);
-
-        // aggregating all
-        let aggr_all = aggregate_verification_keys(&vks, Some(&[1, 2, 3, 4, 5])).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(aggr_all, aggr_vk1);
-
-        // not taking enough points (threshold was 3)
-        let aggr_not_enough = aggregate_verification_keys(&vks[..2], Some(&[1, 2])).unwrap();
-        assert_ne!(aggr_not_enough, aggr_vk1);
-
-        // taking wrong index
-        let aggr_bad = aggregate_verification_keys(&vks[2..], Some(&[42, 123, 100])).unwrap();
-        assert_ne!(aggr_vk1, aggr_bad);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn key_aggregation_doesnt_work_for_empty_set_of_keys() {
-        let keys: Vec<VerificationKey> = vec![];
-        assert!(aggregate_verification_keys(&keys, None).is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn key_aggregation_doesnt_work_if_indices_have_invalid_length() {
-        let keys = vec![VerificationKey::identity(3)];
-
-        assert!(aggregate_verification_keys(&keys, Some(&[])).is_err());
-        assert!(aggregate_verification_keys(&keys, Some(&[1, 2])).is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn key_aggregation_doesnt_work_for_non_unique_indices() {
-        let keys = vec![VerificationKey::identity(3), VerificationKey::identity(3)];
-
-        assert!(aggregate_verification_keys(&keys, Some(&[1, 1])).is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn key_aggregation_doesnt_work_for_keys_of_different_size() {
-        let keys = vec![VerificationKey::identity(3), VerificationKey::identity(1)];
-
-        assert!(aggregate_verification_keys(&keys, None).is_err())
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn signature_aggregation_works_for_any_subset_of_signatures() {
-        let params = Parameters::new(2).unwrap();
-        random_scalars_refs!(attributes, params, 2);
-
-        let keypairs = ttp_keygen(&params, 3, 5).unwrap();
-
-        let (sks, vks): (Vec<_>, Vec<_>) = keypairs
-            .into_iter()
-            .map(|keypair| {
-                (
-                    keypair.secret_key().clone(),
-                    keypair.verification_key().clone(),
-                )
-            })
-            .unzip();
-
-        let sigs = sks
-            .iter()
-            .map(|sk| sign(sk, &attributes).unwrap())
-            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
-
-        // aggregating (any) threshold works
-        let aggr_vk_1 = aggregate_verification_keys(&vks[..3], Some(&[1, 2, 3])).unwrap();
-        let aggr_sig1 = aggregate_signatures_and_verify(
-            &params,
-            &aggr_vk_1,
-            &attributes,
-            &sigs[..3],
-            Some(&[1, 2, 3]),
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        let aggr_vk_2 = aggregate_verification_keys(&vks[2..], Some(&[3, 4, 5])).unwrap();
-        let aggr_sig2 = aggregate_signatures_and_verify(
-            &params,
-            &aggr_vk_1,
-            &attributes,
-            &sigs[2..],
-            Some(&[3, 4, 5]),
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(aggr_sig1, aggr_sig2);
-
-        // verify credential for good measure
-        assert!(verify(&params, &aggr_vk_1, &attributes, &aggr_sig1));
-        assert!(verify(&params, &aggr_vk_2, &attributes, &aggr_sig2));
-
-        // aggregating threshold+1 works
-        let aggr_vk_more = aggregate_verification_keys(&vks[1..], Some(&[2, 3, 4, 5])).unwrap();
-        let aggr_more = aggregate_signatures_and_verify(
-            &params,
-            &aggr_vk_more,
-            &attributes,
-            &sigs[1..],
-            Some(&[2, 3, 4, 5]),
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(aggr_sig1, aggr_more);
-
-        // aggregating all
-        let aggr_vk_all = aggregate_verification_keys(&vks, Some(&[1, 2, 3, 4, 5])).unwrap();
-        let aggr_all = aggregate_signatures_and_verify(
-            &params,
-            &aggr_vk_all,
-            &attributes,
-            &sigs,
-            Some(&[1, 2, 3, 4, 5]),
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(aggr_all, aggr_sig1);
-
-        // not taking enough points (threshold was 3) should fail
-        let aggr_vk_not_enough = aggregate_verification_keys(&vks[..2], Some(&[1, 2])).unwrap();
-        let aggr_not_enough = aggregate_signatures_and_verify(
-            &params,
-            &aggr_vk_not_enough,
-            &attributes,
-            &sigs[..2],
-            Some(&[1, 2]),
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-        assert_ne!(aggr_not_enough, aggr_sig1);
-
-        // taking wrong index should fail
-        let aggr_vk_bad = aggregate_verification_keys(&vks[2..], Some(&[1, 2, 3])).unwrap();
-        assert!(aggregate_signatures_and_verify(
-            &params,
-            &aggr_vk_bad,
-            &attributes,
-            &sigs[2..],
-            Some(&[42, 123, 100]),
-        )
-        .is_err());
-    }
-
-    fn random_signature() -> Signature {
-        let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
-        Signature(
-            G1Projective::random(&mut rng),
-            G1Projective::random(&mut rng),
-        )
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn signature_aggregation_doesnt_work_for_empty_set_of_signatures() {
-        let signatures: Vec<Signature> = vec![];
-        let params = Parameters::new(2).unwrap();
-        random_scalars_refs!(attributes, params, 2);
-        let keypairs = ttp_keygen(&params, 3, 5).unwrap();
-
-        let (_, vks): (Vec<_>, Vec<_>) = keypairs
-            .into_iter()
-            .map(|keypair| {
-                (
-                    keypair.secret_key().clone(),
-                    keypair.verification_key().clone(),
-                )
-            })
-            .unzip();
-
-        let aggr_vk_all = aggregate_verification_keys(&vks, None).unwrap();
-        assert!(aggregate_signatures_and_verify(
-            &params,
-            &aggr_vk_all,
-            &attributes,
-            &signatures,
-            None
-        )
-        .is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn signature_aggregation_doesnt_work_if_indices_have_invalid_length() {
-        let signatures = vec![random_signature()];
-        let params = Parameters::new(2).unwrap();
-        random_scalars_refs!(attributes, params, 2);
-        let keypairs = ttp_keygen(&params, 3, 5).unwrap();
-        let (_, vks): (Vec<_>, Vec<_>) = keypairs
-            .into_iter()
-            .map(|keypair| {
-                (
-                    keypair.secret_key().clone(),
-                    keypair.verification_key().clone(),
-                )
-            })
-            .unzip();
-        let aggr_vk_all = aggregate_verification_keys(&vks, None).unwrap();
-
-        assert!(aggregate_signatures_and_verify(
-            &params,
-            &aggr_vk_all,
-            &attributes,
-            &signatures,
-            Some(&[])
-        )
-        .is_err());
-        assert!(aggregate_signatures_and_verify(
-            &params,
-            &aggr_vk_all,
-            &attributes,
-            &signatures,
-            Some(&[1, 2]),
-        )
-        .is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn signature_aggregation_doesnt_work_for_non_unique_indices() {
-        let signatures = vec![random_signature(), random_signature()];
-        let params = Parameters::new(2).unwrap();
-        random_scalars_refs!(attributes, params, 2);
-        let keypairs = ttp_keygen(&params, 3, 5).unwrap();
-        let (_, vks): (Vec<_>, Vec<_>) = keypairs
-            .into_iter()
-            .map(|keypair| {
-                (
-                    keypair.secret_key().clone(),
-                    keypair.verification_key().clone(),
-                )
-            })
-            .unzip();
-        let aggr_vk_all = aggregate_verification_keys(&vks, None).unwrap();
-
-        assert!(aggregate_signatures_and_verify(
-            &params,
-            &aggr_vk_all,
-            &attributes,
-            &signatures,
-            Some(&[1, 1]),
-        )
-        .is_err());
-    }
-
-    // TODO: test for aggregating non-threshold keys
-}
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2022-2024 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-use crate::error::{CoconutError, Result};
-use crate::traits::{Base58, Bytable};
-use crate::utils::try_deserialize_g2_projective;
-use bls12_381::{G2Affine, G2Projective};
-use group::Curve;
-
-use std::fmt::{Debug, Formatter};
-use std::ops::Deref;
-
-#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone, Copy)]
-pub struct BlindedSerialNumber(G2Projective);
-
-// use custom Debug implementation to show base58 encoding (rather than raw curve elements)
-impl Debug for BlindedSerialNumber {
-    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
-        f.debug_tuple("BlindedSerialNumber")
-            .field(&self.to_bs58())
-            .finish()
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<G2Projective> for BlindedSerialNumber {
-    fn from(value: G2Projective) -> Self {
-        BlindedSerialNumber(value)
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<G2Affine> for BlindedSerialNumber {
-    fn from(value: G2Affine) -> Self {
-        BlindedSerialNumber(value.into())
-    }
-}
-
-impl Deref for BlindedSerialNumber {
-    type Target = G2Projective;
-
-    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
-        &self.0
-    }
-}
-
-impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for BlindedSerialNumber {
-    type Error = CoconutError;
-
-    fn try_from(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> {
-        if bytes.len() != 96 {
-            return Err(
-                CoconutError::Deserialization(
-                    format!("Tried to deserialize blinded serial number with incorrect number of bytes, expected 96, got {}", bytes.len()),
-                ));
-        }
-
-        // safety: we've just made a check for 96 bytes
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        let inner = try_deserialize_g2_projective(
-            &bytes.try_into().unwrap(),
-            CoconutError::Deserialization(
-                "failed to deserialize the blinded serial number (zeta)".to_string(),
-            ),
-        )?;
-
-        Ok(BlindedSerialNumber(inner))
-    }
-}
-
-impl Bytable for BlindedSerialNumber {
-    fn to_byte_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.0.to_affine().to_compressed().to_vec()
-    }
-
-    fn try_from_byte_slice(slice: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> {
-        Self::try_from(slice)
-    }
-}
-
-impl Base58 for BlindedSerialNumber {}
@@ -1,660 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2021 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-use std::ops::Neg;
-
-use bls12_381::{multi_miller_loop, G1Affine, G1Projective, G2Prepared, Scalar};
-use group::{Curve, Group, GroupEncoding};
-
-use crate::error::{CoconutError, Result};
-use crate::proofs::ProofCmCs;
-use crate::scheme::keygen::VerificationKey;
-use crate::scheme::setup::Parameters;
-use crate::scheme::BlindedSignature;
-use crate::scheme::SecretKey;
-use crate::Attribute;
-use crate::Signature;
-
-// TODO: possibly completely remove those two functions.
-// They only exist to have a simpler and smaller code snippets to test
-// basic functionalities.
-use crate::traits::{Base58, Bytable};
-use crate::utils::{hash_g1, try_deserialize_g1_projective};
-
-// TODO NAMING: double check this one
-// Lambda
-#[derive(Debug)]
-#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq, Eq))]
-pub struct BlindSignRequest {
-    // cm
-    commitment: G1Projective,
-    // h
-    commitment_hash: G1Projective,
-    // c
-    private_attributes_commitments: Vec<G1Projective>,
-    // pi_s
-    pi_s: ProofCmCs,
-}
-
-impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for BlindSignRequest {
-    type Error = CoconutError;
-
-    fn try_from(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<BlindSignRequest> {
-        if bytes.len() < 48 + 48 + 8 + 48 {
-            return Err(CoconutError::DeserializationMinLength {
-                min: 48 + 48 + 8 + 48,
-                actual: bytes.len(),
-            });
-        }
-
-        let mut j = 0;
-        let commitment_bytes_len = 48;
-        let commitment_hash_bytes_len = 48;
-
-        // safety: we made bound check and we're using constant offest
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        let cm_bytes = bytes[..j + commitment_bytes_len].try_into().unwrap();
-        let commitment = try_deserialize_g1_projective(
-            &cm_bytes,
-            CoconutError::Deserialization(
-                "Failed to deserialize compressed commitment".to_string(),
-            ),
-        )?;
-        j += commitment_bytes_len;
-
-        // safety: we made bound check and we're using constant offest
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        let cm_hash_bytes = bytes[j..j + commitment_hash_bytes_len].try_into().unwrap();
-        let commitment_hash = try_deserialize_g1_projective(
-            &cm_hash_bytes,
-            CoconutError::Deserialization(
-                "Failed to deserialize compressed commitment hash".to_string(),
-            ),
-        )?;
-        j += commitment_hash_bytes_len;
-
-        // safety: we made bound check and we're using constant offest
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        let c_len = u64::from_le_bytes(bytes[j..j + 8].try_into().unwrap());
-        j += 8;
-        if bytes[j..].len() < c_len as usize * 48 {
-            return Err(CoconutError::DeserializationMinLength {
-                min: c_len as usize * 48,
-                actual: bytes[56..].len(),
-            });
-        }
-
-        let mut private_attributes_commitments = Vec::with_capacity(c_len as usize);
-        for i in 0..c_len as usize {
-            let start = j + i * 48;
-            let end = start + 48;
-
-            if bytes.len() < end {
-                return Err(CoconutError::Deserialization(
-                    "Failed to deserialize compressed commitment".to_string(),
-                ));
-            }
-
-            // safety: we made bound check and we're using constant offest
-            #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-            let private_attributes_commitment_bytes = bytes[start..end].try_into().unwrap();
-            let private_attributes_commitment = try_deserialize_g1_projective(
-                &private_attributes_commitment_bytes,
-                CoconutError::Deserialization(
-                    "Failed to deserialize compressed commitment".to_string(),
-                ),
-            )?;
-
-            private_attributes_commitments.push(private_attributes_commitment)
-        }
-
-        let pi_s = ProofCmCs::from_bytes(&bytes[j + c_len as usize * 48..])?;
-
-        Ok(BlindSignRequest {
-            commitment,
-            commitment_hash,
-            private_attributes_commitments,
-            pi_s,
-        })
-    }
-}
-
-impl Bytable for BlindSignRequest {
-    fn to_byte_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        let cm_bytes = self.commitment.to_affine().to_compressed();
-        let cm_hash_bytes = self.commitment_hash.to_affine().to_compressed();
-        let c_len = self.private_attributes_commitments.len() as u64;
-        let proof_bytes = self.pi_s.to_bytes();
-
-        let mut bytes = Vec::with_capacity(48 + 48 + 8 + c_len as usize * 48 + proof_bytes.len());
-
-        bytes.extend_from_slice(&cm_bytes);
-        bytes.extend_from_slice(&cm_hash_bytes);
-        bytes.extend_from_slice(&c_len.to_le_bytes());
-        for c in &self.private_attributes_commitments {
-            bytes.extend_from_slice(&c.to_affine().to_compressed());
-        }
-
-        bytes.extend_from_slice(&proof_bytes);
-
-        bytes
-    }
-
-    fn try_from_byte_slice(slice: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> {
-        BlindSignRequest::from_bytes(slice)
-    }
-}
-
-impl Base58 for BlindSignRequest {}
-
-impl BlindSignRequest {
-    fn verify_proof(&self, params: &Parameters, public_attributes: &[&Attribute]) -> bool {
-        self.pi_s.verify(
-            params,
-            &self.commitment,
-            &self.private_attributes_commitments,
-            public_attributes,
-        )
-    }
-
-    pub fn verify_commitment_hash(&self, public_attributes: &[&Attribute]) -> bool {
-        self.commitment_hash == compute_hash(self.commitment, public_attributes)
-    }
-
-    pub fn get_commitment_hash(&self) -> G1Projective {
-        self.commitment_hash
-    }
-
-    pub fn get_private_attributes_pedersen_commitments(&self) -> &[G1Projective] {
-        &self.private_attributes_commitments
-    }
-
-    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.to_byte_vec()
-    }
-
-    pub fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<BlindSignRequest> {
-        BlindSignRequest::try_from(bytes)
-    }
-
-    pub fn num_private_attributes(&self) -> usize {
-        self.private_attributes_commitments.len()
-    }
-}
-
-pub fn compute_attributes_commitment(
-    params: &Parameters,
-    private_attributes: &[&Attribute],
-    public_attributes: &[&Attribute],
-    hs: &[G1Affine],
-) -> (Scalar, G1Projective) {
-    let commitment_opening = params.random_scalar();
-
-    // Produces h0 ^ m0 * h1^m1 * .... * hn^mn
-    // where m0, m1, ...., mn are attributes
-    let attr_cm = private_attributes
-        .iter()
-        .chain(public_attributes.iter())
-        .zip(hs)
-        .map(|(&m, h)| h * m)
-        .sum::<G1Projective>();
-
-    // Produces g1^r * h0 ^ m0 * h1^m1 * .... * hn^mn
-    let commitment = params.gen1() * commitment_opening + attr_cm;
-    (commitment_opening, commitment)
-}
-
-pub fn compute_pedersen_commitments_for_private_attributes(
-    params: &Parameters,
-    private_attributes: &[&Attribute],
-    h: &G1Projective,
-) -> (Vec<Scalar>, Vec<G1Projective>) {
-    // Generate openings for Pedersen commitment for each private attribute
-    let commitments_openings = params.n_random_scalars(private_attributes.len());
-
-    // Compute Pedersen commitment for each private attribute
-    let pedersen_commitments = commitments_openings
-        .iter()
-        .zip(private_attributes.iter())
-        .map(|(o_j, &m_j)| params.gen1() * o_j + h * m_j)
-        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
-
-    (commitments_openings, pedersen_commitments)
-}
-
-pub fn compute_hash(commitment: G1Projective, public_attributes: &[&Attribute]) -> G1Projective {
-    let mut buff = Vec::new();
-    buff.extend_from_slice(commitment.to_bytes().as_ref());
-    for attr in public_attributes {
-        buff.extend_from_slice(attr.to_bytes().as_ref());
-    }
-    hash_g1(buff)
-}
-
-/// Builds cryptographic material required for blind sign.
-pub fn prepare_blind_sign(
-    params: &Parameters,
-    private_attributes: &[&Attribute],
-    public_attributes: &[&Attribute],
-) -> Result<(Vec<Scalar>, BlindSignRequest)> {
-    if private_attributes.is_empty() {
-        return Err(CoconutError::Issuance(
-            "Tried to prepare blind sign request for an empty set of private attributes"
-                .to_string(),
-        ));
-    }
-
-    let hs = params.gen_hs();
-    if private_attributes.len() + public_attributes.len() > hs.len() {
-        return Err(CoconutError::IssuanceMaxAttributes {
-            max: hs.len(),
-            requested: private_attributes.len() + public_attributes.len(),
-        });
-    }
-
-    let mut commitment_hash;
-    let mut commitment;
-    let mut commitment_opening;
-
-    loop {
-        // Compute the attributes commitment
-        let (c_opening, c) =
-            compute_attributes_commitment(params, private_attributes, public_attributes, hs);
-        commitment_opening = c_opening;
-        commitment = c;
-
-        // Compute the commitment hash
-        commitment_hash = compute_hash(commitment, public_attributes);
-
-        // Check if the commitment hash is not the identity point
-        if !bool::from(commitment_hash.is_identity()) {
-            break;
-        }
-    }
-
-    let (pedersen_commitments_openings, pedersen_commitments) =
-        compute_pedersen_commitments_for_private_attributes(
-            params,
-            private_attributes,
-            &commitment_hash,
-        );
-
-    let pi_s = ProofCmCs::construct(
-        params,
-        &commitment,
-        &commitment_opening,
-        &pedersen_commitments,
-        &pedersen_commitments_openings,
-        private_attributes,
-        public_attributes,
-    );
-
-    Ok((
-        pedersen_commitments_openings,
-        BlindSignRequest {
-            commitment,
-            commitment_hash,
-            private_attributes_commitments: pedersen_commitments,
-            pi_s,
-        },
-    ))
-}
-
-pub fn blind_sign(
-    params: &Parameters,
-    signing_secret_key: &SecretKey,
-    blind_sign_request: &BlindSignRequest,
-    public_attributes: &[&Attribute],
-) -> Result<BlindedSignature> {
-    let num_private = blind_sign_request.private_attributes_commitments.len();
-    let hs = params.gen_hs();
-
-    if num_private + public_attributes.len() > hs.len() {
-        return Err(CoconutError::IssuanceMaxAttributes {
-            max: hs.len(),
-            requested: num_private + public_attributes.len(),
-        });
-    }
-
-    // Verify the commitment hash
-    let h = compute_hash(blind_sign_request.commitment, public_attributes);
-    if bool::from(blind_sign_request.commitment_hash.is_identity()) {
-        return Err(CoconutError::Issuance(
-            "Commitment hash should not be an identity point".to_string(),
-        ));
-    }
-    if !(h == blind_sign_request.commitment_hash) {
-        return Err(CoconutError::Issuance(
-            "Failed to verify the commitment hash".to_string(),
-        ));
-    }
-
-    // Verify the ZK proof
-    if !blind_sign_request.verify_proof(params, public_attributes) {
-        return Err(CoconutError::Issuance(
-            "Failed to verify the proof of knowledge".to_string(),
-        ));
-    }
-
-    // in python implementation there are n^2 G1 multiplications, let's do it with a single one instead.
-    // i.e. compute h ^ (pub_m[0] * y[m + 1] + ... + pub_m[n] * y[m + n]) directly (where m is number of PRIVATE attributes)
-    // rather than ((h ^ pub_m[0]) ^ y[m + 1] , (h ^ pub_m[1]) ^ y[m + 2] , ...).sum() separately
-    let signed_public = h * public_attributes
-        .iter()
-        .zip(signing_secret_key.ys.iter().skip(num_private))
-        .map(|(&attr, yi)| attr * yi)
-        .sum::<Scalar>();
-
-    // h ^ x + c[0] ^ y[0] + ... c[m] ^ y[m] + h ^ (pub_m[0] * y[m + 1] + ... + pub_m[n] * y[m + n])
-    let sig = blind_sign_request
-        .private_attributes_commitments
-        .iter()
-        .zip(signing_secret_key.ys.iter())
-        .map(|(c, yi)| c * yi)
-        .chain(std::iter::once(h * signing_secret_key.x))
-        .chain(std::iter::once(signed_public))
-        .sum();
-
-    Ok(BlindedSignature(h, sig))
-}
-
-/// Verifies a partial blind signature using the provided parameters and validator's verification key.
-///
-/// # Arguments
-///
-/// * `params` - A reference to the cryptographic parameters.
-/// * `blind_sign_request` - A reference to the blind signature request signed by the client.
-/// * `public_attributes` - A reference to the public attributes included in the client's request.
-/// * `blind_sig` - A reference to the issued partial blinded signature to be verified.
-/// * `partial_verification_key` - A reference to the validator's partial verification key.
-///
-/// # Returns
-///
-/// A boolean indicating whether the partial blind signature is valid (`true`) or not (`false`).
-///
-/// # Remarks
-///
-/// This function verifies the correctness and validity of a partial blind signature using
-/// the provided cryptographic parameters, blind signature request, blinded signature,
-/// and partial verification key.
-/// It calculates pairings based on the provided values and checks whether the partial blind signature
-/// is consistent with the verification key and commitments in the blind signature request.
-/// The function returns `true` if the partial blind signature is valid, and `false` otherwise.
-pub fn verify_partial_blind_signature(
-    params: &Parameters,
-    private_attribute_commitments: &[G1Projective],
-    public_attributes: &[&Attribute],
-    blind_sig: &BlindedSignature,
-    partial_verification_key: &VerificationKey,
-) -> bool {
-    let num_private_attributes = private_attribute_commitments.len();
-    if num_private_attributes + public_attributes.len() > partial_verification_key.beta_g2.len() {
-        return false;
-    }
-    if bool::from(blind_sig.0.is_identity()) {
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    // TODO: we're losing some memory here due to extra allocation,
-    // but worst-case scenario (given SANE amount of attributes), it's just few kb at most
-    let c_neg = blind_sig.1.to_affine().neg();
-    let g2_prep = params.prepared_miller_g2();
-
-    let mut terms = vec![
-        // (c^{-1}, g2)
-        (c_neg, g2_prep.clone()),
-        // (s, alpha)
-        (
-            blind_sig.0.to_affine(),
-            G2Prepared::from(partial_verification_key.alpha.to_affine()),
-        ),
-    ];
-
-    // for each private attribute, add (cm_i, beta_i) to the miller terms
-    for (private_attr_commit, beta_g2) in private_attribute_commitments
-        .iter()
-        .zip(&partial_verification_key.beta_g2)
-    {
-        // (cm_i, beta_i)
-        terms.push((
-            private_attr_commit.to_affine(),
-            G2Prepared::from(beta_g2.to_affine()),
-        ))
-    }
-
-    // for each public attribute, add (s^pub_j, beta_{priv + j}) to the miller terms
-    for (&pub_attr, beta_g2) in public_attributes.iter().zip(
-        partial_verification_key
-            .beta_g2
-            .iter()
-            .skip(num_private_attributes),
-    ) {
-        // (s^pub_j, beta_j)
-        terms.push((
-            (blind_sig.0 * pub_attr).to_affine(),
-            G2Prepared::from(beta_g2.to_affine()),
-        ))
-    }
-
-    // get the references to all the terms to get the arguments the miller loop expects
-    #[allow(clippy::map_identity)]
-    let terms_refs = terms.iter().map(|(g1, g2)| (g1, g2)).collect::<Vec<_>>();
-
-    // since checking whether e(a, b) == e(c, d)
-    // is equivalent to checking e(a, b) • e(c, d)^{-1} == id
-    // and thus to e(a, b) • e(c^{-1}, d) == id
-    //
-    // compute e(c^{-1}, g2) • e(s, alpha) • e(cm_0, beta_0) • e(cm_i, beta_i) • (s^pub_0, beta_{i+1}) (s^pub_j, beta_{i + j})
-    multi_miller_loop(&terms_refs)
-        .final_exponentiation()
-        .is_identity()
-        .into()
-}
-
-/// Creates a Coconut Signature under a given secret key on a set of public attributes only.
-pub fn sign(secret_key: &SecretKey, public_attributes: &[&Attribute]) -> Result<Signature> {
-    if public_attributes.len() > secret_key.ys.len() {
-        return Err(CoconutError::IssuanceMaxAttributes {
-            max: secret_key.ys.len(),
-            requested: public_attributes.len(),
-        });
-    }
-
-    //Serialize the array structure of the public attributes into a byte array
-    let mut serialized_attributes = Vec::new();
-    //Prepend the length of the entire array (in bytes)
-    let array_len = public_attributes.len() as u64;
-    serialized_attributes.extend_from_slice(&array_len.to_le_bytes());
-    //Serialize each attribute with its length
-    for &attribute in public_attributes.iter() {
-        let attr_bytes = attribute.to_bytes();
-        let attr_len = attr_bytes.len() as u64;
-
-        // Prefix the attribute with its length
-        serialized_attributes.extend_from_slice(&attr_len.to_le_bytes());
-        serialized_attributes.extend_from_slice(&attr_bytes);
-    }
-
-    //Hash the resulting byte array to derive the point H
-    let h = hash_g1(serialized_attributes);
-
-    // x + m0 * y0 + m1 * y1 + ... mn * yn
-    let exponent = secret_key.x
-        + public_attributes
-            .iter()
-            .zip(secret_key.ys.iter())
-            .map(|(&m_i, y_i)| m_i * y_i)
-            .sum::<Scalar>();
-
-    let sig2 = h * exponent;
-    Ok(Signature(h, sig2))
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use crate::scheme::keygen::keygen;
-    use crate::tests::helpers::random_scalars_refs;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn blind_sign_request_bytes_roundtrip() {
-        // 0 public and 1 private attribute
-        let params = Parameters::new(1).unwrap();
-        random_scalars_refs!(private_attributes, params, 1);
-        random_scalars_refs!(public_attributes, params, 0);
-
-        let (_commitments_openings, lambda) =
-            prepare_blind_sign(&params, &private_attributes, &public_attributes).unwrap();
-
-        let bytes = lambda.to_bytes();
-        assert_eq!(
-            BlindSignRequest::try_from(bytes.as_slice()).unwrap(),
-            lambda
-        );
-
-        // 2 public and 2 private attributes
-        let params = Parameters::new(4).unwrap();
-        random_scalars_refs!(private_attributes, params, 2);
-        random_scalars_refs!(public_attributes, params, 2);
-
-        let (_commitments_openings, lambda) =
-            prepare_blind_sign(&params, &private_attributes, &public_attributes).unwrap();
-
-        let bytes = lambda.to_bytes();
-        assert_eq!(
-            BlindSignRequest::try_from(bytes.as_slice()).unwrap(),
-            lambda
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_prepare_blind_sign_non_identity_commitment_hash() {
-        let params = Parameters::new(1).unwrap();
-        random_scalars_refs!(private_attributes, params, 1);
-        random_scalars_refs!(public_attributes, params, 0);
-
-        // Call the function to prepare the blind sign
-        let result = prepare_blind_sign(&params, &private_attributes, &public_attributes);
-
-        // Ensure the result is Ok
-        assert!(result.is_ok(), "prepare_blind_sign should succeed");
-
-        let (_, blind_sign_request) = result.unwrap();
-
-        // Ensure the commitment_hash is not the identity point
-        assert!(
-            !bool::from(blind_sign_request.commitment_hash.is_identity()),
-            "commitment_hash should not be the identity point"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_blind_sign_with_identity_commitment_hash() {
-        let params = Parameters::new(1).unwrap();
-        random_scalars_refs!(private_attributes, params, 1);
-        random_scalars_refs!(public_attributes, params, 0);
-
-        // Call the function to prepare the blind sign
-        let (_commitments_openings, blind_sign_request) =
-            prepare_blind_sign(&params, &private_attributes, &public_attributes).unwrap();
-        let blind_sign_request = BlindSignRequest {
-            commitment_hash: G1Projective::identity(),
-            ..blind_sign_request // This copies the other fields from the existing instance
-        };
-
-        let signing_secret_key = SecretKey {
-            x: params.random_scalar(),
-            ys: vec![params.random_scalar()],
-        };
-
-        // Call blind_sign and ensure it returns an error due to identity commitment hash
-        let result = blind_sign(
-            &params,
-            &signing_secret_key,
-            &blind_sign_request,
-            &public_attributes,
-        );
-
-        // The result should be an error
-        assert!(
-            result.is_err(),
-            "blind_sign should return an error when commitment_hash is the identity point"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn successful_verify_partial_blind_signature() {
-        let params = Parameters::new(4).unwrap();
-        random_scalars_refs!(private_attributes, params, 2);
-        random_scalars_refs!(public_attributes, params, 2);
-
-        let (_commitments_openings, request) =
-            prepare_blind_sign(&params, &private_attributes, &public_attributes).unwrap();
-
-        let validator_keypair = keygen(&params);
-        let blind_sig = blind_sign(
-            &params,
-            validator_keypair.secret_key(),
-            &request,
-            &public_attributes,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        assert!(verify_partial_blind_signature(
-            &params,
-            &request.private_attributes_commitments,
-            &public_attributes,
-            &blind_sig,
-            validator_keypair.verification_key()
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn successful_verify_partial_blind_signature_no_public_attributes() {
-        let params = Parameters::new(4).unwrap();
-        random_scalars_refs!(private_attributes, params, 2);
-
-        let (_commitments_openings, request) =
-            prepare_blind_sign(&params, &private_attributes, &[]).unwrap();
-
-        let validator_keypair = keygen(&params);
-        let blind_sig = blind_sign(&params, validator_keypair.secret_key(), &request, &[]).unwrap();
-
-        assert!(verify_partial_blind_signature(
-            &params,
-            &request.private_attributes_commitments,
-            &[],
-            &blind_sig,
-            validator_keypair.verification_key()
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn fail_verify_partial_blind_signature_with_wrong_key() {
-        let params = Parameters::new(4).unwrap();
-        random_scalars_refs!(private_attributes, params, 2);
-        random_scalars_refs!(public_attributes, params, 2);
-
-        let (_commitments_openings, request) =
-            prepare_blind_sign(&params, &private_attributes, &public_attributes).unwrap();
-
-        let validator_keypair = keygen(&params);
-        let validator2_keypair = keygen(&params);
-        let blind_sig = blind_sign(
-            &params,
-            validator_keypair.secret_key(),
-            &request,
-            &public_attributes,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        // this assertion should fail, as we try to verify with a wrong validator key
-        assert!(!verify_partial_blind_signature(
-            &params,
-            &request.private_attributes_commitments,
-            &public_attributes,
-            &blind_sig,
-            validator2_keypair.verification_key()
-        ),);
-    }
-}
@@ -1,722 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2021 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-use core::borrow::Borrow;
-use core::iter::Sum;
-use core::ops::{Add, Mul};
-
-use bls12_381::{G1Projective, G2Projective, Scalar};
-use group::Curve;
-use nym_pemstore::traits::{PemStorableKey, PemStorableKeyPair};
-use serde_derive::{Deserialize, Serialize};
-
-use crate::error::{CoconutError, Result};
-use crate::scheme::aggregation::aggregate_verification_keys;
-use crate::scheme::setup::Parameters;
-use crate::scheme::SignerIndex;
-use crate::traits::Bytable;
-use crate::utils::{
-    try_deserialize_g1_projective, try_deserialize_g2_projective, try_deserialize_scalar,
-    try_deserialize_scalar_vec, Polynomial,
-};
-use crate::Base58;
-
-#[derive(Debug)]
-#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone))]
-#[cfg_attr(
-    feature = "key-zeroize",
-    derive(zeroize::Zeroize, zeroize::ZeroizeOnDrop)
-)]
-pub struct SecretKey {
-    pub(crate) x: Scalar,
-    pub(crate) ys: Vec<Scalar>,
-}
-
-impl PemStorableKey for SecretKey {
-    type Error = CoconutError;
-
-    fn pem_type() -> &'static str {
-        "COCONUT SECRET KEY"
-    }
-
-    fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.to_bytes()
-    }
-
-    fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> std::result::Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        Self::from_bytes(bytes)
-    }
-}
-
-impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for SecretKey {
-    type Error = CoconutError;
-
-    fn try_from(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<SecretKey> {
-        // There should be x and at least one y
-        if bytes.len() < 32 * 2 + 8 || (bytes.len() - 8) % 32 != 0 {
-            return Err(CoconutError::DeserializationInvalidLength {
-                actual: bytes.len(),
-                modulus_target: bytes.len() - 8,
-                target: 32 * 2 + 8,
-                modulus: 32,
-                object: "secret key".to_string(),
-            });
-        }
-
-        // this conversion will not fail as we are taking the same length of data
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        let x_bytes: [u8; 32] = bytes[..32].try_into().unwrap();
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        let ys_len = u64::from_le_bytes(bytes[32..40].try_into().unwrap());
-        let actual_ys_len = (bytes.len() - 40) / 32;
-
-        if ys_len as usize != actual_ys_len {
-            return Err(CoconutError::Deserialization(format!(
-                "Tried to deserialize secret key with inconsistent ys len (expected {ys_len}, got {actual_ys_len})"
-            )));
-        }
-
-        let x = try_deserialize_scalar(
-            &x_bytes,
-            CoconutError::Deserialization("Failed to deserialize secret key scalar".to_string()),
-        )?;
-        let ys = try_deserialize_scalar_vec(
-            ys_len,
-            &bytes[40..],
-            CoconutError::Deserialization("Failed to deserialize secret key scalars".to_string()),
-        )?;
-
-        Ok(SecretKey { x, ys })
-    }
-}
-
-impl SecretKey {
-    /// Following a (distributed) key generation process, scalar values can be obtained
-    /// outside of the normal key generation process.
-    pub fn create_from_raw(x: Scalar, ys: Vec<Scalar>) -> Self {
-        Self { x, ys }
-    }
-
-    /// Extract the Scalar copy of the underlying secrets.
-    /// The caller of this function must exercise extreme care to not misuse the data and ensuring it gets zeroized
-    pub fn hazmat_to_raw(&self) -> (Scalar, Vec<Scalar>) {
-        (self.x, self.ys.clone())
-    }
-
-    pub fn size(&self) -> usize {
-        self.ys.len()
-    }
-
-    /// Derive verification key using this secret key.
-    pub fn verification_key(&self, params: &Parameters) -> VerificationKey {
-        let g1 = params.gen1();
-        let g2 = params.gen2();
-        VerificationKey {
-            alpha: g2 * self.x,
-            beta_g1: self.ys.iter().map(|y| g1 * y).collect(),
-            beta_g2: self.ys.iter().map(|y| g2 * y).collect(),
-        }
-    }
-
-    // x || ys.len() || ys
-    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        let ys_len = self.ys.len();
-        let mut bytes = Vec::with_capacity(8 + (ys_len + 1) * 32);
-
-        bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.x.to_bytes());
-        bytes.extend_from_slice(&ys_len.to_le_bytes());
-        for y in self.ys.iter() {
-            bytes.extend_from_slice(&y.to_bytes())
-        }
-        bytes
-    }
-
-    pub fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<SecretKey> {
-        SecretKey::try_from(bytes)
-    }
-}
-
-impl Bytable for SecretKey {
-    fn to_byte_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.to_bytes()
-    }
-
-    fn try_from_byte_slice(slice: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> {
-        SecretKey::try_from(slice)
-    }
-}
-
-impl Base58 for SecretKey {}
-
-// TODO: perhaps change points to affine representation
-// to make verification slightly more efficient?
-#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Clone)]
-pub struct VerificationKey {
-    // TODO add gen2 as per the paper or imply it from the fact library is using bls381?
-    pub(crate) alpha: G2Projective,
-    pub(crate) beta_g1: Vec<G1Projective>,
-    pub(crate) beta_g2: Vec<G2Projective>,
-}
-
-impl PemStorableKey for VerificationKey {
-    type Error = CoconutError;
-
-    fn pem_type() -> &'static str {
-        "COCONUT VERIFICATION KEY"
-    }
-
-    fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.to_bytes()
-    }
-
-    fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> std::result::Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        Self::from_bytes(bytes)
-    }
-}
-
-impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for VerificationKey {
-    type Error = CoconutError;
-
-    fn try_from(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<VerificationKey> {
-        // There should be at least alpha, one betaG1 and one betaG2 and their length
-        if bytes.len() < 96 * 2 + 48 + 8 || (bytes.len() - 8 - 96) % (96 + 48) != 0 {
-            return Err(CoconutError::DeserializationInvalidLength {
-                actual: bytes.len(),
-                modulus_target: bytes.len() - 8 - 96,
-                target: 96 * 2 + 48 + 8,
-                modulus: 96 + 48,
-                object: "verification key".to_string(),
-            });
-        }
-
-        // this conversion will not fail as we are taking the same length of data
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        let alpha_bytes: [u8; 96] = bytes[..96].try_into().unwrap();
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        let betas_len = u64::from_le_bytes(bytes[96..104].try_into().unwrap());
-
-        let actual_betas_len = (bytes.len() - 104) / (96 + 48);
-
-        if betas_len as usize != actual_betas_len {
-            return Err(
-                CoconutError::Deserialization(
-                    format!("Tried to deserialize verification key with inconsistent betas len (expected {betas_len}, got {actual_betas_len})"
-                    )));
-        }
-
-        let alpha = try_deserialize_g2_projective(
-            &alpha_bytes,
-            CoconutError::Deserialization(
-                "Failed to deserialize verification key G2 point (alpha)".to_string(),
-            ),
-        )?;
-
-        let mut beta_g1 = Vec::with_capacity(betas_len as usize);
-        let mut beta_g1_end: u64 = 0;
-        for i in 0..betas_len {
-            let start = (104 + i * 48) as usize;
-            let end = start + 48;
-            // we're using a constant 48 byte offset (which is the size of G1 compressed) so unwrap is fine
-            #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-            let beta_i_bytes = bytes[start..end].try_into().unwrap();
-            let beta_i = try_deserialize_g1_projective(
-                &beta_i_bytes,
-                CoconutError::Deserialization(
-                    "Failed to deserialize verification key G1 point (beta)".to_string(),
-                ),
-            )?;
-
-            beta_g1_end = end as u64;
-            beta_g1.push(beta_i)
-        }
-
-        let mut beta_g2 = Vec::with_capacity(betas_len as usize);
-        for i in 0..betas_len {
-            let start = (beta_g1_end + i * 96) as usize;
-            let end = start + 96;
-            // we're using a constant 96 byte offset (which is the size of G2 compressed) so unwrap is fine
-            #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-            let beta_i_bytes = bytes[start..end].try_into().unwrap();
-            let beta_i = try_deserialize_g2_projective(
-                &beta_i_bytes,
-                CoconutError::Deserialization(
-                    "Failed to deserialize verification key G2 point (beta)".to_string(),
-                ),
-            )?;
-
-            beta_g2.push(beta_i)
-        }
-
-        Ok(VerificationKey {
-            alpha,
-            beta_g1,
-            beta_g2,
-        })
-    }
-}
-
-impl<'b> Add<&'b VerificationKey> for VerificationKey {
-    type Output = VerificationKey;
-
-    #[inline]
-    fn add(self, rhs: &'b VerificationKey) -> VerificationKey {
-        // If you're trying to add two keys together that were created
-        // for different number of attributes, just panic as it's a
-        // nonsense operation.
-        assert_eq!(
-            self.beta_g1.len(),
-            rhs.beta_g1.len(),
-            "trying to add verification keys generated for different number of attributes [G1]"
-        );
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            self.beta_g2.len(),
-            rhs.beta_g2.len(),
-            "trying to add verification keys generated for different number of attributes [G2]"
-        );
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            self.beta_g1.len(),
-            self.beta_g2.len(),
-            "this key is incorrect - the number of elements G1 and G2 does not match"
-        );
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            rhs.beta_g1.len(),
-            rhs.beta_g2.len(),
-            "they key you want to add is incorrect - the number of elements G1 and G2 does not match"
-        );
-
-        VerificationKey {
-            alpha: self.alpha + rhs.alpha,
-            beta_g1: self
-                .beta_g1
-                .iter()
-                .zip(rhs.beta_g1.iter())
-                .map(|(self_beta_g1, rhs_beta_g1)| self_beta_g1 + rhs_beta_g1)
-                .collect(),
-            beta_g2: self
-                .beta_g2
-                .iter()
-                .zip(rhs.beta_g2.iter())
-                .map(|(self_beta_g2, rhs_beta_g2)| self_beta_g2 + rhs_beta_g2)
-                .collect(),
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl Mul<Scalar> for &VerificationKey {
-    type Output = VerificationKey;
-
-    #[inline]
-    fn mul(self, rhs: Scalar) -> Self::Output {
-        VerificationKey {
-            alpha: self.alpha * rhs,
-            beta_g1: self.beta_g1.iter().map(|b_i| b_i * rhs).collect(),
-            beta_g2: self.beta_g2.iter().map(|b_i| b_i * rhs).collect(),
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl<T> Sum<T> for VerificationKey
-where
-    T: Borrow<VerificationKey>,
-{
-    #[inline]
-    fn sum<I>(iter: I) -> Self
-    where
-        I: Iterator<Item = T>,
-    {
-        let mut peekable = iter.peekable();
-        let head_attributes = match peekable.peek() {
-            Some(head) => head.borrow().beta_g2.len(),
-            None => {
-                // TODO: this is a really weird edge case. You're trying to sum an EMPTY iterator
-                // of VerificationKey. So should it panic here or just return some nonsense value?
-                return VerificationKey::identity(0);
-            }
-        };
-
-        peekable.fold(VerificationKey::identity(head_attributes), |acc, item| {
-            acc + item.borrow()
-        })
-    }
-}
-
-impl VerificationKey {
-    /// Create a (kinda) identity verification key using specified
-    /// number of 'beta' elements
-    pub(crate) fn identity(beta_size: usize) -> Self {
-        VerificationKey {
-            alpha: G2Projective::identity(),
-            beta_g1: vec![G1Projective::identity(); beta_size],
-            beta_g2: vec![G2Projective::identity(); beta_size],
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn aggregate(sigs: &[Self], indices: Option<&[SignerIndex]>) -> Result<Self> {
-        aggregate_verification_keys(sigs, indices)
-    }
-
-    pub fn alpha(&self) -> &G2Projective {
-        &self.alpha
-    }
-
-    pub fn beta_g1(&self) -> &Vec<G1Projective> {
-        &self.beta_g1
-    }
-
-    pub fn beta_g2(&self) -> &Vec<G2Projective> {
-        &self.beta_g2
-    }
-
-    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        let beta_g1_len = self.beta_g1.len();
-        let beta_g2_len = self.beta_g2.len();
-        let mut bytes = Vec::with_capacity(96 + 8 + beta_g1_len * 48 + beta_g2_len * 96);
-
-        bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.alpha.to_affine().to_compressed());
-
-        bytes.extend_from_slice(&beta_g1_len.to_le_bytes());
-
-        for beta_g1 in self.beta_g1.iter() {
-            bytes.extend_from_slice(&beta_g1.to_affine().to_compressed())
-        }
-
-        for beta_g2 in self.beta_g2.iter() {
-            bytes.extend_from_slice(&beta_g2.to_affine().to_compressed())
-        }
-
-        bytes
-    }
-
-    pub fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<VerificationKey> {
-        VerificationKey::try_from(bytes)
-    }
-}
-
-impl Bytable for VerificationKey {
-    fn to_byte_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.to_bytes()
-    }
-
-    fn try_from_byte_slice(slice: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> {
-        VerificationKey::try_from(slice)
-    }
-}
-
-impl Base58 for VerificationKey {}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
-pub struct VerificationKeyShare {
-    pub key: VerificationKey,
-    pub index: SignerIndex,
-}
-
-impl From<(VerificationKey, SignerIndex)> for VerificationKeyShare {
-    fn from(value: (VerificationKey, SignerIndex)) -> Self {
-        VerificationKeyShare {
-            key: value.0,
-            index: value.1,
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
-#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone))]
-pub struct KeyPair {
-    secret_key: SecretKey,
-    verification_key: VerificationKey,
-
-    /// Optional index value specifying polynomial point used during threshold key generation.
-    pub index: Option<SignerIndex>,
-}
-
-impl From<KeyPair> for (SecretKey, VerificationKey) {
-    fn from(value: KeyPair) -> Self {
-        (value.secret_key, value.verification_key)
-    }
-}
-
-impl PemStorableKeyPair for KeyPair {
-    type PrivatePemKey = SecretKey;
-    type PublicPemKey = VerificationKey;
-
-    fn private_key(&self) -> &Self::PrivatePemKey {
-        &self.secret_key
-    }
-
-    fn public_key(&self) -> &Self::PublicPemKey {
-        &self.verification_key
-    }
-
-    fn from_keys(secret_key: Self::PrivatePemKey, verification_key: Self::PublicPemKey) -> Self {
-        Self::from_keys(secret_key, verification_key)
-    }
-}
-
-impl KeyPair {
-    const MARKER_BYTES: &'static [u8] = b"coconutkeypair";
-
-    pub fn from_keys(secret_key: SecretKey, verification_key: VerificationKey) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            secret_key,
-            verification_key,
-            index: None,
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn secret_key(&self) -> &SecretKey {
-        &self.secret_key
-    }
-
-    pub fn verification_key(&self) -> &VerificationKey {
-        &self.verification_key
-    }
-
-    pub fn to_verification_key_share(&self) -> Option<VerificationKeyShare> {
-        self.index.map(|index| VerificationKeyShare {
-            key: self.verification_key.clone(),
-            index,
-        })
-    }
-
-    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        // Schema is coconutkeypair[14]|secret_key_len[8]|secret_key[secret_key_len]|verification_key_len[8]|verification_key[verification_key_len]|signer_index[8] - optional
-        self.to_byte_vec()
-    }
-
-    pub fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> {
-        KeyPair::try_from_byte_slice(bytes)
-    }
-}
-
-impl Bytable for KeyPair {
-    fn to_byte_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        // Schema is coconutkeypair[14]|secret_key_len[8]|secret_key[secret_key_len]|verification_key_len[8]|verification_key[verification_key_len]|signer_index[8] - optional
-        let mut byts = vec![];
-        let secret_key_bytes = self.secret_key.to_bytes();
-        let secret_key_len = (secret_key_bytes.len() as u64).to_le_bytes();
-        let verification_key_bytes = self.verification_key.to_bytes();
-        let verification_key_len = (verification_key_bytes.len() as u64).to_le_bytes();
-        byts.extend_from_slice(Self::MARKER_BYTES);
-        byts.extend_from_slice(&secret_key_len);
-        byts.extend_from_slice(&secret_key_bytes);
-        byts.extend_from_slice(&verification_key_len);
-        byts.extend_from_slice(&verification_key_bytes);
-        if let Some(index) = self.index {
-            byts.extend_from_slice(&index.to_le_bytes())
-        }
-        byts
-    }
-
-    fn try_from_byte_slice(slice: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> {
-        KeyPair::try_from(slice)
-    }
-}
-
-impl Base58 for KeyPair {}
-
-impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for KeyPair {
-    type Error = CoconutError;
-
-    fn try_from(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<KeyPair> {
-        let header_len = Self::MARKER_BYTES.len();
-
-        // we must be able to at the very least read the length of secret key which is past the header
-        // and is 8 bytes long
-        if bytes.len() < header_len + 8 {
-            return Err(CoconutError::DeserializationMinLength {
-                min: header_len + 8,
-                actual: bytes.len(),
-            });
-        }
-
-        // safety: we made bound check and we're using constant offest
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        let secret_key_len =
-            u64::from_le_bytes(bytes[header_len..header_len + 8].try_into().unwrap()) as usize;
-        let secret_key_start = header_len + 8;
-
-        let secret_key =
-            SecretKey::try_from(&bytes[secret_key_start..secret_key_start + secret_key_len])?;
-
-        // we must be able to read the length of verification key
-        if bytes.len() < secret_key_start + secret_key_len + 8 {
-            return Err(CoconutError::DeserializationMinLength {
-                min: secret_key_start + secret_key_len + 8,
-                actual: bytes.len(),
-            });
-        }
-
-        // safety: we made bound check
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        let verification_key_len = u64::from_le_bytes(
-            bytes[secret_key_start + secret_key_len..secret_key_start + secret_key_len + 8]
-                .try_into()
-                .unwrap(),
-        ) as usize;
-        let verification_key_start = secret_key_start + secret_key_len + 8;
-
-        let verification_key = VerificationKey::try_from(
-            &bytes[verification_key_start..verification_key_start + verification_key_len],
-        )?;
-        let consumed_bytes = verification_key_start + verification_key_len;
-        let index = if consumed_bytes < bytes.len() && [consumed_bytes..].len() == 8 {
-            #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-            Some(u64::from_le_bytes(
-                bytes[consumed_bytes..consumed_bytes + 8]
-                    .try_into()
-                    .unwrap(),
-            ))
-        } else {
-            None
-        };
-        Ok(KeyPair {
-            secret_key,
-            verification_key,
-            index,
-        })
-    }
-}
-
-/// Generate a single Coconut keypair ((x, y0, y1...), (g2^x, g2^y0, ...)).
-///
-/// It is not suitable for threshold credentials as all subsequent calls to `keygen` generate keys
-/// that are independent of each other.
-pub fn keygen(params: &Parameters) -> KeyPair {
-    let attributes = params.gen_hs().len();
-
-    let x = params.random_scalar();
-    let ys = params.n_random_scalars(attributes);
-
-    let secret_key = SecretKey { x, ys };
-    let verification_key = secret_key.verification_key(params);
-
-    KeyPair {
-        secret_key,
-        verification_key,
-        index: None,
-    }
-}
-
-/// Generate Coconut keypairs.
-///
-/// Generate a set of n Coconut keypairs [((x, y0, y1...), (g2^x, g2^y0, ...)), ...],
-/// such that they support threshold aggregation by `threshold` number of parties.
-/// It is expected that this procedure is executed by a Trusted Third Party.
-pub fn ttp_keygen(
-    params: &Parameters,
-    threshold: u64,
-    num_authorities: u64,
-) -> Result<Vec<KeyPair>> {
-    if threshold == 0 {
-        return Err(CoconutError::Setup(
-            "Tried to generate threshold keys with a 0 threshold value".to_string(),
-        ));
-    }
-
-    if threshold > num_authorities {
-        return Err(
-            CoconutError::Setup(
-                "Tried to generate threshold keys for threshold value being higher than number of the signing authorities".to_string(),
-            ));
-    }
-
-    let attributes = params.gen_hs().len();
-
-    // generate polynomials
-    let v = Polynomial::new_random(params, threshold - 1);
-    let ws = (0..attributes)
-        .map(|_| Polynomial::new_random(params, threshold - 1))
-        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
-
-    // TODO: potentially if we had some known authority identifier we could use that instead
-    // of the increasing (1,2,3,...) sequence
-    let polynomial_indices = (1..=num_authorities).collect::<Vec<_>>();
-
-    // generate polynomial shares
-    let x = polynomial_indices
-        .iter()
-        .map(|&id| v.evaluate(&Scalar::from(id)));
-    let ys = polynomial_indices.iter().map(|&id| {
-        ws.iter()
-            .map(|w| w.evaluate(&Scalar::from(id)))
-            .collect::<Vec<_>>()
-    });
-
-    // finally set the keys
-    let secret_keys = x.zip(ys).map(|(x, ys)| SecretKey { x, ys });
-
-    let keypairs = secret_keys
-        .zip(polynomial_indices.iter())
-        .map(|(secret_key, index)| {
-            let verification_key = secret_key.verification_key(params);
-            KeyPair {
-                secret_key,
-                verification_key,
-                index: Some(*index),
-            }
-        })
-        .collect();
-
-    Ok(keypairs)
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use crate::scheme::setup::setup;
-
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn keypair_bytes_roundtrip() {
-        let params1 = setup(1).unwrap();
-        let params5 = setup(5).unwrap();
-
-        let keypair1 = keygen(&params1);
-        let keypair5 = keygen(&params5);
-
-        let bytes1 = keypair1.to_bytes();
-        let bytes5 = keypair5.to_bytes();
-
-        assert_eq!(KeyPair::from_bytes(&bytes1).unwrap(), keypair1);
-        assert_eq!(KeyPair::from_bytes(&bytes5).unwrap(), keypair5);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn secret_key_bytes_roundtrip() {
-        let params1 = setup(1).unwrap();
-        let params5 = setup(5).unwrap();
-
-        let keypair1 = keygen(&params1);
-        let keypair5 = keygen(&params5);
-
-        let bytes1 = keypair1.secret_key.to_bytes();
-        let bytes5 = keypair5.secret_key.to_bytes();
-
-        assert_eq!(SecretKey::from_bytes(&bytes1).unwrap(), keypair1.secret_key);
-        assert_eq!(SecretKey::from_bytes(&bytes5).unwrap(), keypair5.secret_key);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn verification_key_bytes_roundtrip() {
-        let params1 = setup(1).unwrap();
-        let params5 = setup(5).unwrap();
-
-        let keypair1 = &keygen(&params1);
-        let keypair5 = &keygen(&params5);
-
-        let bytes1: Vec<u8> = keypair1.verification_key.to_bytes();
-        let bytes5: Vec<u8> = keypair5.verification_key.to_bytes();
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            VerificationKey::try_from(bytes1.as_slice()).unwrap(),
-            keypair1.verification_key
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            VerificationKey::try_from(bytes5.as_slice()).unwrap(),
-            keypair5.verification_key
-        );
-    }
-}
@@ -1,672 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2021 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-// TODO: implement https://crates.io/crates/signature traits?
-
-use bls12_381::{G1Projective, G2Prepared, G2Projective, Scalar};
-use group::Curve;
-
-pub use keygen::{SecretKey, VerificationKey};
-
-use crate::error::{CoconutError, Result};
-use crate::scheme::setup::Parameters;
-use crate::scheme::verification::check_bilinear_pairing;
-use crate::traits::{Base58, Bytable};
-use crate::utils::try_deserialize_g1_projective;
-use crate::Attribute;
-
-pub mod aggregation;
-pub mod double_use;
-pub mod issuance;
-pub mod keygen;
-pub mod setup;
-pub mod verification;
-
-pub type SignerIndex = u64;
-
-// (h, s)
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub struct Signature(pub(crate) G1Projective, pub(crate) G1Projective);
-
-pub type PartialSignature = Signature;
-
-impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for Signature {
-    type Error = CoconutError;
-
-    fn try_from(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Signature> {
-        if bytes.len() != 96 {
-            return Err(CoconutError::Deserialization(format!(
-                "Signature must be exactly 96 bytes, got {}",
-                bytes.len()
-            )));
-        }
-
-        // safety: we just checked for the length so the unwraps are fine
-        #[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
-        let sig1_bytes: &[u8; 48] = &bytes[..48].try_into().expect("Slice size != 48");
-        #[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
-        let sig2_bytes: &[u8; 48] = &bytes[48..].try_into().expect("Slice size != 48");
-
-        let sig1 = try_deserialize_g1_projective(
-            sig1_bytes,
-            CoconutError::Deserialization("Failed to deserialize compressed sig1".to_string()),
-        )?;
-
-        let sig2 = try_deserialize_g1_projective(
-            sig2_bytes,
-            CoconutError::Deserialization("Failed to deserialize compressed sig2".to_string()),
-        )?;
-
-        Ok(Signature(sig1, sig2))
-    }
-}
-
-impl Signature {
-    pub(crate) fn sig1(&self) -> &G1Projective {
-        &self.0
-    }
-
-    pub(crate) fn sig2(&self) -> &G1Projective {
-        &self.1
-    }
-
-    pub fn randomise_simple(&self, params: &Parameters) -> Signature {
-        let r = params.random_scalar();
-        Signature(self.0 * r, self.1 * r)
-    }
-
-    pub fn randomise(&self, params: &Parameters) -> (Signature, Scalar) {
-        let r = params.random_scalar();
-        let r_prime = params.random_scalar();
-        let h_prime = self.0 * r_prime;
-        let s_prime = (self.1 * r_prime) + (h_prime * r);
-        (Signature(h_prime, s_prime), r)
-    }
-
-    pub fn to_bytes(self) -> [u8; 96] {
-        let mut bytes = [0u8; 96];
-        bytes[..48].copy_from_slice(&self.0.to_affine().to_compressed());
-        bytes[48..].copy_from_slice(&self.1.to_affine().to_compressed());
-        bytes
-    }
-
-    pub fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Signature> {
-        Signature::try_from(bytes)
-    }
-
-    pub fn verify(
-        &self,
-        params: &Parameters,
-        partial_verification_key: &VerificationKey,
-        private_attributes: &[&Attribute],
-        public_attributes: &[&Attribute],
-        commitment_hash: &G1Projective,
-    ) -> Result<()> {
-        // Verify the commitment hash
-        if bool::from(self.0.is_identity()) {
-            return Err(CoconutError::Verification(
-                "Commitment hash should not be an identity point".to_string(),
-            ));
-        }
-        if !(commitment_hash == &self.0) {
-            return Err(CoconutError::Verification(
-                "Verification of commitment hash from signature failed".to_string(),
-            ));
-        }
-
-        let alpha = partial_verification_key.alpha;
-
-        let signed_attributes = private_attributes
-            .iter()
-            .chain(public_attributes.iter())
-            .zip(partial_verification_key.beta_g2.iter())
-            .map(|(&attr, beta_i)| beta_i * attr)
-            .sum::<G2Projective>();
-
-        // Verify the signature share
-        if !check_bilinear_pairing(
-            &self.0.to_affine(),
-            &G2Prepared::from((alpha + signed_attributes).to_affine()),
-            &self.1.to_affine(),
-            params.prepared_miller_g2(),
-        ) {
-            return Err(CoconutError::Unblind(
-                "Verification of signature share failed".to_string(),
-            ));
-        }
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
-impl Bytable for Signature {
-    fn to_byte_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.to_bytes().to_vec()
-    }
-
-    fn try_from_byte_slice(slice: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> {
-        Signature::from_bytes(slice)
-    }
-}
-
-impl Base58 for Signature {}
-
-#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub struct BlindedSignature(G1Projective, G1Projective);
-
-impl Bytable for BlindedSignature {
-    fn to_byte_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.to_bytes().to_vec()
-    }
-
-    fn try_from_byte_slice(slice: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> {
-        Self::from_bytes(slice)
-    }
-}
-
-impl Base58 for BlindedSignature {}
-
-impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for BlindedSignature {
-    type Error = CoconutError;
-
-    fn try_from(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<BlindedSignature> {
-        if bytes.len() != 96 {
-            return Err(CoconutError::Deserialization(format!(
-                "BlindedSignature must be exactly 96 bytes, got {}",
-                bytes.len()
-            )));
-        }
-
-        // safety: we just checked for the length so the unwraps are fine
-        #[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
-        let h_bytes: &[u8; 48] = &bytes[..48].try_into().expect("Slice size != 48");
-        #[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
-        let sig_bytes: &[u8; 48] = &bytes[48..].try_into().expect("Slice size != 48");
-
-        let h = try_deserialize_g1_projective(
-            h_bytes,
-            CoconutError::Deserialization("Failed to deserialize compressed h".to_string()),
-        )?;
-        let sig = try_deserialize_g1_projective(
-            sig_bytes,
-            CoconutError::Deserialization("Failed to deserialize compressed sig".to_string()),
-        )?;
-
-        Ok(BlindedSignature(h, sig))
-    }
-}
-
-impl BlindedSignature {
-    pub fn unblind(
-        &self,
-        partial_verification_key: &VerificationKey,
-        pedersen_commitments_openings: &[Scalar],
-    ) -> Signature {
-        // parse the signature
-        let h = &self.0;
-        let c = &self.1;
-        let blinding_removers = partial_verification_key
-            .beta_g1
-            .iter()
-            .zip(pedersen_commitments_openings.iter())
-            .map(|(beta, opening)| beta * opening)
-            .sum::<G1Projective>();
-
-        let unblinded_c = c - blinding_removers;
-
-        Signature(*h, unblinded_c)
-    }
-
-    pub fn unblind_and_verify(
-        &self,
-        params: &Parameters,
-        partial_verification_key: &VerificationKey,
-        private_attributes: &[&Attribute],
-        public_attributes: &[&Attribute],
-        commitment_hash: &G1Projective,
-        pedersen_commitments_openings: &[Scalar],
-    ) -> Result<Signature> {
-        let unblinded = self.unblind(partial_verification_key, pedersen_commitments_openings);
-        unblinded.verify(
-            params,
-            partial_verification_key,
-            private_attributes,
-            public_attributes,
-            commitment_hash,
-        )?;
-        Ok(unblinded)
-    }
-
-    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 96] {
-        let mut bytes = [0u8; 96];
-        bytes[..48].copy_from_slice(&self.0.to_affine().to_compressed());
-        bytes[48..].copy_from_slice(&self.1.to_affine().to_compressed());
-        bytes
-    }
-
-    pub fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<BlindedSignature> {
-        BlindedSignature::try_from(bytes)
-    }
-}
-
-// perhaps this should take signature by reference? we'll see how it goes
-#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
-pub struct SignatureShare {
-    signature: Signature,
-    index: SignerIndex,
-}
-
-impl From<(Signature, SignerIndex)> for SignatureShare {
-    fn from(value: (Signature, SignerIndex)) -> Self {
-        SignatureShare {
-            signature: value.0,
-            index: value.1,
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl SignatureShare {
-    pub fn new(signature: Signature, index: SignerIndex) -> Self {
-        SignatureShare { signature, index }
-    }
-
-    pub fn signature(&self) -> &Signature {
-        &self.signature
-    }
-
-    pub fn index(&self) -> SignerIndex {
-        self.index
-    }
-
-    // pub fn aggregate(shares: &[Self]) -> Result<Signature> {
-    //     aggregate_signature_shares(shares)
-    // }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use crate::hash_to_scalar;
-    use crate::scheme::aggregation::{
-        aggregate_signatures_and_verify, aggregate_verification_keys,
-    };
-    use crate::scheme::issuance::{blind_sign, compute_hash, prepare_blind_sign, sign};
-    use crate::scheme::keygen::{keygen, ttp_keygen};
-    use crate::scheme::verification::{prove_bandwidth_credential, verify, verify_credential};
-    use crate::tests::helpers::random_scalars_refs;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn unblind_returns_error_if_integrity_check_on_commitment_hash_fails() {
-        let params = Parameters::new(2).unwrap();
-        random_scalars_refs!(private_attributes, params, 2);
-
-        let (_commitments_openings, lambda) =
-            prepare_blind_sign(&params, &private_attributes, &[]).unwrap();
-
-        let keypair1 = keygen(&params);
-
-        let sig1 = blind_sign(&params, keypair1.secret_key(), &lambda, &[]).unwrap();
-
-        let wrong_commitment_opening = params.random_scalar();
-        let wrong_commitment = params.gen1() * wrong_commitment_opening;
-        let fake_commitment_hash = compute_hash(wrong_commitment, &[]);
-        let wrong_commitments_openings = params.n_random_scalars(private_attributes.len());
-
-        assert!(sig1
-            .unblind_and_verify(
-                &params,
-                keypair1.verification_key(),
-                &private_attributes,
-                &[],
-                &fake_commitment_hash,
-                &wrong_commitments_openings,
-            )
-            .is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn unblind_returns_error_if_signature_verification_fails() {
-        let params = Parameters::new(2).unwrap();
-        let p = [hash_to_scalar("Attribute1"), hash_to_scalar("Attribute2")];
-        let private_attributes = vec![&p[0], &p[1]];
-
-        let p2 = [hash_to_scalar("Attribute3"), hash_to_scalar("Attribute4")];
-        let private_attributes2 = vec![&p2[0], &p2[1]];
-
-        let (commitments_openings, lambda) =
-            prepare_blind_sign(&params, &private_attributes, &[]).unwrap();
-
-        let keypair1 = keygen(&params);
-
-        let sig1 = blind_sign(&params, keypair1.secret_key(), &lambda, &[]).unwrap();
-
-        assert!(sig1
-            .unblind_and_verify(
-                &params,
-                keypair1.verification_key(),
-                &private_attributes2,
-                &[],
-                &lambda.get_commitment_hash(),
-                &commitments_openings,
-            )
-            .is_err());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn verification_on_two_private_attributes() {
-        let params = Parameters::new(2).unwrap();
-        let serial_number = params.random_scalar();
-        let binding_number = params.random_scalar();
-        let private_attributes = vec![&serial_number, &binding_number];
-
-        let keypair1 = keygen(&params);
-        let keypair2 = keygen(&params);
-
-        let (commitments_openings, lambda) =
-            prepare_blind_sign(&params, &private_attributes, &[]).unwrap();
-
-        let sig1 = blind_sign(&params, keypair1.secret_key(), &lambda, &[])
-            .unwrap()
-            .unblind_and_verify(
-                &params,
-                keypair1.verification_key(),
-                &private_attributes,
-                &[],
-                &lambda.get_commitment_hash(),
-                &commitments_openings,
-            )
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let sig2 = blind_sign(&params, keypair2.secret_key(), &lambda, &[])
-            .unwrap()
-            .unblind_and_verify(
-                &params,
-                keypair2.verification_key(),
-                &private_attributes,
-                &[],
-                &lambda.get_commitment_hash(),
-                &commitments_openings,
-            )
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let theta1 = prove_bandwidth_credential(
-            &params,
-            keypair1.verification_key(),
-            &sig1,
-            &serial_number,
-            &binding_number,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        let theta2 = prove_bandwidth_credential(
-            &params,
-            keypair2.verification_key(),
-            &sig2,
-            &serial_number,
-            &binding_number,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        assert!(verify_credential(
-            &params,
-            keypair1.verification_key(),
-            &theta1,
-            &[],
-        ));
-
-        assert!(verify_credential(
-            &params,
-            keypair2.verification_key(),
-            &theta2,
-            &[],
-        ));
-
-        assert!(!verify_credential(
-            &params,
-            keypair1.verification_key(),
-            &theta2,
-            &[],
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn verification_on_two_public_attributes() {
-        let params = Parameters::new(2).unwrap();
-        random_scalars_refs!(attributes, params, 2);
-
-        let keypair1 = keygen(&params);
-        let keypair2 = keygen(&params);
-        let sig1 = sign(keypair1.secret_key(), &attributes).unwrap();
-        let sig2 = sign(keypair2.secret_key(), &attributes).unwrap();
-
-        assert!(verify(
-            &params,
-            keypair1.verification_key(),
-            &attributes,
-            &sig1,
-        ));
-
-        assert!(!verify(
-            &params,
-            keypair2.verification_key(),
-            &attributes,
-            &sig1,
-        ));
-
-        assert!(!verify(
-            &params,
-            keypair1.verification_key(),
-            &attributes,
-            &sig2,
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn verification_on_two_public_and_two_private_attributes() {
-        let params = Parameters::new(4).unwrap();
-        random_scalars_refs!(public_attributes, params, 2);
-
-        let serial_number = params.random_scalar();
-        let binding_number = params.random_scalar();
-        let private_attributes = vec![&serial_number, &binding_number];
-
-        let keypair1 = keygen(&params);
-        let keypair2 = keygen(&params);
-
-        let (commitments_openings, lambda) =
-            prepare_blind_sign(&params, &private_attributes, &public_attributes).unwrap();
-
-        let sig1 = blind_sign(&params, keypair1.secret_key(), &lambda, &public_attributes)
-            .unwrap()
-            .unblind_and_verify(
-                &params,
-                keypair1.verification_key(),
-                &private_attributes,
-                &public_attributes,
-                &lambda.get_commitment_hash(),
-                &commitments_openings,
-            )
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let sig2 = blind_sign(&params, keypair2.secret_key(), &lambda, &public_attributes)
-            .unwrap()
-            .unblind_and_verify(
-                &params,
-                keypair2.verification_key(),
-                &private_attributes,
-                &public_attributes,
-                &lambda.get_commitment_hash(),
-                &commitments_openings,
-            )
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let theta1 = prove_bandwidth_credential(
-            &params,
-            keypair1.verification_key(),
-            &sig1,
-            &serial_number,
-            &binding_number,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        let theta2 = prove_bandwidth_credential(
-            &params,
-            keypair2.verification_key(),
-            &sig2,
-            &serial_number,
-            &binding_number,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        assert!(verify_credential(
-            &params,
-            keypair1.verification_key(),
-            &theta1,
-            &public_attributes,
-        ));
-
-        assert!(verify_credential(
-            &params,
-            keypair2.verification_key(),
-            &theta2,
-            &public_attributes,
-        ));
-
-        assert!(!verify_credential(
-            &params,
-            keypair1.verification_key(),
-            &theta2,
-            &public_attributes,
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn verification_on_two_public_and_two_private_attributes_from_two_signers() {
-        let params = Parameters::new(4).unwrap();
-        random_scalars_refs!(public_attributes, params, 2);
-
-        let serial_number = params.random_scalar();
-        let binding_number = params.random_scalar();
-        let private_attributes = vec![&serial_number, &binding_number];
-
-        let keypairs = ttp_keygen(&params, 2, 3).unwrap();
-
-        let (commitments_openings, lambda) =
-            prepare_blind_sign(&params, &private_attributes, &public_attributes).unwrap();
-
-        let sigs = keypairs
-            .iter()
-            .map(|keypair| {
-                blind_sign(&params, keypair.secret_key(), &lambda, &public_attributes)
-                    .unwrap()
-                    .unblind_and_verify(
-                        &params,
-                        keypair.verification_key(),
-                        &private_attributes,
-                        &public_attributes,
-                        &lambda.get_commitment_hash(),
-                        &commitments_openings,
-                    )
-                    .unwrap()
-            })
-            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
-
-        let vks = keypairs
-            .into_iter()
-            .map(|keypair| keypair.verification_key().clone())
-            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
-
-        let mut attributes = Vec::with_capacity(private_attributes.len() + public_attributes.len());
-        attributes.extend_from_slice(&private_attributes);
-        attributes.extend_from_slice(&public_attributes);
-
-        let aggr_vk = aggregate_verification_keys(&vks[..2], Some(&[1, 2])).unwrap();
-        let aggr_sig = aggregate_signatures_and_verify(
-            &params,
-            &aggr_vk,
-            &attributes,
-            &sigs[..2],
-            Some(&[1, 2]),
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        let theta = prove_bandwidth_credential(
-            &params,
-            &aggr_vk,
-            &aggr_sig,
-            &serial_number,
-            &binding_number,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        assert!(verify_credential(
-            &params,
-            &aggr_vk,
-            &theta,
-            &public_attributes,
-        ));
-
-        // taking different subset of keys and credentials
-        let aggr_vk = aggregate_verification_keys(&vks[1..], Some(&[2, 3])).unwrap();
-        let aggr_sig = aggregate_signatures_and_verify(
-            &params,
-            &aggr_vk,
-            &attributes,
-            &sigs[1..],
-            Some(&[2, 3]),
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        let theta = prove_bandwidth_credential(
-            &params,
-            &aggr_vk,
-            &aggr_sig,
-            &serial_number,
-            &binding_number,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        assert!(verify_credential(
-            &params,
-            &aggr_vk,
-            &theta,
-            &public_attributes,
-        ));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn signature_bytes_roundtrip() {
-        let params = Parameters::default();
-        let r = params.random_scalar();
-        let s = params.random_scalar();
-        let signature = Signature(params.gen1() * r, params.gen1() * s);
-        let bytes = signature.to_bytes();
-
-        // also make sure it is equivalent to the internal g1 compressed bytes concatenated
-        let expected_bytes = [
-            signature.0.to_affine().to_compressed(),
-            signature.1.to_affine().to_compressed(),
-        ]
-        .concat();
-        assert_eq!(expected_bytes, bytes);
-        assert_eq!(signature, Signature::try_from(&bytes[..]).unwrap())
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn blinded_signature_bytes_roundtrip() {
-        let params = Parameters::default();
-        let r = params.random_scalar();
-        let s = params.random_scalar();
-        let blinded_sig = BlindedSignature(params.gen1() * r, params.gen1() * s);
-        let bytes = blinded_sig.to_bytes();
-
-        // also make sure it is equivalent to the internal g1 compressed bytes concatenated
-        let expected_bytes = [
-            blinded_sig.0.to_affine().to_compressed(),
-            blinded_sig.1.to_affine().to_compressed(),
-        ]
-        .concat();
-        assert_eq!(expected_bytes, bytes);
-        assert_eq!(blinded_sig, BlindedSignature::try_from(&bytes[..]).unwrap())
-    }
-}
@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2021 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-use bls12_381::{G1Affine, G2Affine, G2Prepared, Scalar};
-use ff::Field;
-use group::Curve;
-use rand::thread_rng;
-
-use crate::error::{CoconutError, Result};
-use crate::utils::hash_g1;
-
-/// System-wide parameters used for the protocol
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub struct Parameters {
-    /// Generator of the G1 group
-    g1: G1Affine,
-
-    /// Additional generators of the G1 group
-    hs: Vec<G1Affine>,
-
-    /// Generator of the G2 group
-    g2: G2Affine,
-
-    /// Precomputed G2 generator used for the miller loop
-    _g2_prepared_miller: G2Prepared,
-}
-
-impl Parameters {
-    pub fn new(num_attributes: u32) -> Result<Parameters> {
-        if num_attributes == 0 {
-            return Err(CoconutError::Setup(
-                "Tried to setup the scheme for 0 attributes".to_string(),
-            ));
-        }
-
-        let hs = (1..=num_attributes)
-            .map(|i| hash_g1(format!("h{i}")).to_affine())
-            .collect();
-
-        Ok(Parameters {
-            g1: G1Affine::generator(),
-            hs,
-            g2: G2Affine::generator(),
-            _g2_prepared_miller: G2Prepared::from(G2Affine::generator()),
-        })
-    }
-
-    pub fn gen1(&self) -> &G1Affine {
-        &self.g1
-    }
-
-    pub fn gen2(&self) -> &G2Affine {
-        &self.g2
-    }
-
-    pub(crate) fn prepared_miller_g2(&self) -> &G2Prepared {
-        &self._g2_prepared_miller
-    }
-
-    pub fn gen_hs(&self) -> &[G1Affine] {
-        &self.hs
-    }
-
-    pub fn random_scalar(&self) -> Scalar {
-        // lazily-initialized thread-local random number generator, seeded by the system
-        let mut rng = thread_rng();
-        Scalar::random(&mut rng)
-    }
-
-    pub fn n_random_scalars(&self, n: usize) -> Vec<Scalar> {
-        (0..n).map(|_| self.random_scalar()).collect()
-    }
-}
-
-pub fn setup(num_attributes: u32) -> Result<Parameters> {
-    Parameters::new(num_attributes)
-}
-
-// for ease of use in tests requiring params
-// TODO: not sure if this will have to go away when tests require some specific number of generators
-#[cfg(test)]
-impl Default for Parameters {
-    fn default() -> Self {
-        Parameters {
-            g1: G1Affine::generator(),
-            hs: Vec::new(),
-            g2: G2Affine::generator(),
-            _g2_prepared_miller: G2Prepared::from(G2Affine::generator()),
-        }
-    }
-}
@@ -1,432 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2021-2024 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-use crate::error::{CoconutError, Result};
-use crate::proofs::ProofKappaZeta;
-use crate::scheme::setup::Parameters;
-use crate::scheme::Signature;
-use crate::scheme::VerificationKey;
-use crate::traits::{Base58, Bytable};
-use crate::utils::try_deserialize_g2_projective;
-use crate::Attribute;
-use bls12_381::{multi_miller_loop, G1Affine, G2Prepared, G2Projective, Scalar};
-use core::ops::Neg;
-use group::{Curve, Group};
-
-pub use crate::scheme::double_use::BlindedSerialNumber;
-
-// TODO NAMING: this whole thing
-// Theta
-#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub struct VerifyCredentialRequest {
-    // blinded_message (kappa)
-    pub blinded_message: G2Projective,
-    // blinded serial number (zeta)
-    pub blinded_serial_number: BlindedSerialNumber,
-    // sigma
-    pub credential: Signature,
-    // pi_v
-    pub pi_v: ProofKappaZeta,
-}
-
-impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for VerifyCredentialRequest {
-    type Error = CoconutError;
-
-    fn try_from(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<VerifyCredentialRequest> {
-        if bytes.len() < 288 {
-            return Err(
-                CoconutError::Deserialization(
-                    format!("Tried to deserialize theta with insufficient number of bytes, expected >= 288, got {}", bytes.len()),
-                ));
-        }
-
-        // safety: we just checked for the length so the unwraps are fine
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        let blinded_message_bytes = bytes[..96].try_into().unwrap();
-        let blinded_message = try_deserialize_g2_projective(
-            &blinded_message_bytes,
-            CoconutError::Deserialization(
-                "failed to deserialize the blinded message (kappa)".to_string(),
-            ),
-        )?;
-
-        let blinded_serial_number_bytes = &bytes[96..192];
-        let blinded_serial_number =
-            BlindedSerialNumber::try_from_byte_slice(blinded_serial_number_bytes)?;
-
-        let credential = Signature::try_from(&bytes[192..288])?;
-
-        let pi_v = ProofKappaZeta::from_bytes(&bytes[288..])?;
-
-        Ok(VerifyCredentialRequest {
-            blinded_message,
-            blinded_serial_number,
-            credential,
-            pi_v,
-        })
-    }
-}
-
-impl VerifyCredentialRequest {
-    fn verify_proof(&self, params: &Parameters, verification_key: &VerificationKey) -> bool {
-        self.pi_v.verify(
-            params,
-            verification_key,
-            &self.blinded_message,
-            &self.blinded_serial_number,
-        )
-    }
-
-    pub fn has_blinded_serial_number(&self, blinded_serial_number_bs58: &str) -> Result<bool> {
-        let blinded_serial_number = BlindedSerialNumber::try_from_bs58(blinded_serial_number_bs58)?;
-        let ret = self.blinded_serial_number.eq(&blinded_serial_number);
-        Ok(ret)
-    }
-
-    // blinded message (kappa)  || blinded serial number (zeta) || credential || pi_v
-    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        let blinded_message_bytes = self.blinded_message.to_affine().to_compressed();
-        let blinded_serial_number_bytes = self.blinded_serial_number.to_affine().to_compressed();
-        let credential_bytes = self.credential.to_bytes();
-        let proof_bytes = self.pi_v.to_bytes();
-
-        let mut bytes = Vec::with_capacity(288 + proof_bytes.len());
-        bytes.extend_from_slice(&blinded_message_bytes);
-        bytes.extend_from_slice(&blinded_serial_number_bytes);
-        bytes.extend_from_slice(&credential_bytes);
-        bytes.extend_from_slice(&proof_bytes);
-
-        bytes
-    }
-
-    pub fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<VerifyCredentialRequest> {
-        VerifyCredentialRequest::try_from(bytes)
-    }
-
-    pub fn blinded_serial_number(&self) -> BlindedSerialNumber {
-        self.blinded_serial_number
-    }
-
-    pub fn blinded_serial_number_bs58(&self) -> String {
-        self.blinded_serial_number.to_bs58()
-    }
-}
-
-impl Bytable for VerifyCredentialRequest {
-    fn to_byte_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.to_bytes()
-    }
-
-    fn try_from_byte_slice(slice: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> {
-        VerifyCredentialRequest::try_from(slice)
-    }
-}
-
-impl Base58 for VerifyCredentialRequest {}
-
-pub fn compute_kappa(
-    params: &Parameters,
-    verification_key: &VerificationKey,
-    private_attributes: &[&Attribute],
-    blinding_factor: Scalar,
-) -> G2Projective {
-    params.gen2() * blinding_factor
-        + verification_key.alpha
-        + private_attributes
-            .iter()
-            .zip(verification_key.beta_g2.iter())
-            .map(|(&priv_attr, beta_i)| beta_i * priv_attr)
-            .sum::<G2Projective>()
-}
-
-pub fn compute_zeta(params: &Parameters, serial_number: &Attribute) -> G2Projective {
-    params.gen2() * serial_number
-}
-
-pub fn prove_bandwidth_credential(
-    params: &Parameters,
-    verification_key: &VerificationKey,
-    signature: &Signature,
-    serial_number: &Attribute,
-    binding_number: &Attribute,
-) -> Result<VerifyCredentialRequest> {
-    if verification_key.beta_g2.len() < 2 {
-        return Err(
-            CoconutError::Verification(
-                format!("Tried to prove a credential for higher than supported by the provided verification key number of attributes (max: {}, requested: 2)",
-                        verification_key.beta_g2.len()
-                )));
-    }
-
-    // Randomize the signature
-    let (signature_prime, sign_blinding_factor) = signature.randomise(params);
-
-    // blinded_message : kappa in the paper.
-    // Value kappa is needed since we want to show a signature sigma'.
-    // In order to verify sigma' we need both the verification key vk and the message m.
-    // However, we do not want to reveal m to whomever we are showing the signature.
-    // Thus, we need kappa which allows us to verify sigma'. In particular,
-    // kappa is computed on m as input, but thanks to the use or random value r,
-    // it does not reveal any information about m.
-    let private_attributes = [serial_number, binding_number];
-    let blinded_message = compute_kappa(
-        params,
-        verification_key,
-        &private_attributes,
-        sign_blinding_factor,
-    );
-
-    // zeta is a commitment to the serial number (i.e., a public value associated with the serial number)
-    let blinded_serial_number = compute_zeta(params, serial_number);
-
-    let pi_v = ProofKappaZeta::construct(
-        params,
-        verification_key,
-        serial_number,
-        binding_number,
-        &sign_blinding_factor,
-        &blinded_message,
-        &blinded_serial_number,
-    );
-
-    Ok(VerifyCredentialRequest {
-        blinded_message,
-        blinded_serial_number: blinded_serial_number.into(),
-        credential: signature_prime,
-        pi_v,
-    })
-}
-
-/// Checks whether e(P, Q) * e(-R, S) == id
-pub fn check_bilinear_pairing(p: &G1Affine, q: &G2Prepared, r: &G1Affine, s: &G2Prepared) -> bool {
-    // checking e(P, Q) * e(-R, S) == id
-    // is equivalent to checking e(P, Q) == e(R, S)
-    // but requires only a single final exponentiation rather than two of them
-    // and therefore, as seen via benchmarks.rs, is almost 50% faster
-    // (1.47ms vs 2.45ms, tested on R9 5900X)
-
-    let multi_miller = multi_miller_loop(&[(p, q), (&r.neg(), s)]);
-    multi_miller.final_exponentiation().is_identity().into()
-}
-
-pub fn check_vk_pairing(
-    params: &Parameters,
-    dkg_values: &[G2Projective],
-    vk: &VerificationKey,
-) -> bool {
-    let values_len = dkg_values.len();
-    if values_len == 0 || values_len - 1 != vk.beta_g1.len() || values_len - 1 != vk.beta_g2.len() {
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    // safety: we made an explicit check for if the length of the slice is 0, thus unwrap here is fine
-    #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-    if &vk.alpha != *dkg_values.first().as_ref().unwrap() {
-        return false;
-    }
-    let dkg_betas = &dkg_values[1..];
-    if dkg_betas
-        .iter()
-        .zip(vk.beta_g2.iter())
-        .any(|(dkg_beta, vk_beta)| dkg_beta != vk_beta)
-    {
-        return false;
-    }
-    if vk.beta_g1.iter().zip(vk.beta_g2.iter()).any(|(g1, g2)| {
-        !check_bilinear_pairing(
-            params.gen1(),
-            &G2Prepared::from(g2.to_affine()),
-            &g1.to_affine(),
-            params.prepared_miller_g2(),
-        )
-    }) {
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    true
-}
-
-pub fn verify_credential(
-    params: &Parameters,
-    verification_key: &VerificationKey,
-    theta: &VerifyCredentialRequest,
-    public_attributes: &[&Attribute],
-) -> bool {
-    if public_attributes.len() + theta.pi_v.private_attributes_len()
-        > verification_key.beta_g2.len()
-    {
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    if !theta.verify_proof(params, verification_key) {
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    let kappa = if public_attributes.is_empty() {
-        theta.blinded_message
-    } else {
-        let signed_public_attributes = public_attributes
-            .iter()
-            .zip(
-                verification_key
-                    .beta_g2
-                    .iter()
-                    .skip(theta.pi_v.private_attributes_len()),
-            )
-            .map(|(&pub_attr, beta_i)| beta_i * pub_attr)
-            .sum::<G2Projective>();
-
-        theta.blinded_message + signed_public_attributes
-    };
-
-    check_bilinear_pairing(
-        &theta.credential.0.to_affine(),
-        &G2Prepared::from(kappa.to_affine()),
-        &(theta.credential.1).to_affine(),
-        params.prepared_miller_g2(),
-    ) && !bool::from(theta.credential.0.is_identity())
-}
-
-// Used in tests only
-pub fn verify(
-    params: &Parameters,
-    verification_key: &VerificationKey,
-    public_attributes: &[&Attribute],
-    sig: &Signature,
-) -> bool {
-    let kappa = (verification_key.alpha
-        + public_attributes
-            .iter()
-            .zip(verification_key.beta_g2.iter())
-            .map(|(&m_i, b_i)| b_i * m_i)
-            .sum::<G2Projective>())
-    .to_affine();
-
-    check_bilinear_pairing(
-        &sig.0.to_affine(),
-        &G2Prepared::from(kappa),
-        &sig.1.to_affine(),
-        params.prepared_miller_g2(),
-    ) && !bool::from(sig.0.is_identity())
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use crate::scheme::issuance::sign;
-    use crate::scheme::keygen::keygen;
-    use crate::scheme::setup::setup;
-
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn vk_pairing() {
-        let params = setup(2).unwrap();
-        let keypair = keygen(&params);
-        let vk = keypair.verification_key();
-
-        let mut dkg_values = vec![vk.alpha];
-        dkg_values.append(&mut vk.beta_g2.clone());
-        assert!(check_vk_pairing(&params, &dkg_values, vk));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn theta_bytes_roundtrip() {
-        let params = setup(2).unwrap();
-
-        let keypair = keygen(&params);
-        let r = params.random_scalar();
-        let s = params.random_scalar();
-
-        let signature = Signature(params.gen1() * r, params.gen1() * s);
-        let serial_number = params.random_scalar();
-        let binding_number = params.random_scalar();
-
-        let theta = prove_bandwidth_credential(
-            &params,
-            keypair.verification_key(),
-            &signature,
-            &serial_number,
-            &binding_number,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-
-        let bytes = theta.to_bytes();
-        assert_eq!(
-            VerifyCredentialRequest::try_from(bytes.as_slice()).unwrap(),
-            theta
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn reject_forged_signature_via_linear_combination() {
-        // This test checks if the protocol correctly rejects forged signatures created
-        // by linear combinations of valid signatures. The verification for forged
-        // signatures should fail.
-        let params = Parameters::new(4).unwrap();
-
-        let scalar_2 = Scalar::one() + Scalar::one();
-        let scalar_2_inv = Scalar::invert(&scalar_2).unwrap();
-
-        //#1
-        let a = params.random_scalar();
-        let zero = Scalar::zero();
-        let a_zero = vec![&a, &zero];
-        let zero_a = vec![&zero, &a];
-
-        let validator_keypair = keygen(&params);
-
-        //#2
-        let sig_a_zero = sign(validator_keypair.secret_key(), &a_zero).unwrap();
-        let sig_zero_a = sign(validator_keypair.secret_key(), &zero_a).unwrap();
-
-        assert!(verify(
-            &params,
-            validator_keypair.verification_key(),
-            &a_zero,
-            &sig_a_zero
-        ));
-        assert!(verify(
-            &params,
-            validator_keypair.verification_key(),
-            &zero_a,
-            &sig_zero_a
-        ));
-
-        //#3
-        let h0 = sig_a_zero.0;
-        // Removed unnecessary references
-        let h1 = scalar_2_inv * sig_a_zero.1 + scalar_2_inv * sig_zero_a.1;
-        let forged_signature = Signature(h0, h1);
-        let a_half = a * scalar_2_inv;
-        let new_plaintext = vec![&a_half, &a_half];
-
-        // The forged signature should not pass verification
-        assert!(!verify(
-            &params,
-            validator_keypair.verification_key(),
-            &new_plaintext,
-            &forged_signature
-        ));
-
-        //#4
-        let scalar_3 = Scalar::one() + Scalar::one() + Scalar::one();
-        let scalar_4 = Scalar::one() + Scalar::one() + Scalar::one() + Scalar::one();
-        let scalar_4_inv = Scalar::invert(&scalar_4).unwrap();
-        let scalar_3_over_4 = scalar_3 * scalar_4_inv;
-
-        // Removed unnecessary references
-        let h1_2 = scalar_4_inv * sig_a_zero.1 + scalar_3_over_4 * sig_zero_a.1;
-        let forged_signature_2 = Signature(h0, h1_2);
-        let a_quarter = a * scalar_4_inv;
-        let a_3_over_4 = a * scalar_3_over_4;
-        let new_plaintext_2 = vec![&a_quarter, &a_3_over_4];
-
-        // The second forged signature should also not pass verification
-        assert!(!verify(
-            &params,
-            validator_keypair.verification_key(),
-            &new_plaintext_2,
-            &forged_signature_2
-        ));
-    }
-}
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2022 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-use crate::random_scalars_refs;
-use crate::tests::helpers::tests::generate_dkg_keys;
-use crate::{
-    aggregate_verification_keys, setup, tests::helpers::*, ttp_keygen, verify_credential,
-    CoconutError, VerificationKey,
-};
-
-#[test]
-fn keygen() -> Result<(), CoconutError> {
-    let params = setup(5)?;
-    let node_indices = vec![15u64, 248, 33521];
-
-    random_scalars_refs!(public_attributes, params, 2);
-
-    // generate_keys
-    let coconut_keypairs = ttp_keygen(&params, 2, 3)?;
-
-    let verification_keys: Vec<VerificationKey> = coconut_keypairs
-        .iter()
-        .map(|keypair| keypair.verification_key().clone())
-        .collect();
-
-    // aggregate verification keys
-    let verification_key = aggregate_verification_keys(&verification_keys, Some(&node_indices))?;
-
-    // Generate cryptographic material to verify them
-    let theta = theta_from_keys_and_attributes(
-        &params,
-        &coconut_keypairs,
-        &node_indices,
-        &public_attributes,
-    )?;
-
-    // Verify credentials
-    assert!(verify_credential(
-        &params,
-        &verification_key,
-        &theta,
-        &public_attributes,
-    ));
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-#[test]
-#[ignore] // expensive test
-fn dkg() -> Result<(), CoconutError> {
-    let params = setup(5)?;
-    let node_indices = vec![15u64, 248, 33521];
-
-    random_scalars_refs!(public_attributes, params, 2);
-
-    // generate_keys
-    let coconut_keypairs = generate_dkg_keys(5, &node_indices);
-
-    let verification_keys: Vec<VerificationKey> = coconut_keypairs
-        .iter()
-        .map(|keypair| keypair.verification_key().clone())
-        .collect();
-
-    // aggregate verification keys
-    let verification_key = aggregate_verification_keys(&verification_keys, Some(&node_indices))?;
-
-    // Generate cryptographic material to verify them
-    let theta = theta_from_keys_and_attributes(
-        &params,
-        &coconut_keypairs,
-        &node_indices,
-        &public_attributes,
-    )?;
-
-    // Verify credentials
-    assert!(verify_credential(
-        &params,
-        &verification_key,
-        &theta,
-        &public_attributes,
-    ));
-
-    Ok(())
-}
@@ -1,186 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2022 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-use crate::*;
-use itertools::izip;
-use std::fmt::Debug;
-
-// unwraps are fine in the test code
-#[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-pub fn theta_from_keys_and_attributes(
-    params: &Parameters,
-    coconut_keypairs: &Vec<KeyPair>,
-    indices: &[scheme::SignerIndex],
-    public_attributes: &[&PublicAttribute],
-) -> Result<VerifyCredentialRequest, CoconutError> {
-    let serial_number = params.random_scalar();
-    let binding_number = params.random_scalar();
-    let private_attributes = vec![&serial_number, &binding_number];
-
-    // generate commitment
-    let (commitments_openings, blind_sign_request) =
-        prepare_blind_sign(params, &private_attributes, public_attributes)?;
-
-    let verification_keys: Vec<VerificationKey> = coconut_keypairs
-        .iter()
-        .map(|keypair| keypair.verification_key().clone())
-        .collect();
-
-    // aggregate verification keys
-    let verification_key = aggregate_verification_keys(&verification_keys, Some(indices))?;
-
-    // generate blinded signatures
-    let mut blinded_signatures = Vec::new();
-
-    for keypair in coconut_keypairs {
-        let blinded_signature = blind_sign(
-            params,
-            keypair.secret_key(),
-            &blind_sign_request,
-            public_attributes,
-        )?;
-        blinded_signatures.push(blinded_signature)
-    }
-
-    // Unblind
-    let unblinded_signatures: Vec<(scheme::SignerIndex, Signature)> = izip!(
-        indices.iter(),
-        blinded_signatures.iter(),
-        verification_keys.iter()
-    )
-    .map(|(idx, s, vk)| {
-        (
-            *idx,
-            s.unblind_and_verify(
-                params,
-                vk,
-                &private_attributes,
-                public_attributes,
-                &blind_sign_request.get_commitment_hash(),
-                &commitments_openings,
-            )
-            .unwrap(),
-        )
-    })
-    .collect();
-
-    // Aggregate signatures
-    let signature_shares: Vec<SignatureShare> = unblinded_signatures
-        .iter()
-        .map(|(idx, signature)| SignatureShare::new(*signature, *idx))
-        .collect();
-
-    let mut attributes = Vec::with_capacity(private_attributes.len() + public_attributes.len());
-    attributes.extend_from_slice(&private_attributes);
-    attributes.extend_from_slice(public_attributes);
-
-    // Randomize credentials and generate any cryptographic material to verify them
-    let signature = aggregate_signature_shares_and_verify(
-        params,
-        &verification_key,
-        &attributes,
-        &signature_shares,
-    )?;
-
-    // Generate cryptographic material to verify them
-    let theta = prove_bandwidth_credential(
-        params,
-        &verification_key,
-        &signature,
-        &serial_number,
-        &binding_number,
-    )?;
-
-    Ok(theta)
-}
-
-// unwraps are fine in the test code
-#[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-pub fn transpose_matrix<T: Debug>(matrix: Vec<Vec<T>>) -> Vec<Vec<T>> {
-    if matrix.is_empty() {
-        return vec![];
-    }
-    let len = matrix[0].len();
-    let mut iters: Vec<_> = matrix.into_iter().map(|d| d.into_iter()).collect();
-    (0..len)
-        .map(|_| {
-            iters
-                .iter_mut()
-                .map(|it| it.next().unwrap())
-                .collect::<Vec<_>>()
-        })
-        .collect::<Vec<_>>()
-}
-
-#[macro_export]
-macro_rules! random_scalars_refs {
-    ( $x: ident, $params: expr, $n: expr ) => {
-        let _vec = $params.n_random_scalars($n);
-        #[allow(clippy::map_identity)]
-        let $x = _vec.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
-    };
-}
-
-pub use random_scalars_refs;
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-pub mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use bls12_381::Scalar;
-    use nym_dkg::{bte::decrypt_share, combine_shares, Dealing, NodeIndex};
-    use rand_chacha::rand_core::SeedableRng;
-
-    pub fn generate_dkg_secrets(node_indices: &[NodeIndex]) -> Vec<Scalar> {
-        let dummy_seed = [42u8; 32];
-        let mut rng = rand_chacha::ChaCha20Rng::from_seed(dummy_seed);
-        let params = nym_dkg::bte::setup();
-
-        // the simplest possible case
-        let threshold = 2;
-
-        let mut receivers = std::collections::BTreeMap::new();
-        let mut full_keys = Vec::new();
-        for index in node_indices {
-            let (dk, pk) = nym_dkg::bte::keygen(&params, &mut rng);
-            receivers.insert(*index, *pk.public_key());
-            full_keys.push((dk, pk))
-        }
-        let dealings = node_indices
-            .iter()
-            .map(|&dealer_index| {
-                Dealing::create(&mut rng, &params, dealer_index, threshold, &receivers, None).0
-            })
-            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
-        let mut derived_secrets = Vec::new();
-        for (i, (ref mut dk, _)) in full_keys.iter_mut().enumerate() {
-            let shares = dealings
-                .iter()
-                .map(|dealing| decrypt_share(dk, i, &dealing.ciphertexts, None).unwrap())
-                .collect();
-
-            let recovered_secret =
-                combine_shares(shares, &receivers.keys().copied().collect::<Vec<_>>()).unwrap();
-
-            derived_secrets.push(recovered_secret)
-        }
-        derived_secrets
-    }
-    pub fn generate_dkg_keys(num_attributes: u32, node_indices: &[NodeIndex]) -> Vec<KeyPair> {
-        let params = Parameters::new(num_attributes).unwrap();
-        let mut all_secrets = vec![];
-        for _ in 0..num_attributes {
-            let secrets = generate_dkg_secrets(node_indices);
-            all_secrets.push(secrets);
-        }
-        let signers = transpose_matrix(all_secrets);
-        signers
-            .into_iter()
-            .map(|mut secrets| {
-                let x = secrets.pop().unwrap();
-                let sk = SecretKey::create_from_raw(x, secrets);
-                let vk = sk.verification_key(&params);
-                KeyPair::from_keys(sk, vk)
-            })
-            .collect()
-    }
-}
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod e2e;
-pub mod helpers;
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2021-2023 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-#![warn(clippy::expect_used)]
-#![warn(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-
-use crate::CoconutError;
-use bls12_381::{G1Affine, G1Projective, Scalar};
-use group::GroupEncoding;
-
-pub trait Bytable
-where
-    Self: Sized,
-{
-    fn to_byte_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8>;
-
-    fn try_from_byte_slice(slice: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, CoconutError>;
-}
-
-pub trait Base58
-where
-    Self: Bytable,
-{
-    fn try_from_bs58<S: AsRef<str>>(x: S) -> Result<Self, CoconutError> {
-        let bs58_decoded = &bs58::decode(x.as_ref()).into_vec()?;
-        Self::try_from_byte_slice(bs58_decoded)
-    }
-    fn to_bs58(&self) -> String {
-        bs58::encode(self.to_byte_vec()).into_string()
-    }
-}
-
-impl Bytable for Scalar {
-    fn to_byte_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.to_bytes().to_vec()
-    }
-
-    fn try_from_byte_slice(slice: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, CoconutError> {
-        let received = slice.len();
-        let Ok(arr) = slice.try_into() else {
-            return Err(CoconutError::UnexpectedArrayLength {
-                typ: "Scalar".to_string(),
-                received,
-                expected: 32,
-            });
-        };
-
-        let maybe_scalar = Scalar::from_bytes(arr);
-        if maybe_scalar.is_none().into() {
-            Err(CoconutError::ScalarDeserializationFailure)
-        } else {
-            // safety: this unwrap is fine as we've just checked the element is not none
-            #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-            Ok(maybe_scalar.unwrap())
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl Base58 for Scalar {}
-
-impl Bytable for G1Projective {
-    fn to_byte_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.to_bytes().as_ref().to_vec()
-    }
-
-    fn try_from_byte_slice(slice: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, CoconutError> {
-        let received = slice.len();
-        let arr: Result<[u8; 48], _> = slice.try_into();
-        let Ok(bytes) = arr else {
-            return Err(CoconutError::UnexpectedArrayLength {
-                typ: "G1Projective".to_string(),
-                received,
-                expected: 48,
-            });
-        };
-
-        let maybe_g1 = G1Affine::from_compressed(&bytes);
-        if maybe_g1.is_none().into() {
-            Err(CoconutError::G1ProjectiveDeserializationFailure)
-        } else {
-            // safety: this unwrap is fine as we've just checked the element is not none
-            #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-            Ok(maybe_g1.unwrap().into())
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl Base58 for G1Projective {}
@@ -1,382 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2021 - Nym Technologies SA <contact@nymtech.net>
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
-
-use core::iter::Sum;
-use core::ops::Mul;
-
-use bls12_381::hash_to_curve::{ExpandMsgXmd, HashToCurve, HashToField};
-use bls12_381::{G1Affine, G1Projective, G2Affine, G2Projective, Scalar};
-use ff::Field;
-
-use crate::error::{CoconutError, Result};
-use crate::scheme::setup::Parameters;
-use crate::scheme::SignerIndex;
-
-pub struct Polynomial {
-    coefficients: Vec<Scalar>,
-}
-
-impl Polynomial {
-    // for polynomial of degree n, we generate n+1 values
-    // (for example for degree 1, like y = x + 2, we need [2,1])
-    pub fn new_random(params: &Parameters, degree: u64) -> Self {
-        Polynomial {
-            coefficients: params.n_random_scalars((degree + 1) as usize),
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Evaluates the polynomial at point x.
-    pub fn evaluate(&self, x: &Scalar) -> Scalar {
-        if self.coefficients.is_empty() {
-            Scalar::zero()
-            // if x is zero then we can ignore most of the expensive computation and
-            // just return the last term of the polynomial
-        } else if x.is_zero().into() {
-            // we checked that coefficients are not empty so unwrap here is fine
-            #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-            *self.coefficients.first().unwrap()
-        } else {
-            self.coefficients
-                .iter()
-                .enumerate()
-                // coefficient[n] * x ^ n
-                .map(|(i, coefficient)| coefficient * x.pow(&[i as u64, 0, 0, 0]))
-                .sum()
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-#[inline]
-fn generate_lagrangian_coefficients_at_origin(points: &[u64]) -> Vec<Scalar> {
-    let x = Scalar::zero();
-
-    points
-        .iter()
-        .enumerate()
-        .map(|(i, point_i)| {
-            let mut numerator = Scalar::one();
-            let mut denominator = Scalar::one();
-            let xi = Scalar::from(*point_i);
-
-            for (j, point_j) in points.iter().enumerate() {
-                if j != i {
-                    let xj = Scalar::from(*point_j);
-
-                    // numerator = (x - xs[0]) * ... * (x - xs[j]), j != i
-                    numerator *= x - xj;
-
-                    // denominator = (xs[i] - x[0]) * ... * (xs[i] - x[j]), j != i
-                    denominator *= xi - xj;
-                }
-            }
-            // numerator / denominator
-            numerator * denominator.invert().unwrap()
-        })
-        .collect()
-}
-
-/// Performs a Lagrange interpolation at the origin for a polynomial defined by `points` and `values`.
-/// It can be used for Scalars, G1 and G2 points.
-pub(crate) fn perform_lagrangian_interpolation_at_origin<T>(
-    points: &[SignerIndex],
-    values: &[T],
-) -> Result<T>
-where
-    T: Sum,
-    for<'a> &'a T: Mul<Scalar, Output = T>,
-{
-    if points.is_empty() || values.is_empty() {
-        return Err(CoconutError::Interpolation(
-            "Tried to perform lagrangian interpolation for an empty set of coordinates".to_string(),
-        ));
-    }
-
-    if points.len() != values.len() {
-        return Err(CoconutError::Interpolation(
-            "Tried to perform lagrangian interpolation for an incomplete set of coordinates"
-                .to_string(),
-        ));
-    }
-
-    let coefficients = generate_lagrangian_coefficients_at_origin(points);
-
-    Ok(coefficients
-        .into_iter()
-        .zip(values.iter())
-        .map(|(coeff, val)| val * coeff)
-        .sum())
-}
-
-// A temporary way of hashing particular message into G1.
-// Implementation idea was taken from `threshold_crypto`:
-// https://github.com/poanetwork/threshold_crypto/blob/7709462f2df487ada3bb3243060504b5881f2628/src/lib.rs#L691
-// Eventually it should get replaced by, most likely, the osswu map
-// method once ideally it's implemented inside the pairing crate.
-
-// note: I have absolutely no idea what are the correct domains for those. I just used whatever
-// was given in the test vectors of `Hashing to Elliptic Curves draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-11`
-
-// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-11#appendix-J.9.1
-const G1_HASH_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"QUUX-V01-CS02-with-BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_";
-
-// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-11#appendix-K.1
-const SCALAR_HASH_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"QUUX-V01-CS02-with-expander";
-
-pub fn hash_g1<M: AsRef<[u8]>>(msg: M) -> G1Projective {
-    <G1Projective as HashToCurve<ExpandMsgXmd<sha2::Sha256>>>::hash_to_curve(msg, G1_HASH_DOMAIN)
-}
-
-pub fn hash_to_scalar<M: AsRef<[u8]>>(msg: M) -> Scalar {
-    let mut output = vec![Scalar::zero()];
-
-    Scalar::hash_to_field::<ExpandMsgXmd<sha2::Sha256>>(
-        msg.as_ref(),
-        SCALAR_HASH_DOMAIN,
-        &mut output,
-    );
-    output[0]
-}
-
-pub fn try_deserialize_scalar_vec(
-    expected_len: u64,
-    bytes: &[u8],
-    err: CoconutError,
-) -> Result<Vec<Scalar>> {
-    if bytes.len() != expected_len as usize * 32 {
-        return Err(err);
-    }
-
-    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(expected_len as usize);
-    for i in 0..expected_len as usize {
-        // we just checked we have exactly the amount of bytes we need and thus the unwrap is fine
-        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
-        let s_bytes = bytes[i * 32..(i + 1) * 32].try_into().unwrap();
-        let s = match Into::<Option<Scalar>>::into(Scalar::from_bytes(&s_bytes)) {
-            None => return Err(err),
-            Some(scalar) => scalar,
-        };
-        out.push(s)
-    }
-
-    Ok(out)
-}
-
-pub fn try_deserialize_scalar(bytes: &[u8; 32], err: CoconutError) -> Result<Scalar> {
-    Into::<Option<Scalar>>::into(Scalar::from_bytes(bytes)).ok_or(err)
-}
-
-pub fn try_deserialize_g1_projective(bytes: &[u8; 48], err: CoconutError) -> Result<G1Projective> {
-    Into::<Option<G1Affine>>::into(G1Affine::from_compressed(bytes))
-        .ok_or(err)
-        .map(G1Projective::from)
-}
-
-pub fn try_deserialize_g2_projective(bytes: &[u8; 96], err: CoconutError) -> Result<G2Projective> {
-    Into::<Option<G2Affine>>::into(G2Affine::from_compressed(bytes))
-        .ok_or(err)
-        .map(G2Projective::from)
-}
-
-// use core::fmt;
-// #[cfg(feature = "serde")]
-// use serde::de::Visitor;
-// #[cfg(feature = "serde")]
-// use serde::{self, Deserialize, Deserializer, Serialize, Serializer};
-//
-// // #[cfg(feature = "serde")]
-// #[serde(remote = "Scalar")]
-// pub(crate) struct ScalarDef(pub Scalar);
-//
-// // #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(Serialize, Deserialize))]
-//
-// impl Serialize for ScalarDef {
-//     fn serialize<S>(&self, serializer: S) -> core::result::Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
-//     where
-//         S: Serializer,
-//     {
-//         use serde::ser::SerializeTuple;
-//         let mut tup = serializer.serialize_tuple(32)?;
-//         for byte in self.0.to_bytes().iter() {
-//             tup.serialize_element(byte)?;
-//         }
-//         tup.end()
-//     }
-// }
-//
-// impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for ScalarDef {
-//     fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> core::result::Result<Self, D::Error>
-//     where
-//         D: Deserializer<'de>,
-//     {
-//         struct ScalarVisitor;
-//
-//         impl<'de> Visitor<'de> for ScalarVisitor {
-//             type Value = ScalarDef;
-//
-//             fn expecting(&self, formatter: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
-//                 formatter.write_str("a 32-byte canonical bls12_381 scalar")
-//             }
-//
-//             fn visit_seq<A>(self, mut seq: A) -> core::result::Result<ScalarDef, A::Error>
-//             where
-//                 A: serde::de::SeqAccess<'de>,
-//             {
-//                 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
-//                 for i in 0..32 {
-//                     bytes[i] = seq
-//                         .next_element()?
-//                         .ok_or_else(|| serde::de::Error::invalid_length(i, &"expected 32 bytes"))?;
-//                 }
-//
-//                 let res = Scalar::from_bytes(&bytes);
-//                 if res.is_some().into() {
-//                     Ok(ScalarDef(res.unwrap()))
-//                 } else {
-//                     Err(serde::de::Error::custom(
-//                         &"scalar was not canonically encoded",
-//                     ))
-//                 }
-//             }
-//         }
-//
-//         deserializer.deserialize_tuple(32, ScalarVisitor)
-//     }
-// }
-//
-// #[cfg(feature = "serde")]
-// pub(crate) struct G1ProjectiveSerdeHelper(Scalar);
-//
-// #[cfg(feature = "serde")]
-// pub(crate) struct G2ProjectiveSerdeHelper(Scalar);
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use rand::RngCore;
-
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn polynomial_evaluation() {
-        // y = 42 (it should be 42 regardless of x)
-        let poly = Polynomial {
-            coefficients: vec![Scalar::from(42)],
-        };
-
-        assert_eq!(Scalar::from(42), poly.evaluate(&Scalar::from(1)));
-        assert_eq!(Scalar::from(42), poly.evaluate(&Scalar::from(0)));
-        assert_eq!(Scalar::from(42), poly.evaluate(&Scalar::from(10)));
-
-        // y = x + 10, at x = 2 (exp: 12)
-        let poly = Polynomial {
-            coefficients: vec![Scalar::from(10), Scalar::from(1)],
-        };
-
-        assert_eq!(Scalar::from(12), poly.evaluate(&Scalar::from(2)));
-
-        // y = x^4 - 5x^2 + 2x - 3, at x = 3 (exp: 39)
-        let poly = Polynomial {
-            coefficients: vec![
-                (-Scalar::from(3)),
-                Scalar::from(2),
-                (-Scalar::from(5)),
-                Scalar::zero(),
-                Scalar::from(1),
-            ],
-        };
-
-        assert_eq!(Scalar::from(39), poly.evaluate(&Scalar::from(3)));
-
-        // empty polynomial
-        let poly = Polynomial {
-            coefficients: vec![],
-        };
-
-        // should always be 0
-        assert_eq!(Scalar::from(0), poly.evaluate(&Scalar::from(1)));
-        assert_eq!(Scalar::from(0), poly.evaluate(&Scalar::from(0)));
-        assert_eq!(Scalar::from(0), poly.evaluate(&Scalar::from(10)));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn performing_lagrangian_scalar_interpolation_at_origin() {
-        // x^2 + 3
-        // x, f(x):
-        // 1, 4,
-        // 2, 7,
-        // 3, 12,
-        let points = vec![1, 2, 3];
-        let values = vec![Scalar::from(4), Scalar::from(7), Scalar::from(12)];
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            Scalar::from(3),
-            perform_lagrangian_interpolation_at_origin(&points, &values).unwrap()
-        );
-
-        // x^3 + 3x^2 - 5x + 11
-        // x, f(x):
-        // 1, 10
-        // 2, 21
-        // 3, 50
-        // 4, 103
-        let points = vec![1, 2, 3, 4];
-        let values = vec![
-            Scalar::from(10),
-            Scalar::from(21),
-            Scalar::from(50),
-            Scalar::from(103),
-        ];
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            Scalar::from(11),
-            perform_lagrangian_interpolation_at_origin(&points, &values).unwrap()
-        );
-
-        // more points than it is required
-        // x^2 + x + 10
-        // x, f(x)
-        // 1, 12
-        // 2, 16
-        // 3, 22
-        // 4, 30
-        // 5, 40
-        let points = vec![1, 2, 3, 4, 5];
-        let values = vec![
-            Scalar::from(12),
-            Scalar::from(16),
-            Scalar::from(22),
-            Scalar::from(30),
-            Scalar::from(40),
-        ];
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            Scalar::from(10),
-            perform_lagrangian_interpolation_at_origin(&points, &values).unwrap()
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn hash_g1_sanity_check() {
-        let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
-        let mut msg1 = [0u8; 1024];
-        rng.fill_bytes(&mut msg1);
-        let mut msg2 = [0u8; 1024];
-        rng.fill_bytes(&mut msg2);
-
-        assert_eq!(hash_g1(msg1), hash_g1(msg1));
-        assert_eq!(hash_g1(msg2), hash_g1(msg2));
-        assert_ne!(hash_g1(msg1), hash_g1(msg2));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn hash_scalar_sanity_check() {
-        let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
-        let mut msg1 = [0u8; 1024];
-        rng.fill_bytes(&mut msg1);
-        let mut msg2 = [0u8; 1024];
-        rng.fill_bytes(&mut msg2);
-
-        assert_eq!(hash_to_scalar(msg1), hash_to_scalar(msg1));
-        assert_eq!(hash_to_scalar(msg2), hash_to_scalar(msg2));
-        assert_ne!(hash_to_scalar(msg1), hash_to_scalar(msg2));
-    }
-}
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Jędrzej Stuczyński	a2437ebe3e	chore: remove legacy gateway key compatibility (#5531 ) * removed aes128ctr key between client and gateway * removed deprecated code and all references to the legacy aes128ctr key * clippy * post rebase fixes	2025-03-04 16:42:29 +00:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	e72103bbe6	deprecated unpaginated /issued-ticketbooks-challenge request (#5555 )	2025-03-04 16:42:08 +00:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	f7ebddf84b	chore: removed sphinx backwards compatibility (#5515 )	2025-03-04 14:59:00 +00:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	c8e825bd1e	chore: remove legacy gateway authentication (#5553 ) * remove legacy gateway authentication * fixed test code	2025-03-04 14:56:50 +00:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	8c6f84b3fe	Merge pull request #5550 from nymtech/merge/release/2025.4-dorina Merge/release/2025.4 dorina	2025-03-04 12:55:45 +00:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	27dc9c8024	Merge branch 'develop' into merge/release/2025.4-dorina	2025-03-04 11:00:24 +00:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	42d559bc69	fix prometheus metric naming test due to changes to packet version scheme	2025-03-04 10:46:12 +00:00
benedettadavico	41b9b0e5bd	update changelog	2025-03-04 10:40:08 +01:00
dependabot[bot]	6c781a0064	build(deps): bump itertools from 0.13.0 to 0.14.0 (#5509 ) Bumps [itertools](https://github.com/rust-itertools/itertools) from 0.13.0 to 0.14.0. - [Changelog](https://github.com/rust-itertools/itertools/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md) - [Commits](https://github.com/rust-itertools/itertools/compare/v0.13.0...v0.14.0) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: itertools dependency-type: direct:production update-type: version-update:semver-minor ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2025-03-04 00:37:35 +01:00
dependabot[bot]	080ec80722	build(deps): bump uuid from 1.13.2 to 1.15.1 (#5542 ) Bumps [uuid](https://github.com/uuid-rs/uuid) from 1.13.2 to 1.15.1. - [Release notes](https://github.com/uuid-rs/uuid/releases) - [Commits](https://github.com/uuid-rs/uuid/compare/v1.13.2...v1.15.1) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: uuid dependency-type: direct:production update-type: version-update:semver-minor ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2025-03-04 00:36:24 +01:00
dependabot[bot]	9c17239831	build(deps): bump flate2 from 1.0.35 to 1.1.0 (#5510 ) Bumps [flate2](https://github.com/rust-lang/flate2-rs) from 1.0.35 to 1.1.0. - [Release notes](https://github.com/rust-lang/flate2-rs/releases) - [Changelog](https://github.com/rust-lang/flate2-rs/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md) - [Commits](https://github.com/rust-lang/flate2-rs/compare/1.0.35...1.1.0) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: flate2 dependency-type: direct:production update-type: version-update:semver-minor ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2025-03-04 00:35:12 +01:00
dependabot[bot]	f6c19ec02b	build(deps): bump the patch-updates group across 1 directory with 14 updates (#5549 )	2025-03-03 20:05:21 +01:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	94ff8a79ee	feature: disallow routing mix packets to nodes not present in the topology (#5526 ) * new NymNodeTopologyProvider to also keep track of ips of all nodes * added nym-api endpoint for nodes existence by ip * change behaviour of updating allowed nodes alongside the topology * clippy * license fix * fix default filtering limit	2025-03-03 18:03:47 +00:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	155c4d37ef	feature: v2 authentication request (#5537 ) * introduced v2 authentication request between clients and gateways * client to send v2 auth when possible * added persistence to last used authentication timestamp * added clients identity to signed plaintext	2025-03-03 17:51:30 +00:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	7060fa6dad	fixed sphinx version metrics registration (#5546 )	2025-03-03 17:24:10 +00:00
Jon Häggblad	9be9c04f52	Add SURBs soft threshold (#5535 ) * Add surbs soft threshold * wip * Proactively request more SURBs than needed * fmt * cleanup * wip logging * wip * debugging * wip * Tidy * tidy * Set threshold buffer default for IPR * rustfmt * wasm fixes * debug * Tweak debug message * Set default min buffer to 0 * Tweak backlog message * Restore debug message * tweak * tweak * wasm	2025-03-03 14:06:20 +01:00
import this	2a6fe6624d	[DOCs/operators]: Advanced server setup: install KVM, virtualise machines, prep VMs for nym-node (#5493 ) * initialise KVM docs * initialise steps for KVM installation and setup * document guide to setup KVM network bridge * add new page with KVM installation * add disclaimer * add VM configuration guide * first version finalised, ready for testing and review * finish VM guide * setup guide finished * add last sentence	2025-03-03 11:49:09 +00:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	4f7124e661	Feature/chain status api (#5539 ) * nym-api endpoint to return latest block information * attached chain health to health query * fixed serde casing * one of the most nastiest work arounds in test code	2025-03-03 10:47:40 +00:00
mfahampshire	f52f07f6ec	Max/tcp proxy bin sdk readme (#5354 ) * removed old todos * add bin files to proxy * add readme to sdk * fmt	2025-03-03 07:39:17 +00:00
Fran Arbanas	b709d3ba0b	Fix/pull from harbor (#5521 ) * fix: pull from harbor instead of dockerhub * add remaining * add comments saying that these changes will only work with VPN	2025-02-28 14:01:33 +01:00
Jon Häggblad	128f69a5d6	Simplify IPR v8 (#5532 ) * Purge stuff from v8 * Adapt to v8 changes * Use protocol in ipr header * Remove commented out code * Remove unused error	2025-02-28 13:04:53 +01:00
Jon Häggblad	40dd7dc95e	Add RUSTUP_PERMIT_COPY_RENAME to ci-build (#5533 )	2025-02-28 10:55:30 +01:00
Jack Wampler	f13ce6bf2d	HickoryDnsResolver use a shared instance by default to limit fd use (#5523 )	2025-02-27 09:05:10 -07:00
Jon Häggblad	856dbfe1ac	IPR request types v8 (#5498 ) * IPR v8 request/response types * Remove signature for when we use sender tags * Remove unused * Address some review comments * Update license to GPL-3.0 for IPR Since the IPR can run as a binary, make sure it's license is GPL-3.0 * update cargo deny * Add back support for v6 * Tidy responses * Clippy * Fix compilation * Conversions * Conversions * Split response conversion * request split * Complete conversion switch * Remove commented out code * rustfmt * Remove unused conversions * Remove unused TryFrom * use from	2025-02-27 15:21:55 +01:00
Tommy Verrall	b2f6836756	Merge pull request #5465 from pedrofaustino/patch-1 Display error messages if IPv4 or IPv6 address not found on nymtun0	2025-02-27 11:11:41 +01:00
Tommy Verrall	87e429d78a	Merge pull request #5524 from nymtech/yana/memo-and-links Make "Memo" visible per default on send NYM	2025-02-27 10:32:38 +01:00
Yana	4178809555	Make "Memo" visible per default on send NYM	2025-02-26 18:53:08 +02:00
benedetta davico	e6f6e1342f	Update ns-api version	2025-02-26 12:25:46 +01:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	65175fee09	merge #5512 again after reverting due to incorrect rebase (#5520 ) * setup workspace global lints to prevent needless panics * removed sources of panic in nym-crypto, nym-node and nym-api * adjusted test code	2025-02-26 10:52:09 +00:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	69b2448500	chore: removed all old coconut code (#5500 )	2025-02-26 10:02:55 +00:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	8ba5322997	bugfix: bound check when recovering a reply SURB (#5502 )	2025-02-26 09:48:21 +00:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	2cb3817b2c	feat: add config option for maximum number of client connections (#5513 )	2025-02-26 09:48:13 +00:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	80b395cd8e	feat: use ct_eq for checking bearer token (#5501 ) (#5519 )	2025-02-26 09:48:05 +00:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	8f5457e698	feature: allow nym-nodes to understand future version of sphinx packets (#5496 ) (#5518 ) * use updated sphinx crate * updated outfox usage of keygen in tests * use x25519 in outfox * remove redundant constructor * adjusted key convertion traits	2025-02-26 09:47:57 +00:00
dynco-nym	9de5d7213a	Another total_stake SQL fix (#5516 )	2025-02-24 18:06:03 +01:00
dynco-nym	94eb362a71	Fix total_stake on SQL update (#5514 )	2025-02-24 20:50:42 +05:30
dependabot[bot]	0f615f48f2	build(deps): bump the patch-updates group with 2 updates (#5505 )	2025-02-24 13:33:20 +01:00
Bogdan-Ștefan Neacşu	d511611641	Connection fd callback before actual connection (#5494 )	2025-02-24 14:23:43 +02:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	17d3ff2d77	feat: use ct_eq for checking bearer token (#5501 )	2025-02-24 09:04:34 +00:00
dynco-nym	dd3dcfa7fe	Treat gateways as Nym Nodes (#5504 ) * Generate GW moniker if missing Beside that: - clear up gw nomenclature - adjust counting when legacy nodes are present in nym node APIs - create utils module * Store gatewy descriptions * Clippy & version	2025-02-21 20:32:39 +01:00
dynco-nym	86ea2d23cb	Update version in Cargo.toml (#5503 )	2025-02-21 16:16:44 +01:00
dynco-nym	42a37442e8	Fix stats bug & remove HM caching (#5495 ) * Fix stats bug & remove HM caching * Use variable for better clarity * Minor fixes	2025-02-21 16:05:26 +01:00
dynco-nym	6b24f081e1	Add extra args for the probe (#5499 )	2025-02-21 12:14:37 +01:00
Jędrzej Stuczyński	6e5d0dac1b	feature: allow nym-nodes to understand future version of sphinx packets (#5496 ) * use updated sphinx crate * updated outfox usage of keygen in tests * use x25519 in outfox * remove redundant constructor * adjusted key convertion traits	2025-02-21 11:06:07 +00:00
mfahampshire	5f2740bf66	add vercel config file: turn off autodeploy on master (#5490 )	2025-02-19 11:03:04 +00:00
Tommy Verrall	ecb15034d3	Merge pull request #5489 from nymtech/fix/contracts-cargo-lock fix: Cargo.lock for contracts	2025-02-19 11:41:30 +01:00
Fran Arbanas	bd49c222a3	fix: Cargo.lock for contracts	2025-02-19 09:06:34 +01:00
pedrofaustino	0d397ab5cc	Display error messages if IPv4 or IPv6 address not found on nymtun0 (issue #5461 )	2025-02-14 12:47:34 +01:00
				`@@ -1 +0,0 @@`
				`This project was partially funded through the NGI0 PET Fund, a fund established by NL.net with financial support from the European Commission's NGI programme, under the aegis of DG Communications Networks, Content and Technology under grant agreement No 825310.`